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This monograph brings together the invited 
contributions to the first of a series of seminars 
sponsored by the Development Studies Cent re , the 
Aust ralian Nat ional Univers ity . The cont ributors 
were chosen for their particular experience and 
expert ise in the field of development ass istance , 
and are drawn from academic l ife , public service , 
internat ional folllldat ion s and the pro fess ions . 
Papers in this volume range widely , but 
recurring themes include : the achievement of  
developmental obj ectives within essent ially 
polit ical mot ivated programs of aid ; adminis­
trative alternat ives for aid organizat ion in 
donor collllt ries in the context o f  polit ical 
responsib ility and bureaucratic control ; and 
choices of appropriate forms of aid . 
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Intro duction 
R. T .  Shand 
Each year the Execut ive Committee o f  the Development 
Studies Cent re ( DSC) of The Aust ral ian National University 
decides on a topic of  major significance in the field of 
development studies for a seminar series in that year . This 
monograph brings together the invited cont ribut ions to the 
first of these series , held in 19 7 7 , and organized by E . K .  
Fisk , then Execut ive Director o f  DSC .  The contributors were 
chosen for their part icular experience and expert ise in the 
field o f  internat ional development ass istance , and are drawn 
from academic life , public service , internat ional foundat ions 
and the pro fess ions . 
Papers in this volume range widely but recurring themes 
include : 
the achievement o f  developmental objectives within 
essentially polit ically mot ivated programs of aid ; 
administrat ive alternat ives for aid organization 
in donor count ries in the context of pol it ical 
responsib ility and bureaucrat ic cont rol ; 
choices of appropriate forms o f  aid . 
Miller in the open ing contribut ion ident ifies the various 
context s in which polit ics of aid operate and sees aid s imply 
as an extension o f  normal domestic polit ical pro cesses for 
donors and recipients . He downplays the importance o f  the 
economic factor in aid , partly because it is only one of 
several t rans fer processes and partly b ecause aid has wrought 
no fundamental changes for recipients . For him ,  polit ics 
remains the dominant influence in shaping decisions on 
internat ional aid . 
Silco ck ' s  paper on the Pearson Commission reviews a 
major crisis period in internat ional aid when the polit ical 
will o f  donors , especially the USA , was waverin g  in the face 
of bourgeoning need . He t races the changing pol it ical 
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con text of aid and argues that the replacement of internat ion­
alist att itudes with the modern emphas is on nat ional sover­
eignty in the Third World has greatly compl icated the 
achievement of effect ive resource t rans fer through aid . 
Arndt offers a recipient ' s  view of the aid process . He 
reviews argument s  against aid : ideological , economic , 
polit ical and emot ional , all of which , he suggest s ,  are 
admissable but not sufficient to j ust ify a pol icy of complete 
self-rel iance .  Given the need for aid , Arndt comment s on 
the pros and cons of each of the maj or categories of  develop­
ment ass istance . 
Three maj or contribut ions then consider quest ions o f  
aid administ rat ion .  First , Viviani , in a survey primarily 
of DAC colllltries , examines the various locat ions o f  polit ical 
responsib ility for , and bureaucrat ic control of aid , and then 
cons iders alternat ives . The characteris t ics o f  an aid 
program are seen to be influenced mos t  crucially by the nexus 
between aid policy formulat ion and organ ization . 
Second , Viviani and Wilenski present an Aust ralian case 
study of the i ssues whi ch had b een cons idered by Viviani 
in an internat ional context . They analyse the interactions 
of politicians and bureaucrats during the short l ife span of 
the Australian Development Ass istance Agency (ADAA) , when 
Aust ralian aid was administ ered by an autonomous statut ory 
body .  ADAA ' s history is considered in the context of five 
arguments put forward for separat ing aid administrat ion from 
its customary home in the Department o f  Foreign Af fairs . It 
llllderlines the dif ficulty of adding power and leverage to 
aid simply by upgrading it in bureaucrat ic terms . 
Ingram addresses the problem of administering aid 
effect ively , and maximiz ing its contribut ion to the economic 
and social development of developing countries . This he 
considers within the set t ing o f  Aust ralian aid ( forms , 
direct ion , s ize)  and it s constraints , and focusses principally 
on b ilateral proj ect aid for the rural secto r . 
The connnon thread o f  these three papers is the problem 
o f  comb ining developmental obj ectives with those o f  foreign 
and t rade policy . Viviani con cludes that administ rat ive 
isolat ion of the aid organizat ion from these policy areas is 
not a solution . Viviani and Wilenski ' s analysis of ADAA 
experience b ears this out . Ingram sees the aid administrator ' s  
task as being to further the process o f  socio-economic 
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development in developing count ries as effect ively as poss ible 
with an aid program that operates within certain local 
constraints . 
Two useful sectoral contribut ions are provided by Garnaut 
and Retzlaff . Garnaut draws on his experience in Papua New 
Guinea to examine how a developing country might best augment 
government revenues and thus developmental expenditures , by 
extracting rent from rat ional exploitat ion of  natural resources . 
Where foreign governments are involved in financing expend­
itures on such resource developments , Garnaut stresses the 
n eed for appropriate inst itut ional arrangements that will 
avoid distort ion of the country ' s  development pat t ern and 
maximize revenue flows to  the host government , or more 
broadly , will ensure compatib ility of  nat ional sovereignty 
in developing countries with donor interests in large scale 
ventures for resource exploitat ion . Such arrangement s ,  he 
argues , are largely lacking at present . 
Retzlaff t races the changing focus o f  aid to the rural 
sector from the 1950s to the 19 70s . He summarizes achieve­
ments and failures and discusses three key problem areas 
which he considers must be tackled if further gains are to 
be achieved : 
(a)  removal of  local t echnical constraints on food 
product ion within these countrie s  by national 
research systems , 
(b ) achievement of  a more equit able distribut ion of  
rural income , and 
(c)  buildin g  o f  an appropriate inst itutional framework 
for the rural s ector to facil itate achievement o f  
rising and equitably distributed income levels . 
Retzlaff then considers the donor ' s  role in this process 
and offers advice on appropriate patterns of support . 
Echoing Miller , Ret zlaff concludes by stressing the essent ially 
polit ical nature of bilateral assistan ce to rural development . 
The next three contributors examine specific forms of  
aid . Thi s writer ' s  own paper is designed to clarify three 
broad strategies that are variously available to developing 
count ries for development o f  the agricultural sector : 
enlargement of  the exchange economy , extension o f  the land 
front ier and increasing resource product ivity . Each is 
examined in terms of i ts cont ribut ion to achievement o f  
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policy obj ect ives , and for each , Aust ralia ' s past and 
potential contribution is reviewed . 
Jon es documents the ext raordinary growth of interest in 
and finan ce for populat ion control over the past two decades , 
but especially s ince 1965 . He stresses the influence of 
foreign aid in this field on the adopt ion o f  populat ion 
control polcies in developing countries in the 19 60s . He 
then examines the role of foreign ass istance in the new 
global context , in which developing count ries mostly accept 
the n eed for control policies , and adequate int ernat ional 
funds are available . Aid opt ions are reviewed in the l ight 
of recent experience .  Preference i s  expressed for provis ion 
of technical ass istance , part icularly in research and 
t raining , and in support ing pilot proj ect s , and suggest ions 
are o ffered for an Aust ralian role . 
Bridger is concerned with urgent problems of health in 
developing countries . The hazards to health , he argues , are 
such as to require new unconventional approaches if progress 
is to be made . The author illustrates the l inks between 
malnut rit ion and illhealth and stresses the n eed for measures 
in both areas . In food pol icy , supplies of  both protein and 
staple foods must be augmented , and food ut ilization 
technology studied . Bet ter nutrit ion , he argues , will further 
policies of populat ion control . In the field of health 
t rans fer to developing count ries , priority should be given 
to evolving medical t reatment systems that b enefit the rural 
maj orit ies , with a better balance b etween curat ive and 
prevent ive medicine . Appropriate provis ions of public health 
services , hous in g ,  water supplies and immunizat ion programs 
with both curat ive and preventive components are required to  
reduce transmission of the  maj or communicable diseases , while 
health planning is required to direct resources effect ively 
into priority purposes . Various forms of a id to the rural 
sector are shown to induce negat ive health ef fect s . Far more 
attent ion is advo cated for integration of health measures in 
rural proj ect planning . 
Final ly , Kasper examines the aid-t rade matrix of economic 
relat ions b etween donors and recipients ,  and concludes that 
the aid obj ect ives will be frustrated if it is not increasingly 
supplemented by t rade opportunit ies . Accordingly the author 
argues against protect ionism in donor countries and in 
part icular in Aust ralia in recent years . He considers the 
cos t s  and benefit s  of internat ional co-operat ion and offers 
a design for accelerated adj ustment in developed count ries. 
Chapt er 1 
The politics of internat ional aid 
J . D. B . Miller 
The politics of  int ernat ional aid result s from the 
fundamental problem of s carcity , which lies at the root of 
political effort j ust as it is at the root of  economic 
effort . Politics manifests  it s elf in four context s : that 
of the individual stat e  deciding how much of it s revenue and 
resources to devote to aid , and in what manner ; that of the 
recip ient country , deciding how to distribut e  scarce aid 
among the many claims and needs which might be served ; that 
of the mult ilat eral agency for whose funds many countries 
compet e ;  and that of the maj or and middle powers compet ing 
with one another for influence derived from aid programs which 
are never big enough to meet demand . These four context s 
will b e  discussed in this paper . Firs t , however ,  it is 
desirable to  emphas ize the relat ionship between s carcity and 
polit ics . 
Wherever there is s carcity of money , resources , j obs or 
opportmlity ,  t here is the sort of compet it ion which we call 
polit ics . Compet ition occurs , in formal and in formal ways , 
to  secure the favourable use of what ever inst itut ions are 
available to provide rewards or retain exist ing posit ions . 
Polit ics is about the use of governmen..t , in one form or 
another, to  help or not hinder the aims and circumstances 
of part icular individuals or groups . The at tempt to get 
government on one ' s side ,  or to control government altogether , 
arises largely from those phenomena which we variously call 
scar city , diversity and inequality . If  men were all the 
s ame ,  and all had what they wanted, there would be no 
polit ics . As things are , however , there is no sign that 
polit ics will ever stop (Miller 1962 : Chs 1-2 ) . 
Economic inequality , the result o f  different ial gains 
from b asic scarcity , is probab ly the most powerful spur t o  
polit ical act ion , whether in a local , nat ional o r  int er­
nat ional context . It is not the only spur , and at t imes 
1 
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others may be more immediate and prove more powerful . 
Moreover , economic inequality does not automatically lead 
to polit ical action : men are not always aware of their 
inferior status , and , when they are , they do not always draw 
the conclus ion that they should use governments to  get what 
they might have . ' False cons ciousness '  ( a  fashionable Marxist 
term which I use with caut ion and only in invert ed commas ) 
is often present : in a sense , men often do not know what 
politically-minded people think they ought to want . In the 
main , however , t hese situat ions occur in circumstances 
somewhat distant from government . The levers of power are 
not immediately apparent , or , if  they are , they cannot be 
got at . In situat ions of int ernat ional aid which are 
essent ially governmental , everyone is likely to be familiar 
with the levers of power (whether able to get at them 
immediately or not ) , and to f ind it natural to t ry to use 
them. So  aid is bas ically a polit ical quest ion in two 
respect s : it occurs in s ituat ions of known s carcity , in 
which the need for compet ition for available f\lllds is 
constantly apparent ; and it occurs in a context in which 
government s are both the arenas and the principal actors . 
Polit ics as an act ivity is capable of being carried on 
in a variety of ways , formal and informal , and individual 
and concert ed . It can be a mat ter of long-term planning 
(never altogether successful , but involving quest ions of t ime 
whi ch extend and modify political results )  or o f  immediat e 
ad hoe decision .  It is thus flexible in method and in aim.  
As a flexible act ivity it necessarily involves f lexible 
concepts .  I can think of no t erm used in polit ical study 
which cannot be st ret ched t o  cover a variety o f  s ituat ions : 
they are all like ' capit al ' in economics . 
We can , however , use certain t erms in a fairly constant 
way , so long as we remain aware o f  their potent ially protean 
character . The one which I have fo\llld most useful in 
polit ical study is ' int erest ' .  Interests are the driving 
force of polit ics . ! They are those groups of people , 
organized or unorganized , clearly defined or lacking art ic­
ulat ion , which have common concerns and wish to see these 
put into effect through governmental means . Where I can 
locate an interest (which can also be defined , confusingly , 
1To say this is not to deny the import an ce of individuals , 
even in the mos t  concerted aspects of  polit ics . I have 
given due weight to individual polit ical effo rt , I hope , in 
Miller 1962 : Ch . 6 ,  and Miller 1976 .  
3 
as a number of people with the same interests) ,  I am 
prepared to find polit ical consequences , in the shape o f  some 
att empt to change , reinforce or prevent some aspect of public 
policy . We see this clearly in the case of such people as 
farmers and trade unionis t s  (whom we often call ' interest 
groups ' ) ,  but somewhat less clearly in the case of those with 
less organizat ion . Yet there may even be latent int erests 
which become actual when some act of  public policy brings 
their common concerns to the surface . Stat es themselves 
constitut e  interest s ,  although we should beware of their 
constant iteration of their ' nat ional ' interests : these may 
in fact b e  simply the expression of  special interest s  as 
represented by part icular polit icians or the bureaucracy , or 
dominant sections o f  society , or part icular industries , or 
given regions or areas . Indeed, one can view the compet it ion 
amongst domest ic interests  to grab the flag of ' nat ional 
int erest ' ,  and hold it high on their own behalf against 
foreigners , as on e of the most familiar aspects of foreign 
policy . 
It should now be apparent that in each of the context s 
listed in the introductory paragraph, I expect polit ics to 
emerge because there will be compet it ion for the resources 
provided by government s .  Thi s  competit ion is not necessarily 
ignoble . In politics people normally seek resources for 
what they have decided are good causes . Polit ics would be 
much less attractive if it did not involve the thought of  a 
good j ob well done , or o f  a proper end properly achieved .  
Much o f  the intensity o f  polit ics derives from such feelings . 
Internat ional aid provides many examples of them. 
We may now consider each of the four context s ,  and then 
draw some conclusions about the polit ics of aid in general . 
Polit ics o f  aid within individual stat es 
There is no need to demonstrate in det ail that there is 
a special politics of aid within donor count ries like the 
United Stat es , Britain ,  Canada,  Sweden and Australia . The 
typical s ituat ion in the parliamentary democracies is that 
aid programs are supported by foreign offices and defence 
departments (because of the influence which it is hoped they 
will provide) , by t rade and agriculture departments (because 
it is hoped that aid will b e  used to buy local goods and in 
the long run stimulate demand for these on a commercial 
basis ) , by humanitarian and church groups (because they wish 
to improve the lot of their fellow men) , and by those othe r ,  
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more d irectly polit ical , interest groups which are concerned 
to right some of the wrongs of the imperialist era . 
Opposition comes from domestic spending departments (which 
want the money for the ir own constituents ) , from t reasuries 
and other agencies concerned either to limit government 
expenditure or to prune inefficiency , from nat ionalist-minded 
pressure groups , and from left-inclined persons who regard 
foreign aid as neo-imperialism. When government revenues 
and expenditures are booming,  there may be relat ively lit t le 
debate ; when the opposite is the case , then the foreign 
off  ices and the humanitarians may have to fight hard to 
sustain a previous year ' s  level of aid . 2 
Within the aid program itself , there will be polit ics 
about the balance between defence and economic aid , about 
which recipients should get mos t  aid , about the weight to be 
given to the wishes of recipient cotmtries ' governments , 
about the extent to which local interest s  ( e . g .  farmers and 
manufacturers ) should be allowed to  det ermine the form of 
the aid in part icular cases , and about issues like the 
balance between proj ect aid and technical assistance . 
The politics within the donor country , whether it is 
the l arger politics o f  the allocat ion o f  funds to aid as 
against other governmental act ivities , or whether it is 
confined t o  t he agencies which specialize in aid programs , 
is natural and in a sense proper , although it may b e  
repugnant t o  tho se people who think of  aid a s  all-important , 
and who resen t  other claims on the budget . It is natural 
because each of the interests involved has a well-articulated 
view arising from it s posit ion in relat ion to the govern­
mental machine , and regards this view as correct . Self­
int erest is directly involved ,  whether blatantly or covertly , 
but it is self-interest absorbed in a caus e .  In any case 
the polit ical syst em is normally accustomed to incorporat ing 
and moderat ing divergent interes t s : it would be unnatural 
if they all suddenly agreed with one another .  ( Such 
' tmnatural ' behaviour does somet imes occur in the face of 
nat ional catastrophe such as war ; but what happens then is 
that the new s ituat ion produces its own interest s , and 
' natural ' behaviour resumes in a different cont ext. It is 
the tmarticulated hope of many humanitarians that the 
2As might be expected , the domestic polit ics of foreign aid 
has b een most clearly documented in the United States . 
Two good books are O ' Leary 196 7  and Montgomery 1962 . 
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parliamentary democracies will wake up one morning to find 
everyone suddenly agreed that aid h as become the most urgent 
nat ional need , t rans cending all others . The effect would 
be essent ially that o f  a catastrophe . )  
The propriety of  such domestic politics is harder to 
establish . Whether one regards it as proper or not will 
depend upon one ' s view of monism and pluralism as social 
obj ectives . A monist believes , implicit ly or explicitly , 
that society should display miity in import ant things , and 
that the weight o f  social effort should be directed towards 
this end .  He will deplore the proliferat ion of int erests , 
and call for their amalgamat ion in a miited urge in a 
part icular direct ion ,  whether to  the right or the left . A 
pluralist will accept the inevit ability of  the proliferat ion 
of interests in a free society , and be mainly concerned that 
they should have free play . (The comparision is like that 
between monopoly and compet it ion as ends in economic act ivity . )  
I am a pluralist . 
Monis t s  and pluralists must both take accomit of  
divergent interests  in s ituat ions over which they do  not 
have ab solut e  control - that is , one must recognize plurality 
for t he purposes of  political analysis , even if  one does not 
approve . The variety of  interest s  displayed within the 
context of a donor comitry ' s  aid politics , already described , 
is a guide t o  the sort o f  analysis we should attempt when 
assessing the polit ics of  aid in this or any other cont ext . 
We should ask such quest ions as these : 
(a)  Which interes t s  are discernib le both insid e and 
outside the machinery o f  stat e ,  and how w ell are 
they organized, (that is , who is likely to want to 
be heard and be able to affect decisions ) ?  
(b ) How st rongly will they press their case ( that is , 
are they interest s which will press hard on public 
opinion , polit icians and of ficial s ; if  of ficials , 
do they regard their lines of policy as vital) ? 
( c )  What means can they use to get their way ( that is , 
if out s ide government , can they use the media , 
church groups , polit ical part ies , et c . ; if  ins ide , 
do they have access to ministers , caucuses , cab inet 
committees and the like) ? 
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( d) How is the state machinery likely to  reconcile 
them so that a policy eventually emerges ( that is , 
what are the means by which compromises and 
decisions are hammered out - interdepartmental 
committees , cab inet , prime ministerial decree , et c . ) ?  
(e)  What maj or polit ical impulses are likely to guide 
the general direct ion of policy ( for example , in 
US aid policy , to what extent is anti-Communism 
likely to  be moderated by the needs of det ente ; 
in French policy , how are obligations to  former 
colonies to be reconciled with obligat ions to 
partners in the European Economic Community) ? 
Questions like these are readily applicable to  the aid 
policies of parliament ary democracies ; even though we may 
not have all the fact s at our finger-t ips , we can see that 
these are the quest ions that ought to be asked if  we are to  
make sense of an aid program. It is less obvious that similar 
quest ions ought to be asked about the aid policies of author­
it arian countries such as the Soviet Union , China and Saudi 
Arabia.  We have become accustomed to a deafening row from 
contending int erests when the US decides it s aid policy , 
and a deafening s ilence when the Russ ians and Chines e  decide 
theirs . Yet it would be naive to assume that this difference 
in noise-level represents a t ot al difference of charact er .  
Monist though the authoritarian regimes claim t o  b e ,  they 
are subj ect , like others , to the pressures o f  scarcity . 
Their budget s represent decisions about priorit ies which must 
have been argued over at length : there is no form of 
divinat ion which can decide immediately how much will be 
allotted to foreign aid as against wheat or s teel product ion , 
or whether S omalia should get more than Ethiopia . The 
di fference from the democracies lies in the absence of public 
polit i cs - of that appeal to public and governmental opinion 
which is so  characterist ic of the Unit ed States , though 
somewhat less so o f  count ries like Aus tralia.  Within the 
machinery of stat e  (which includes the Communist Party) , 
however ,  much the same sort o f  process goes on , and could be 
elucidated by much the same quest ions - though the answers 
are so much harder to obt ain . 
It is thus possible to const ruct a framework for analysis 
o f  the polit ics o f  a donor country ' s  aid program, even though 
it mus t be a flexible one . Is the same .t rue of a recipient 
count ry ' s  politi cs ?  
Politics of aid in recipient count ries 
It must be borne in mind that many of the collllt ries 
receiving aid are small and are relat ively s imple in their 
polit ics compared to the donor countries . 3 This is less 
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true o f  large states with highly developed polit ical systems , 
like India and some of the Lat in American countries , than 
of many in Africa and the Pacific . Tonga , for example , has 
a s impler polity than the United States : if one has any 
access at all to  the state machine , it is relatively easy 
to work out who gets what , together with when , how and why . 
In a small , relat ively b ackward count ry like Nepal or 
Botswana , the degree of organiz at ion of interest s  outside 
the machinery of state is slight , and the range of interest s  
within that machinery i s  necessarily limited . In many 
recipient countries there is a concentrat ion of ult imat e 
power in the hands of an individual , his family and his 
immediate entourage ; this means that the analys is to be 
applied is that of t radit ional ' court polit ics ' ,  which would 
have been equally llllderstood in the Florence of Machiavelli 
and the Paris of  Louis XIV as in present-day Kampala or 
Nairobi .  
Given such local limitat ions , i t  is important to 
recogn iz e  also  that economic aid is as polit ical for a 
recipient country as for a donor .  What is the immediate 
impact of aid upon a recipient country ?  It is to make 
someone , or some social group , or some area , b et ter off than 
before . When an internat ional trans fer o f  resources takes 
place , it is reflect ed in greater welfare in some part of 
the recipient country , even if this is confined to better 
t echnical t raining for a few people , higher pro ceeds from 
rented houses for some landlords , and j ob s  for more officials . 
We do not have t o  postulate any last ing or significant 
improvement in general st andards ( indeed , we should be very 
foolish to do so)  in o rder to recognize that some people 
gain from internat ional aid . This is the aspect most 
obvious to those in the recipient collllt ry .  They would be 
less than human if they did not want t o  participate in the 
process .  Western observers are often shocked by the 
' corrupt ion ' revealed when the procedures of aid distribut ion 
are exposed;  the matter looks different within the polit ical 
structures of underdeveloped count ries , where con crete gains 
fo r individuals and families are readily appreciated , while 
3 For a comprehensive accollllt of the interest s  likely to be 
found in recipient collll.tries , see Esman 19 66 . 
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the ab stract goals of ' development ' , which s eem natural to 
many western theorist s , have little or no mean ing . While we 
can reasonably expect to see that goals o f  western policy­
makers reflected in certain parts of the governmental 
machinery of recipient count ries ( for example , by military 
men and western-t rained economists , in their different ways , 
in Indonesia) , other parts of  the machinery will be quite 
indi fferent to these goals , and will view the bus iness of 
receiving aid as largely a matter of pecuniary opportunity . 
Some o f  the questions we might ask o f  the polit ics of  a 
recipient count ry are : 
(a)  Which groups and individuals part icipate in 
negot iat ions with pot ential donors ? 
(b ) Which parts of  the polit ical and governmental 
machines are involved ? 
( c) What are the associat ions , within the recipient 
community , of  the groups under (a) and (b ) ? Is 
some direct benefit likely2 
( d) What countervailing pressures exist within the 
recipient community , and can they be felt at the 
seat of  power ? 
( e) Who is in ult imate control of aid negot iat ions and 
the distribut ion of the proceeds ? Are there b rokers 
who operat e on behalf of the ult imat e cont rollers ? 
These quest ions are designed to elucidat e the process 
by which aid proposals are put forward and their proceeds 
distributed . Just as no one would believe that donor 
count ries ' policies are decided solely in terms of specialist 
economists ' assessments o f  what is  most likely to lessen 
poverty and stimulate economic growth in poor countr ies , so 
in the poor countr ies it would be foolish to assume that a 
s imilar sense dictat es either the planning or the execut ion 
of an aid program. Such ideas are always present in some 
degree at both ends of the aid t ransact ion . They are , 
however , not the only ideas present , and the people holding 
them are not the only ones who count at either end .  The 
people whose 'ident ity might be dis covered by asking the 
questions j ust posed could be either idealists or self-seekers , 
or something o f  both . What is more import ant than making 
moral j udgment s about them is deciding how they operat e , and 
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what sort of  sys tem exists , either implicitly or explicitly , 
to enable them to do what they do . 
The political framework for mult ilat eral aid 
The third context in which we can dis cern the polit ics 
of  internat ional aid is that o f  the mult ilat eral agency , which 
may be universal , as in the case of the United Nat ions , or 
may consist of  a relat ively small number o f  donors , as  does 
the European Economic Community ( EEC) . One would expect to find 
differences of  polit ical atmosphere between agencies of  which 
both donors and recipients are members , and those cons ist ing 
only of donors . 4 In the former case there is the likelihood 
of the recipients forming a coalit ion on the one hand and 
donors on the other ( as has happened in the Unit ed Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development , though here the issues 
go well beyond aid in the accepted sense) , with ample 
opportunity for recipients ' propaganda to be exert ed within 
the donor community . Such an adversary s ituat ion means , in 
essence , confrontat ion over the more emot ional issues , and a 
degree o f  compromise over those in which vit al interests of 
the donor count ries are involved ( for example , shipping costs ,  
res cheduling of deb t s , stockpiling o f  commodit ies ) . 
The latter case ( that of  OECD ' s Development Assistance 
Committee ( DAC) , and of some of the bodies involved in the 
EEC ' s  aid mechanism) is politically the more interesting , 
though less can b e  found out about it , on account of the 
confident ial nature of the discus sions and the lack o f  
part icipant s whose int erest might l i e  in continually leaking 
details to the pres s . It s eems likely , however ,  that the 
polit ics of these bodies involves keeping as much of a united 
front as possible , while leaving s cope for some memb ers to 
exert pressure on others . In respect of  the DAC , for example , 
it is widely believed that the USA and the Western European 
countries have put pressure on Japan to increas e aid and t o  
make i t  look more humanit arian and les s bus inesslike in 
character . In the EEC ' s  aid structures it is fairly clear 
that ex-French dependencies got the lion ' s share of aid , and 
that those which are closest to France in policy get the most 
of  the lion ' s  share , b ecause of France ' s  ef fect ive dominance 
of EEC pro cesses (Jones 19 7 3) . 
4For good analyses of the polit ics of  several UN agencies 
concerned with aid of one form or another , see Cox and 
Jacob son 19 7 3 .  There i s  a not very satis facto ry account o f  
the DAC in Rubin 1966 . 
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In all analyses of  the politics of  internat ional aid , 
especially those involving direct allocat ion (whether by 
individual donor count ries or by mult ilateral bodie s ) , 
att ention must b e  paid to t he influence of pro fess ionals , 
that is of  those whose lives are wholly spent in negot iat ion , 
calculat ion , disbursement , oversight and execution of aid 
proj ect s and programs . 5 Like diplomat s and soldiers , these 
people have much in common in their experience , lifestyle 
and obj ectives , whatever country they come from. Indeed , 
they may be come so abso rb ed in the techniques which they are 
operat ing as not to seem very nat ional at all . 6 At the same 
t ime , again like diplomats and s oldiers , they are normally 
bound to a broad sense of the ir count ries ' national int erests . 
They do not become ' int ernat ionalist ' , in the sense of moving 
away from nat ional int erest t o  a concept o f  what is good for 
the world at large , unless they b ecome permanent ly associat ed 
with bodies such as the United Nat ions , the Int ernat ional 
Labour Office or the World Bank - though even here they will 
still be subj ect to accusat ions that they are serving the 
interests o f  their countr ies . Whether they work in a 
b ilat eral or a multilateral context , however , their con cerns 
will be practical in character ( that is , related to  aid 
poss ib ilities) though self-support ing in the long run (so 
that they are in favour o f  aid in the same way as professors 
are in favour of educat ion : it is their universe and their 
l ivelihood) . 
In essence , the polit i cs o f  multilateral aid reflect s 
world politics at l arge . The associat ions and alliances of 
world polit ics reproduce themselves to a large extent at the 
multilat eral aid level , though t here are at least two modi­
ficat ions which arise from the special conditions of multi­
lat eralism :  
5 
( a) S in ce it is an understood condition o f  multilat eral 
aid that there mus t  be s omething for everyone , and 
Unfortunately , as in other aspects o f  aid polit ics , nearly 
all the study has been done in the United States and confined 
to US experience . There is a useful pict ure of aid personnel 
in Benvenis te and Ilchman 19 6 9 . In this regard as in others 
it would be unwise to ignore the host ile account of foreign 
aid processes in such books as Weissman 19 74 , in spite of 
their obviously part isan nature . 
6cf . Marshall Goldman ' s  observat ions about his recept ion when 
visit ing both Soviet and US aid proj ects ( Goldman 1 9 6 7 : x-xi) . 
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since int ernat ionalist pro fess ionals are likely to 
have a great er say in the dist ribut ion of aid than 
in a nat ional program, there are great er prospect s 
of concent rat ion on need ; 
(b)  S ince mult ilat eral aid is decided by a form of 
consensus and is not t ied to the same degree of 
bilat eral aid , it is less suscept ible to direct 
pressure from donors . This is presumab ly the main 
reason why maj or donors have regarded mult ilat eral 
aid as largely window-dres sing , and have allott ed 
comparat ively small sums to it . 7 
Donors ' competit ion for influence 
We need not spend much t ime on the fourth context of 
internat ional aid ,  that of compet it ion b etween the maj or 
powers for in fluence . It is too obvious to require explan­
at ion . The United S tat es , the Soviet Union and China provide 
much aid as direct compet it ion ( the associates of the first 
two somet imes doing the wo rk for them,  but essent ially in the 
context of comp et it ion) , and view aid to a large extent as 
a means of either pre-empt ing in fluence within a given count ry , 
or preventing monopoly influence on the part of one of  the 
others . One of the most pot ent argument s  of those urging a 
cont inuance of US aid is that the Rus sfans will move in if 
US aid ceases , and presumably the same things are said in 
Mos cow and Pekin g .  The sophisticat ed answer that this may 
be no bad thing , and that the Russ ians (or  the Americans , or 
the Chinese)  will find themselves in more t rouble than they 
can cope wit h ,  has only recently begun to gain ground , 
especially in respect of  the Indian sub-cont inent . Compet ition 
of the knee-j erk variety has been customary for a long t ime . 
There is much to  be argued about whether ' influence ' is 
ever gained in proport ion to  the aid given . On the general 
plane , it can b e  suggested that a great power cannot count 
on the sub servience o f  a smaller power unles s ( i) it can 
effect ively threaten invasion and subj ugat ion in the event 
of disobedience , or ( ii)  the smaller power ' s  economy is so 
heavily dependent on the greater power ' s  that economic threat 
( for example , of the suspens ion of aid) can bring immediat e 
acquies cence . The Soviet Union has been able to operat e 
under ( i) in respect o f  some East European stat es , as has 
7 Not only maj or donors . Aust ralia is a case in point . 
12 
the USA in the Caribbean and Central America , but neither 
appears to have been notably success ful with ( ii) ,·which the 
Soviet Union t ried in respect of China and Yugoslavia , and 
which the USA has attempted from t ime to  t ime with various 
Lat in American count ries . So far as the threat of withdrawal 
of aid is concerned , one would need to consider a good many 
cases b efore deciding how effect ive the threat can be . My 
guess is that it i s  somet imes effect ive in small mat t ers , 
rarely in large . 
In any event , the purpose o f  competit ive aid is usually 
negat ive rather than positive ,  to the extent that it is 
des i gned to nullify someone else ' s  influence , not to make 
one ' s  own tot ally dominant . Clearly there are cases in which 
a recipient country has b een regarded as strategically or 
symbolically so s ignificant that not only had the adversary 
to be excluded but also the recipient made sub servient : US 
aid to South Vietnam, Cambodia and South Korea was at t imes 
o f  this o rder . Mo re often , however , the s it uat ion has been 
less dire , and the maj or powers have cheerfully co-existed 
as aid donors , con fident that neither was exert ing exclus ive 
influence . Afghanistan is a case in point. Perhaps (who 
knows ? )  some of the Pacific islands will achieve this happy 
condition . 
What is of maj or importance , however , is the extent to 
which aid by the great powers has become a matter o f  short­
t erm polit ical influence , rather than of the longer-term 
polit ical aims which the two super-powers once had . 
Simplifying out rageously , one can say that 2 5  or 30 years 
ago , at the beginnings of US and Soviet aid to Third World 
count ries , each power had a b ro ad sense of what aid was 
supposed to do . US policy , mistakenly using the analogy o f  
success ful aid in Western Europe , looked to  rapid economic 
growth as a result o f  aid , with ent erprise spreading widely , 
and a consequent bourgeoisificat ion of the polit ics of  states 
emerging from colonialism. Liberal polit ics was to flow 
from economic growth and liberal economics . 8 In contras t , 
Soviet theory (a  misreading of Lenin ? )  was that newly 
independent states were already under bourgeois control , and 
that rapid indust rial development was needed in order to 
prolet arianize a working class capable of responding to 
Communist leadership . (Both were chary of theoriz ing about 
8A valuab le account of the connect ion between American 
do ct rines on aid and polit ical development is given by 
Packenham 19 73. 
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the rural masses . )  Common to both was the view that massive 
t rans fers of resources would produce accept ab le polit ical 
result s through fundamental economic change . 
Nowadays these visions have largely disappeared . Hardly 
anyone believes that the t ransfer of resources to any country 
will be suf ficient to make fundamental changes in its economy 
or its society . Aid has proved to be too predict able in it s 
effect s , and to  b e  far too expensive . The result has been 
to shrink the great powers ' concept ions of aid to something 
closer to what they should probably have always been in 
realistic t erms . Out of the experience of how little aid 
can affect a basic economy has arisen the conviction that 
aid need not be mass ive but must be strategically directed 
to the groups , movements and areas , and at t imes the 
individuals , most likely to be sympathet ic to the great power 
in quest ion , and to see that it s int erests are not harmed . 
This is an int ensely politi cal view o f  aid , with which 
economists  may well st ruggle in vain . It is , however ,  now 
connnonplace in disputed areas in Africa , As ia and the Middle 
East , and may well b ecome so in the Pacific . 
Conclusions 
The first conclusion is that the polit ics o f  int ernat ional 
aid , in spit e of it s exotic connect ions , is not basically 
different from other forms of polit ics . Within a donor 
country , the pro cesses of  struggle for port ions of the budget 
or the nat ional income are not not iceably different from 
those of other calls on the nat ion ' s  purse . Within a 
recipient country , the st ruggle for funds from abroad is much 
the same as that for funds derived from domestic sources . 
Whether economists or polit icians take the init iat ives , the 
processes are much the same in these two cases . S imilarly , 
in int ernat ional relat ions aid is simply one amongst many 
means of furthering one country ' s  cause with another or a 
number o f  others . 
The second is that we cannot realistically regard aid 
as primarily an economic quest ion . It can , of course , be 
t reated as such in the abst ract ( in the sense that there can 
be speculation about what would be the economic result if 
aid to a part icular count ry were of this or that character 
over given periods of  t ime) ; but in practice aid is only 
one of a number of t rans fers of resources between countries , 
and is o ft en dwarfed by others . It is , however , the most 
direct ly polit ical of the t rans fers , because ,  unlike those 
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involved in trade and investment , it  is made from government 
to government , and is subj ect to all the pressures of int er­
governmental connect ions . In realist ic terms it is best 
seen , like war , as an ext ens ion of polit ics through other 
means . 
Thirdly , this point has b een height ened in recent years 
by the tacit recognit ion that aid will not perform the 
economic and so cial miracles which were once expect ed of it . 
Donors will not spend enough to make maj or changes in the 
economies of recipients . The es calat ing expectat ions of the 
common man in the donor count ries comb ine with the 
disappo inting result s in recipient count ries to produce both 
reluct ance and s cept icism in donor governments .  Aid has 
stab ilized as a minor aspect of internat ional economics , 
enlivened now and then by minor polit ical crises . 
Fourthly , at the same t ime as aid has stab iliz ed as 
more or less a constant in the budget s of both donor and 
recipient count ries , it has emerged as an established 
instit ut ion or vested interest in its own right , having it s 
own pro fessionals who bulk large in the domest ic discussions 
which ultimat ely shape aid programs . Aid has become , in a 
sense , both middle-aged and respectable ; stab ility suit s it . 
Fifthly , aid has become , through the circumstances 
j ust des cribed , a matter of  propaganda and influence rather 
than of economic change . Instead of  the profess ionals b eing 
involved in large-scale planning for significant increases 
in nat ional income , they are more likely to be working on 
relat ively small-s cale proj ects which are concret e and have 
immediat e value in terms o f  influence and propaganda . This 
is economically sensib le in many cases , s ince for recipient 
countries maj or economic achievements are out of reach , and 
only small-s cale operat ions can be effect ively mounted.  
But it  also  encourages the sense of  short-term polit ical 
gain at both ends of the donor-recipient connect ion . 
If these conclusions are correct , what then remains 
for the two archetypal figures who have at tract ed so much 
of the limelight in western countries in respect of aid -
the humanitarian and the economist ? Somet imes they have had 
different approaches , but they have been basically unit ed 
against those polit icians , military men and officials to  
whom the purpose of  aid has b een essentially inst rumental . 
Humanitarians have wanted people in the poor countries to 
get more food , clothes , shelt er , health and educat ion , 
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through sacrifice on the part of the rich . Economis t s  have 
wanted poor countries to increase their consumpt ion of  these 
things through improvement of the bases of their economies , 
this improvement to be assisted by effect ive foreign aid . 
In both cases the aim has been only tenuously connect ed with 
the political obj ect ives of the donor countries , as formulated 
by the polit icians , soldiers and officials . Yet those 
pol it ical obj ectives have been the ones most ardently pursued . 
Presumably there is st ill scope for the humanitarian 
and the economist in modifying programs which are bas ically 
political in aim. The humanitarian can induce some sense 
of  necessary sacrifice , and the economis t  some awareness of 
likely economic effect s .  S ince they are natural candidates 
for posit ions as pro fess ionals , their influence in these 
direct ions may often be cons iderable . Each is to be seen , 
however ,  as operating in what is basically an inhospitable 
environment .  Polit ics will out . 
Chapter 2 
The Pearson Commission and after : 
nat ional states and world community 
T . H . S ilco ck 
This chapter has been prepared mainly from a review of  
notes and documents collected or written while the author 
was a member of the s t aff of the Pearson Commission on 
Internat ional Development , 1968-69 . It begins by an 
appreciat ion of the work of  the Pearson Commission under 
three heads : the type o f  motive to which it appealed , the 
type of act ion it suggest ed ,  and the effects on inst itut ional 
st ructure that it envisaged . The rest of  the survey considers 
two other topics , each b roadly tmder the divis ions of mot ive , 
action and institutions : first , the changes that have 
occurred in the at t itudes to aid and development , and next 
the present prob lems of development in a world community , 
with specific implicat ions for Australia . 
The set t ing-up o f  the Pearson Commission was , in a way , 
a political act , and its Report ( Pearson 196 9 )  a polit ical 
do cument . George Woods , and later Robert McNamara , Pres idents 
o f  the World Bank , realized - as was indeed well known among 
those interested in aid - that more independent countries had 
recently come into being , with a strong desire for development , 
l ittle skill in achieving it , and a convict ion that the terms 
on which aid was given should be improved (Pearson 1969 : vii 
and Byres 19 7J : introduct ion ) . At the same t ime the aid­
donors , and particularly the USA, were becoming disillusioned 
about the effect iveness of aid , which was given for often 
incompat ible obj ect ives by many dif ferent countries . The 
composit ion of the Commission was clearly des igned to achieve 
two related obj ect ives : to increase the willingness of 
develop�d count ries to  go on giving aid and to eliminate 
tmdesirable aid practices by showing where and how aid could 
be most effective ; and to focus the new demands of  developing 
count ries for reforms in aid on what was both practicable 
and likely to be effect ive . 
16 
17 
This was not the brief o ff icially given to the Commission , 
which was asked to  conduct a ' Grand Ass ize ' ,  making a general 
study of internat ional development and report ing on it in one 
year . However ,  the appointment o f  Lester Pearson , a devoted 
internationalist and shrewd politician , as chairman, and the 
subsequent select ion of commission ers and staff , virtually 
ensured that we should study development quest ions with an 
emphasis on aid and on improving the flow of aid both 
quantitat ively and qualit atively . 
So far as the staff was concerned , we were well aware 
that the t ime availab le would not allow more than a survey 
based mainly on pooling our exist ing knowledge , t rying to  
reach consensus and to  meet the Commission ' s  quest ions . We 
had less than one y ear , with four full conunission sess ions 
and six partial sessions collecting evidence from governments 
of  developing countries ( largely to be able to sense the state 
of feeling toward different types of development activity) . 
We had to  consider to what mot ives the Commission should 
appeal , who were our principal t arget s , and what modifications 
in the quantity and character of  aid and related contribut ions 
to development we could propose with any reasonable hope of 
success .  It was clear from the beginning that both 
commissioners and staf f  had been chosen primarily to have an 
impact on developed countries : the aim was to generat e the 
polit ical will in them to expand aid , but at the same t ime 
make reconunendat ions that would b e  regarded as acceptable , 
even if inadequat e ,  to most developing countries . 
The focus on mot ivat ion 
Our main target was the United States Congress .  This 
was a battlefield on two fronts . The s imultaneous at tacks , 
both from liberals disillusioned with the Vietnam War and 
local commercial interests that had always been isolationist , 
against any promotion of development by the United States in 
the Third World , threatened a situat ion in which ( it appeared) 
starvat ion and disease on an unthinkab le scale would ravage 
mos t  o f  the poo rer developing countries . What we argued about 
was how we could affect American behaviour . And it ult imat ely 
seemed clear that any attempt to influence the United States 
Congress direct ly would be counterproduct ive . The Commiss ion 
has been crit icized for not coming out with any new arguments 
for aid : presumably becaus e we did not spend o.ur t ime trying 
to  provide more detailed stat istical evidence that - as we 
believed from what evidence we had - aid was often given from 
confused and incompat ible mot ives , and often to ineffect ive 
18 
and self-seeking government s ,  and that these and other facts 
irregularly reduced its effect iveness . Further , that if aid 
were direct ed to development , using skills learnt from much 
hard experience , it could ass ist it , oft en cons iderably . We 
were not writ ing for academics but for reasonable people in 
aid agencies , planning minist ries and volunt ary bodies , who 
had to be convinced and also provided ( if possible) with 
some backing of internat ional consensus which they could use 
to convince politicians . We could not , however ,  appeal to 
electorat es any more than to academics : we had to handle 
the press as best we could , and provide a comprehensib le 
package that governments , both donor and recipient , would 
support in their own interest for the sake of consensus . 
The mot ives to whi ch we appealed were those o f  the 
' glob al village ' : not so much world solidarity as the 
increas ing interaction and mutual awarnness of humankind and 
hence the impo ssib ility of insulat ing,  within national states , 
the polit ical ideas of  intervent ion ' to reduce disparit ies and 
remove inequit ies ' (Pearson 1969 : 7 ) . One might fairly para­
phrase Pearson ' s stat ement of obj ect ives by saying that , within 
the wo rld which had been ' shrunk ' by improved communicat ion 
and transport , disparit ies had become more obvious and some 
direct trans fer was necessary to  reduce them; some o f  the 
causes of inequality had become so glaring that there was 
enough polit ical consensus to condemn these as ' inequit ies ' ,  
and these the t rans fer system should remove . We clearly did 
not suggest that all inequality was inequity .  
The Report attempted t o  give the impress ion that i f  the 
aid t arget s ( 1  per cent of Gross National Product overall 
t ran s fer,  0 . 7 per cent o ffic ial and on concess ional t erms , 
and 0 . 14 per cent multilateral) were met and if the other 
conditions in trade , populat ion , educat ion , research ,  co­
ordinat ion et c .  could be met , an average growth rate of 6 per 
cent could be achieved , with an increasing proport ion of it 
in agriculture . It was expected that , by the end of the 
century , this would create a s ituat ion in which disparit ies 
would be lessened and direct int erstat e  t rans fers dwindle to 
ins ignificance . 
What were the other conditions , related to  aid , that the 
Connniss ion reconnnended , and how honest and factual was the 
suggestion that they would lead to a t ime limit of this kind 
on internat ional income trans fers ? 
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Act ions proposed 
Interrelat ed actions to increase aid flows were 
recommended . These recommendat ions on condit ions can be 
analysed in several ways . One , which is relatively simple , 
is to follow the chapter divisions o f  the Report it self , 
which d ivided them into : Trade Policy ; Private Investment ; 
Partnership in Development ; Development Deb t s ; More Ef fect ive 
Aid ; Populat ion , Educat ion and Res earch ;  and Internat ional 
Framework . This is not a part icularly logical arrangement 
for analysis , and was selected mainly as a compromise . 
There were dif ferent staff pressures for presentat ion within 
a tight t ime s chedule ; a desire to group matters according 
to  act ion requirements ; and a des ire for good sequence in the 
argument . Under t rade the recommendat ions were mainly 
concerned to secure greater access for goods from les s  
developed collllt ries , a t  a pace depending on prevailing 
polit ical constraints ;  on commodity agreement s the Commission 
showed more awareness of the need to consider how supply 
could in fact be rest ricted than is now fashionable , but even 
the oil cartel is rllllning into  difficulties on this problem. 
Under Private Investment the Report is chiefly concerned 
to favour avoidance of restrict ions on private investment s 
from rich co\lllt ries , and has b een r ightly much criticized 
for this . This was due neither to  a lack of balance in the 
Commis sion nor to \lllawareness by the staff of the element s 
of monopoly , politi cal intervent ion ,  corrupt ib ility and the 
like , which are so lightly handled in the Report and s o  
necessary to  a fair assessment o f  this issue . But in the 
final session in which this chapter was discus sed , Arthur 
Lewis was absent on medical grounds , and without effect ive 
opposit ion the reasonably balanced staf f  paper was savagely 
mauled by the two banker commissioners . 
The recommendations on Partnership in Development and 
on the Internat ional Framework were the most s ignificant 
part of the Report , and the part which unfavourable circum­
stances in the immediate aftermath have most seriously 
damaged . These were that there should be adequate pro fes sional 
assessment o f  both recipient and donor performance , in groups 
chaired by the World Bank and the International Monet ary Flllld ,  
with adequate symmetry between recipient an d  donor represent­
ation . These condit ions were regarded as important by most 
of  the staff - and the commissioners appeared to have been 
persuaded o f  this . 
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The chapters on Development Deb t s  and More Effect ive 
Aid make reconnnendat ions which , while s t ill allowing t rans fers 
to take place mainly as concess ional loans and on a b ilat eral 
basis , would - if supervision has been of the kind envisaged -
have greatly st rengthened the civil servants concerned , in 
att empt ing to · develop s trategies that would handle both 
balance-of-payments problems and debt-rescheduling and the 
finance of IDA. l It was suggested that this could be done by 
methods which would involve j oint act ion , and would s imul­
taneously hamper collusion against recipient s ,  but could do 
it without subj ect ing the whole operat ion to the present spate 
o f  mass slogans , introduced as bargaining counters . 
We may , however ,  cons ider the Commis sion ' s  recommendat ions 
in terms o f  a different analyt ical structure . We may consider 
the Commission as at tempt ing to persuade a group of separate 
f ree ( though not equal ) agents to engage in a relat ed set of 
act ions for a part icular obj ect ive . The persuasion can , in 
such conditions , ( i )  be directed t o  each separate act ion or 
each separate agent , using known int erest s ,  likely result s 
and rat ional argument ; (ii)  use the interrelations b etween 
the act s or the need for consensus , or both , as part of the 
persuasion ; or ( iii)  propose related act ions , each of which 
depends for it s success on machinery to b ring pressure on 
all to play their part , and can s imultaneously propose that 
this machinery be created . 
An example of the first kind o f  persuasion would be the 
att empt to in fluence all countries to make birth control 
knowledge mo re widely available and develop inst itut ions ( in 
educat ion and social security) to make large families less 
of an ass et and more of a liab ility to parents ,  as they have 
become to s o ciety . The argument for this is that death rates 
have fallen and a high growth-rate of population tends to 
reduce capital per head by using too much saving on widen ing , 
not deepenin g ,  capit al ; but that this pressure does not fall 
on the individual family . 
An example o f  the second kind is the att empt to  persuade 
each count ry not to t ie its aid because this put s st rong 
pressure on others , part icularly on small donors , to 
preserve their balance of payments by tying their own aid 
and so makes all aid much less effective , while the original 
count ries gain litt le or nothing . 
1rhe Internat ional Development Associat ion , a World Bank 
affil iate handling ' so ft ' loans . 
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An example of  the third kind would be the recommendat ion 
for the World Bank to hold a special session o f  the Board of  
Governors in which all member countries would be asked to 
outline their programs for reaching an agreed aid target . 
Structure of supervision and complementarity envisaged 
A high proport ion of the Pearson Commission recommend­
ations were intended to be presented in a form in which 
endorsement o f  the Report would imply endorsement of a whole 
set of recommendat ions clearly intended as a package , and 
with machinery for supervis ing implementat ion , which would be 
both professional and mult ilateral . 2 This has not been 
widely recognized . It was hoped that the strong interest 
which other developed countries would have in put t ing pressure 
on the United States to accept the aid targets , and which 
most of the less developed countries would have in securing 
profess ionally backed support for monitoring a number of 
their UNCTAD3 aims , would lead governments to accept the 
Report as a whole . It was realized that the United States 
Congress would probably not accept the whole package , but it 
was felt that external leverage of this kind was the most 
hopeful instrument to persuade it  to go part of  the way . 
Some idea o f  the kind of  structure that would have been 
proposed can be derived from a study of the f inal pages of  
Chapters 6 and 11 . The keystone is miss ing from the arch 
that these were to form. This was the creat ion of an 
International Development Council , which was to have provided 
a supervisory function . The reason why the Council was 
omitted , and the recommendat ions were not presented for 
adoption as a single package , presented first and supported 
by the detailed argument of  the Report , is that the Brit ish 
Government indicated that it intended to give st rong support 
to the Report as a whole (and has indeed continued to do so ) 
but could do it only if these two features were omitted . 
With only moderate suppo rt from France , the role o f  Britain 
was essential ; but the removal of  these two features of  the 
creation of supervi sory machinery and a package of complementary 
2 Byres ( 19 72 : Ch . 3)  sees the report in terms of leverage and 
attacks this as neo-colonialism. The chapter can be 
recommended - provided it is read in conj unct ion with the 
Report itself - as an indicat ion o f  the lengths to which 
ideological misrepresentation can go on this issue . 
3united Nations Conference on Trade and Development . 
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reforms made it almost inevitab le that every country would 
j udge each recommendat ion wholly in terms of its  nat ional 
interest . Many of the detailed targets and recommendat ions 
remain as targets today , but the package deal has changed . 
The paramountcy of nat ional interest leads to the major 
quest ion whether it was rat ional and honest to hold out the 
hope that implementat ion o f  the system of recommendat ions 
proposed would lead to a rate of self-sustaining growth in 
most of the less developed countries , and to structural 
changes within them, that would allow concessional aid 
largely to disappear within a generat ion . 
Structures , of  course , help to change motives . In the 
context of 1969 it was by no means unreasonable to predict 
that an economic structure of the kind recommended could 
have secured subs tantial growth and a momentum towards change 
in various components of the quality of life in the less 
developed countries . If this had happened it is almost 
inconceivab le that - with effective machinery in existence 
for trans fer of funds from rich count ries to generat e new 
potent ialit ies in poor ones - the political will to reduce 
the gap still further would have given way to a revival of  
nat ional separateness .  However ,  in spite o f  strenuous 
efforts , it proved impossible to persuade Pearson - who 
drafted the introductory chapter himself - to leave the 
future more open . People n eed to be persuaded in terms of 
their exis ting motives , not those which (once they do in 
fact act ) will later emerge . 
Att itudes to aid and development 
It must be emphasized at this po int that the whole aid 
sys tem , the whole quest ion of  development , is about nat ional 
sovereignty , and about very little else . Complex co­
operat ive act ivity is needed to apply some of  the resources 
and skills that have made rich countries rich , to raising 
the living standards of  people in poor countries . This can 
take place only if those in internat ional and nat ional 
inst itutions who are interact ing and carrying out such 
activity can exert some leverage on the great maj ority whose 
awareness is briefer and narrower ; and in general the obstacle 
to this is a quite irrational weight given by the maj ority 
to even trivial and short-term interests of one set of 
strangers - nationals of one ' s  own country - in comparison 
with important interests o f  other strangers , who are 
foreigners . To make internat ional development effect ive it 
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i s  necessary t o  give polit ical muscle t o  those who , by 
actually working together , have learnt and are learning some 
of the techniques that can b e  effective . 
Since World War II , internat ionalism has been counter­
balanced by the enormous increase in the importance of the 
ideology of nat ional sovereighty , at a time when this 
particular organization of our mental framework seems , at 
first sight , totally inappropriate . Large-scale governmental 
con ferences take place almos t every month , and conferences 
involving representat ives of the whole planet two or three 
times a year . But in addit ion funct ional gatherings - for 
profess ional , social , cultural , economic , athlet ic or other 
purposes - continue to be held, with part icipants representing 
regional or nat ional organizat ions . There is increasing 
awareness of issues that can be tackled only on a planetary 
scale : effects of human activities on the atmosphere and 
the o ceans , the control  of satell ite communicat ion and space 
explorat ion , the control of the act ivit ies of mult inat ional 
corporat ions , scient ific and economic act ivit ies in polar 
regions and their po ssible effects on ice and climat ic 
balance , money and the sys tem of internat ional liquidity , 
and many other matters . Moreover , apprec iat ion is growing 
that the relative stability provided for a quarter of a 
century by the cold-war nuclear-threat system can hardly 
las t anoth er decade , both because of increase in the number 
of nuclear powers and because of  diffus ion of knowledge of 
nuclear technology beyond military control . 
In these condit ions it is obviously necessary to develop 
effect ive polit ical ins titut ions which can transfer resources ,  
both to create inducements and t o  impose sanctions , over the 
planet as a whole , and such inst itutions , once created , can 
also promote both development and redistribut ion . Nat ional 
sovereignty is , in this sense , a barrier to be surmounted . 
The concept - if treated as an absolute - is an outdated one , 
and the fact that the poor and deprived are , as individuals ,  
a maj ority o f  the world ' s inhab itants is much more s ignificant 
than the fact that governments with very limited resources 
are a maj ority of all governments . It is necessary to bear 
this in mind in order to retain a framework of thought within 
which ideologies of different nat ions or groups may be 
con sidered . Yet it is clear both that the sense of  sover­
eignty within a defined territory is regarded as an important 
polit ical weapon in the hands of the deprived maj ority , and 
that the creation of an ideology within a territory is an 
important tool for creating ident ity and security within 
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defined frontiers . 4 
Thi s  requires us to take a fresh look at the concept of  
leverage . The kind of leverage envisaged by the Pearson 
Commission was meant to be leverage by those who were 
concerned with developmen t , and were learning by experience 
to persuade those with more l imited awareness to act with a 
longer t ime-span in view and in terms o f  wider interests . 
Essentially it was concerned mainly with expert ise rather 
than with conflict of interest . There was no denial that 
such conflict could exis t , but rather a concentrat ion on 
matters in which a b roader awareness would produce consensus 
on ends , and on means to achieve them. 
The ' subs titut ion of polit ical for economic leverage ' 
(Haq 19 7 6 )  can mean that the prevail ing popular ideology 
of a group becomes a part of the negot iat ion sys tem.  
Increasingly leverage is being used in terms of  overs impl if ied 
ideologies employed to generate consensus and weaken 
oppos ition . Yet the process of  commun icat ion is only partly 
one of mutual confrontat ion and manipulat ion . It is partly 
one of mutually modifying mot ives so that they can lead to  
agreed results , and this involves adj us t ing the ideological 
structure . 
The main motive to which appeals are now being made is 
that of a New Internat ional Economic Order based on complete 
nat ional sovereignty , and sovereign equal ity , but involving 
a charter of the rights and dut ies of states (United Nat ions 
19 75a , 19 75b , 1975c) . But rights and dut ies imply a code 
of behaviour , and this can only be operat ive if it is either 
universally and continuously accepted or if there are 
inst itut ions that can enforce it . So long as there is such 
s trong emphasis on sovereignty , maj ority decisions have no 
effect unless the act ions of the maj ority bring enough 
economic or other pressure to induce the rest to conform. 
There was some alarm b efore the Sixth Spec ial Assembly of the 
UN of 19 74 that , if the - expected con frontat ion between less 
developed and industrialized countries came about , the UN 
would b e  so weakened that it would be virtually destroyed . 
This alarm was no t ,  of course , shared by the elect orates of 
indus trialized count ries and the pressure had l ittle effect 
in modifying their governments ' stance . 
4some indicat ion of this can b e  found in th e sect ion on 
Africa in the appendix to the Pearson Report . 
2 5  
In the Seventh Spec ial Sess ion i t  was recognized by 
the Group of 7 7  that - whatever may have been decided by 
maj ority vote in the 19 74 General Assembly in adopt ing the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Dut ies of States - act ions 
that had to b e  taken towards a New Internat ional Economic 
Order were plainly wit hin the sovereignty of the industrial ized 
countries and could be taken only by their governments . The 
attempt therefore was to use the session in what Mr Peacock 
has described as ' a struggle for the agenda ' . 5 A large 
number of detailed resolut ions were in fact agreed wh�ch 
commit ted the indust rialized countries not to act ions but to 
negot iat ions . However ,  the leverage used in the negot iat ions 
themselves still takes very lit tle account of the re alit ies 
of national sovereignty in industrial count ries . President 
Nyerere may say that the people of the rich countries speak 
like poor people , but are in fact rich ,  and that an increase 
in their price of sugar is only a minor inconvenience compared 
to it s importance to the genuinely poor producers ; but a 
rise in the price of  sugar causes a reduct ion in real incomes ,  
clearly seen as such by many unions which are well able to  
bring pressure to bear on governments . It appears to be a 
fact of life in the present politics of most industrial 
countries that pressure from quite a small number of powerful 
unions or industrial groups - if unmatched by other internal 
pressures - will suffice to  off set almost any risk in foreign 
policy short of nuclear war . The bargaining resources 
available to less developed count ries to force industrial 
countries to give up unamb iguous nat ional interests are in 
fact still very limited . 
Much more s ignificant are arguments , for example by 
Mahbubul Haq and Paul S treeten , that the Group of  7 7  should 
make common cause with part icular pressure groups within the 
industrial world , on individual issues . It is noteworthy too 
that Michael Manley , Prime Minister o f  Jamaica , gave as one 
of the key issues in a new world order ' the problem of  
polit ical leadership accept ing a redefinition o f  the exercise 
of  sovereignty ' . 
One should not , however ,  hope for too much immediate 
willingness , on either side of the debate ,  to l imit nat ional 
sovereignty . Both sides see in national sovereignty their 
necessary protect ion from the other side . This makes 
progress toward any internat ional commitment diff icult . 
5 speech at the Nat ional Press Club , Canberra , on ' The 
Emerging Agenda ' ,  18 November 19 7 6 . 
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However , there is some evidence that , s ince the Seventh 
Special Sess ion of  the UN General Assembly in 19 75 , there 
has b een some movement towards ident ifying the areas in which 
progress  is possible . Inst itutions need to be modified to 
make growth poss ible in the limited areas in which this can 
be achieved . 
In exploring how this can be done we can look at the 
bargain ing role of nat ional sovereignty on both sides of 
the debate . In the less developed countries sovereignty has -
for the most part - b een recently won within an area usually 
defined in terms of former colonial rulers ' administrat ive 
convenience and possess ing little inherent nat ional ident ity . 
The pos sess ion of the nat ional territory was , in the early 
days of independence , seen as a sufficient condit ion for 
rapidly eradicat ing the poverty from which it s people 
suffered . The fact that this has not happened has therefore 
to be attributed to neocolonial ism in the rest of  the world -
which certainly still exis ts but is hardly now significant -
rather than to any error in the original expectat ions ; for 
these countries correctly see that they need to exert 
pressure , and their territorial sovereignty is their maj or 
weapon and itself needs to be maintained against external 
pressures . They are , in Myrdal ' s  terms ( 19 7 l : Ch . 7 ) ,  ' soft ' 
states , in which part icular interest s , l ike mult inat ional 
co rporat ions or even individuals ,  like corrupt c ivil 
servants , can render public policy inef fect ive rather than 
s imply in fluence it s direct ion ; and their power to act at 
all depends on mobiliz ing nat ional will against excessive 
out s ide threat s by techniques learnt from totalitarian 
states of the right or left . 
The Pearson Connniss ion , because o f  its compos it ion , 
clearly overest imated the pos s ib il ity that it could mob il ize 
pressure to generalize , to the world as a whole , the 
exist ing concern for social j ust ice within nat ion-states , 
merely by emphasiz ing the fact that this concern would wither 
within our nat ion-states themselves if it were not so 
generalized . We can accept the fact that the Commis s ion 
expected too much even if we believe - as I do - that the 
bargaining power of less developed count ries , based on 
territorial sovereignty (even if combined with all attainable 
solidarity among such government s ) , is hopelessly inadequat e ,  
and their own profess ional commitment and technique far too 
weak , to have much impact on world poverty without the type 
of addit ional pressure which the Pearson Commiss ion hoped 
to rally . 
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In the indust rialized countries nat ional sovereignty is 
a different kind of bargaining counter . These are , on the 
whole , ' hard ' states , in Myrdal ' s  terms . Government policy 
does not extend to every area of nat ional life , but in those 
areas to which it does extend it is carried out pretty 
effectively . Internal pressure from part icular interest s 
can operate at either the polit ical or the bureaucrat ic level , 
but it resul t s  in a reasonably art iculated and agreed policy 
and does not to any considerable extent operate to weaken the 
effectiveness of the state machine . There are , of course , 
many individual cit izens and independent inst itut ions which 
have interests abroad , but these tend to influence polit ical 
policy through appropriate channels , giving rise to a 
perceived system of nat ional interests that the government 
tries to protect by force , diplomatic pressure and political 
interact ion with other states . Clearly the smaller and 
weaker a ' hard ' s tate is , the mor e  l ikely it will be to 
sacrifice something of its national interest to secure a 
system which is predictab le , in which i t  can enj oy some 
freedom of act ion . But all ' hard ' states value some order 
and predictab ility in their environment which will protect 
their f reedom to preserve an orderly way of  l ife . 
The area in �hich negot iat ion that will limit nat ional 
sovereignty is most likely to be effect ive is in modifying 
the s tructures of int ernat ional relat ions - in trade , f inance 
and transfer of knowledge and skills - so that it will help 
to diminish poverty in poor countries but do it in an orderly 
manner . In so far as these structures are controlled by 
internat ional bodies , any multilateral system is l ikely to 
be related to the Un ited Nat ions in which less developed 
countries have a large maj ority . Mo reover in this area some 
kind o f  internat ional system is necessary , so that there are 
already restrict ions on nat ional sovereignty in the form of 
ins t itut ions with coercive powers ( in  finance) and networks 
of agreements ( in trade ) . Nevertheless relat ively little 
progress has been made , with three except ions : some expans ion 
and extension of non-reciprocal preferences for manufactures 
from less developed countries , but without internat ional 
machinery to enforce this ; some progress in init iat ing 
nego t iations on the financing of buffer stocks to stab ilize 
commodity prices ; and a small step by the Internat ional 
Monetary Fund ( IMF) towards automac ity through a t rust fund 
for loans to less developed count ries financed not by 
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contribut ions but by 6 a sale of gold . 
Limited success in these fields might have been extended 
by better underst anding of polit ical constraints on both s ides . 
It is very diff icult for industrial ized count ries to make a 
system of preferences for less developed countries automat ic 
unless the ground has b een prepared by appeals to internal 
pressures , for example ,  by consumers ;  but more emphas is on 
cost reduct ions and less on trans fers might have helped 
towards accept ance of a sanct ioned general agreement . On the 
other hand it would be unreasonable to expect consensus on 
the s ide of the Group of 7 7  if there were no st ress on 
trans fer of wealth to poorer countries , but this might have 
been expressed with more polit ical sagacity . 
On the quest ions of buffer stocks and monetary reform ,  
there are reasonably val id technical reasons for resis t ing 
the pressures of the less developed countries . Differences 
in elas t icities of supply and demand almost certainly make 
it inefficient to  stabil iz e  prices of all commodit ies of 
interest to less developed countries in a uniform manner ; 
but it is unreasonable to expect the Group of  7 7. to accept 
the weakening of its pos ition which a completely piecemeal 
approach would imply .  S imilarly there are serious difficult ies 
in creat ing a firm link between Special Drawing Right ( SDR) 
creat ion and f inancing development of less developed countries 
unless th ere are very strong barriers which prevent this 
from leading to creat ion of SDRs merely so as to redistribut e 
income , when additional l iquidity is not needed . However ,  
the effect s o f  short-term pressures exercis ed by the !MF , in 
the past , on some countries ' development plans , make it 
unreasonable to expect less developed countries to abj ure 
any chance of exercising influence on the !MF merely b ecause it 
it creates some liquidity . 
Control of the !MF and the World Bank introduces the 
problem of internat ional institutions in relat ion to sovereign 
equality of s tates . Since Bretton Woods - when the !MF and 
Wo rld Bank were founded on a basis of  weighted vot ing - the 
UN system and all its aff iliated agencies have worked on the 
principle of on e nation-state one vot e  ( except for veto 
arrangements on the Security Council ) . This gives the average 
6 . The less developed countries had , of course ,  hoped for auto-
mat ic trans fers by a l ink b etween the creat ion of  Special 
Drawing Right s and the f inancing of development of less 
developed count ries . 
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Cypriot about a thousand t imes a s  many votes a s  the average 
Chinese , and is patently inconsistent with any ideas of  
human equality .  
From the point o f  view o f  industrialized countries , any 
internat ional organizat ions which engage in operat ions , and 
not s imply consultat ions ,  should be run mainly by professionals 
qualified in the tasks that have to be undertaken . This was , 
on the whole , the Pearson Commis s ion pat tern of internat ional 
operations , though at least the Pearson Report envisaged 
b ilateral monitoring of donor and recipient performance . 
The pattern today is to envisage at least some internat ional 
act ivities , such as those o f  UNCTAD and UNID0 , 7 as t rade­
union type actions , art iculat ing pressure through the United 
Nations on behalf of less developed countries . Such pressure , 
however , can b e  compat ible with some degree of nat ional 
sovereignty only if it can lead to automat ic act ion , in 
accordance with def ined circumstances , by profess ional bodies 
that have powers def ined by agreement . 
I feel convinced that press ure does indeed need to be 
exercised , mainly by the less developed countries themselves .  
This I base on my involvement with the Pearson Commiss ion ,  
and later the s igning o f  the Columb ia Declarat ion (Ward , 
D ' Anj ou and Runnalls 19 71 : 10) . I realise that our Report 
neither went far enough nor was it even allowed to appear in 
the form intended . Most of us who are concerned with aid 
would wish such pressure to succeed in greatly diminishing 
exist ing disparit ies . However , we would not necessarily wish 
it to succeed in achieving the kind of changes towards which 
it is now being directed , nor that such charges are a 
pract ical reality . 
The indust rialized nat ion-stat e  is  not particularly 
well designed for responding to minor pressures from it s 
polit ical environment . It has teeth and claws , a well­
developed roar , quite efficient sensors for reacting to its 
enemies , but is not a very effect ive social animal ; it is 
apt to be quarrelsome and dangerous when provoked . We need 
to t ry - on the way to eliminat ing the dangerous b east from 
our planet - to help it to b e  more sensitive and respons ive . 
However ,  while some of us would - for the sake of 
improved dist ribution and improved relat ions - be will ing to 
7United Nat ions Industrial Development Organizat ion . 
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put such weight as we could behind some of the UNCTAD demands ,  
few who have read the Lima declarat ion would wish t o  strengthen 
UNIDO in its present form (UNIDO 19 75 ) . Not content with 
repeating some of the industrializ ation idiocies of the early 
1950s , it seems to have spent its t ime hunt ing out new 
examples of impract icality . There is much negotiat ing to be 
done , and we need to inquire whether our existing inst itut ions , 
especially in Austral ia , can be modified to enable this task 
to be carried out more effect ively . 
To what motives do we wish to refer , here in Australia , 
dealing with institut ional aspect s of international development 
in the world of the last quarter of  the twent ieth century ? 
Most academics and aid officials feel an obligat ion to 
persuade Aust ral ians to accept sacrifices in living standards 
if t hese would raise living standards in the less developed 
countries . The convict ion that sacrifices would help , 
however , is essent ial . 
The ethical case that needs to be furthered in developed 
countries seems to me a twofold one : first , to attempt to 
explain that the rhetoric of less developed countr ies is by 
no means wholly without foundat ion and is necessary to their 
solidarity and pressure ; and secondly to welcome the pressure , 
without wholly yielding to it , as a means of getting agreement s 
made and inst itut ions estab lished which will genuinely reduce 
disparit ies and mit igate inequit ies in the world economic 
sys tem .  
How can we set about do ing this in inst itut ional terms ? 
First o f  all , we need to s trengthen inst itut ions by which 
those attending internat ional gatherings bring some feedback 
to their own cotlllt ry .  It is of very great importance that 
the electors ,  especially of small countries , should be exposed 
as much as possib le to the subj ect matter of  internat ional 
conferences . This seems to imply that placing an Overseas 
Development Bureau within the Minist ry of Foreign Affairs is 
missing an import ant opportunity , unless we wish all the 
conduct of foreign policy to be democrat ically run, which is 
unlikely . 
The Ministry of Foreign Af fairs has highly complex 
interests to negot iate ,  often involving the secrecy that is 
essent ial for interact ions in small groups within larger 
groups . It will , in some degree , look upon the interests of  
cit izens of related countries - Commonwealth countr ies or 
Papua New Guinea for example - as important , though less 
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important than Australian ones . If  aid officials are in 
this Minis t ry they will either b e  merely play-act ing when 
they take part in internat ional conferences , or , if they are 
influenced , they will try to influence their Ministry .  This , 
however ,  is what Foreign Ministries have to guard against 
in their embassies , which must report the count ry ' s  problems 
but maintain their own nat ional int erest .  It is only in so 
far as a particular concern has become , say ,  a sufficiently 
popular cause in Sweden to b e  a Swedish interest that it is 
appropriate for the Swedish Foreign Ministry to press it . 
If those engaged in internat ional development activit ies 
part icipat e  in sessions where they are under some moral 
pressure , they should indeed be limited in the actual 
negotiat ions by briefs reflect ing the current state of  
opinion and current interes t s ; but they should be memb ers of  
a semi-independent agency , with powers to mobilize and 
art iculate local response if they consider the response 
inadequat e .  
There i s  not , however , much point in having an independent 
agency ,  represented in Cab inet through some other Ministry 
than Foreign Affairs , unless some polit ical support from 
opinion-forming bodies could in fact b e  mob il iz ed .  Would 
there be any stance that Australia could adopt that might 
carry some bargaining power internat ionally and at the same 
t ime attract popular support here ? 
Other small , but relatively r ich , countries like Sweden , 
the Netherlands and Canada have been able to capture useful 
init iat ives : a small country is normally less constrained 
in external policy by the need to reconcile a large number 
of  internal issues . Australia , by its very name , posit ion 
in the heart o f  the ' South ' in the North-South dialogue , and 
ex-colony status should not b e  t aking such a low profile . 
In the immediate future it might be able to take an 
initiat ive on the issue of  commodity-price support . This is 
an i ssue on which the industrialized countries have a good 
technical reason for opposing a comprehensive scheme covering 
commodit ies o f  interest to less developed count ries as a 
whole ; this is that it is always difficult to avoid making 
such a scheme an instrument for stab iliz ing prices upwards , 
and different commodit ies would have very dif ferent long-run 
elast icit ies of supply . This factor would be likely to 
wreck the scheme if it were mainly organized , as it at 
present appears to be proposed , with an eye to polit ical 
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consensus among the group of  less developed countries , rather 
than to effective operation . The main reason for the 
oppos it ion of indus trialized count ries , however ,  is no doub t  
the fear that the resultant long-run rais ing of  commodity 
prices would create further inflat ionary pressure on their 
economies l.lllless they did in fact take polit ically unpopular 
steps to limit their own rate of income-growth .  That , however , 
is what the proposed s cheme o f  price control is all about : 
it is intended to redistribute income and not merely to smooth 
it over time .  
It would probab ly not b e  imposs ible for Australia to  
propose a buffer s tock and control scheme that would cover 
at least a ran ge of commodities , with provisions for relat ive 
adj ustment of prices in accordance with technically determined 
criteria, that could effect ively produce some income t ransfer 
if dis cipl ine was ob s erved by the part icipat ing countries . 
It is pos s ible to imagine an Aust ralian Development 
Ass istance Agency , which had developed along the lines of  
the  Canadian Internat ional Development Agency , seeing an 
opportunity to mobilize support for such a s cheme , working 
it out in detail , and put t ing it forward in the negot iat ions . 
S ince polit ically this would be incurring bad marks in 
the United States and Britain in return for good marks in 
most of the less developed countries , the ' internat ional is t ' 
countries , and possibly France , there is virtually no chance 
that it could be proposed by our exist ing aid machine , which 
would have to argue the case , without art iculate out side 
support , within the Minis t ry of Foreign Affairs . However , 
with a different internal structure , an init iat ive o f  this 
kind could be a first step in a series of  init iat ives for 
professionally operated , automati c , disc iplined act ivit ies , 
gaining international polit ical support because they were , 
on the one hand , t rans ferring income from the minority of  
rich col.llltries to the maj ority o f  poor ones and on the other 
increasing the effect iveness of  internat ional co-operat ion . 
This may be , l ike our work on the Pearson Commission , a 
frus t rated daydream, becaus e the political b ase , comb ining 
popular pressure with technical discipline , is st ill lacking.  
Unles s , however ,  our institutions can change so that they 
are responsive both to changing polit ical pressures and new 
technical knowledge , we may l eave our grandchildren a choice 
between a world run by totalitarian commissars or one 
dominated by increasingly harsh controls administered by a 
2 0  per cent rich minority ; if , indeed , the alternat ives do 
not dest roy one another and most of the world . 
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Chapter 3 
Problems o f  the aid recipient country 
H . W. Arndt 
Most o f  the contribut ions collected here naturally look 
at problems of aid from the point of view of the donor country . 
The concern in the main has b een with the difficult ies of 
giving aid . This chap ter will focus on the difficult ies of 
receiving aid , on the problems faced by the recipient country .  
Fo r the evidence of the less developed countries ' (LDC) point 
of view I must rely largely on what I have read and on what 
I have observed at fairly close quart ers in Indonesia . 
One preliminary point to clear the ground : I shall b e  
writing almost entirely about o fficial aid , that is to say , 
government-to-government bilateral aid and mult ilateral aid 
to governments . This is , in pract ice and inevitably , much 
the larger part of internat ional aid . There are only two 
exceptions . One is voluntary aid , by churches and other 
charitab le organizat ions , which is often given to private 
groups and agencies but always with at least the tacit 
approval of  the recipient country ' s  government . The other 
is aid to polit ical opponents of the country ' s  government , 
rebels or insurgents , such as the aid given by Hitler and 
Mussolini to Franco during the Spanish civil war , by the 
Allies to the European underground during World War II and 
by Hanoi to the Vietcong durin g  the Vietnam War . It is 
somet imes suggested that , if  aid is to promote development 
in count ries ruled by react ionary governments , it may need 
to aim at ' shift s in polit ical power and leadership styles ' 
( Retzlaf f ,  below : p . 166) .  But this is at b est a romantic not ion 
and at worst a recommendat ion of warfare . It is certainly 
not what we ate concerned with . For all pract ical purposes , 
we may there fo re take it for granted that aid is aid to 
government s ,  good o r  bad . To a large extent , the problems 
of  the recipient country are the problems of its government , 
or at least to the nation as seen by it s government . This 
means , incidentally , that there is one obj ect ion to aid that 
need not trouble us . That all foreign aid in various ways 
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strengthens the government in power in the recipient country 
is true but irrelevant in our context . 
We may conveniently consider the problems for the 
recipient count ry under two broad headings . First , the 
problems presented by the aid relat ionship as such ; and 
second., problems presented by part icular kinds o f  aid . 
Self-reliance : the case against aid 
Much has b een said and writt en in recent years about 
the virtues of self-reliance for developing countries , and 
indeed a strong case can b e  made against accept ance of any 
foreign aid . 
The strongest statements of the view that most inter­
nat ional aid s ince World War II has done more harm than good 
to the recipient countries , and that they would be better 
o ff without it , have of course come from the radical end of  
the political spectrum, especially from neo-Marxist s  who 
condenm ' aid as imperial ism' (Hayter 19 7 1 )  but they do not 
really rej ect all aid . Their opposit ion is directed at aid 
from capitalist count ries , and especially from the imperialist 
super-power , the United States . It rest s  on the view that 
all western aid has been an inst rument of neo-colonialism, 
that it has hindered real development by propping up 
react ionary regimes , st rengthening existing ruling elites 
and thus prevent ing necessary ins t itut ional change , import ing 
inappropriate technologies and generally perpetuating a 
dependency relat ionship b etween the developed ' cent re ' and 
the underdeveloped ' periphery ' ( Sunkel 19 72 ; Chil cote 19 74) . 
Most exponents of this view applaud Soviet aid or Chinese 
aid which they see as free from these faults . 
But qualms about the benefit s of  aid are shared by many 
others . The most obvious financial cos t s  lie in accumulating 
debt burdens on credits which are really aid only to the 
extent of their grant equivalent and on pro f it s  of direct 
privat e investment which ,  however ,  beneficial to development , 
is not properly to be regarded as aid at all . Apart from 
this , the most serious costs of aid t o  the recipient 
government are the limitat ions it may impose in various ways 
on its own freedom of act ion , in other words , the ' strings ' 
attached to it . 
The poor count ry or government that seeks aid from a 
rich donor government or internat ional agency is ipso facto 
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in a weak bargaining position .  In the ext reme case , such as 
Taiwan and South Korea in the 1950s or Cuba in the 1960s , it 
may surrender virtually all independence in foreign policy 
and accept a satellite status . But some risk of ' st r ings ' 
is almost ines capab le in the aid relat ionship . Not only 
does a government that accept s large-scale aid run the risk 
of serious dis ruption of its economy if the donor should for 
any reason decide suddenly to  cut o ff aid , as China found 
in 1956 , but there is also a con t inuing vulnerab ility to  
pressures exerted through the terms and conditions on which 
aid is of fered . 
For many years , those who wished to  pillory interference 
in the domestic affairs of recipient countries would c ite 
the role of  the Internat ional Monetary Fund . Part icularly 
in Lat in America , the rules for restorat ion of price stab ility 
through fiscal and monetary rest raint which it had devised 
were denounced as inappropriat e  to  local condit ions and 
conducive to s tagnat ion rather than development ( Eshag and 
Thorpe 1965 ) . Similarly , when the World Bank developed 
performan ce criteria fo r select ion of aid proj ect s and 
performance tests for their cont inuance , LDC critics were 
quick to cry ' neo-colonialism ' (Patel 19 71 : 2 9 9 ) . More 
recently , p ressure on recipient government s  to  toe the l ine 
has tended to  come from those who , in the spirit of  Sussex , 
Mr McNamara and the ILO , believe that social obj ect ives , 
such as employment , equality and basic needs , should be given 
priority over economic growth and who are only too ready 
to impose this debat able view on recipient governments as a 
condit ion o f  bilateral and multilateral aid .  
The danger of  ' strings ' ,  however , while i t  needs t o  
b e  guarded against , i s  not a s  strong an argument against aid 
as some have suggested . Performan ce st rings , whether of the 
IMF or the World Bank kind , or even of the Sussex variety , 
may be pos it ively welcome to the t echnocrat s of  the recipient 
government , as a reinforcement against the pressures of 
lo cal polit icians , vested interests , bureaucrat ic inef ficiency 
and co rrupt ion .  And there are ways of loosening the strings 
that donors might attach to  aid . One safety valve is 
' fungibility ' ,  the ab ility of recipients to divert to other 
uses the domestic resources set free by specific foreign 
aid . I f  a donor government insists  on providing gratis 
military hardware that would otherwise have to be bought , 
this frees foreign exchange for civilian us es , and vice 
versa .  So , within reason , why not humour the whims o f  
dono rs ? I shall return to this point later . Another , more 
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important , safeguard i s  diversification of  sources of  aid . 
The recipient country is obviously most exposed to pressure 
from a single powerful donor ; much less so from a consort ium. 
When it s favours are sought by rival powers , it may be in a 
strong pos it ion to call the tune , as Sukarno appreciat ed in 
the late 1950s and Hanoi in the late 1960s . In any case,  so 
sensit ive are all government s to charges of  int erference in 
the domestic af fairs o f  othe rs that aid donors generally 
lean over backwards to avoid at least overt pressure through 
strings attached to aid . 
A more fundamental case for self-reliance , for do ing 
without foreign aid ,  is that all aid by others , in its nature , 
saps the will to help on eself .  This obj ection has b een mos t  
connnonly advanced against U S  shipments under PL480 and other 
food aid which not only inevitably depresses domestic food 
prices in the recipient count ry and thus price incentives to  
farmers but also , it is said , by  reducing the urgency of the 
food problem, reinfo rces the tendency of urban planners to 
neglect agricult ure . Nothin g ,  as Dr Johnson would have 
said , so concent rates the minds of  politicians on domest ic 
food pro duct ion as the innninence of  famine . The same 
obj ect ion has b een appl ied to  other forms o f  aid . External 
capital aid , it is claimed , reduces domestic saving (Papanck 
1 9 72 ) . Trans fer o f  technology , through direct investment 
and other channels ,  dis courages domestic R & D effort . 
There is sub stance in all these argument s ,  though the 
extent will vary a good deal according to the circumstances . 
But do they really amount to a case against accept ing aid ? 
Provided the reduct ion in domest ic supply only part ially 
o f fsets the addition to the supply of food , capital or 
t echnology from abroad , there is a net gain , at  least in the 
short run . It is of  course arguable that , if food aid 
dis courages efforts to increase domestic food product ion , it 
benefit s the present at the expense of future generat ions . 
But the same is t rue of famine relie f ,  or indeed of medical 
aid which , by reducing the death rate , adds to the difficult ies 
of rais ing living standards in the long run . How far can 
government s of poor count ries be expected to pract ise self­
reliance at the expense of  the wel fare of their citizens ? 
The case for self-reliance is , in the last resort , the 
purit an case against charity , against welfarism.  Mendicancy 
is incompat ible with self-resp ect . The most important 
element in an effect ive development st rategy is national will , 
and this requires above all national pride . To puritans 
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l ike myself , such reasoning makes a st rong emot ional appeal . 
But there is wisdom in the warning that policy makers in 
developing count ries should ' not overdraw the s ingular virtues 
of sel f-reliance in personal behaviour into nat ional policy ' 
(Minhas 19 7 7 ) . Delib erat e  choice of sel f-reliance is a 
development st rategy of belt-tight ening and ruthlessness ,  
much like the Stalinist st rategy o f  forced industrial izat ion . 
In pract ice ,  for all the talk , self-rel iance has usually been 
a matter o f  making a virt ue of necess ity . Sukarno ' s  Indonesia 
and Mao ' s  China rej ected aid only when no more was forth­
comin g .  The only case of a count ry refus ing available aid 
that comes to mind is Burma under both U Nu and General Ne 
Win , and that is not exactly an advert isement for sel f-reliance 
as a development strategy .  
There is also an irrational emot ional case for self­
reliance . When intelligent , sophis ticated o f ficials o f  
LDCs have to  allow themselves to be lectured and hectored by 
bumb l ing , obt use , arrogant ' expert s '  merely because thes e 
' expert s ' represent rich donor government s  or internat ional 
banks ; when they find the high salaries and large expense 
accounts of such experts deb it ed agains t repayable credit s 
labelled ' aid ' ; when they are s olemnly informed by self­
righteous moralists  in donor countries that the extent of  
corrupt ion and administrat ive inefficiency in their count ries 
throws serious doubt on the propriety and wisdom of  providing 
further aid , then one cannot be surprised that , in their 
rage and frustration , they feel like yell ing , with Sukarno : 
' Go  to hell with your aid ' . But , as int elligent , sophis t i­
cat ed officials , they grit their teeth , make polite or 
rheto rical contribut ions to the North-South Dialogue pointin g  
out that there would be n o  n eed f o r  aid if  the world ' s  
resources were less tmj ust ly dis tributed and meanwhile t ry 
to negot iate the most useful , least damaging aid program 
they can . 
The art of receiving aid 
The decision to accept aid having once been made in 
principle , the task for the recipient government is to make 
the best o f  the aid o ffered . All forms of aid present 
problems . To cover them all in this paper would mean giving 
a res ume of the vast aid literature . Let me illust rate the 
is sues with reference to each of the main types of aid or , 
to  use the preferred term, development as s istance , by drawing 
on Indonesia ' s  expe rience . 
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Balance of payments support . The most welcome form of 
foreign aid has always been convert ible foreign exchange , 
for that buys anything , even foreign expert s .  But it is 
rarely offered , and then usually on such stringent conditions 
as attach to !MF stand-by agreement s .  The next best thing 
is donor-count ry currency , such as Indonesia received from the 
the Inter-governmental Group on Indonesia ( IGGI) consort ium 
from 196 7  Wlt il 197 3 .  This has the disadvantage of being 
t ied . In the IDDI case , the currency of  some donors did not 
sell well , either because they had nothing much useful to 
sell or because their product s were expensive or because use 
of the currency was subj ect to onerous condit ions (as in the 
case of US dollar which required costly shipment in American 
ships over long distances ) . 
Donors have usually b een reluctant to see their currency 
used for the purchase of all types of imports , on the ground 
that aid is supplied for development investment , not for 
current consumpt ion , especially consumption of  luxury goods . 
In Indones i a ,  such aid - so-called DK ( credit exchange) aid -
was therefo re available only for import s of goods on a 
priority l is t . In the early years of  the IGGI program ,  the 
Indonesian s ide would point out that massive imports of  
consumption goods , such as  rice and textiles , were essential 
to their efforts to stabilize prices and thus to rest ore the 
condit ions for development , and this point was conceded by 
the donors (Arndt 1975 : 90) . Lat er ,  the Indonesian policy 
makers found the limited list o f  DK goods convenient as a 
means of protection domestic import -compet ing industries 
whi ch were liab le to suffer from aid that too generously 
ext ended Indonesia ' s  capacity to import . 
Food aid . Somewhat similar considerat ions apply to 
food aid . From the point o f  view of  the donors , food aid 
began as nearly costless surplus dispos al , but in more recent 
years , when wheat and other foodstuffs have b een readily 
saleable in world markets , it has b een more nearly equivalent 
to supplying foreign exchange and therefore less liberally 
offered . From the recipient co\lllt ry ' s  point of view , food 
aid is priceless when it saves lives in periods of famine . 
In more normal circumstan ces , it confront s recipients with 
the t rade-off we have already discus sed , b etween better 
nutrit ion now or more domestic food product ion later ( subj ect 
to the usual distribut ional complicat ions , such as the 
t endency for rice imports in Indonesia to benefit public 
sector employees and the urban and rural poor at the expense 
of  not quite so poor rice farmers ) .  
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All aid which enab les the recipient government to sell 
additional goods at home , whether DK-financed import s or 
rice or wheat , has the addit ional advantage that it  not only 
adds to market supplies but also ext ract s purchas ing power 
from the public and thus has a doubly disinflat ionary effect . 
Without this effect of  IGGI aid , it is very doub t ful whether 
the Indonesian stabilizat ion program of 196 7-69 could have 
succeeded . Food aid can , however , present special problems 
if , for example , the donors offer wheat to a country that 
eat s rice and has neither flour mills nor b akeries . In 
Indonesia ' s  case , this problem was part ially overcome by 
shipping wheat flour until domest ic flour mills were built 
and partly by the invent ion of  bulgur (wheat processed to  be 
edib le ,  if  not palatable , after boiling l ike rice) . Moreover , 
if  food aid , like PL4 80 , is on credit (however soft and 
deferred) it builds up debts , and can be very expensive if , 
like PL4 80 , it is valued at donor count ry prices and is 
transported in donor country ships (Glassburner 1969) . 
Proj ect aid . Donors prefer proj ect to program aid 
because it gives them maximum control over the use of their 
money : the purpose fo r which it is used , the efficiency 
with which it is used and usually also the goods on which 
it is spent . For these very reasons , proj ect aid can be 
troublesome to the recipient government . 
Even if  the donor government is imbued with the best 
mot ives , and is not primar ily concerned with export promot ion , 
its views on what is good  for the recipient country ' s  
development are botmd to carry weight , if  only because it 
must b e  convinced that proj ects request ed by the recipient 
government make sense ; and this applies equally to mult i­
l ateral proj ect aid by int ernational agencies . The more 
cons cient ious the donor ,  the more careful its pre-investment 
surveys , its built-in safeguards for efficient procurement 
and implementation , the more the choice and shape of  the 
proj ect will b e  influenced by the donor ' s  expert s and the 
longer will tend to be the delays and frust rat ions . Such 
safeguards , however ,  should be j udged over the longer term. 
Every one of the Soviet aid proj ect s for Sukarno ' s  Indonesia 
( except the Ganefo stadium ,  a luxury consumpt ion good) was 
a disas trous failure precisely because the Russ ians were so 
anxious to gain political kudos by agreeing to Indonesia ' s  
requests , sight tmseen ; while the two US turnkey proj ects 
which caused endless friction and unpopularity during the 
long pre-investment stage , the Pusri fertilizer plant and 
the Gres ik cement plant , worked like clockwork once they 
41 
were handed over and proved invaluable ( Shakow 1964) . One 
possible answer to the obvious in ference from this story is 
that recipient countries must be left free to learn from 
their own mistakes . But one wonders . What the Indonesians 
learned was that to make effect ive use of such aid they 
needed , for s ome t ime yet , technical ass ist ance at every 
stage of a proj ect . 
Every aid proj ect impos es costs  on the recipient 
government , costs  of debt service if it is financed by 
interes t-bearing and repayable credit s ( though in condit ions 
of chronic worldwide inflat ion the real interest burden may 
be small or n egat ive) , cos t s  of distort ion o f  it s own 
preferred pat tern o f  investment , and costs in terms of  one 
o f  its s carcest resources , the t ime of i ts own high-level 
administrators . The problem for it s policy-makers is to 
ensure that the proj ect aid program consists as far as 
possib le of those proj ects for which the likely b enefits 
exceed the likely costs  by the great est margin . 
The costs  of distortion are probab ly very much less 
serious than they have recently b een painted in the aid 
lit erature . It has become a standard charge against west ern­
type proj ect aid , mult ilateral as much as bilateral , that it 
has tended to be biased in favour of large-s cale , capital­
intensive infrastructure proj ect s , frequently serving the 
modern , urban sectors of the economy , and has neglected both 
the maj or important areas of grass-roots rural development 
and social obj ect ives , s uch as greater equality of  income 
and wealth and mass part icipat ion . This crit icism seems to 
me fundamentally mis conceived . 
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Even if we accept the view that rural development and 
social obj ectives deserve much higher priority in development 
policies of LDC governments , it does not follow that they 
also deserve high priority in b ilateral or mult ilateral aid 
programs . Provided aid proj ect s  are such that they have a 
legit imate place in the recipient government ' s total 
development program,  the criterion for select ion should be 
not what i s  most important but what foreign aid donors are 
good at . Most of the tasks that most need doing in rural 
development and institut ional change are quite unsuit ed to 
be carried out by foreign governments or internat ional 
agencies , either b ecause they require prolonged day-to-day 
contact at village l evel by people who speak the language 
and understand the problems of villagers or because they 
touch on polit ically sensit ive issues . What foreign donors 
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are good at are precisely the large-scale infrastructure 
proj ects which require capit al , efficient management and 
technical knowledge . If Jakarta needs a better telephone 
system to work at all ef ficient ly as a city , if Indonesian 
airport s need navigat ion aids , if Sumatra needs a highway , 
if port s , irrigat ion works and plantat ions need to be 
rehabilit ated , then it i s  no crit icism of aid proj ect s in 
these fields to point out that rural development is more 
important . 
This is why fllllgib ility is so valuable.  If foreign 
donors undertake proj ect s for which domestic resources would 
otherwise be needed and if the domestic resources are not so 
sp ec ific that they cannot b e  put to other good uses , it is 
clearly sensible to take advantage of  s uch aid . It may even 
be worthwhile accept ing as aid a proj ect that would not rate 
high enough priority to be included in the recipient 
government ' s  priority program, provided it does not make 
excessive claims on complementary local resources . In this 
way , it may even be po ssible to make occasional concessions 
to dono r idiosyncrasies , let t ing them build a polytechnic 
here or a livestock research stat ion there , or concentrate 
all their aid in Scandinavian fashion on family planning or 
public health . 
However , a proviso on administrative cos t s  is important , 
and it is part icularly relevant to aid proj ects by small 
donors . The costs  of a $0 . 5  million aid proj ect by a small 
dono r colllltry ,  in terms of the t ime and energy of high-level 
administrators of the recipient government which it ab sorb s , 
may be almost as great as those of  a $ 2 00 million proj ect by 
the World Bank .  T o  the officials and pol it icians o f  the 
small donor , it may be j ust as important as to the off icers 
of the World Bank to be able to demonstrate to their mast ers 
that their money has been efficiently spent on a worthwhile 
proj ect . But the real cost to the recipient government per 
dollar received may be 2 00 t imes as great . I have more than 
once heard Indonesian technocrat s quietly groaning at the 
thought of having to find and shepherd through all its stages 
yet another proj ect suited to the purse and pretensions of an 
importunate small dono r government . That is why I suggested 
some years ago that Aust ralia might do well to channel most 
of its bilateral proj ect aid through the World Bank (Arndt 
1970.) . The suggestion , needless to say , fell on deaf 
ears . 
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Technical ass istance . Since what the developed 
countries can b est supply and the developing count ries most 
need is know-how , technical assistance has increas ingly come 
to be regarded internat ionally as the b est type o f  aid . It 
also appeals to donors b ecause the average cost per proj ect 
is relat ively small , it lends itself to aid in small doses , 
it does not prej udge questions about appropriat e technology , 
and it is relat ively easy to adminis ter at the donor end 
since expert s are relat ively easy to find on suit able terms 
and conditions . 
For the recipient country , by contrast , technical 
assistance present s some of the greatest dif ficult ies . 
Much has been writ ten about expert s in LDCs and I need not 
go over th e ground again . Let me take Australian technical 
assistance to Indonesia as an illust rat ion . The number of 
Australian specialists in potent ial technical assistance 
areas who can ef fect ively communicate in Indones ian 
probably does not exceed two or three dozen , yet the use­
fulness of  sp ecialists who cannot communicat e in Indonesian 
is severely circumscribed . Most Austral ian profess ionals 
expect terms and conditions for technical assistance miss ions , 
or are required to accept conditions , such that the cost of 
one man-year was put at $50 , 000 even three years ago and is 
now much higher . To negot iat e a single t echnical as sistance 
proj ect absorbs numerous man-days of relat ively high-level 
administrat ive work on both sides , and the at tent ions which 
the expert expects , or courtesy and diplomacy require him 
to be given while on mi ss ion absorb many more , at least on 
the Indonesian side . There is a limit ed supply of  efeect ive 
counterpart s ,  technical ass istance competes for t ime with 
the day-to-day duties of the official s  who are being 
assisted , and there are o ften believed to be security and 
other constraints on the use of  foreigners . For all these 
reasons , both Aust ralia ' s  capacity to give technical 
assistance and Indonesia ' s  absorpt ive capacity are smaller 
than is sometimes realized . 
To put it bluntly , it is s imply unreal ist ic to imagine , 
as some crit ics of proj ect aid seem to do , that anything 
like the current volume of b ilateral and mult ilateral 
development ass istance could be switched from proj ect aid 
to technical assistance .  I doubt whether a count ry like 
Indonesia has the ab sorpt ive capacity for even a doubling 
of the present flow of  technical ass istance from all sources . 
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Training . On the problems of  aid through trainin g ,  
whether o f  LDC nat ionals in the donor country or through 
inst itut ion-building in the recipien t count ry , there is also 
an ample lit erature and I have nothing original to add . The 
chief problems in the former situat ion are those of  alien­
at ion and brain-drain ; those in the lat ter situat ion the 
high co sts and great difficulty of technical ass ist ance in 
this part icular form. Only a very large count ry ,  like the 
United States , or a very well-heeled foundat ion can really 
undertake educat ional inst itution-building on a significant 
scale . All a small count ry like Aust ralia can do to upgrade 
t eaching and research at tert iary level in developing 
count ries is  so marginal , as  the grandiosely tit led 
Australian-Asian Universities Co-operation Scheme has 
demonst rated , that it plays much the same role as voluntary 
aid : it is good for the sel f-respect o f  the donors , good 
(one hopes ) for the inunediate b ene ficiaries , but of no 
significan ce to the overall development of the recipient 
country . 
Conclus ion 
Aid is a difficult business , for recipients as for 
donors . But there seems lit tle point in making it more 
dif ficult than it need be . In terms of comparative 
advantage , it would seem best for the donor country to 
concent rate on higher technology ,  capit al-intensive 
assistance to which its factor proport ions and its technical 
skills best suit it , leaving to recipient s the possibly more 
impo rtant , and certainly more intricate and sensit ive task 
of undertaking small-s cale rural and poverty-orient ed 
programs . 
I am , as I have explained , not all that much concerned 
about the problem of ' st ring '  or dependence . Performance 
tests required by donors may be pos it ively helpful , the risk 
of distort ion of the preferred development pattern is 
limited by fungib ility and , in the last resort , the recipient 
count ry can say :  ' Go  to hell with your aid ' . 
Sel f-reliance to the point o f  rej ecting all aid means 
throwing out the baby with the bathwater . But I am impressed 
by the psychological burden on the recipient country o f  any 
aid relat ionship which smacks too much of  charity , on the 
one side , and mendican cy ,  an the other . From this point of  
view , an idealistic ins istence in donor count ries on the 
humanitarian mot ive for aid , however noble and perhaps 
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helpful in coaxing dollars for aid out of taxpayers ' 
po cket s ,  can only do harm. From the point of view of  the 
morale and self-respect of the recipient countries , the less 
rhetoric about humanitarian motives and the more cool 
presentation of aid as being in the donor count ry ' s  enlight­
ened sel f-int erest the better . If we all came to see aid 
frankly , like trade , as a two-sided bus iness relat ionship 
in which donor and recipient both pursue their respect ive 
national interests as they see them , the moral argument for 
self-reliance as a matter of  dignity and nat ional pride 
would largely dis appear . 
Chap ter 4 
Problems o f  a id adminis trat ion and policy formulat ion 
among western countries 
N. Viviani 
What we are about to describe , then , is a power 
st ruggle in which ideas - in part icular the 
concep tion o f  the program - played a maj or role 
both as weapons and as motives for empire 
building . The concep tions were weapons because 
they could be used by the part icular adminis­
trat ive units that represented them to advance 
their claims to a larger place in the program. 
They were mot ives for empire-building because 
the administrators of these uni ts saw the 
broadening of the funct ions of their units as 
the principal means for implementing their 
concep tions of the program.  I do not believe 
that this kind of  power struggle was a peculiarity 
of  ECA, but rather that a deeper analysis o f  the 
phenomenon of empire building in government and 
in bus iness would show that these elements are 
always present and very often are of central 
importance . 
Herbert S imon ' s  description 
( 1953 : 25 1 )  o f  the evolution o f  the 
Economic Cooperat ion Administration 
Simon ' s  dis cuss ion a quarter of  a century ago o f  what 
we would now call the bureaucrat ic pol it ics of  the Economic 
Cooperat ion Administrat ion directs our at tent ion to a central 
phenomenon in the administrat ion of aid among western donor 
countries : that the tens ion between competing ideas on aid 
pol icy and considerat ions of  bureaucratic power is the most 
common and o ften the mo st important factor in shaping western 
aid programs . Whether the gift horse has good or bad teeth 
is for the most part an outcome of the st ruggle between 
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fact ions within government t o  have their particular ideas on 
aid triumph and at the same t ime to expand their turf , rather 
than the result of either rational polit ical decisions or o f  
a conspiracy practised b y  western governments t o  undermine 
or underwrite the government s  of  poorer countries . This 
broad contention , which requires modificat ion in some 
part icular cases that we will examine , is unexcep tionable 
when seen in the context of the literature of public adminis­
tration and bureaucrat ic pol it ics . The administrat ion o f  
aid , while a useful example of  these general phenomena in 
government adminis t rat ion , has some special features which 
make it worthy o f  study in its own right . One of  these is 
that , with one maj or except ion , aid administrat ion in western 
countries is subj ect only to fit ful polit ical control ( that 
is , control by politicians) , thus allowing bureaucrats a wide 
amb it in which to pract ise their politics and ,  more importantly , 
encouraging a continuing conflict among them over the ends 
of policy as well as dispute about its means . Another 
special feature is that aid adminis trat ion within western 
government s  is conducted for the most part in the absence of  
pressure from a constituency . While it  is  true that some 
domestic lobb ies attempt to influence aid policy and that 
there is some effective pressure from recipients , policy-making 
in western capitals is relat ively free of the domestic 
constraints that in fluence economic policy-making o r  some 
areas o f  foreign policy decis ion-making so strongly . Since , 
as will b e  argued later , both polit ical control cons traints 
and domestic political influences are weak , aid administrat ion 
provides a relat ively unimpeded arena for the exercise of  
bureaucrat ic power . 
Beyond cons iderat ions such as these lie some basic 
quest ions as to the worth of  present western aid administrat ion 
pract ice . Few areas o f  pub lic administrat ion have attracted 
such sustained and trenchant crit icism both within and without 
government , as well as from the benefic iaries -cum-vict ims . 
Are the problems of  aid administrat ion as intractable and 
counterproduct ive as we are led to b elieve and where , among 
the counsels o f  refo rm ranging from the radical internat ional­
iz at ion of aid t o  the restructuring of recipients '  acceptance 
of aid , may b e  found a way to manage the aid t ransact ion 
that mit igates those outcomes which crit ics agree are 
undesirable ? Or is it rather that the nat ional (and sect ional ) 
interest imperat ives in aid expressed through bureaucrat ic 
st ructures which are themselves not least concerned with their 
own power po sition ,  are immutable to large degree , and a 
realistic expectat ion of  change would envisage only a 
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peripheral tinkering with administ rat ive structures ? These 
(and many other) quest ions find no clear answer in this survey 
but they serve to indicate that the mot ives in th is d is cussion 
are both analyt ical and policy-oriented . 
We b egan with the content ion that compet ing ideas on aid , 
pursued through bureaucrat ic st ructures where considerat ions 
o f  power and territory are important , are what really shape 
an aid program. To examine this propo sit ion in relat ion to 
western count ries , two related perspect ives are employed : 
the degree o f  polit ical cont rol that is exercised over aid 
and the locat ion o f  bureaucrat ic respon sibil ity for aid . 
When looking at the latter we will focus particularly on the 
degree o f  centraliz ation of organizat ion , for it seems o ften 
that this factor most closely affects the existence o f  
bureaucrat ic con flict . Two other persp ec t ives find short 
shrift here : the influence o f  o rganizat ional outcome on aid 
policy and practice is clearly important , l as are the pictures 
that people carry in their heads about aid and development , 
but st raw to make these bricks is in short supply . 
I have chosen to concentrate the dis cussion on those 
western donors who are members o f  the Development As s istance 
Commi ttee (DAC ) , 2 because they form a fairly well defined 
class in terms of the nature of  their aid and a reasonable 
amount of  informat ion is available on their administ rat ions . 
The nature o f  aid organiz at ion in mult ilateral bodies differs 
qual itat ively , and insufficient in format ion is available on 
aid organizat ion in communist count ries , among OPEC count ries 
and other non-DAC donors to make comparison useful within the 
con fines of this chapter . Among western dono rs some will be 
acco rded more weight than others , so that the aid organiz­
at ions o f  the Big Five3 ( the Unit ed States , France , West 
Germany , Japan and the United Kingdom) will receive more 
attention than other DAC donors , although some features of  
the aid administ rat ion o f  Canada , the Netherlands and Sweden 
will be noted . This is partly b ecause the most interestin g  
1Judith Tendler (1975)  focusses on this aspect o f  US AID .  
2nevelopment Assistance Committee o f  the Organizat ion for 
Economic Co-op erat ion and Development ( OECD) . Members are 
the United States , France , West Germany , Japan , the United 
Kingdom , Canada , Australia ,  the Netherlands , Sweden , Norway , 
Belgium, New Zealand , Denmark , Italy , Austria , Portugal . 
3The five largest donors in the DAC . 
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comparisons arise among the �ig Fiv�, but the concent rat ion 
is also b iased by the amount of  material available . 
Th e s cope o f  the issues raised here is also quit e narrow . 
We are not concerned here with the ideological issue in aid , 
that is , in crude terms , whether aid support s development 
ends , or is exploitative . Fo r the purposes of  this dis cussion , 
it is assumed that aid is important to both donors and 
recipients and that it will cont inue in some form or other 
for the fo reseeable fut ure . The analys is deals only with 
what has been called ' the headquarters ' view of aid ' ; that 
is , aid organizat ion within the donor count ries . It does 
not treat the administrat ion of aid to or in rec ipient 
countries , nor development administrat ion within rec ipient 
countries . The discussion is also not concerned with the 
internat ional polit ics o f  aid in the sense that it does not 
deal with co-op erat ion or rival ry among donors , nor with the 
place of aid in North-South relat ions . 
The chapter seeks to draw out , from the literature on 
aid , the main cont inuing problems in aid organiz at ion as they 
af fect policy formulation ; to suggest some explanat ions for 
the kinds of st ructures that have emerged for these tasks in 
western count r ies and to dis cuss connnon and uncommon features 
in nat ional aid administrat ions . The di scuss ion proceeds by 
rais ing the cent ral problems in aid admin is trat ion in a general 
way and then describes some part icular nat ional approaches to 
these problems . Three ma in i ssues are raised : 
(a) Political responsib il ity for aid . This part 
des cribes the way in which min isterial and 
parl iamentary (and President ial and Congress ional ) 
responsib iliti es for aid are formally organized and 
how these operate in pract ice . The relat ive roles 
played by min i sters and bureaucrat s in making 
dec is ions on aid are the important cons iderat ions 
here . 
(b ) Bureaucratic control o f  aid . Given that policy­
making power is usually divided in bureaucracies , 
whi ch min i stries play dominant roles in aid policy­
making and why ? The observat ion that various parts 
of bureaucracies have dif ferent orientat ions on aid 
quest ions provides a key to understanding the way 
con flict in ideas on aid becomes inst itut ional ized 
in administrat ive structures . For example , foreign 
minist ries have a ' natural ' view that aid should 
serve their cent ral responsibility , the pursuit of 
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diplomat ic advantage , while finance mini st ries ' 
concern with expenditure priorit ies and the balance 
of payment s  often has the effect of their viewing 
aid as an opt ional extra to be tolerated in good 
years and cut in lean ones . Trade departments have 
a ' natural ' interest in the export o f  goods and 
investment capital and thus also claim a role in 
decis ions on aid as do some other parts o f  the 
bureauc racy . How are these d iffering bureaucrat ic 
interests reconciled with each other and with 
general aid obj ect ives ? What is the effect on aid 
policy of a rest ruc turing of bureaucratic arrange­
ment s which is intended to change the order o f  
priority given t o  such interest s ?  
( c )  Administrat ive alternat ives in aid . This part 
makes some general observat ion s on the relat ion ship 
between aid o rganizat ion and pol icy formulat ion , 
and sp eculates on the o rganizat ional conditions 
that app ear to be necessary to improve the out comes 
of policy-making on aid . 
The literature on foreign aid falls  into three broad 
categories : that dealing with the emergence , the concepts 
and ideolo gy of  aid ; that which deals with the positive or 
negat ive contributions o f  aid to the economic development of  
recipients ; and that which deals with aid policies and 
pract ices of various donor countries . While this literature 
is ext ens ive , with one or two quite recent exceptions4 it 
largely neglects the issues raised above . 5 There are , for 
example , seemingly endless discus s ions of  the conflicts between 
aid , fo reign and commercial policy , but these are rarely 
di scussed from the perspective of how such conflicts are 
resolved at bureaucrat ic level . There are probably two 
reasons fo r this : first , the persistent concern with 
ideology in aid has probably militated again st study of the 
4To gether with Tendler (19 75 ) , a conspicuous except ion is 
George Cunningham (19 74) . The Overseas Development Inst itute 
in Brit ain has however taken a con sis tent interest in these 
quest ions in it s publicat ions fo r some years . 
5There is much in the theoret ical literature on decision­
makin g and bureaucrat ic pol it ics which is relevant to the 
is sues raised in this chapt er , but which cannot be dis cussed 
here . 
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more prosaic aspects of  aid administrat ion , although a concern 
with these has become more evident in recent years , and 
second , the difficulties associated with ob tain ing an ' inside ' 
view of  the workings of  the bureaucracy in this sensitive 
area are not inconsiderable , and have thus hindered systematic 
research . 
For these reasons a caveat must be entered about the 
discuss ion which follows . There are some clear gaps in basic 
informat ion about the way nat ional aid administ rat ions work , 
and thus this is an attempt to open up the issue , rather than 
a definit ive di scuss ion of  what actually takes place . 
Pol it ical responsibility for aid 
While it is clear in any government where , for example , 
responsibility for government finance or foreign policy lies , 
the experience o f  many western count ries s ince the 1950s 
shows that no s imilar consensus exist s  among polit icians or 
bureaucrat s as to  where responsib ility for aid ought to be 
lo cated . Thi s  is partly b ecaus e of  the nature of  the b east ; 
aid policies have some aspects that affect the interests of  
other areas o f  government admin ist rat ion ; aid funct ions 
include both general administ rat ive tasks and specialized 
pro fess ional needs . 6 Because aid is less discrete than some 
other areas of administrat ion and because it is a relat ive 
latecomer to government , it needs to  establish a place in 
the bureauc rat ic club . The locat ion o f  aid in the government 
st ructure has o ften caused difficul t ies , not least because o f  
the sensit ivity that polit icians and diplomat s attach t o  aid 
operat ions overseas . It is also hampered by a lack of  
consensus within bureaucracies as  to the purposes of aid  and 
this feeds uncertainty as to placement of responsibility for 
aid . 
In most count ries , then , the locat ion o f  the control of  
aid ,  both polit ical and bureaucrat ic , has b een st rongly 
influenced by exist ing hureaucrat ic arrangement s and the 
con siderat ions of power upon which these rest . In general , 
those concerned with the administrat ion o f  aid have perceived 
two broad alternat ives : the aggregation or central izat ion 
6There are of  course other areas of policy , for example , 
science or energy pol icy that share the same problems in 
finding consensus on bureaucrat ic locat ion . 
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of  aid policy and funct ions under on e responsible minister or 
the disaggregat ion of  policy and funct ion s among a numb er of  
ministers and departments with interest s  in the area . A 
preference for either kind o f  arrangement is o f  course a 
normat ive one ; in the cas e of a preference fo r cent ral izat ion 
the impl icat ions are that aid has a distinct character and 
status which ought to b e  mat ched by a suffic ient degree of  
bureaucrat ic autonomy , while the preference for  disaggregat ion 
assumes the primacy of  co-ordination of aid with other nat ional 
interests and thus a lesser status for aid . In this respect 
count ries that are embarking on a more act ive aid policy 
usually consider undert aking an aggregat ion of  aid func t ions . 
There are ,  of course , degrees o f  aggregat ion , and two 
varieties are o f  part icular interest .  Where aid funct ions 
are aggregated in a separate ' aid ' department then argument s 
over pol icy with other department s are conducted in a 
different way and at a dif ferent level than if  aid funct ions 
are aggregated within a foreign ministry .  In the former case 
an independent aid department can consult other department s ,  
and i f  in clear dispute can offer separate advice to its 
pol it ical master . By contrast , disputes on fo reign policy­
aid matters within a foreign ministry will tend to be resolved 
at bureaucrat ic level , while conflicts  between the foreign 
ministry and other mini stries , say on the volume of  aid ; will 
tend to gravit ate to polit ical decis ion . 
At the other end o f  the scale where there is a large 
degree of  disaggregat ion of function s  among several ministries , 
two main po ssib ilit ies may b e  p erceived : first , the ministries 
involved co-ordinate their interest s  at desk level and p resent 
the minister o r  ministers responsible with collect ively 
agreed advice , a process that has the advantage of avoiding 
the unpredictable outcome that may result if ministers argue 
the is sue out . On the other hand , if interministerial 
interest s cannot be eas ily reconciled , this can lead to an 
evapo rat ion of responsibility, especially in countries where 
the concept o f  collect ive responsibility o f  ministers is weak . 
Thus , the dec ision on the polit ical and bureaucrat ic 
locat ion of aid fllllctions is the crit ical one in that it 
de fines who will play in this arena and who will be mere 
spectato rs ; it defines whose ideas shall be heard at the 
polit ical level and who will be silenced , and it not only 
defines who will have the responsibility for policy , but also 
who will have the power to enforce it , these las t  two b eing 
more often found in oppos it ion to one another than in unity . 
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The number and variety of changes that have occurred in 
western aid administrat ions over the last twenty years or so 
is test imony to the tensions that arise when either of these 
broad alternat ives or some hyb rid of them is adopted . While 
the kinds of political responsib ility that are adopted are 
few - pres ident , foreign minister , minis ter for ' aid ' , or 
divis ion of responsibil ity among a number of ministers - the 
administrat ive arrangements  that are attached to these lines 
of responsibility vary widely . 
In the case of France and the Un ited St ates , polit ical 
control of aid is exercised by the President , in France directly 
and continuously , and in the USA on occas ion directly but more 
often indirectly . Again presidential control o f  aid in France 
is allied with a wide degree of dispers ion o f  aid functions , 
while in the United States centralization of the heart of  the 
program is concentrated in the Agency for Internat ional 
Development (AID) . 
Where the foreign minister is responsible for aid , all 
aid may be controlled by a section of his foreign ministry ,  
some aid may be , o r  none . He may have a semi-autonomous 
bur�au within his ministry (as in Norway and in Australia) ; 
he may have an independent authority report ing to him 
directly through the head o f  his min istry (as has occurred 
in Canada) ; and each of these bodies may have the control of  
all o r  o f  only part o f  aid . 
In four count ries only ( the United Kingdom , West Germany , 
the Netherlands , and Sweden) is there a minister ent irely 
responsible for aid , and in only one country , the Un ited 
Kingdom , does this responsible minister have control of  a 
department which centralizes all aid function s .  In West 
Germany and th e Netherlands implementat ion of aid is the 
responsibility of other departments and while S IDA (the Swedish 
Internat ional Development Authority) cont rols bilateral aid , 
the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs prepares the aid 
budget and cont rols mult ilateral aid . Japan represent s the 
other end of  the spectrum : both political responsibility and 
bureaucrat ic control are widely dispersed . 
Thus there is a cont inuum o f  arrangement s for polit ical 
respons ibility for aid which extends from the independent 
ministry for aid with its own responsible minister (as in the 
United Kingdom under its Labour government s ) , through those 
cases where the foreign mini ster (or president ) assumes 
responsibility for aid which is controlled by a variety of 
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more or less aggregated an d autonomous bodies , to the 
situat ion wher e a number of minist ers collect ively assume 
responsibility fo r aid and the widest degree of  dispers ion 
of funct ion occurs (as in Japan) . Given that nat ional 
arrangements vary widely , it is s till poss ible to make some 
general observat ions about the nature of political control 
exercised over aid and its relat ionship to policy out comes . 
France is the instruct ive except ion to the propos it ion 
advanced at the start o f  this chapter . Relat ive to the other 
count ries discussed presidential control of aid policy is 
very strong , the corollary b eing that the exerc ise o f  
bureauc rat ic power in this area i s  weak . There appear t o  be 
three reasons for this circumstance : firs t , it is a character­
ist ic o f  the French polit ical system generally - the Pres ident 
is able to both propose and dispo se without a wide degree o f  
formal reference to his coll eagues o r  offic ials ; second , it 
is the result of the st ructure of ministers and department s 
who have interes ts in aid in which the Secretary for African 
Affairs conduct s an outs ide lin e  to  African countries and 
advises the President directly , bypass ing other ministries , 
and where the Prime Min i ster and Mini ster for Finance predom­
inate over the Minister and Ministry for Foreign Affairs , 
Minist ry of Trade , and DOMI'OM; 7 finally , it has b een the 
historical and ideological principle of French President s  
s ince d e  Gaulle that relat ions with former French colonies 
(especially those in Francophone Africa) are an integral and 
high priority part of  French foreign policy , providing France 
with credibil ity and credit as a maj or power with an ability 
to deliver votes at the UN , with access to both the Arab 
states and the North-South dialo gue , and not least with the 
opportunity to expand French culture and language . Here aid 
directly supports fo reign policy , and indeed in the French 
view is inseparable from it . Thus , apart from the st ructural 
reasons fo r the exercise of presidential power , this percept ion 
of  the importance of aid to foreign policy requires presidential 
control . 
In France , both the broad st ructure o f  polit ical power 
and the high priority given to aid work together to provide 
continuing st rong polit ical direct ion in the aid fiel d .  The 
amb it for debate on policy is circums cribed and confined to 
means rather than ends and little influenced by internat ional 
reassessments . Change generally oc curs at the top (prompted 
7Ministry of  Overseas Department s and Territories . 
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by representat ion from recipient s )  rather than proceeding 
from officials who find the polit ical barriers to influencing 
pol icy too difficult to surmount . The problems that other 
countries experience in maintaining or expanding the aid 
budget are relatively absent in Fran ce ,  again because of the 
combinat ion of strong polit ical cont rol and the high priority 
ascribed to aid . 
Th e French situat ion stands in contrast to that of  
count ries in which the  foreign minister has responsibility 
for aid . Here there is often some degree of tens ion between 
the aims of aid and the obj ect ives and pract ice of  foreign 
policy . 
Where foreign ministers are responsible , foreign policy 
generally takes p ride of  place , and aid mattens assume a 
res idual status , dominated by bureaucrats .  The degree to 
which foreign ministers exercise their formal power of 
decision on aid depends in part on their level of  interest , 
and in part on whether the bureaucrat ic arrangement s encourage 
or inhib it ministerial decis ion-making . For example , when 
aid administ rat ion is fully integrated into the foreign 
ministry ,  conflicts between foreign policy and aid obj ect ives 
are usually resolved at bureaucrat ic level and policy cho ices 
may not even be raised with the minister . If , however ,  there 
is a degree of separat ion b etween aid and foreign policy 
administ rat ion then ministers may b e  expected to  resolve 
confl i ct s  aris ing b etween these obj ectives . Polit icians 
often regard aid princ ipally as a fo reign ' slush ' fund ,  which 
they us e to smooth over diff icult ies in bilateral or int er­
nat ional negot iat ions . Fo reign ministries tend to encourage 
them in this for reasons of diplomacy , although aid bureau­
crat s and finance ministries are inclined to oppose this kind 
o f  us e o f  aid funds . The outcomes in such situat ions again 
depend on whether aid bureaucrats can advise the minister 
directly , or whether they are able to put their view only at 
departmental l evel . Thus the organ izat ion of  aid directly 
b ears on the degree of  ministerial cont rol exercised . 
At the ministerial level , aid tends to b e  a low priority 
area in government decisions , and in spite of rhetoric to the 
cont rary concerning internat ional development , aid often 
comes out second b est when a severe conflict arises among 
min isters about priorit ies in allocat ion of resources . There 
are several reasons for this : foreign ministers themselves 
have to resolve conflicts b etween aid and foreign pol icy 
obj ect ives and although they assume that it is in their 
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foreign policy interest s  to have a large aid budget , they 
are not surprised when other ministers accord aid the same 
secondary status they themselves give it . More important is 
the fact that , in ministerial discuss ions on domestic 
economic management , foreign ministers and aid ministers 
carry litt le weight , so that in a contest b etween cut s in 
foreign as against domest ic expenditure , ministers for 
finance usually prevail simply b ecaus e they are more powerful 
in this area . 8 Similarly , if there is concern with the 
balance of payment s ,  aid is the first vict im of cuts in 
fo reign expendit ure b ecause it does not have sufficient status 
or entrenched interests to survive as , for example , defence 
does . 9 Thus foreign ministers , given their priorit ies , 
generally do not want to fo rce aid to the po int of  dispute , 
and if they do , they often lo se the battle . Colaco ' s  study 
(19 73)  of  the sens it ivity o f  levels of  aid in DAC countries 
to budget deficit s ,  inflat ion and the balance on current 
account illustrates the outcomes of these conflict s .  There 
is , in most DAC count ries , a relat ionship b etween a deterior­
at ion in the balance of  payments and a decline in aid levels 
in both the short and long term. The polit ical mechanism 
for this is of course the more powerful posit ion of the 
finance minister . 
The inst itut ion of a separate minister for aid does not 
appear to vary this experience s ignificant ly . In the United 
Kingdom in 1964 , Barbara Cast le as first Minister for Overseas 
Development (ODM) took her place in the inner Cab inet prin­
cipally as a rising star in the n ew government but also as an 
earnest of  the new priority to b e  given to aid . ODM was not 
only to be concerned with aid but to have an impact on trade , 
investment and other policies that had development implicat ions . 
8The int erests of  the domest ic const ituency will prevail 
unless such foreign expenditure can be p erceived as cont rib­
ut ing directly to domestic interest s , for example , through 
expo rt s o r  in security terms . In these cases the maintenance 
of the aid budget is usually achieved at the cost of a 
decline in aid interest s prop er . 
9The United Kingdom experience here is interesting , for the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer prevailed immediately on aid 
cuts in the period 1964 to 19 70  ( Seers and Streeten (19 72 ) , 
but the Minis ter for Defence conducted a spirited st rategic 
retreat over a number of years ( Crossman , 19 7 6 , passim) . 
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Ironically , Castle and her successors t o  1970  pres ided over 
a decline in Brit ish aid in money and real terms , and a 
deteriorat ion in other British fore ign policies towards 
developing countries that was unparalleled in Britain ' s  
recent history ( Seers and Streeten 19 7 0 : 12 7 ) . This was an 
indicat ion , if indeed one were needed , that an increase in 
the ascribed status o f  aid and the appointment of a separate 
mini ster are not proof against established power forces and 
the exigencies of  other nat ional policies . 
When this British experience is compared with that of 
France , two things are not iceable : b ecause o f  the relat ively 
low prior ity ascribed to aid , polit ical support evaporated 
in the face of other pressures , principally economic ; and 
more generally , the latent tens ion in Britain between aid as 
applied to development obj ectives and aid as a tool o f  foreign 
policy has led to  a continuing search for new organizat ional 
arrangements to give one obj ective or the other priority . 
These have taken on a party colour . 
In the ministerial arena , it appears that the ingredient 
neces sary to make stated aid policies prevail in the face of 
comp et ing claims is whether sufficient col lective ministerial 
support can be mustered for aid obj ect ives . This in turn 
depends on a number of  factors , of which the ideological 
coIIDilitment to aid itsel f  is relatively less significant . It 
depends first , on how important the aid program is perceived 
to be by ministers , relat ive to other nat ional interests ; 
second , it depends on the role that the leader of the 
government chooses to play in such disputes , and f inally it 
depends on the level - o f public crit icism or support that 
polit icians perceive to exist . Without these conditions 
being sat isfied in a positve or at least neutral way , aid 
obj ectives tend to go under in competit ive situat ions . The 
British and Aust ralian ( Seers and St reeten 19 72 ; Viviani and 
Wilenski 19 78)  experiences are interesting in this respect ;  
but a more telling example , outs ide the Westminster system ,  
o f  the operat ion of these three factors ,  both positively and 
negatively , is a comparison o f  United States aid in 1961 and 
19 70 . 
The Kennedy administrat ion came to o ff ice in 1961 with 
a program that was act ively internat ional , and its new 
direct ion in foreign policy towards developing countries was 
but tressed by a new American approach to foreign aid . The 
ideology of US foreign aid was as much a response to competition 
with the USSR in a cold war s ituat ion as to the need for 
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economic development o f  poor count ries , but the sub stantial 
pol itical impetus given to aid by the new administrat ion 
ensured the inst itut ion of  changes in US aid pol icy and 
administrat ion that were to endure in the face o f  Congress ional 
crit icism and other bureaucratic interests for almost a 
decade . The establ ishment o f  the US  Agency for Internat ional 
Development in 1961 to centralize some but not all func t ions , 
the expans ion of  the aid budget and the widenin g o f  its 
geographical distribut ion , the institut ion of  an ac tivist 
(even interventionis t )  approach to country programmin g ,  all 
testified to the strength of polit ical support from the 
Pres ident and his departmental .appointees for an increased 
importance for foreign aid vis-a-vis other nat ional policies 
and the tapping of a largely acquiescent reservo ir of public 
support for foreign aid in the early 1960s . 
Compare the situat ion when Nixon came to power . Con­
gres sional and wider public support for aid had eroded 
s ignificantly , no t least b ecaus e the expectat ions raised as 
to what aid could achieve had proved unfulfillable ; the 
pressure of other comp eting nat ional interest s , balance o f  
payment s cons iderat ion s ,  foreign pol icy and commercial 
intere sts succeeded in scoring again st foreign aid b ecause 
of the declining political support accorded to aid and hence 
in aid ' s  bureaucrat ic power . Nixon ' s  own predilect ion and 
response to these facto rs was to further downgrade foreign 
aid in nat ional priorit ies ; to curtail any expansion in aid 
and to look to arrangements that would tie US aid more t ightly 
to US domes tic interests (Thorp 1971  and Cunningham 1974 : 68) . 
The rise and decline o f  US Pres ident ial , Congressional 
and public support for aid is of particular significance 
b ecause the US plays a preponderant role in the aid f ield in 
influencing the behaviour of  other dono rs (and recip ient s )  
and in assuming a global leadership role . Many have concluded 
that the decline in the United States of support for aid was 
due to a polit ical recognition of the ' fa ilures ' o f  aid , in 
the sense that aid was insuf ficiently capable o f  sat isfying 
American nat ional obj ect ives . 10 There is clearly a good 
deal in this , for if the rat ionale for aid is founded f irmly 
on dono r interests prosecuted abroad (such as polit ical 
' stab ility ' ,  and effective recipient support o f  US interest s )  
lOFor example , Liberals in Congress disliked aid b ecause it 
propped up US intervention in Indo china and con servatives 
disliked it b ecause it did not serve American polit ical 
interests adequately . 
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then an apparent failure to achieve these does lead to a 
lo ss o f  domestic polit ical support and a consequent eros ion 
of  the place of  aid among comp et ing interest s . But there 
are other , wider factors in US aid which were less influential 
for other donors . To the extent that aid was an important 
inst rument for the support of US policies in the cold war , 
its decline was inevitable given the process of  detente which 
succeeded cold war ten s ions . Again , the retreat of the United 
States from an activist and intervent ionist foreign policy 
stemming from the Vietnam experience and signi fied by Nixon ' s  
Guam do ctrine led to a decline in support for aid . Aid is 
peculiarly sensit ive to the working out o f  chan ging forces 
in internat ional polit ics , and in part icular to the expans ion 
or retraction in foreign policy stances . It may well be that 
the l evel and compos it ion o f US aid s ince Nixon indicates 
very well a decline in the American commitment to the economic 
development of poor countries , following the decline o f  the 
enthus iasm of the 1960s when aid was expected not only to 
move mountains , but foreign government s  as well . 
In contrast to the French s ituat ion , where the polit ical 
system and the importance attached to aid make for continuing , 
centralized high level polit ical control , the American 
experience is one in which polit ical control o f  aid is 
effect ively divided b etween Pres ident and Congress ( the 
latter being both a policy maker and an interested const itu­
ency) in a s ituation where larger swings in the importance 
at tached to aid influence the Pres ident ' s  cho ice about 
exerc ising his power . Where he chooses not to exercise his 
power act ively , the role is assumed by Congress and/or the 
administ rat ion . Here the United States is unique , for it is 
the only country in which the legislature plays a significant 
role in aid policy . 
All DAC donors require approval by legislature for all 
aid budgets in some form or other but , with the exception o f  
the USA, this i s  a more or less formal pro cess . Aid budgets 
are prepared within minist ries where most confl ict s on 
resource allocat ion are reconciled and then receive ministerial 
approval . They are then submitted for approval o f  the legis­
lature with other budgetary proposals . 11 While est imates 
committees and their equivalents may quibble , the outcomes 
11some parts o f  aid budgets are established under cont inuing 
legislat ion , e . g . Australian World Bank cont ribut ions , 
while in this resp ect the · United S tates adopt s  an opposite 
course requiring legi sLat ive approval for every replenishment . 
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are usually automat ic because of the parliamentary maj orit ies 
of  the government . The chief benefit of  legislat ive overs ight 
is that ministers and bureaucrats can be quest ioned on aid 
matters , abuses can be exposed and opinion can be tested . 
In the United States , however ,  although the Pres ident 
formally carries the ent ire respon sibility for foreign policy , 
the role o f  Congress is central to the setting o f  the aid 
budget , and Congress can in its deliberat ions significant ly 
influence aid policy and through this fo reign policy . This 
pro ces s  is complex and drawn out over t ime ,  so that more than 
a year can elapse b etween the submis s ion o f  the aid request 
by the Presiden t to Congress , and it s authorizat ion and 
appropriat ion . The aid request is submitted to both the House 
o f  Representat ives and the Senate , and the powerful Senate 
Fo reign Relat ions Committee and the House Connnit tee on Inter­
nat ional Af fairs enquire into the aid proposals and reports 
to their respect ive chambers for decision . When , as o ften 
occurs , the House and the Senate differ in their recommend­
at ions , a conference is called to resolve the differences 
before the process of authoriz at ion and appr-0priat ion is 
completed . 
Such a brief des cript ion can do l ittle j ust ice to the 
complexity o f  the polit icking in this pro cess . But if  we 
look at the out comes of  this pro cess on some part icular 
issues we can gain a sense of the relat ive power exercised 
by President and Congress .  Almost every year the aid request 
is  reduced by Congress , usually substantially ; the p ro cess 
of  annual author izat ion and appropriat ion app ears to inhib it 
forward planning in AID , and Congress '  requirement that 
changes in the approved program must be cleared by it , 
inhibit s both President ial and administ rative programming 
flexibility . Further , Congress has frequently added riders 
to aid legislat ion conveying the ' sense ' of Congress with 
respect to geographical dist ribut ion of aid , amounts o f  
PL480 food aid , and a whole variety of  fo reign policy issues , 
some of  which have little to do with economic aid . 
Congress does more than react to an agenda presented by 
the Adminis t ration . In recent years it has sought to create 
an aid policy - the New Direct ions of 1973  - in which its 
views of  the distribution aspects of US aid attempt to give 
a new cast to the purposes of economic assistance . While 
in the past the Pres ident and AID have had to develop support 
in Congres s  fo r their policies , in the case of policy orig­
inat ing in the legislature , Congress needs support from AID , 
from the State Department and from the President if  these 
changes in emphas is are to be made . 
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It seems then that it is  the relat ive balance of  power 
between Pres ident and Congress , and the amount of polit ical 
capital the President is willing to expend to have his way , 
that shapes the aid program at any one part icular t ime . 
Where the aid bureaucracy has direct and success ful access 
to the President , and can influence Congress ional opin ion 
in its favour , then it s role increases in importance . It 
may be that this occurs mostly when aid issues are relat ively 
impo rtant among the ran ge of nat ional preoccupat ions . 
This dis cussion o f  the polit ical control of  aid has 
stressed the diversity of means of cont rol , while f inding 
some common incen t ives and dis incent ives to the exercise of  
that cont rol .  The French s ituat ion epitomizes politi cal 
control and has bureaucrat ic consequences that we shall 
dis cuss later . The American experience is a hal fway house 
in which the triangular influences of  President , Congress 
and AID predominate according to shifting c ircumstances . 
For the rest , the formal requirement fo r polit ical control 
exists , but its exercise is s trongly const rained by the 
generally low status of aid , the compet ing claims for 
resources from other interests , and the organiz at ional 
arrangements for aid which influence which issues will come 
to ministers . I have argued generally that col lective 
mini sterial (or polit ical )  support for aid is a necessary 
condit ion for aid matters to survive the compet it ion of 
other national interes ts , and have con cluded that this 
condit ion is mo re o ften unsat is f ied than not , part icularly 
when cho ices are made sharp by di fficult economic circum­
stances . This may only ind icate that aid is ext remely 
sensit ive to domestic and internat ional economic conditions , 
but it points clearly to the polit icians ' dilemma : given 
the fact that polit icians are obliged to look to the wel fare 
of their own people firs t , how do they j ustify the expenditure 
of funds on other states when it is clear at times that it 
is to the cost (at least in the short term) of their own 
people ? It is this dilemma which is at the centre of  
discus sions o f  budget priorit ies and i t  is one for  which 
very few countries have succeeded in developing and maintaining 
a satisfactory rationale . 12 Thus it is that part ies which in 
12 0ne thinks here of the French who have given priority to 
the disseminat ion of French polit ical and cultural values , 
and o f  the Swedes who have developed public support for a 
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oppos it ion promoted enlightened internat ionalism, find that 
the assumpt ion of power makes for nat ionalist responses to 
such dilemmas . 
Bureaucrat ic control of  aid 
The foregoing dis cuss ion was concerned with the various 
degrees of polit ical control exercised in nat ional aid 
programs and the circums tances in which this control is 
exercised . An as sumpt ion emerged that the relat ionship 
between polit ical and bureaucrat ic aid is rather like a tug­
o f-war : when polit icians choo se to  pull , bureaucrat s usually 
follow (but in their own way) , but if polit icians for some 
reason do not pull, a st ruggle develops among bureaucrats as 
to whom among them shall direct their pulling . The po int s 
at issue among bureauc rat s are real ones ; their stuuggle is 
not merely for territorial advantage , and the two mo st 
content ious and endurin g  of these issues are those of the 
balance to be found between aid and foreign policy consider­
at ions , and the making of the aid budget . In both o f  these 
i ssues we should take account o f  the dead hand o f  the past : 
the pat tern of a state ' s  foreign relat ions tends t o  b e  a 
pers ist ent one (albeit with fluctuat ions at the margin)  and 
the o ccas ional dramat ic severing o f  a b ilateral relat ionship 
should not lead to a dis count ing of the weight that lies 
behind preserving each relat ionship in the pat tern through 
all available means including aid . S imilarly , the most 
power ful factor in aid budget ing is , as with all budgeting,  
the inertia o f  past decisions . A s ignificant short run 
increase in an aid budget is difficult enough to achieve in 
any circumstances , but t o  mainta in  a long-t erm t rend increase 
above an agreed level of  other claims on government is well 
nigh impo ss ible (Heclo and Wildavsky 1 9 74 : 2 7 f f ) . Both of  
these factors are properly o rganizat ional out comes and 
influence the following dis cuss ion significantly . 
Several historical influences can b e  dist inguished which 
help to explain the differin g  aid structures of DAC donors 
over the last twenty-five years . First , France and Britain 
can b e  viewed together as former colonial powers , whose aid 
12 ( cont inued) 
long-term internat ionalist stance . On the other hand , 
examples abound o f  countries which in failing to develop 
and maintain an adequate rat ionale for aid have seen their 
aid programs fall prey to the incurs ions of other nat ional 
interest s .  
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policies and adminis t rat ions grew out of  that experience , and 
which found different policy and administrat ive responses to 
the changes of  the 1960s and 19 70s . Second , against these 
we may contrast West Germany and Japan , which had quite 
different colonial experiences , were vanquished powers , and 
which saw the ir aid programs in part as relat ing to their 
rehab ilitat ion as bona fide members of the internat ional 
conununity . Third , the United States requires a class of it s 
own as it sought to use aid to help maintain its predominant 
world power posit ion vis-a-vis the USSR through the 1950s and 
1960s . Finally , there are a number o f  what might b e  called 
' internat ionalist ' aid donors ; the Scandinavian count ries , 
Canada , and more recently the Netherlands . 13  This class ific­
at ion is not meant to be absolute or exhaust ive , but merely 
indicates some important factors in the development o f  each 
nation ' s  aid . As nat ional and int ernat ional fortunes have 
chan ged ,  so have the policies and administrat ions of these 
dono rs , so that they have at t imes fallen into other cate­
gories . In the dis cus s ion o f  the aid organizat ion o f  these 
donors , we will concentrate on how var ious bureaucrat ic roles 
in aid policy formulation emerged and why these have changed 
over time . It is wo rth reiterat ing here that the discuss ion 
which follows is not concerned with the relative merit s of  
nat ional aid p erformance and thus does not seek to make a 
j udgment relat ing administrat ive arrangement s to the worth 
of aid programs . 
The French system o f  aid s t ill exhib its it s post-colonial 
character , especially in the concentrat ion of aid on former 
French colonies , in the s ignificance attached to technical 
ass istance , and not least in the administrat ive arrangements 
made for aid . Although the administrat ion of French aid is 
widely dispersed among government bodies and is frankly 
confusing to the outsider , it is helpful to consider French 
aid as consisting o f  three separate geographically concen­
trated programs , each with it s own rat ionale and obj ect ives , 
together with separate capital funding and technical as sistance 
arrangements . 14 Aid to France ' s  Overseas Departments and 
Territories is admini stered not only by the ministry of state 
responsible for these , 15 but also by some specialist ministries 
l3These donors are not discussed in detail in this paper , 
but see below (p . 83 ) for some conunent s .  
14For an extended descript ion o f  French aid see Hayter (1966 : 
85 f f )  and Cunningham ( 19 74 : 1 70ff) . 
15This department falls under the author ity o f  the Prime 
Minister , lt s head having deputy s tatus . 
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and by the Cent ral Fund fo r Economic Cooperat ion ( CCEE )  which 
is the controlling body for loans to developing count ries . 
The Francophone count ries south of the Sahara , l ' Etat s 
Africains et Mal gaches (EAM) , with which France maintains 
part icular polit ical and cultural links , receive loans from 
the CCEE and financial and technical ass istance from the 
Secretariat of Stat e  for Foreign Affairs responsible for 
Cooperat ion (an adminis trat ively separate part of the Ministry 
o f  Foreign Affairs )f6 
French a id to count ries outside these two categoriesl 7  
derives financially from the Mini stry of  the Economy and 
Finance , while technical ass istance is p rovided by the 
Directorate General for Cultural , Scient ific and Technical 
Relat ion s ,  a no rmal unit of  the Ministry of  Foreign Af fairs . 
The concept ion b ehind each of these three arrangement s 
dif fers and reflects the cont inuing influence of  post­
colonial facto rs and the transmut at ion o f  thes e  into French 
interest s in the Third World . In the bureaucrat ic arena , 
the differences which are perceived to exist among classes 
of  recipients provide the rat ionale for each part of the 
bureaucracy to maintain it s hold over its own area of admin­
istrat ion . It seems that a minimum of co-ordinat ion takes 
place and that there is much duplicat ion o f  funct ions . The 
problems that result tend to be sorted out by ambassadors at 
post level who have overall authority over Cooperat ion 
Missions . 
While there appears to be less disput e in French aid 
administrat ion than in some other count ries over cent ral 
policy quest ions , given the st rong polit ical control which 
the Pres ident exert s , these bureaucrat ic arrangements allow 
a fruit ful area for dispute over territory . The cooperat ion 
secretariat and the Ministry for Fo reign Affairs app ear to 
seek an expansion of  their roles at the other ' s  expense , but 
such problems are contained by the predominance of  the Prime 
Minister over this arena and also by the Prime Mini ster ' s  
authority over DOMI'OM. Bureaucrat ic argument s p rovide no 
st rong base fo r mounting a challenge either to policy or to 
the exis t ing structure . 
16From 1961 to 1966 this Secretariat was a separate Ministry 
o f  Cooperat ion responsible for all aid to EAM states . 
1 7  Denoted b y  the French a s  ' foreign ' countries . 
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We no ted above the direct control that the Pres ident 
exert s  over the aid budget and this seems sufficient to make 
Ministry of  Finance of ficial s  wary of intervent ion . S imilarly 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot extend its in fluence 
over the aid budget becaus e of the predominance of the Finance 
Ministry ,  and it is ins truct ive that while the French aid 
budget has expanded regularly , the Foreign Af fairs budget has 
declined under pressures from F inance . 
There has b een much crit icism o f  these bureaucrat ic 
arrangement s  in France as wasteful and ineffect ive . In the 
early 1960s the government ordered an inquiry . The result , 
the Jeanneney Report (Hayter 1966 : 92 )  proposed extens ive 
administ rat ive reorganizat ion of  French aid . It envisaged 
the concent rat ion of  all French aid in two organizat ions 
cont rolled chiefly by the Foreign Ministry and funct ionally 
divided b etween financial and techni cal as s istance . These 
proposals provoked support for an alternat ive administ rat ive 
arrangement : the enlargement o f  the Ministry o f  Coop erat ion 
to undertake respon sib ility for all aid (like the Brit ish 
Ministry of Overseas Development ) , and the arguments between 
the two s ets o f  proponent s followed the classical l ines : 
developmental versus polit ical considerat ions ; experi ence 
versus lack of experience in aid ; and included the mud 
slinging typical o f  th ese debates in Britain in which the 
central izers are accused of being tainted with colonial ism 
and the diplomat s are accused of formal ism and political 
venality . 
The French Prime Minister outlined the choices incisively 
to the Nat ional Assembly in June 1964 in a speech which 
deserves quotat ion at some length : 
[our administrat ive structures ] are very 
complex . Where does it come from, this complexity? 
Clearly from history 
For myself ,  I do not believe that we can [modify 
these structures ] at the moment , that is to say 
in the next days o r  weeks . For some t ime , the 
af fairs of Algeria and of Black Africa will retain 
specific characteris t ics . I b elieve that a l ittle 
apparent incoherence is preferable to a kind of 
brutal and arb it rary fusion which would in the end 
create inf initely greater complicat ions . But I am 
also convinced that in the n ext year or two , in 
1965 or in 1966 , we will adopt another formula . 
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It is at  any rate one of the problems with which 
the Government is preoccupied . • .  
Two solut ions are po ss ible . One is that of  the 
Jeanneney Report . The other , which is nearer to 
the heart of the Minister of Coop erat ion , 
consists in creat ing progressively a big Minis t ry 
of Cooperat ion , which would first take Algerian 
affairs , and then , later , once it was sufficiently 
experienced and well established , stand up to face 
the old lady of the Quai d ' Orsay and say to her : 
Give me back , if not my legions , at least Morocco , 
Tunisia and the other count ries . 
Between these two formulas , I must admit that our 
choice has not yet b een made • . . At any rate , 
this choice will be dictated by the following 
considerat ions : should we attach decis ive 
impo rtance to the link between cooperat ion and 
foreign policy ? ls cooperat ion really linked 
with our foreign policy ? Is it part of the normal 
act ivities o f  ambassadors ? 
Or are the special techniques and methods o f  
cooperat ion on the contrary s o  specific that it 
it better , so to speak , to be a cooperator by 
pro fession ?  Should the Minis t ry o f  Cooperat ion 
alone ful fil th� requirements o f  coop eration ? 
( Quot ed in Hayter 1966 : 93-4) . 
As it happened no wide-ranging administ rat ive reform 
took place then , or indeed since . For internal polit ical 
reasons , the Ministry of Cooperat ion was downgraded to a 
secret ariat o f  state within the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs , 
and fruitless at tempt s  failed to curb the power o f  the 
Minis t ry of Finance , which carried great weight precisely 
because of  the dispersal o f  aid funct ions . The debate on 
admin ist rat ion in the early and mid-1960s in fact led to the 
solidification of the exis t ing disaggregat ion of funct ions , 
and a new inquiry in 19 7 1  was fated to the same neglect as the 
Jeanneney Report . 
The French experience in attempt ing administrat ive 
reform in aid illustrates the inert ia o f  established power 
relat ions and the defence o f  territory preoccupat ions of  a 
civil service which i s  not very flexib le and greatly est eems 
administ rat ive t radit ions . It further illustrates that where 
there are several di screte obj ectives in aid and litt le 
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concern to reconcile these because of  a percept ion of  the 
differing status of recipients , the rat ionale for central­
iz at ion of aid funct ion s is lacking . 
The French case illustrates the need for caut ion in 
ascrib ing too much weight to bureaucratic arrangements in 
policy making . The dispersal o f  French aid administ rat ion 
does not appear to have hampered the development of a broad 
policy line which f inds wide support in the departments 
concerned with aid . It may be that where such a consensus 
exists on the broad approach to aid , the st rains that occur 
in such a dispers ion of administrat ion are less severe than 
in situat ions where a s imilar consensus is lacking . Here , 
the quest ion is whether a s ignificant change in aid adminis­
trat ion arrangement s say ,  towards centralizat ion , would make 
for a material change in French aid pol icies . 
It is not without significance that the inquiry into 
French aid administ rat ion took place in 196 3-64 rather than 
in the previous decade or later in the 1960s . Cummingham 
has called the 1960s the decade of  the aid agencies , since 
almo st all wes tern donors then considered the cent ralization 
of aid funct ions . Within nat ional administ rat ions , such 
cons iderat ions were given impetus by changing historical 
roles in aid , the need to develop rat ionales for aid separate 
to some degree from foreign policy and commercial obj ect ives , 
and because o f  a percept ion o f  the in creas ing complexity of  
aid and the need for  co-ordinat ion . Int ernat ionally , 
compet it ion between donors was increas ing , and the workings 
of the Development Ass ist ance Committee o f  OECD focussed the 
attent ion o f  donors on one anothers ' pro grams , !� thus provoking 
bureaucrat s to see that limitat ions o f  their structures hi�dered 
changes in their _programs . In .the French case , domestic factors 
were clearly more important than internat ional ones , although 
the latter provided the climate for a reassessment of  
administ rat ion . 
The Brit ish experience in reorganizat ion o f  aid adminis­
tration differs substantially from the French ,  although both 
count ries had played a comparable colonial role . Before the 
Wilson Labour Government of 1964 , Brit ish aid administ rat ion 
was divided between the Foreign Office which gave aid to non­
Commonwealth developing count ries , the Commonwealth Office 
1 8Although at thi s stage DAC was concerned more with 
target ing and the terms of aid than with it s administrat ion . 
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which aided Commonwealth countries and the Colonial Office 
which administered colonial aid . In addit ion , the Treasury , 
which had respon sibil ity for internat ional financial inst it­
ut ions and general budgetary oversight , and the Board of 
Trade played powerful rol es in the decisions on aid policies . 
This div·is ion of  responsibilit ies was of  course s imilar to 
the French and derived from much the same historical cons ider­
at ions , resulting in comparable prob lems of duplicat ion and 
co-ordinat ion . 
A small , but vocal sect ion of public op inion in Britain 
had managed to ga in Labour Party backing for the central­
iz at ion and separat ion of aid funct ion s as a means of embarking 
on a new kind of aid and development policy for Britain , one 
which would be oriented more towards the needs o f  recipients 
than to Brit ish interests . The new Labour Government set up 
the Ministry for Overseas Development as soon as it came to 
office , and some representat ives of this group , headed by 
Thomas Balogh (later adviser to Wilson)  managed to determine 
the organizat ion o f  the new ministry ,  and became themselves 
involved in it s pol icy-making and adminis t rat ion . Dudley 
Seers (then Director of the Inst itute for Development Studies 
in Sussex) and Paul Streeten ( then Pro fessor of Economics at 
Sus sex) headed the economic planning staff , and it is  to them 
we owe the frankest insider account o f  any nat ional aid 
program. 19 
ODM itself was an amalgam of the staff o f  the Old 
Department of Technical Cooperat ion , together with Foreign 
Office , Colonial and Commonwealth Office s taff and some 
Treasury people , on to which were grafted some twenty 
economist s  in a planning staff who were to provide a specialist 
input to aid and to ensure that wider development consider­
at ions were taken into account in the range of  Brit ish 
overseas policies . Apart from the new planning staff , the 
ODM had a dis t inct colonial flavour in that many officials 
saw British policy ' as a sort of  j umbo vers ion of  the old 
colonial and wel fare op erat ion s ' ( Seers and Streeten 19 72 : 14 3 ) . 
The experience of  ODM in the years 1964-70 showed that 
it had ext reme difficulty in maintaining both the volume o f  
19 seers an d  S treeten 19 7 2 . They eventually became dis illusioned 
outs iders and rel iance on their account needs to be tempered 
with awareness of this . 
69 
aid20  and what it considered an enlightened aid stance , and 
that it s in fluence on other asp ects of  Brit ish policy related 
to development was negligible . There were two main reasons 
for this . The first was the lack of  collect ive pol it ical 
will which has b een described above (page 5 7 ) .  The second 
was ODM ' s place in the pattern o f  bureaucrat ic power which 
operated in this period in Whitehall . Brit ish administrat ive 
convention is perhaps at it s strongest in adherence to the 
norm that agreement should be found on matters of policy 
before reference to ministers . As one permanent secretary 
expressed it : ' There ' s  a tremendous incent ive for officials 
to agree . . .  In the last resort , if you don ' t  sort things out 
with the Treasury , ministers will dec ide , and they are 
polit ical animals .  You don ' t  know what they ' ll do ' (quot ed 
in Heclo and Wildavsky 19 74 : 80) . 
The s ign ificance o f  this pressure to agree at official 
level is seen at once , when it i s  compared to  the independent 
operat ing lat itude of US AID . In the Brit ish system confl ict ing 
views within a department are composed roughly according to 
the hierarchical st ructure resulting in a departmental ' view ' : 
the compos it ion of conflic t in g  views among departments is 
st rongly influenced by an implic it hie rarchy based on exercise 
of  the power levers available to departments . This is rat ion­
alized and legit imized by content ions o f  superior knowledge 
such as the Treasury ' s  argument on budgeting : ' We see it 
all ; they [ the departments ] don ' t ' , ( quoted in Heclo and 
Wildavsky 19 74 : 40 ) , or the Foreign Minis try ' s  claim on aid 
administ rat ion : ' we know what these chaps in recipient 
count ries reaZ Zy want ' .  
The effect of  rest ructuring aid responsib ilit ies and 
their locat ion within a new independent department was to 
allow the predominant bureaucrat ic actors either s ingly or 
together to oppos e  ODM policy proposals which conflicted with 
their departmental interest s which subsumed both considerat ions 
of territory and their concept ion of nat ional interest . Thus 
ODM was never able to wrest cont rol of World Bank matters 
from the Treasury , although the World Bank is more a develop­
ment inst itut ion than a f inancial one . Again , while the White 
Paper on development as sistance of  1965 showed clear signs 
of a compromise approach ( ODM views had prevailed in that aid 
was to foster development , terms of loans were to be softened 
2 0  Aid l evelled o f f  in money terms , sustaining a series o f  
severe cut s ; the proport ion o f  Gross Nat ional Product devoted 
to aid fell from 0 . 5 3 per cent in 1964 to 0 . 37 per cent in 
1 9 70 . 
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and so on) yet the Nat ional Plan showed the predominance of 
Treasury and this counted more than the White Paper : the 
chief reference was that aid was to be rest rained because 
of balance of payments difficult ies . These were all public 
s igns of  a debilitating bureaucrat ic struggle , where the 
prize was the relative weight that should be given to 
Brit ish nat ional interests , both polit ical and commercial , 
as against the interests o f  recipient count ries . A Treasury 
official , asked about the relation b etween Brit ish trade and 
aid remarked with a modest degree o f  understatement : ' If I 
can say so frankly , there has been a little b it o f  a tendency 
in an aid Minist ry to say our prime responsibil ity i s  toward 
the recipient country ' (quoted in Seers and Streeten 19 72 : 14 9 ) . 
In the bureaucratic l ine-up on aid mat ters , the 
Department of Economic Affairs was ant i-aid , as was the 
Treasury , b eing concerned with domestic budget priorit ies 
and especially with the deteriorating balance of payment s , 
which was used as much as an excuse for cut t ing aid as a 
reason for do ing so . 21 The Board o f  Trade had export 
interest s  to further ,  and did so at the expense of the aid 
program, and with the suppo rt of the Treasury . The overseas 
political departments found l it tle to support in ODM policies , 
s ince these tended to inst itut ionalize their lo ss o f  influence , 
part icularly in the use o f  aid funds fo r diplomat ic purposes . 
On wider development matters relat ing to trade and investment , 
ODM made little or no impact , for the concept ion of  its role 
as a development minist ry had found no backing in Whitehall . 
Its membership o f  commit tees dealing with such issues d id not 
result in any significant effects on policy , s ince the 
respon s ible departments were powerful enough to ignore 
implicat ion s for developing countries . 
The demot ion o f  the ODM Minister from Cabinet in 1967  
meant that the se disputes could not be raised in Cabinet , 22 
and had to be resolved either at departmental l evel or by 
p ersonal dealing between ministers where the Minister for 
Overseas Development was at a disadvantage because o f  his 
j unior status in the ministerial hierarchy . In all of this , 
21 In spite o f  spirited argument s that balance of payments 
considerat ion s were pract ically irrelevant to aid ( Seers 
and Streeten 1972 : 12 8) . 
22By Cros sman ' s  (19 76)  account , aid issues were raised 
in frequently in Cabinet , although this may be a biased view 
as he was qui te uninterested in fo reign aid . 
the exist ing distr ibution o f  bureaucrat ic power prevailed 
against the new , weak mini stry . 
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In 1970 the new Conservative Government placed ODM in 
the Foreign and Conunonwealth Office under the t itle Overseas 
Development Administrat ion . 23  The chief effect of  this change 
was to l imit further the ability of the aid agency to pursue 
policy in the face of disapproval from the rest of  the Foreign 
Office , for under such an arrangement the Minister for 
Overseas Development is subordinate to the Foreign Secretary , 
and this  fact makes for a shift in influence to the polit ical 
s ide of the Foreign Office , and thence possibly to a diminut ion 
o f  Treasury and Trade influence . 
The Brit ish aid experience is of course a class ic one 
in discus sion s about the administration of  aid . It might be 
j udged that the difficult ies which followed the setting up 
of  ODM are chiefly attributable to the workings of  the 
Wes tmins ter system and the sociolo gy of Whitehall , and such 
a j udgment f inds support in the Australian experience s ince 
19 73 , where a similar set of difficulties derived from 
similar polit ical and bureaucratic circums tances ( Chapter 5 
and Viviani and Wilenski 19 78) . From the Brit ish case , it 
might be concluded that a grasp of and commitment to develop­
ment obj ectives needs to be spread more widely in a bureau­
cracy b efore an independent agency can func t ion adequately 
(as it does in the Netherland s ) , and that a degree of stability 
in government and ministerial personnel is required to 
establish a new department ' s  place in the bureaucracy (as in 
Canada) . Again , the level at which decisions are taken , both 
bureaucratically and minis terially , is an essential consider­
at ion in the development of an aid policy which is no t to 
succumb to the preoccupations of other interes ts . 
While the setting up of  ODM did not fulfil Brit ish 
Labour Party obj ectives , it is doubtful whether the pre­
exist ing arrangements , or some comb ination of thes e would 
have either . The experience might have b een different if 
Britain ' s  economic circumstances had not b een so difficult , 
but the problems of the exis ting distribution o f  bureaucratic 
power do seem intractable in the British s ituat ion . The 
basic orientations of  departments such as Trade and Treasury 
are little altered whether aid is administered in an inde­
pendent body , as part of the Foreign Office , or dispersed 
23The Labour Government re-established ODM as a separate 
Ministry in 1974 . 
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even more widely . If such departments perceive that more 
suppo rt exists among minis ters for their priorities - the 
rest raint of expenditure and concern with the balance of  
payment s  - then they will prevail in disputes over the aid 
program.  It is in this way that polit ical will and bureau­
crat ic power combine to defeat aid obj ect ives , as in Britain ;  
or to sus tain them a s  in the Netherlands and Sweden . 
If historical factors (such as colonialism) and the 
force of administrative convention have proved to be the most 
powerful fac tors influencing both Brit ish and French aid 
o rganization , albeit with different outcomes , the same factors 
have operated in different direct ions in the aid organizat ions 
of  Wes t  Germany and Japan . Their polic ies and organizat ion 
were not influenced by post-co lonial ties , and their status 
as vanquished powers influenced , at least init ially , the 
character of their aid programs . In bo th countries ass istan ce 
from the United States was instrumental to postwar economic 
growth . This fact made for the exerc ise of  American influence , 
first on decisions to begin a substantial aid program ( to 
bolster western interests)  and second , on the orientat ion o f  
aid towards economic growth . Further , fo r both Germany and 
Japan , aid was an important factor in their re-entry into 
internat ional society ; it confirmed their renewed s tatus as 
maj or industrial powers and their reintegrat ion into the 
western power bloc . Most of these cons iderat ions are 
historical and are of waning influence , so that the aid 
st ructures of  West Germany and Japan now bear the clearer 
stamp of nat ional polit ical , economic and bureaucrat ic interest . 
Although the Federal Republic o f  Germany had given some 
multilateral aid and technical ass istance in the 1950s , the 
beginning of Wes t  German aid is marked by the es tablishment 
o f  the Ministry for Economic Co-op eration (BMZ ) 24 in 1961 . 
The BMZ was founded for two highly political reasons : in 
respon s e  to US pres sure on Germany to make a stronger aid 
e f fort , and to f ind a Cab inet seat for the Free Democrat 
coalit ion partner of the ruling Chris t ian Democrat party . 
Despite such pragmatic origins , the BMZ developed its own 
dynamic as an aid agency , not only b ecause it had part control 
of a rapidly expanding volume of aid , but also  b ecause it 
managed to develop a clear statement of general aid pol icy 
and have it accepted by other interes ted departments early 
in it s existence . 
2 4BMZ - Bundesministerium fur Wirt s chaftl iche Zusammenarbeit . 
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In 1961 , the BMZ took over the responsibility for 
technical ass istance from the Foreign Office and the Ministry 
of  Economics , while responsibility for capital ass istance 
remained the province of  all three Ministries . This led , 
probably inevitably ,  to a series o f  severe bureaucrat ic in­
fight s ,  some o f  which were conducted publicly in the German 
pres s (White 1965 ) . The divi sion in policy responsibility , 
and between technical ass istance and capital ass istance , lay 
at the heart of  such conflicts and while interdepartmental 
connnittee machinery was supposed to reconcile these differ­
ences , it exacerbated them , for the territorial responsibil ity 
between minist ries had never been clearly defined by the 
government .  The conflict arose , of course , over the relat ive 
weight s to be given to polit ical and commercial cons iderat ions 
in the deci sions on aid . There was lit tle disagreement that 
aid was for economic development (and a consensus that this 
really meant economic growth) , but the vagueness of areas o f  
responsibility allowed every issue t o  come t o  intermin isterial 
con flict . 
In the West German system,  the responsibility for 
implementat ion of aid lies outside the ministries , and is 
placed in the case of capital assistance in a publicly owned 
bank ,  the KFw , 2 5  and in the case of technical as s istance 
originally in two bodies un t il 19 75 when the GTz , 2 6  a 
government-owned company , was set up . Further , a large 
number of  private and semi-private bodies administer technical 
as sistance under government funding . Thus what appears on 
paper to be an aid agency system headed by a Cab inet Minister 
is really a system of  divi sion of  policy-making responsib ility , 
and great dispersion in administrat ion . What has followed 
is con fusion in the feedback o f  informat ion on the effect ive­
ness of aid policies , and a high level o f  interministerial 
con flict . 
The BMZ made several attempt s to ga in control o f  capital 
ass istance policy and finally succeeded in 1972 . That year 
also , there was renewed dis cuss ion about the integrat ion of  
the BMZ into the Foreign Office . This did not occur , and 
one suspects that the BMZ conducted a spirited defence of its 
posit ion , for it survived in a slightly different form but 
with its responsib ilit ies unimpaired in 1975 . 
25Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau . 
2 6  . .  Deuts che Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusannnenarbeit . 
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In the literature in English on the Ge rman aid organiz­
at ion two somewhat conflict ing views emerge : Cunningham 
(19 74 : 12 5 ff)  has argued that while the BMZ lacked the formal 
bureaucrat ic coverage of  ODM in Britain , in pract ice it has 
in fluenced these areas and has exercised its power more 
effectively . He says that the BMZ has held its own in policy 
aga inst the Foreign Office and the Ministry o f  Economics , 
partly b ecause its pol icy pos ition was well developed and 
supported , 2 7  and also (po ssibly more importantly) b ecause 
the Ministry of  Economics , confident in a st rong balance of  
payments posit ion in the 1960s, allowed it  autonomy to operate 
a development-oriented policy . As Cunningham has it : ' While 
German aid was no more alt ruistic than Brit ish aid , the BMZ 
was thus left mo re free to pursue it s development policy 
without the constant nagging about short term export promot ion 
which ODM had to  content with ' (19 74 : 1 35 ) . 
White ' s  view (19 74 : 25 5 )  is that the West German aid 
organiz at ion (like the Brit ish ODM) exhibits ext reme weakness 
in it s vuln erab ility to the pressure of  non-developmental 
interests , and this j udgment derives in part from his stance 
about such conflicts of int erest ,  which is generally ' if yo u 
can ' t  b eat them, j o in them ' . Whatever one ' s  j udgment about 
Ge rman aid organizat ion , it illustrates ( as does the working 
of the Japanese organ iz ation even more markedly) the st rength 
of the bureaucrat ic imperat ive . For both players ( and 
watchers ) Graham Allison ' s  dictum: ( 19 71 : 1 76 )  usually applies : 
' Where you stand [on development issues ] depends on where you 
s it [ in the bureaucrat ic machine ] ' .  
This applies most aptly to the Japanese system o f  aid 
o rganiz at ion , for it is the mo st dispersed of all DAC count ries . 
No one minist ry in the Japanese bureaucracy carries primary 
responsib ility for aid , even in formal terms . Some fourteen 
minist ries claim an are a of legal responsib ility in aid , 
although four ministries , Foreign , Finance , MIT ! , and the 
Economic Planning Agency claim the largest share of respons­
ib ility and form the Commit tee which cons iders loan request s .  
As in the West German system some implementat ion o f  aid is 
carried out by other bodies . The OECF2 8  implement s  yen loans 
for the government and J I CA2 9 technical ass is tance under the 
2 7Both
,
Cunningham and White note the influence on policy of a 
group o f  out siders , coming from many areas , unl ike the 
Brit ish experience .  
2 8The Overseas Economic Co-op erat ion Fund .  
2 9Japan Internat ional Co-op erat ion Agency . 
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surveillance of the Foreign Ministry ,  which itself administers 
grants to recipient s and mult ilateral agencies . The Exim 
Bank provides loans to foreign governments and to Japanese 
business and is closely supervised by the Finance Ministry 
which itself manages loan contribut ions to int ernat ional 
f inancial inst itut ions . Neither MITI nor Agriculture have 
direct access to aid funds as a part of  their departmental 
budget s ,  but both play an impo rt ant role also in policy and 
implementation ( See Rix 19 7 7  and 19 78) . 
Although all this sounds impossibly confusing we can 
see some s imilarit ies with other count ries . Finance has the 
mo st inf luence on loan decisions (because of it s budget ing 
power) and cont rol of sub s cript ions to internat ional financial 
inst itut ions . Foreign manages grants (because these are a 
very small component in the aid program and are used heavily 
for diplomat ic purposes ) and controls aid to UN agencies 
which is highly political . OECF administers yen loans on 
relat ively soft terms as an intermediate step b etween the 
grants of Foreign and the hard t erms of Finance . Co-ordination 
occurs through an interministerial roundabout . This is not 
so dif ferent from many uncentralized western donors . These 
minist ries and agenci es all have inst itut ionalized links 
with bus iness and consultant s .  
The quest ion that arises about this is the chicken-or­
egg one : did these arrangements occur because the Japanese 
have failed and continue to  fail to develop a general aid 
policy ?  Or is it that these arrangements reflect Japanese 
administ rat ive convent ions which have in turn made it 
impossible to develop such a policy ? 
White , writ ing in 1964 , has argued that Japan lacks a 
s ense of internat ional responsib il ity in a world it sees as 
predominantly host ile to  its interests : 
What is missing from Japanese mot ivat ion is the 
concept , which is present to some ext ent in the 
mot ives of most other donor count ries , of an aid 
policy as a contribut ion to an internat ional 
program of political and economic growth ( 1965 : 11 ) . 
By this view , Japan was pressured by the United Stat es 
and other donors to embark on an aid pro gram in the 1960s 
following the period of reparat ion s . It sees it s aid as a 
way o f  supporting its interests as an advanced nat ion rather 
than as an int ernat ional obligat ion con sequent upon achievement 
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of  that status . Japan certainly has reasons f o r  giving aid -
the promot ion of  its export s and investment , the assurance 
of  i ts sources of supply of raw materials , the development 
of  pol it ical influence in As ia and so on - but it has lacked , 
tmtil quite recently , a gen eral aid policy which acknowledges 
internat ional responsib ility or the acceptance of moral 
claims by poo r cotmt ries . This seems to b e  partly a 
consequence of history : the ambivalence of  the Japanese 
role (except in economic terms ) and the compet it ive nature 
of it s world economic role have worked in the past against 
the development of these other s ides of it s internat ional 
stance . 
Further ,  the Japanese have resisted continuously s ome 
asp ect s o f  the convent ional western wisdom on aid . They 
have been s cept ical of the worth of and the degree of  
coIIDilitment to west ern aid  philosophies and have based their 
own limit ed f inancial and philosophical coIIDilitment on argu­
ment s  first , that in spite of their third largest GNP , their 
per capit a  GNP places them in the same league as It aly and 
New Zealand , and second that self-help should b e  the keynote 
in dealing with developing cotmtries . There is a reco gnit ion 
in some part s of government in Japan , that it is now long 
overdue for Japan to reassess and reorient it s aid , but the 
pattern of existing bureaucrat ic forces works s t rongly 
against this . It seems then that the present dispers ion o f  
Japanese aid o rganizat ion reflect s an init ial lack o f  policy 
interest in developing a coherent aid policy and thus a lack 
o f  att ent ion to administ rat ive o rganizat ion . As an aid 
interest developed , in spit e of the lack of a policy framework ,  
those bodies with aid responsib ilit ies have resisted the 
development of a general policy and an administ rat ive 
reorgan iz at ion that might encroach on their exis t ing 
territory . 
As Japanese aid expan ded piecemeal in the 1960s , areas 
of responsib ility were captured by various minist rie s  and 
ab sorbed or placed in out riders tmder ministerial control . 
This pro cess of incremental ism explains the fotmding of  OECF 
and JICA. No ministry is willing to relinquish it s area o f  
responsibil ity so that duplication of funct ions , for example 
in technical assistance , is rife . Further , the t ime t aken 
to assess requests by possible recipients is ext remely long 
given the requirement , by convent ion , for consult at ion and 
compromise to take place among all possib le interested 
minist ries and agencies b efore a decision is taken . 
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The Foreign Ministry is of course concerned primarily 
with the diplomat ic image of aid , Finance with the impact o f  
aid on the budget , the terms of loans an d  the balance of  
payments . MIT! aims to promote export s ,  f inance privat e 
Japanese investment proj ect s  overseas from aid funds , and to 
ensure the sources of  supply of  raw materials . In spite of 
the existence o f  a consensus among top officials on broad 
Japanese interests in foreign aid , these ministerial int erest s 
are o ften con flicting , and hence out comes depend on the 
bureaucrat i c  power wielded by the var ious ministries . This 
bureaucrat ic situat ion works st rongly against the reform of  
exist ing pract ices in aid ( such as  hard terms ) and in fact 
it is far eas ier to embark on a new init iat ive , like aid to 
the Middle East , than to reform the quality of existing aid 
to Southeast Asia . Ministerial interest in aid has b een 
sporadic , although both Prime Minister Ikeda and Foreign 
Minister Miki made political advances in Japanese aid . Mos t  
recently Prime Minister Fukuda has himself init iat ed a maj or 
shift in Japanese aid to the ASEAN countries , one advocated 
unsuccess fully by the Foreign Mini stry for years . Here 
again polit ical will is required to bypas s  the lo gj ams of 
bureaucracy . 
While in all western donor count ries , commercial 
interests  provide a pressure point on official aid policies 
to greater or lesser degree ; in Japan this commercial int erest 
is st rongly inst itut ionaliz ed in aid policy and implementat ion . 
There is a free flow of  personnel b etween the private and 
government sectors , and while Japan lacks a cohes ive aid 
policy it has an ideology of protect ion of commercial 
interest s ,  so that these are fed into the mini-aid policies 
within each department and agency through well established 
channels . It is this inst itut ional factor , the compos ing 
of official aid interests with commercial interests at 
departmental level that provides the linking rat ionale for 
a system which , lacking a gen eral aid pol icy , would otherwise 
be totally fragmented . 
Before turning to US aid administ rat ion which is 
suf ficiently unlike those of other countries to deserve 
separate cons iderat ion , it i s  useful to sum up some tentat ive 
observat ions aris ing from this discuss ion . With the except ion 
of France and the Unit ed States , where strong polit ical 
control o f  aid reduces the policy role of  the bureaucracy , 
the con flict an d  resolut ion of  bureaucrat ic interests in aid 
are the principal determinants of the character of the aid 
program in the count ries studied . This can b e  shown 
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conclus ively only b y  a detailed st udy of the linking o f  the 
process of  decision-amking with the out comes of  policy on 
such aspects as volume o f  aid , degree of  tying and geograph­
ical dist ribut ion , and this is beyond the s cope of the 
present study . But sufficient attent ion has b een directed 
to the central issues o f  aid budget ing and the aid-foreign 
policy nexus to support this conclusion . The existence o f  
bureaucrat ic con flict over these issues i s  not influenced 
significantly by the fact of aggregat ion or disaggregat ion 
o f  aid functions , for the orientations o f  a Foreign Min ist ry 
to diplomacy or a Finan ce Ministry to budgetary rest raint 
are fundamental , and th es e  interest s  will be pursued wherever 
the responsib ility for aid is lo cated . However ,  the degree 
of such con fl i ct and the level at which it is resolved does 
appear to be in fluenced by the centralizat ion or dispers ion 
o f  aid funct ions . It may b e  that the cent ralizat ion o f  aid 
funct ions with a degree of  autonomy l eads to a higher degree 
of con flict than dispers ion of t hese funct ion s ,  but it 
encourages polit ical resolut ion of the issues . On the other 
hand , it seems quit e clear that dispers ion of aid funct ions 
makes for cont inued low level dispute with relat ively less 
opportunity for or encouragement of the exercise of  polit ical 
decis ion . 
United States aid administrat ion occupies a special 
place along the spect rum that has French cent ralized polit ical 
control and bureaucrat ic diffus ion at one pole and the by 
now tradi tional bureaucrat ic predominance in aid of the 
other states at the other pole . In American aid admin is­
trat ion there are four principal actors - the President , 
Congress , Stat e  Department and AID - so that the combinat ions 
o f  power exercised over t ime are far more complex than in 
the other coun tries we have discussed . To gain some insight 
into this , the principal fo cus will be the debate about aid 
organiz at ion that took place in the late 1960s and 19 70s .30 
The shape of the US Agency for Internat ional Development 
in the 19 70s st ems direct ly from the Kennedy reforms o f  1961 
and the consequent cent raliz at ion of  much o f  US aid following 
the dispers ion of  functions o f  the Eisenhower years . These 
reforms , based on a study by the Brookings Institution for 
3°For extended account s o f  the origins and development of 
the US aid pro gram see , inter alia ,  Nelson 196 8 ; Thorp 
1 9 71 ; Kaplan 196 7 ;  Asher 19 70 and various edit ions of the 
Congressional Qua.rterty . 
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the Senate Foreign Relat ions Connnit tee , set up AID as a unit 
in the S tate Department to take over aid formerly administered 
by the Internat ional Cooperat ion Administ rat ion and the 
Development Loan Fund , and to have responsib ility for the 
allo cat ion of food aid . The rat ionale for this change was 
to provide an administ rat ive bas is for a centralized and 
coherent long-term country-by-count ry program o f  development . 
The aid-foreign policy connection was recognized by AID ' s  
locat ion under the formal control of  the State Department . 
The President directly appo int s  the Administrator of  AID , 
and although the holder of  this pos it ion has his powers 
delegated by the Secretary of Stat e ,  AID has enj oyed a 
degree of  independence (both in Washington and in it s 
recipient-count ry based organizat ion s )  which is remarkable 
when compared to other aid agencies . 
AID controls only about half o f  US economic assistance , 
for the Treasury co-ordinates policy towards the World Bank 
and controls aid to the Asian Development Bank , the Department 
of  Agriculture decides the total volume of  PL4 80 food aid , 
volunteers l ie outs ide AID ' s  administ rat ive cont rol , and AID 
has a responsibility to co-op erate with the Exim Bank on the 
allocat ion of loans on connnercial and near- connnercial terms 
to developing count ries . Perhaps mo st important in policy 
terms AID admin i sters ( rather uneas ily) on behalf of  Stat e ,  
the Security Support Ass ist ance funds , which are the direct 
polit ical arm of US foreign and secur ity policy . 
In spite of the complexity of  these arrangements , AID 
enj oyed a wide degree of operat ing lat it ude during the 1960s , 
not greatly const rained by other bureaucrat ic interest s .  
AID had direct access t o  the President an d  operated it s own 
programs relatively independently . While the classic tens ion 
between short-term security interests versus long-term 
economic interests  produced S tat e-AID conflict , the way to 
polit ical resolut ion of important disputes on this was clear . 
On the other hand , a kind o f  consensus existed between State 
and AID on budgetary mat ters and both also saw tradit ional 
proj ect s and programs as a desirable vehicle for ass istance . 
Further , State and AID agreed on the appro ach to Congress , which 
which was the strongest pressure point in the aid proces s , 
containing both ideolo gues and sp ecial interest groups . 
As we have seen (p· · 58 ) ,  AID was most constrained by 
the mood and act ions of Congress and i t  was the loss of 
polit ical support there that led to  the 1968-73  debate about 
aid policies and organiz at ion . In what might be seen as a 
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move to  head off crit icism, the Perkins Committee , appointed 
by Pres ident Johnson and heavily influenced by AID views , 
inquired into aid and its organizat ion and reconnnended the 
cont inuat ion of AID in essent ially it s then form .  However , 
the influent ial Nat ional Planning Associat ion in it s 1969 
repo rt on Un ited States aid (NPA 1969)  took no such benign 
view of  aid : it believed that the US was too act ive in the 
aid field , and principally too involved in what were 
essent ially recipient s '  development decis ions . As a 
consequence , the NPA looked to an increase in mult ilat eral 
aid and a reduct ion in emphasis on count ry pro gramming .  It 
reconnnended that the size of  AID should be cut and it s 
implementat ion fun ct ions dispers ed . 
President Nixon ' s  Peterson Connnit tee which reported 
lat e in 1 9 6 9  took much the same line as the NPA. It 
reconnnended the ab ol it ion of AID , and it s replacement by an 
Internat ional Development Bank ( fo r  development loans)  and 
an Internat ional Development Institut e  ( for technical 
ass ist ance and research) both headed by an International 
Development Council involving the heads of  all agencies with 
aid funct ions , lo cated in the Whit e House with a small staff 
to plan st rategy and co-ordinate policies . Nixon accept ed 
the Peterson proposal s  in principle , but preferred a 
Coo rdinato r o f  Development Ass istance ( related to the Whit e  
House Council on Internat ional Economic Policy) to an Inter­
nat ional Development Council . Draft legislat ion to int roduce 
these changes and renounce country progrannning went to 
Con gress in 1971 . Ironically , the legislat ion which had been 
des igned principally to placate a crit ical Congress found 
little favour there and was not proceeded with .  
While the debate was pro ceeding a t  the polit ical level , 
important changes were occurring in AID . AID lost it s 
polit ical access under Kiss inger , and the not iceab le decline 
in it s importance in nat ional pol icy was accelerated . State­
AID con flict intensified as AID sought new orientat ions in 
it s programs in a shift from country pro grannning to a 
funct ional bas is with a con cern fo r equity in developing 
count ries . This cut directly across State ' s  diplomat ic cash 
flow obj ect ives . AID fotmd it sel f  tmder att ack both f rom 
within the bureaucracy and from both liberals and conservat ives 
in Congress .  
The out come , at least for the t ime being , app eared in 
the rewrite of  the aid legislat ion by Congress in late 1 9 7 3  
and the following y ear : the New Direct ions policy . Here 
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it seems that new thinking in AID about the purposes and 
st ructure of  its programs coalesced with liberal thinking in 
Congress to produce legislat ive backing for a new pol icy 
approach to AID . The cent ral issue in this change was the 
recognit ion that American aid was not reaching the poor in 
developing count ries . The prescript ion that flowed from 
this re cognit ion implied a signif icantly different aid 
program :  one funct ionally and therefore sectorally oriented ; 
a far more aggress ive approach to the use of  US aid resources 
within developing count ries to promote struct ural change in 
polit ical as well as economic areas ; and a changed relat ion­
ship b etween the use o f  aid funds both fo r diplomat ic and 
commercial advantage . 
Leaving as ide the merit s o f  this new approach , it was 
clear that it would provide grounds for pol it ical and adminis­
trat ive confl ict . This could develop within AID , primarily 
b etween those pursuing funct ional and geographical approaches ; 
b etween AID and State wi th the lat ter perceiving heightened 
con flict with recipient governments and the prospects of the 
lo ss of the aid slush funds ; and between AID and the depart­
mental and Congre ssional surrogates of the commercial lobb ies , 
as the latter became aware of  the possible loss o f  their 
trade opportunit ies in the new polic ies . 
During these years also , the United States was searching 
out a response to the broader demands from developing 
count ries for a New Internat ional Economic Order (NIEO) . A 
shift by Kiss inger at the UN General As sembly 7th Special 
Sess ion from his previous hard line , did not augur a funda­
mental change in US policies on the whole range of  issues . 
But it did lead , as in other countries , to an attempt to 
deflect these demands fo r st ructural change in the world 
economy by stressing the actual and potent ial aid cont ri­
bution . Because of  this AID ,  which had b een excluded from 
NIEO matters , formed a rapprochement with State , and both 
AID and State began to go in the same direct ion on these 
issues . 
The future of US aid policy and the o rganizat ion o f  
AID now await a Carter administ rat ion init iat ive . The 
Brookings Inst itut ion , in a study headed by Lester Gordon of 
Harvard , has again recommended a ' new ' policy and st ructure 
to the State Department and President Carter (Gordon and 
associates 19 7 7 ) . This study st rongly recommends a pol icy 
geared to the ' bas ic needs ' o f  the poorest in developing 
countries , unfortunately without arguing the advantages and 
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disadvantages of  such a policy at any length . It argues 
fo r a three- to five-fold increase in aid ftmds ( on the basis 
of  various est imat es of ' needs ' )  and suggests the format ion 
of  a Development Coop erat ion Agency ( DCA) which would be 
separate from the State Department , in o rder to reduce the 
p ressure of short-term polit ical pay-o ffs on long-term 
development plans . The experience in other countries with 
the same prob lem might argue fo r more caut ion and a wider 
view of the political-administrat ive pulling and hauling 
before such a step is taken . 
While the Gordon study , albeit from an independent 
source , reflects the emerging ideolo gy of aid in the Unit ed 
St ates ( from the aid bureaucracy it self and from a spect rum 
o f  opinion in Congress ) , it is not cl ear to what extent such 
an idealistic policy could be implemented . For example , the 
geo graphical distribution of US aid is st rongly b iased towards 
both Is rael and South Korea (ne ither of  which is , properly 
speaking , a developing cotmt ry)  on security grounds , and a 
sober view of a redis t ribut ion away from these two countries 
would need to acknowledge that the polit ical implicat ions 
would soon override any aid considerat ions . Again there is 
an inherent conflict between an aid program directed to 
basic needs and one that is t ied st rongly to the procurement 
of  US goods . This is not to argue that the new policy is 
mis conceived or plain wrong ( even leaving aside p redictable 
react ions within developing cotmt ries themselves) , it is 
only to point to the central argument of this paper : that 
the shape of an aid program is usually the out come of the 
resolut ion of these kinds of con flicts which takes places 
within bureaucracies , either act ing on their own behalf in 
defense of th eir concept ion o f  priority in nat ional interes t s  
or a s  surrogates f o r  out side interes t s . Any new policy or 
new inst itut ional framework that seeks to become estab l ished , 
must take due accotmt of  the power and in ert ia of  such 
established fo rces . Here , the mood of Congress will mean as 
much or as little as in the past : it will support or oppose 
an emerging t rend , not it sel f  embark on a new direct ion . 
The President also will n eed to  find a coal it ion of  support 
from within his admini strat ion and from Congress b efore 
sett ing out in a new direct ion . Yet despite the frequent 
pulling up o f  the roots of the US aid program and the 
reassessment s  that follow ,  one is st ruck by the cont inuity 
in the substance of the program , ,  and the durability of the 
elements of aid policy , though given different priorit ies at 
different t imes .  This seems to suggest that even given the 
volat ility o f  the aid issue with Pres idents and with Congress , 
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the bas ic structure o f  American aid exhib its much the same 
range o f  conflicts over time as do mos t  other western aid 
pro grams . 
This dis cus sion o f  the organizat ion o f  aid o f  the 
' Big Five ' donors has shown a wide variety o f  administrat ive 
responses to aid problems . Before drawing out some common 
themes , it is useful to note some aspects of the aid o f  the 
' internat ional ist ' donors , that is the Scandinavian countries , 
Netherlands and Canada . This term intends to  convey that 
the aid policies of these countries rest on an avowedly 
recipient-oriented philosophy , one which , while nat ional 
interest s  o f  donors may impinge , is carried through in 
pract ice to some effect both b ilaterally and in internat ional 
forums . 
There are some general reasons for the ability o f  
these countries t o  sustain such policies , and they are in 
direct contrast to the experiences of  the ' Big Five ' . 
First , all these countries have relat ively small aid programs 
in c ircumstances of growing nat ional wealth , so that aid 
budgets are not usually subj ect to the depredat ions that 
occur for example in the United Kingdom, the United States 
and Japan . It is also the case that none of  these countr ies 
has crucial foreign policy interest s  to prosecute through 
their aid : as one Aust ralian once put it ' Canadians can 
affo rd to act like knights on white chargers in Southeast 
As ia ;  their interests aren ' t  strongly involved ' .  Finally , 
most o f  these countries have enj oyed lengthy p eriods o f  
stable government under the same re-elected party . This has 
provided the conditions for developing some polit ical 
commitment to internationalism in aid , and allowed new aid 
o rganizations to propagate their views over t ime through 
the rest of their nat ional bureaucracies . 
The foregoing discussion has also shown the individual 
nature of adminis trative responses to aid problems . Clearly , 
the substantive decisions on aid (on its philosophy , degree 
of involvement in recipient countries , and shape of the 
actual program) should influence the organizational decisions , 
but this analysis has demonstrated that the outcome is more 
oft en that organizat ional decision s  influence dec is ions on 
sub stance . These o rganizat ional decisions are in part a 
product o f  historical conditions ( as in the case of  Brit ish 
aid to 1964 and French aid to the present)  or in part 
influenced by the administ rative conventions of the country 
concerned (as in Japan and the United States ) . 
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Despite the apparent individuality of  administrat ive 
organiz at ion , two current s in thinking about this may b e  
discerned : one in the early 19 60s which cent red on the 
st rains of disaggregat ion of funct ion s ,  and the other in 
the late 1960s and early 19 70s which revealed the st rains 
consequent upon a shift towards aggregation . The discuss ion 
on refo rm of aid admin istrat ion in the early 1960s took 
place in the context of a sharp inc rease in the volume o f  
aid funds b eing made available ; the strongly political nature 
of much of the aid being given for ' Cold War ' purposes ; and 
the general increase in interest in aid as an integral part 
of the growing interchange in internat ional society . The 
Kennedy re forms of 1961 , the establishment of ODM in Britain 
in 1964 , the Jeanneney report in France in 1963  and the 
setting up of the BMZ in Germany in 1964 were all differing 
responses to the same internat ional st imuli . 
Disaggregat ion o f  funct ions had created a division 
between capital as sistance and technical assistance , b etween 
loans and grants , between geographical and ftmct ional areas , 
and thus divis ion o f  responsibility among minist ries . In 
the case of all count ries except Japan , a greater or lesser 
degree o f  aggregat ion of  these ftmct ions took place in the 
1960s , and was subj ect to bureaucratic conflict before , 
during and after aggregat ion , according to the extent that 
such conflict was a structural feature of nat ional bureau­
cracies . 
Consider the strains that appeared after a degree o f  
aggregat ion had occurred . Internat ionally the volume o f  
re sources devoted t o  aid began t o  decline in real terms and 
there was widespread dis illus ionment with the effect ivenes s  
o f  aid , while the polit ical imperat ive which had bolstered 
aid had diminished greatly . In these circumstances , aid 
lost it s internat ional momentum and consequently lost 
leverage nat ionally . In some cases the bureaucrat ic strains 
which had occurred in composing aid int erests with other 
nat ional interests revived , as in the United States and 
Britain ;  in other countries the existing syst�m fought o f f  
the challenge , a s  in Germany and Japan . 
The prophets of a continuing decline in aid may b e  
premature . As aid i s  now one of  the basic blocks o f  inter­
nat ional dealing , it cont inues to be subj ect to the classic 
pressures o f  foreign and commercial policy , and these are 
heightened when aid polic ies take on a strong preoccupat ion 
with equity is sues wit hin developing cotmt ries . More 
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importantly , the need within OECD count ries to devise con­
struct ive responses to NIEO demands in a t ime of stagnat ion 
in the internat ional economy , directs policy-makers back to 
aid .  Where aid is seen as one arm of general fo reign economic 
pol icy towards developing countries , especially on trade 
problems , a whole new range of administrat ive relat ionships 
may arise . 
Administrat ive alternat ives in aid 
No one knows the answers . Organizational form 
is a gross variable ; there are always so many 
intervening factors in any s ituat ion that it is 
rarely po ssible to connect the effectiveness of 
a particular policy with a defect or virtue in 
the processing o f  informat ion or j uxtaposit ion 
o f  personnel .  All the more reason that people 
should be freer to dispute the issues . 
Heclo and Wildavsky 1974 : 389 
The conflicts in aid policy are deep-seated and by now 
longstanding . We should not be surprised at their effect s ,  
both intended and unintended , at the other end o f  the pipe­
line in developing count ries : the so-called small country 
bias which works against aid to India for example ;  the 
' reverse flow ' of funds due to some donors ' hard term loans ; 
the white elephant proj ect b ias . All thes e  and others are 
well known and require no reiterat ion here . What follows 
from these observat ions is not a theory of imperial ism , or 
the not ion that the governments of  developing countries are 
willing victims , but rather that the nature of aid policy­
making in western countries tends to produce outcomes such 
as these . It does so , not b ecause those involved are simple­
minded or wicked , but because there are real issues 
involved in situat ions of  contending power , and the out comes 
reflect very of ten the p redominance of one contender at the 
expense of the others . A s imilar ob servat ion can b e  made 
about the makin g and operat ion of domest ic social welfare 
policy , with the important exception that the means of  
redress of  abuse are available to some extent to the 
recipients of social welfare , while they are not generally 
available to recipients of aid . 
While different aid organizat ions produce differing 
policies and programs , there is a thread o f  commonality in 
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the way that this takes place . All of the count ries 
dis cussed have faced the same cent ral problem of aid organ­
iz at ion : how to reconcile the interests of the ' great 
t riad ' 31 ( that is , the foreign , finance and t rade ministrie s )  
with the interests  of  aid . The various nat ional solut ions 
adopted indicate two forces operat ing : the relative intens­
it ies over time of  the triad ' s  interests as against aid 
int erest s ,  and th e relat ive bureaucrat ic and polit ical power 
wielded on each s ide of the conflict . It is the out come of  
these conflicts that by  and large shapes nat ional aid 
programs . 
Does the rest ructuring o f  the organization o f  aid 
s ignificant ly affect policy decisions ? There is  no clear 
answer here , but there are some interesting aspects . A 
rest ructuring of  aid , fo r example an aggregat ion o f  funct ions 
and separation o f  locat ion which is induced fo r polit ical 
reasons , can only have a long-term influence and change 
policy i f  the polit ical support for the change is s ustained . 
Such an init ial act does not o f  itself ensure a new direct ion 
in policy , s ince the triad ' s  int erests will st ill be pursued , 
pos s ibly even more success fully if  the new organizat ion is 
weak . Aga in , if th e restructuring that takes place integrates 
aid funct ion s into a foreign minis t ry , a shift in policy and 
p ract ice towards the use o f  aid as a tool o f  foreign policy 
is inevitable . In this case , on the other hand , the 
interest s  of the t rade and f inance departments may encotmter 
more stalwart opposit ion , j ust b ecause a foreign ministry may 
be more powerful in resist ing these than a more or less 
autonomous agency . Restructuring an aid agency usually 
implies two changes in the way these differing interest s  are 
reconciled . It implies a chan ge in the level at which 
bureaucratic decisions are taken ; for example , where aid 
funct ions are separate and partly autonomous , dec is ions are 
t aken at a higher l evel than when aid is integrated into the 
foreign ministry . Further ,  rest ructuring implies a change 
in the way these var ious interests  are co-ordinated . This 
can b e  either at mini sterial level in the case of autonomous 
agencies or at departmental conmdttee level in the case where 
aid ftmct ions are dispersed . The out come in the first case 
depends on the influence of the responsible minist e r ,  and , 
in the second , on the relat ive st rengths of  various ministries . 
Rest ructuring can make a difference to policy but it requires 
sustained polit ical support , and a shift in bureaucrat ic 
power in reality as well as appearance . 
31The conspfrato rial overtones o f  this term as it is attached 
to Chinese secret societ ies in the diaspora are not implied 
here . 
These problems of  bureaucrat ic conflict in aid seem 
inescapable , resting as they do on the proposit ion that 
minist ries exist to defend their part o f  the nat ional 
interest .  Whether the views prosecuted by ministries are 
8 7  
in fact in the overall long-term nat ional interest is 
another quest ion , . but it is worth sp eculat ing whether there 
is some kind of administrative arrangement of aid that can 
mitigate the aid problems that are due to the influence of  
all these interest s .  This speculation res t s  on three 
assumption s : the normat ive one , that aid has as its primary 
obj ect ive the servicing of developing country interest s ;  
second , the admin i st rat ive reality that various aid organ­
iz at ion s already exist and are bound about with powerful 
nat ional admin i st rat ive conventions ; and third , that 
sufficient polit ical ( i . e .  ministerial) support can b e  
mustered in donor countries for development al interests in 
aid . 
The purpose of  this speculat ion then is to examine 
whether some mechanism can b e  found which will ensure the 
p redominance of independent aid obj ect ives in some specific 
c ircumstances as again st the play of  other nat ional interest s , 
which will allow these obj ect ives to  in form other nat ional 
decisions which relate to recipients '  development , such as 
t rade an d  investment . 
Let us examine four general conditions which seem 
necessary to go some way towards this obj ective . Firs t , aid 
must have relat ive importance in the priorit ies of  government . 
This apparent t ruism means that where aid is ins ignificant 
these conflict s do not really arise .  Obj ect ively , aid is an 
important policy area for each o f  the ' Big Five ' . There 
follows from this a second condit ion : that the opportunit ies 
for effective polit ical control exist and that these should 
be exercised on the large quest ions in aid . Here the exercise 
of polit ical control depends on a number of factors : that 
there is a shift in the power to decide away from the bureau­
c ratic level towards the polit ical level ; that issues should 
come to a deci sion at a high level among ministers and in 
circumstances ensuring that collect ive support is required ; 
and finally that , whatever the kind of  polit ical control , 
access o f  aid advisers to politicians should be comparable 
to that o f  other departmental interests .  
The third condition concerns the structure of advice 
and policy-making at the bureauc rat ic level . As we have 
seen , this is influenced strongly by the kinds o f  political 
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control an d the administrat ive convent ions that exist 
nat ionally . The trouble with aid policy is not that there 
are con flicts inherent in it , but that o ften these do not 
come up for polit ical decis ion , and that when they do they 
are not exposed in such a way as to allow a clear concept ion 
o f  the choices by polit icians . These problems are not 
susceptible to solut ion by organizat ional change , but a 
degree of  bureaucrat ic separat ion o f  aid responsib ilit ies 
allied with an unambiguous lo cat ion of and access to polit ical 
responsibility may provide the framework for recognit ion o f  
these dif ficult ies . 
The cont inuum of  aid organizat ion extends from total 
dispers ion to total aggregat ion . Total dispers ion sub.ord­
inates recipient interests in all circumstances and this is 
without doubt the worst opt ion . One might as well set up a 
bureau for the co rruption o f  foreign governments and an 
agency for the subs idy of  manufacturing interest s , as has 
been j e st fully proposed , and be done with it . At the other 
ext reme it does not follow that the aggregat ion o f  funct ions 
in an autonomous body with it s own minister best serves 
recip ients ' interest s . Given the realit ies o f  the bureau­
crat ic pursuit of  other interest s ,  the isolat ion of  a 
separate body may bring about an indif ference to , or 
rej ect ion of  aid interest s , and such a body , t urning in on 
it sel f ,  can become a voice crying in the wilderness . The 
p roblem is not how to divorce aid obj ect ives from foreign 
policy and trade policy , but how to ensure that aid 
obj ect ives predominate over others in aid flows and that 
these policies take developmental considerations into ac count . 
Administ rat ive isolat ion does not achieve this , and can be 
totally counterproduct ive . 
Between these two poles lie a numb er o f  alternat ives . 
Given existing preferences , an effect ive aid administ rat ion 
st ructure would take account of these aspect s : first , that 
there should be a sufficient degree of aggregat ion and 
autonomy in the aid st ructure to control both finan cial and 
technical as sistance, both bilateral and multilateral aid and 
to develop some special ist skills in the implementat ion of  
aid . This already imp l i es a s iz eab le cent ral ized o r gan izat ion 
with a degree of  autonomy . The second aspect concerns the 
way in which aid and foreign policy are to be related . If 
we assume that diplomat s will generally give priority to 
short-term foreign policy interest s at the expense o f  
developmental considerat ions in aid , then the quest ion 
revolves around whether aid is integrated completely into 
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the geo graphical areas o f  the foreign ministry in the hope 
that this in t ime ' infect s ' staff thinking (White 1974 : 255-6) 
o r  whether some degree o f  separat ion of  aid policy and 
administ rat ion will allow developmental interest s  to b e  
maintained . I am scept ical about the degree to which 
diplomat s ' orientat ions can b e  so changed , the more so because 
the integrat ion of aid into foreign minist ries precludes 
appeals. to ministers , and such important quest ion s are rightly 
the provin ce o f  mini sters . Two solut ions seem possible : 
one is to have an aid organizat ion funct ionally separate 
from the foreign ministry but responsible to the foreign 
minister who then would reconcile aid- foreign policy con­
flicts ; the other is to have an aid o rganizat ion within the 
foreign minist ry under the authority of a j unior minister 
with cab inet rank . 
The third aspect concerns the impact of  connnercial and 
budgetary cons iderations on aid obj ectives . Again , complete 
separat ion of aid makes it a prey for more powerful minis­
tries . The con flict b etween budgetary constraint s and aid 
volume is properly the province of minis ters and requires 
resolution in explicit terms at cab inet level , and not 
compromise at bur�aucrat ic level . The influence of connnercial 
interests  is exerted both at bureaucrat ic level through the 
departmental backers of exporters and manufacturers and at 
the polit ical level in pressure on ministers . Here again 
aid requires the protect ion o f  the foreign minis t ry at 
bureaucrat ic level and of  the foreign minist er at ministerial 
level to avoid degradat ion of the qual ity o f  aid .  
The enduring Cat ch-22 in this i s  of  course that aid 
policy-making must stand sufficiently distant from foreign 
policy interests as to be able to assert it s independent 
obj ect ives , without being so distant as to forego the pro­
tect ion of the foreign minist ry from the incurs ions of  
commercial int erests . 
To these three polit ical and bureaucratic facto rs , a 
fourth , relat ing to emerging problems of  co-ordinat ion can 
be added . With the assertion of  demands for a New Inter­
nat ional Economic Order by developing countries , and the 
search for responses in western countries to this , the place 
of  aid in national priorit ies would seem to be undergoing a 
change . In the past , aid has b een for many donor countries a 
' poo r relat ion ' in policy and something o f  a sop to the 
demands of poor count ries , and for these reasons a prey to 
other interest s .  The need now to const ruct a response to 
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NIEO , changes qualitat ively the role o f  aid : it  retains it s 
place as a ' gap-filler ' ,  but it seems l ikely that policy­
makers , in seeking a co-ordinat ed response to NIEO demands , 
will see in creased aid as a subst itute for changes in 
policies in trade and investment which are too hard politic­
ally , and/ o r  as an inst rument to support such changes abroad 
or adj ustment at home . 
Thus , although this dis cus sion o f  the reform o f  aid 
o rganizat ion proposes chiefly a series of t inkering adj ust­
ments , the problems of co-ordinat ion of  new roles for aid in 
foreign economic policy-making towards developin g  countries 
may assume the status of a maj o r  challenge to exist ing 
arrangements . 
Internat ionally , dissat is fact ion with aid t ransfers is 
manifested both in calls for a new mult ilateralizat ion of all 
aid and in developin g  country at tempt s to  change their aid 
recept ion st ructures . 32 The former has some force behind it 
but it is likely that b ilateral aid will be important for a 
long t ime to come , while the lat ter moves hold the seeds for 
the development of a les s  lopsided aid bargaining f ramework 
between rich and poor countries . What happens to aid within 
the governmental structures o f  western countries is st ill 
c rucial in the present internat ional system and thus worthy 
o f  a freer debate . 
32A part icularly interest ing example in this respect is 
Papua New Guinea ' s  National Development Fund ,  an aid­
revolving mechanism that seeks to avoid the distort ions o f  
tying an d  distorted planning that occur with t raditional 
b ilat eral aid flows . 
Chapter 5 
Pol iticians , bureaucrats and foreign aid : 
a case study 
N .  Viviani and P .  Wi lenski 
The change in government in December 1972 was seen by 
that small constituency of people int erested in aid issues 
and dissat is fied with the exist ing programs as a maj or 
opportunity f or a change in direction for Australia ' s  aid 
policies and programs . The vehicle through which this change 
was to be effected was a new statut ory body responsib le 
directly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and independent 
from the old departments which had t ill then dominated the 
aid field . 
By March 19 7 6 ,  this aid agency had lived out its brief 
span and had been effect ively abolished . 
This chapter sets out to trace the reasons for the 
establishment o f  the Aus tralian Development Ass istance Agency 
(the Aid Agency) , spell out it s obj ect ives and tell some of  
it s l ife story in order to  evaluate its success and failure 
in meeting these obj ectives . 
It is also a case study o f  the interact ion between 
polit icians and bureaucrats and o f  the polit ics practised 
among bureaucrat s t hems elves . We hope to draw some lessons 
as t o  the likely future of Australia ' s  aid policies and the 
appropriate form of organizat ion for this formulat ion and 
implementat ion . 
The proponents of an aid agency believed that while 
foreign policy was an important input in the det erminat ion 
of  aid policy ,  the separat ion of aid administrat ion from the 
Department of Foreign Affairs was the only way to ensure : 
(a) that developmental aspect s ( including the social 
and income distribut ion effect s  of aid) received a 
high priority in formulating aid programs ; 
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(b)  that aid administration was improved , that 
professionalism was introduced into the aid program 
and a career structure for aid o fficers est ab lished ; 
( c) that innovat ion and experiment at ion was encouraged 
and a great er stress placed on research and 
evaluat ion ; and 
(d)  that an integrated aid policy could be developed 
out of the divergent policies of the different 
agencies then administering the aid program. 
A final strand of  opinion was that it was import ant that the 
aid program should develop a constituency within the bureaucracy 
it self which would have a vest ed int erest in an improved and 
enlarged aid program, and would be ab le to promot e the 
int erest s of this program more effect ively than the Department 
o f  Foreign Affairs and the Department of External Territories 
had done . 
These obj ect ives were ambit ious but rather narrowly 
focused on aid issues per se , and were not much concerned with 
wider quest ions as to the impact of other foreign economic 
policies on development prob lems . These were quest ions which 
became increasingly important during the life of the agency ,  
and considerat ion of  them clearly af fects alternat ive forms 
of  aid administ rat ion for the future . 
ALP policy and the agency 
Foreign aid did not appear to have a high priority at 
the out set of the Labor Government . It was not ment ioned in 
the 1972 policy speech and did not get much space in the early 
foreign policy statement s of the new government . It was , 
however ,  a field in which the government took prompt act ion .  
For example , within a few days o f  it s format ion the government 
granted aid to internat ional populat ion planning agencies . 
Moreover , there was a specific plank in the ALP plat form:  
' in pursuit o f  a more meaningful aid program the Labor Party 
proposes • • .  to recognize the various Australian aid programs 
and to establish a mutual co-operat ion agency ' .  
The insert ion of the provision for an aid agency in the 
Labor Party plat form in 1 9 7 1  came largely at the instigat ion 
o f  a former senior officer of the Department of  Foreign 
Affairs , Mr W. L .  Morrison ,  who had left the department in 
1969 to contest success fully the seat of  St George . Morrison 
had seen aid programs administered abroad and had spent a 
period in the purgatory of the aid branch of  the department 
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after his decision to contest a parliamentary seat had been 
annollllced . He was aware of  the extent to which the develop­
ment al aspect s of aid were ignored in the department and o f  
the lack of  professionalism in i t s  aid b ranch . Diplomat ic 
officers of the department regarded a posting to the aid 
branch virt ually as a black mark in their careers . It was 
difficult to ret ain good non-diplomat ic officers in the branch 
as promot ion prospects were limited and the senior pos it ions 
in the department virtually all reserved for diplomatic 
officers . Whitlam, as the dominant foreign affairs influence 
in the ALP , gave his support to this provision in the platform. 
Morrison had a further influence in pressing for increas ed 
professionalism in aid when , in 19 72 , he was made acting 
chairman of a sub-connnitt ee of the Parliamentary Joint 
Connnittee on Foreign Affairs which prepared a report on 
Australian aid . The final recommendat ion of the sub-connnittee 
was a compromise between strengthening and expanding the aid 
b ranch of  Foreign Affairs and establishing a s eparate 
authority .  However ,  the report expressed dissat is fact ion 
with exist ing administ rat ion and gave further currency to 
the idea of  an agency . 
At a t ime when the government was embarking on a large 
number of new measures , and s ince the Aid Agency , while in 
the plat form , had not been part o f  the policy speech , 
Morrison ' s  interest alone might not have been enough to give 
the Agency a higher priority . A new bureaucrat ic actor , in 
the form of the Prime Minister ' s  Office , now also came to  
support the establishment of  the Agency . This was largely 
fortuitous as the Prime Minister had chosen as the head of  
his  office a public servant , much of whose career had been 
spent in the aid field , both in the Department of Foreign 
Af fairs and in the Treasury . The Prime Minister himself 
was a supporter of  the establishment of  a separat e aid agency , 
but it could only have a small place in the wide range of  
i ssues that cros sed his  desk as  Prime Minister , and the 
int erest of his private office in the idea ensured that at 
each stage of the debat e  over the agency he could take an 
act ive role in decision-making on the proposal . This role 
was made easier by the fact that in the first nine months of 
his term as Prime Minist er he was also  Minister for Foreign 
Affairs . 
Exist ing aid arrangements 
The aid administ ration in 19 72 was divided among a 
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number of  different departments ,  and it was their s truggle 
to maintain their interest s  which shaped the s tructure o f  
the Aid Agency and continued t o  in fluence its act ivit ies long 
after it s format ion . It is  therefore necessary to set out 
briefly what these administ rat ive arrangement s  were in order 
fully to understand sub sequent event s .  
Four government departments had primary responsib ility 
in dif ferent part s of Australia ' s  o f ficial development 
ass istance . The Department o f  Foreign Affairs was acknowledged 
as having primary respons ib ility for aid policy , and adminis­
t ered aid to all foreign count ries other t han Papua New Guinea 
(which ,  at the t ime , was st ill administ ered by Aust ralia) , 
as well as aid to  a number of  internat ional organiz at ions . 
While it had prime respon s ib ility for policy , its programs 
amounted to  only about 2 7  p er cent o f  Aust ralia ' s  aid expend­
itures . The department ' s  aid branch had a staff of 12 8 
officers (excluding support staff) , with a further twenty-
one officers overseas employed full t ime on aid mat ters . 
Aid t o  Papua New Guinea, which was two-thirds o f  
Australia ' s  aid program ( an d  over half o f  Papua New Guinea ' s  
budget at that time) , was administered by the Department of  
External Territories , which employed some ninety officers 
(excluding support and purchas ing staf f )  on aid dut ies . The 
decision of the Australian Government , that PNG was to be 
granted self-government on 1 December 197 3 ,  was to  become 
crucial in the format ion o f  the Aid Agency . The decision 
meant that the Department o f  External Territories would be 
abolished on t hat dat e ,  it s remaining respons ib ilit ies were 
up for grabs and the fat e  of its o f ficers had to be determined . 
The Treasury had general oversight o f  the aid program 
because of it s economic and financial implicat ions , and , in 
addit ion , had direct responsib ility for Australia ' s  relat ions 
with , and contribut ions to , t he internat ional financial 
inst itut ions con cerned with aid matters , primarily the World 
Bank Group and the Asian Development Bank . Some eight 
officers were engaged on these tasks . 
The Department of Educat ion administered the Connnonwealth 
Co-operat ion in Educat ion S cheme and acted as a t raining auth­
ority for government-sponsored trainees under all aid s chemes . 
The equivalent o f  1 35 full-t ime staff in central , state and 
reg ional offices throughout Aust ralia were engaged in these 
activit ies . The Department of Educat ion had already been 
reduced in s ize and responsib ility at the end of  1972  through 
95 
the los s o f  its s cience responsib ilit ies to  a separate port­
folio and much o f  its policy-making role had b een trans ferred 
to a number of new cotmnissions . Although the aid funct ion 
could only be regarded as peripheral to the department ' s  
maj or responsib ilities , its persistence in attempt ing to 
retain its aid funct ions and not be reduced further in s iz e  
was to b e  one o f  t he minor features o f  the process b y  which 
the agency was formed . 
In addit ion to these  department s ,  a number of other 
departments provided expert s for aid s chemes or played an 
import ant role in Australia ' s  relat ions with developing 
count ries ( for example , Department of  Overseas Trade) , but as 
as neither these ins titutional arrangements nor these policy 
responsib ilit ies were to be disturbed by the format ion o f  
the agency ,  these departments played lit t le r ole in the 
subsequent debate . This was also true of their ministers , 
even though a number o f  them had expressed a strong interest 
in foreign aid while in Opposition .  
The idea o f  an aid agency thus held some at traction for 
the Department of  External Territories but could muster lit tle 
support amongst maj or departments , none of which saw their 
interest s  advanced by it and some of which saw it threatening 
their responsib ilit ies and influence . 
Department of Foreign Affairs and the Aid Agency 
The Department o f  Foreign Affairs came to be the prime 
bureaucrat ic actor in the est ablishment of  the Agency . It s 
att itude was crit ical and there was conspicuous lack of  
enthusiasm for  the idea of a separate aid agency .  Senior 
o fficers of  the department resented suggest ions that the 
current administrat ion of aid programs was lacking in 
originality or vitality , but were even more deeply concerned 
that a separate agency might pursue aid policies which 
deviated from foreign policy advice s ubmit ted by the depart­
ment . Aid was to them an integral part of foreign policy and 
aid policy advice should be controlled by those concerned 
with foreign policy . This  view came through most clearly 
in the submiss ion o f  the department to  the Royal Commis sion 
on Australian Government Administrat ion (RCAGA) , when even 
a year after the decis ion to  establish the Agency had been 
taken b y  the government , the department continued to  argue 
to the commission that the Agency should be abolished and 
the aid funct ion restored to the department : 
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Coo rdinat ion of  aid programs with Aust ralia ' s  
foreign relat ions is also a matter requiring 
close and constant at tent ion . Aid lies within the 
framework of foreign policy and must be consonant 
with the Government ' s  obj ect ives in our relat ions 
with foreign count ries . The amount and direct ion 
of  our aid must be determined in the light of 
foreign policy obj ect ives and are subj ect to  
diplomat ic negotiat ion and agreement with the 
government s of recipient count ries and int er­
nat ional organisat ions • • •  
The Department of  Foreign Af fairs early in the life of 
the new government prepared a number of papers on foreign 
aid for the Prime Minister in his role as Minis t er for 
Foreign Affairs . These dealt largely with increasing the 
amount of foreign aid and increas ing the flexib ility that 
the Department o f  Foreign Affairs had in its administ rat ion . 
But it was not iceable that while most departments were 
scouring the Labor Party policy speech and plat form at this 
t ime in order to work on the implementat ion of the govern­
ment ' s  policy , t hese Foreign Affairs papers made no ment ion 
of paragraph XXI 3 (b ) of the plat form which related to the 
Aid Agency . Indeed , the department blandly sought authority 
for dis cus sions with the Pub lic Service Board to cent raliz e  
all aid administrat ion within the department . 
Task force on aid administ rat ion 
The Labor Government by early 19 7 3  had already made far­
sweeping administ rat ive changes which it was taking the 
Pub lic Service and , indeed , the public , t ime to digest .  
Other changes , for example the int egrat ion o f  the Departments 
of Army , Navy and Air within the Department o f  De fence , were 
already under way . Against this background the Prime Minister 
was reluct ant to move immediately - and against the advice 
of  his foreign policy officials - for another reorganizat ion . 
He first sought a report from a task force o f  officials drawn 
from the four departments primarily concerned with aid 
administrat ion . This t ask force was ' to examine all the 
opt ions for a unified administrat ion to administ er all aid , 
in cluding mult i-lateral aid , bilateral aid and aid to  an 
independent Papua New Guinea • • •  ' .  
While this group was styled as a task force , it 
functioned as an interdepartmental commit tee and displayed 
all the defect s of that bureaucrat ic hybrid : the search 
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for  the lowest common denominat or of agreement and the 
preparat ion of a report which at tempt ed not so much to solve 
the prob lem but to avoid any mat erial damage to the interests 
of any department represented on the commit tee . This 
part icular commit tee excelled it self by devoting one-third 
of it s repo rt to a chapt er in which officials managed to give 
a new meaning to the Prime Minister ' s  term ' Unified adminis­
t rat ion to  administer all aid ' . They divided out two separate 
opt ions which were defined as ' fully lIDified ' and ' less -than­
fully-unified ' .  This remarkable piece of sophistry allowed 
them to devote most o f  the report to opt ions which the 
government had already ruled out but which would retain for 
the Department s of Treasury and Educat ion their existing 
functions and establish aid to  Papua New Guinea as a separate 
and identifiable unit within the aid o rganizat ion . 
On the other hand , there was also only a passing 
reference to the way in which aid quest ions would be t ied in 
with other aspect s of Australia ' s  economic relat ionship to  
developing countries . By this t ime dis cussion in the 
Organiz ation for Economic Co-operat ion and Development ( OE CD) 
on the development quest ion ( as our represent at ives at the 
OECD were point ing out ) had moved beyond the narrow aid 
quest ion on to broader issues of the ent ire economic relat ion­
ship between the developing count ries and the industrialized 
world . There was no reflect ion o f  this in the task force 
report . It was a barren work , left wast e  by the internecine 
warfare s tirred by the territorial imperat ives of the depart­
ments concerned . 
It is indeed remarkable that at one point the task force 
gravely warned of the dangers of a fully unified aid agency . 
A separate paragraph was given to the warning that ' unified 
organisat ions somet imes tend to develop personalit ies of 
their own and express points of view which may cut across 
broader concepts of  the nat ional interest ' .  The fact that 
agencies develop a philosophy and style o f  their own is widely 
accept ed in the academic literature . As Pet er Self (19 72 : 92 )  
has written : ' An  administ rat ive agency i s  not s imply a 
compliant instrument for the implementat ion of polit ical goals . 
It generates its own interpretat ion of those goals . Everyone 
concerned with public administ rat ion test ifies to the reality 
of  agency or departmental philosophy . • •  ' .  The ' everyone ' 
referred to  by Self does not in Aust ralia include pub lic 
servant s writ ing about the public service . It is rare indeed 
for Australian public servants openly to acknowledge that 
government agencies develop ' separate personalit ies ' and 
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pursue interests o f  their own . The standard view i s  that 
public s ervant s carry out the will of  the government of the 
day . It was perhaps regrettab le that officials who were 
blessed with this sudden ins ight into the dangers of the aid 
agency were not s imilarly ins ight ful in their examinat ion 
of their own department s and the po ssib ility that they too 
might have developed separate personalities and distinct ive 
lines and interest s  o f  their own . 
The report in the end did , however , identify five opt ions 
for ministers to choose from : 
(a)  The expans ion of the exist ing a id b ranch within 
the Department of Foreign Affairs . 
(b ) The establishment within the Department o f  Foreign 
Affairs of an office of  internat ional aid directly 
responsib le to  the Permanent Head . 
( c) The creat ion within the Department o f  Foreign Af fairs 
of a bureau or agency on internat ional aid whos e  
relat ionship to  the Permanent Head of  �oreign Affairs 
might be analogous to that of  the Head of the 
Bureau of  Agricultural Economics to the Secret ary 
of the Department o f  Primary Indus t ry .  
( d) A separate department or authority responsib le to  
the Foreign Minister and not  to  the Permanent Head 
of Foreign Affairs . 
(e)  A separate department of  s t ate  with its own 
minis ter . 
Bureaucrat ic lobbying before the cab inet submiss ion 
The task force report had thus not great ly advanced the 
arguments about the Aid Agency , but it had brought mat ters 
to the point where a decision had to  be reached .  The next 
step was that the Prime Minister would have to decide what 
form o f  cab inet submission would go forward . Department s  
now began to  lobby their ministers and the ministers to lobby 
the Prime Minister . 
The Department o f  Foreign Affairs cont inued in its 
oppos it ion to a separate aid agency . It argued it s case 
that aid was an essent ial tool of foreign policy forcefully 
and cogently . Others saw in the Agency an opportunity for 
profess ionalism and a career in development , but the department 
saw only the dangers of a stodgy and inbred service . The 
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department put a very high s t ress on the avoidance o f  
conflict and of  con flict ing recomnmendations to  the Minister . 
The department , as its submission to RCAGA testified , felt 
that it would be an intolerable s ituat ion for dif ferences of  
opinion on this matter not to be resolved int ernally in the 
public service , and for them to b eco�e known either to the 
minister or , even worse , to the public . 
The Department of External Territories and its minister 
is believed to have come down in the end in favour of  Opt ion 
( c) l isted above , but with the important addit ion that the 
head o f  the agency be a statutory appointment . As this would 
have required legislat ion set t in g  out dut ies and respons­
ibilit ies o f  the officer , the department ' s  att itude was a 
s tand well towards Opt ion ( d) without actually saying so . 
The department was also in favour of an ident ifiable Papua 
New Guinea unit within the Aid Agency .  
The Department o f  Educat ion an d  its minister were 
principally concerned with the maintenance of their own 
functions . They argued that the unificat ion of  t raining 
funct ions in the agency would be tant amount to  estab lishing 
a new educat ional authority and one lacking the depth and 
expertise of  the department . The department agreed that 
there could be advantages in great er unificat ion of aid 
funct ions , but came to the conclusion that in the area of 
t raining this could be achieved , in fact , by a greater 
consolidat ion of t raining funct ions within the Department 
o f  Educat ion itself . 
The Treasury did not at this t ime appear very concerned 
whethe r  the agency was estab lished or not , so long as it 
maintained responsibility for relat ions with the internat ional 
banks . 
It was clear , then , that there was little enthusiasm 
within the bureaucracy for a separat e agency ,  the only support 
coming from the relat ively llllimport ant Department of External 
Territories , whose officers were seeking some sort of new 
home on the dispersion of  their department . The other 
departments which would provide the bulk of the staffing for 
the new agency were all clearly opposed t o  it and the Public 
Service Board lit tle more than equivocal . Without the clear 
s tatement in the Labor Party plat form and the pressure 
generated by the impending dissolut ion of the Department of  
External Territories (and the interest of  the  Prime Minister ' s  
private office) , it may b e  doub ted whether plans for an 
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agency would have proceeded any further . 
The Prime Minister , clearly dissat isfied with the stage 
matt ers had reached , sought the advice of an eminent former 
public servant and internat ional aid expert who had b een 
crit i cal of Australia ' s  foreign aid . Not surpris ingly , his 
report came down in favour of a statutory authority . This 
gave the proposal the legit imacy and bureaucrat ic respect­
ability whi ch allowed the Prime Minister to make his dec ision 
and he came down in favour o f  the agency . 
However ,  as became evident lat er from announcements 
about the agency and the Second Reading Speech , he had made 
some concess ions to the departmental views - presumably in 
o rder to t ake his senior officials with him rather than to 
ride roughshod over their advice . These concess ions were 
to become ext remely important in the sub sequent operat ions 
of the Agency . 
The most important of  them was that to ens ure co­
ordinat ion . The legislat ion listing the funct ions o f  the 
Director of the Agency stat ed that these funct ions should 
be exercised subj ect t o  the direct ion of the minister , and 
through this power of  direct ion the minister would be able 
to  establish requirement s  for consultat ion with the 
Department of  Foreign Affairs ; when it was thought desirable 
the minister would also be able to direct that on certain 
matters the head of the Agency should report to him through 
the Secretary o f  Foreign Affairs . 
The second maj or concess ion was that , although all aid 
funct ions were to be unit ed ,  the Treasurer would remain 
Governo r in the World Bank .  This , again , was to  provide the 
leverage for two years of interdepartmental correspondence . 
The cab inet decision 
The Prime Minis ter ' s  decision on what he would submit 
to cabinet was reflected in a change to the ALP plat form at 
the July 19 7 3 Conferen ce .  The amendment as recommended by 
the Foreign Affairs Policy Commit t ee ,  of whi ch the Prime 
Minister was chairman , deleted the pledge ' to reorganise the 
administ rat ion of the various Aust ralian aid programs and to 
establish a mut ual cooperat ion agency ' ,  and inserted in it s 
place a far more sp ecific statement : ' The Labor Government 
will establish a st atutory development ass is tance agency 
respons ib le to the Minister for Foreign Af fairs and 
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responsib le for Australia ' s  proj ect s ,  training and similar 
act ivit ies and relat ions with internat ional development 
inst itut ions ' .  A number of ministers at this conference , 
and principally the Minister for Labor , effected changes in 
the party ' s  plat form in order to  bolster their case in 
subsequent cab inet dis cuss ions and some would view this 
amendment in much the same light , though it seemed unlikely 
that the agency would be opposed in cabinet discuss ion . 
The estab lishment of  an agency was approved by the 
cab inet on 17 Septemb er 19 7 3  and announced the next day in 
the following terms : 
Cabinet agreed to  the estab lishment o f  an Australian 
Development Assistance Agency as a statutory body 
to administer Aust ralia ' s b ilateral aid and our 
part icipat ion in all programs of mult ilateral aid 
to developing countries . The Agency will take over 
the aid funct ions at present carried out by other 
departments , including Foreign Affairs , External 
Territories , Educat ion and the Treasury . It is 
intended that the Agency be estab lished from 1 
December 19 7 3 ,  the dat e proposed for the beginning 
of self-government for Papua New Guinea . 
The Government believes that improvement s  can and 
must be effected in almost all aspects of  our aid 
endeavours - in the machinery for formulat ing 
policy , in assessing part icular proj ect s for 
assistance , in ensuring great er attention to  the 
welfare and dist rib ut ive effects of our aid , in 
evaluat ing the economic and social effect iveness 
of our various s chemes , in apport ioning and 
seeking approval for funds allocated for the 
program ,  in b ringing great er cont inuity and 
expert ise into our staffing arrangements , and in 
mo re direct ly associat ing the community with the 
program. 
A fully unified aid administrat ion will ensure 
that a comprehensive , rat ional approach is adopted 
to foreign aid . The dispersal of aid funct ions 
among various Departments has reflected and 
sustained the somet imes con fl ict ing viewpoints of 
individual Departments and has complicated the 
whole pro cess of coordination . It has involved 
unt enable delays , and the machinery used to 
implement the program is cumb rous . The new 
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Agency would be so constit uted as to be able t o  
formulate a comprehens ive aid policy an d  to ensure 
that the various programs are quickly and effect­
ively put into act ion . It would deal with both 
the bilateral and mult ilat eral programs . The 
annual appropriat ions would be subj ect to Cabinet 
direct ion and Parliamentary cont rol and the 
operat ions of  the Agency would be subj ect to  the 
independent s crut iny of  the Aud it or-General . 
The government had thus , after nine months of deliber­
at ions , memoranda , meetin gs , submissions and counter­
submiss ions finally decided on a stat ut o ry agency .  Further­
more , it had clearly decided that the Agency would absorb 
the aid funct ions carried out by the Department s  o f  Foreign 
Affairs , External Territories , Educat ion and Treasury , and 
it had settled on detailed legislat ive provisions for the 
agency . It might seem to be observer , un rehearsed in the 
ways of  the Canberra bureaucracy , that there the matter had 
come to an end .. The decisions had been taken , the proponent s 
of the Agency had won . 
The cabinet decision ' interpreted ' 
In fact , the bat tle had hardly begun , and it was t o  be 
another 15 months before the Aust ralian Development Ass istance 
Agency (ADAA) was finally established as a separate body , and 
even then with fl.lllct ions considerab ly modified from those 
which a reader of  the government announcement might reasonab ly 
have expected . 
The first step in this new round of  int erdepartmental 
warfare came with the ' explanat ion ' of  the decision given t o  
the department s b y  the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cab inet . Cab inet decisions are , by their nature , relat ively 
brief and somet imes , especially when the decision is a 
compromise ,  somewhat ambiguous . The departments which 
implement decisions must look for the meaning b ehind the 
words . To do this they rely in part upon what their own 
minister tells them o f  the cabinet discussions and in part 
(since a minister ' s  memory may be somewhat imprec ise , owing 
to inatt ention o r  part isanship) on supplementary informat ion 
provided by the cabinet secretaries from notes taken of  
officials . This is something o f  a two-way process , as  the 
officials s itting in the Cabinet Room are not expert on the 
subj ect s  1.lllder dis cussion and sometimes need to seek the 
advice of departments on specific quest ions , so as to be able 
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to understand the import o f  various points made . This pro cess 
somet imes goes as far as the Secretariat clearing with 
department s drafts of the terms of cabinet decisions - which , 
in fact , gives departments a second chance to  modify a 
decision taken . It is rare , once a decis ion is finally 
writ ten up , for ministers to obj ect to it s terms , and this 
is an indicat ion that the pro cess of modificat ion is , in fact , 
kept within very strict limits .  Ministers are themselves 
also  consulted by the Secretariat . The process of ' inter­
pretat ion ' of decisions is a somewhat more sub tle one and 
places cons iderab le power in the hands of officials of the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet who provide the 
Secretariat . On this o ccas ion , as ministers were only 
subsequently to learn , the cab inet o fficials advised depart­
ments of two points that they felt amplified the decision 
taken , and were in the spirit o f  the cab inet dis cuss ion . 
Both o f  these were sub sequently to be hotly disputed , but by 
the t ime that the disput e o ccurred , they had already had 
their effect . 
First , department s were notified that although no 
reference was made to it in the cab inet decis ions , the 
feeling was t hat the new agency should not result in increases 
in public employment and should draw s taff from those 
departments now engaged in a id funct ions . This ' implicat ion ' 
was in many ways directly contrary to the spirit of the 
proposal to establish an agency with it s s t ress on new 
activit ies in the socio-economic field , and upgrading of  
research and evaluat ion ,  as well as  the need to  introduce 
new ideas into the aid program.  That it reflected views put 
forward by s ome ministers did not come int o dispute , but it 
found no place in the government decis ion , and it s sub sequent 
insert ion , had it been made openly , might well have aroused 
strong ministerial oppos it ion . 
Second , there was a reference to  the feeling in cabinet 
that the Treasurer should cont inue to be the Governor in the 
World Bank Group and the As ian Development Bank ,  and that 
this was interpreted by officials to mean that the Treasury 
was to cont inue to  have the primary role in policy advice .  
When i t  became apparent t o  cab inet o fficials that there was 
dispute over this addit ional interpret at ion , it was referred 
back for agreement to be reached between the Departments of 
Foreign Affairs and the Treasury . The Prime Minister , on 
the advice o f  the Department of  Foreign Affairs , moved 
quickly to seek the co-operation of the T reasurer in the 
act ual t rans fer of funct ions , but once the matter had come 
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back into the realms of int er-ministerial and interdepart­
ment al correspondence , the original disput e ,  about where the 
funct ions carried out by the Treasury should be located , 
continued in the form o f  a d ispute over interpret at ion of the 
cabinet decis ion . In the meant ime s responsib ility for 
relat ions with the banks stayed where they were , in the 
Treasury , and in the final analysis , although the Agency was 
given some say in these relat ions , the responsib ility was 
never t rans ferred . 
In one respect , however , the government decision was to 
be implemented in the manner in which it had b een decided 
upon . The content ion of the Department of  Educat ion , far 
less of a heavyweight than Treasury , that the administ rat ion 
o f  the Sponsored Overseas Student Program should be retained 
by the department and not be t rans ferred to the Agency , was 
rebut ted by the Prime Minister , who insis ted that the original 
decision could be interpret ed in only one way . 
Bureaucrat ic polit ics and staf fing of  the Agency 
With the exception , therefore , of the T reasury funct ion s , 
the government decisions had at least established what 
funct ions the Agency should perform , namely , those which had 
been previously carr ied out by the Departments of Foreign 
Af fairs , External Territories , and Educat ion . Bureaucrat ic 
warfare now centred on two other issues : 
( a) Staffing of  the Agency . In part icular two aspects 
were in disput e - how many staf f should the Agency 
be allowed and where they should come from;  and 
(b ) Control of the Agency .  In part icular the relat ions 
between the Minister for Foreign Af fairs , the 
Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
the Directo r  of the Aid Agency . 
The first o f  these two problems arising from the 
' interpretat ion ' placed on the cabinet decision was brought 
to the Prime Minister ' s  at tention within a fortnight of the 
government ' s  deci sion . The Department of Foreign Affairs 
had for lon g  been aware of the deficiencies in its own aid 
branch and now became a strong proponent for an in crease in 
s t af f  for the new Agency . 
In the end this view was to prevail and a number of new 
pos it ions were created in the Agency , but not unt il after 
much interdepartmental correspondence . · Many of  the new 
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officers were not recruited unt il almost two years after the 
cab inet decis ion and some of  the new impetus had b een lost . 
In the meant ime much of the quest ion of  where staff were 
to come from was settled almo st by default . The deadline of  
1 December 19 73 (Papua New Guinea ' s  self-government day and 
the date of the abolition of the Department of External 
Territories ) had been reached and the legislat ion had not yet 
been introduced . A decis ion was t aken by the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs , on the advice of his department , that the 
Agency would start its life as an o f f  ice within the department -
a decis ion which gave the department ult imate control over 
the Agency for the next fourteen months . 
Innnediate decis ions then had to be made on the staffing 
of  the Agency . Clearly , the only way that the Agency could 
operate was by taking over much of the existing staff from 
the departments that at that t ime carried out it s funct ions . 
This could have involved s imply a transfer of  all of  the 
people involved or the throwing open of at least the more 
senior pos it ions to compet it ion . The decision taken by the 
Public Service Board on the recommendat ion of the Secretary 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs , and after nego t iations 
with the departments concerned, was , however ,  s imply to 
transfer the approximately 450 pos it ions involved , from the 
defunct Department o f  External Territories and from the 
Department o f  Foreign Affairs , together with the officers 
who were then occupying those pos itions . A t ransfer of  aid 
funct ions from the Department o f  Educat ion was deferred by 
agreement between departments until the beginning o f  the new 
academic year in March 19 7 4 , when again both the posit ions 
and the people occupying them were trans ferred . 
The t rans fer of  aid funct ions from the Department of  
the Treasury , of  course ,  cont inued to  be  buried in protracted 
interdepartmental discussions . 
The departments which had so s trongly obj ected to the 
establishment of the Agency thus had the maj or say in its 
initial organization and staffin g .  The Director of the 
Agency at this s tage s till occupied the pos it ion of 
Administrator to Papua New Guinea , and his was a lone and 
distant voice . (The Act ing Director was a senior Foreign 
Affairs officer . ) These were , of course ,  all interim 
decis ions , but once taken they became very hard to undo . 
Thus , what had been intended by some to be a brave new start 
in the aid field began life in it s embryo form simply as the 
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redesignat ion of the offices occupied by a large number of 
public servant s ,  all of whom continued in their old tasks in 
much the same way . 
These measures did not pass unnoticed by the proponents 
of the Agency . As a proponent told one of  the authors of 
this paper ten days after the Agency had been established , 
department s, basing themselves on select ive quotations from 
various government documents, ' seemed determined to strangle 
the Agency at birth ' . 
The role of the Second Reading Speech 
The Bill establishing the Agency was first introduced 
into Parliament on 12 March 1974 . Although the Prime Minister 
was no longer the minister responsib le , he himself made the 
Second Reading Speech and explained the purposes of the 
agency . Bureaucrat ic battles require a focus , and a Second 
Reading Speech often may provide this . In this case 
departments fought a rearguard act ion , while proponents of  
the Agency close to the Prime Minister tried to  place on 
reco rd government intent ions and to influence the bureaucratic 
warfare . 
On the three issues which were s t ill in disput e ,  the 
Prime Minister gave the proponents varying degrees of support . 
On the first of  these , the absorpt ion by the Agency of 
funct ions carried out by the Department s of Educat ion and 
Treasury , the Prime Minister was unequivocal : 
The Agency is to  have responsibility for the 
administrat ion of all of Australia ' s  b ilateral aid 
and our participat ion in all programs of mult i­
lateral aid to developing countries . The process 
of  unificat ion of Aid funct ions is to be completed 
by absorb ing Aid functions carried out by other 
departments including the Departments of Educat ion 
and the T reasury . 
On the issue of staffing , while not specifically stating 
that there would be an increase in staf f ,  he clearly 
reiterated government intentions to upgrade and improve 
various specific aspects of aid administrat ion . This was a 
statement that was sub sequently to  be effective in arguments 
about the organizat ion and size of the Agency . 
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The greatest disagreement , however , was on the quest ion 
of direct access to the minister and ultimate responsibility 
for providin g  advice , an issue which was to be a running 
sore b etween the Agency and the Department of Foreign Affairs 
throughout the Agency ' s  existence . A compromise had been 
reached in mid-19 7 3  when , despite the statutory independence 
of the Agency , the Prime Minister conceded that there might 
be issues on which the minis ter directed the director of 
the Agency to report to him through the Secretary of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs . 
The Department o f  Fo reign Affairs st rongly maintained 
it s view that , since aid was an int egral part of foreign 
policy , not only would there be issues on which the Director­
General would report through the Secretary , but also that 
everything should b e  done to avoid confl ict ing recommendat ions 
to the minister , and that there should be agreement reached 
between the Agency and the department on all aid matters 
with foreign policy implicat ions . This would have meant 
effectively that Foreign Affairs , by withholding its agreement , 
could block the Agency ' s  reconnnendat ions . 
The view that con flict in policy advice might be a 
healthy process for resolving general dif ficulties over 
policy , or that tensions could be ' creat ive ' (to  use a phrase 
common amongst Pres ident Kennedy ' s  advisers) had no place in 
the Foreign Affairs out look. This alternat ive view was , 
however , not ent irely unrecognized , and one of  the proponents 
of the Agency in the Prime Minister ' s  Of fice reflected in a 
not e : ' Of course there may be at t imes conflicting advice 
to the Minister from the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
the Aid Agency . This is not something to be discouraged ; it 
is what Ministerial responsib ility is all about . It would 
be a poo r thing if  every disagreement were buried at the 
o fficial level so that the opt ions were closed o f f  before an 
issue came for decis ion to the Minister . ' 
The wording of the speech appeared to be a compromise 
in that the Prime Minis ter noted in it that : ' the Director­
General will exercise his fllllctions subj ect to the directions 
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs . This provis ion will 
ensure coordination b etween foreign policy and aid adminis­
trat ion and will enable the Minister to establish a require­
ment for consult at ion with the Department of Foreign Af fairs . '  
However , it was in fact something of a victory for the 
A gency in that he omitted a sentence that had been urged 
108 
upon him stat ing that : ' If it is thought des irable the 
Minister will also be able to direct that on certain mat ters 
the Head of  the Agency repo rt to him through the Secretary of 
the Department of Foreign Affairs . '  However ,  the dispute 
was far from over . 
It is int eresting to note , in passing , that the deb ate 
in the House o f  Representat ives , while quit e lively , did not 
reveal any opposition to the estab lishment of  the Agency . 
Indeed , it is s ignificant in the light of the subsequent 
act ion of the Liberal-Country Party Government that the 
opening words of the Opposit ion Spokesman , Mr Peacock , were : 
' The Opposition support s the Austral ian Development Ass istance 
Agency Bill . ' The main crit icism of  the Oppos it ion was over 
the lack of  substance in relat ion to aid policy in the 
Se cond Reading Speech . 
Intra-Agency conflict and the Department o f  Fo reign Affairs 
The year that the Aid Agency operated as an off ice o f  
the Department of  Foreign Affairs was a crucial one in which 
circumstances combined to dull the init ial enthusiasm of  some 
of it s proponent s ,  and one which led to the establishment of  
a position for  the Agency in the bureaucracy that was weak 
and a prey to incurs ions from other departments . 
The fa ilure to confer legislat ive legit imat ion on the 
Agency in this year provided the first circumstances for its 
weakness . Be fore the ADAA Bill could be passed by the Senate ,  
it was consigned t o  l imbo by the double dissolution o f  May 
19 74 , and it was not passed by both Houses unt il December 
19 74 . 
Before Mr L . W .  Johnson took up his appointment of  
Director-General ( later Director) in April 19 74 the office 
was headed by Mr Max Loveday , a s enior career diplomat . In 
this period it funct ioned much as other division s o f  the 
Department of Foreign Af fairs . Within broad lines of  
exist ing policy , the Act ing Director-General advised the 
Minister directly , after consultat ion with other sect ions of  
Foreign Affairs . The normality of  this process , however , 
began to be dis rupted in early 19 75 by a new element . 
The trans fer of the Department of  Foreign Affairs ' Aid 
Branch and the rump of Ext ernal Territories to the new Agency 
had the effect that three discret e groups establ ished them­
selves in the Agency ,  and formalized the ir separat ion through 
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the staffing proposals and arrangements that were finally 
adopted . First , the former Department of Foreign Affairs ' 
aid branch re-established it sel f  almost entirely as Divis ion 
I of  the Agency with the responsibility for programming and 
administ rat ion of  bilateral aid ( init ially to count ries 
other than Papua New Guinea but later including aid to Papua 
New Guinea as well ) . Second , the remainder of Territories 
established itself in control of Division II with respons­
ibility for b road policy formulat ion , for multilateral aid 
and initially for aid to Papua New Guinea and administrat ive 
services . Finally , the part of  Department of  Foreign Af fairs 
formerly with some responsib ility for training and educat ion 
and that part of  the Department of  Educat ion with similar 
former responsibilities , comb ined to form the Third Division , 
concerned with training and educat ion . 
The locat ion of each division in a different building 
(although quite near each other in the case of  Divis ions I 
and II)  reinforced the effects of  former bureaucrat ic 
separation , which was soon to be transformed into a degree 
of social distance , and worse , a strong degree of intra­
Agency policy confl ict . In retrospect , none of this was 
inevitab le , but the effect o f  the December 19 7 3  decis ions 
on staffing , together with the failure to foresee that to 
cont inue the existing conditions of bureaucrat ic separat ion 
would lead to policy conflict , produced a s ituat ion in which 
normal arguments over the priority of foreign policy and 
developmental considerat ions b ecame the chief arena of 
con fl ict within the Agency , and this con flict spilled over 
into conflict s on status , administrat ive territory , and on 
the issue of access to the minister . 
The problem of intra-Agency conflict began to upset the 
normal pattern of advice to the minister given by the Act ing 
Director-General in the process of  consultat ion with the 
Department o f  Foreign Affairs . This seemed to some in the 
Agency to reflect only the predominance of the department ' s  
part icular view of  the connect ion b etween aid pol icy and 
foreign policy . There were att empts to bypass normal 
channels of advice which led to swift retribution . Such 
occurrences consolidated the exist ing divis ions within the 
Agency , and confirmed the Deparmment of Foreign Affairs ' 
views that the whole exercise was fast becoming a disaster . 
It was in the context o f  these difficulties that the 
Department of Foreign Affairs acted in order to establ ish 
formally , and in practice , the condit ions for consultat ion 
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before the much-delayed legislat ion was passed and b efore 
the new Director-General became firmly established . They 
complained to their new minis ter , Senator Willesee , that 
their predict ions of conflict were being fulfilled (and 
there was at least a sense in which the Department of  Foreign 
Affairs had helped fulfil them) and that the government ' s  
interest would have to b e  protected by a firm ministerial 
inst ruct ion to the Agency estab lishing the necess ity for 
consultat ion and co-ordinat ion . The minister , who freely 
admitted that he had never been particularly keen on the 
idea of a statutory aid agency , and who regarded aid as a 
minor sect ion of  his port folio , agreed that a requirement 
fo r the Agency to consult with the Department of Foreign 
Af fairs should be established , although he did not require 
that the head of the Agency report to him through the 
Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (as the 
department had requested) , nor indeed that after such 
consultat ion , agreement had to be reached before submiss ion 
to the minister . He reserved the right to decide the out come 
of such conflict s  himself .  The minister ' s  inst ruct ions , 
drafted by the Department of Foreign Affairs , were introduced 
in a letter to the newly appointed head of the Agency , and 
were accepted by him. Thereafter the department sought and 
succeeded in having public recognit ion of  these arrangements 
included in the Second Reading Speech of October 19 74 and in 
other public do cuments , and used this ministerial backing 
cont inuous ly to bring the Agency into  l ine on part icular 
is sues . (The department also sought that the deputy to the 
head o f  the Aid Agency should be a Foreign Affairs officer , 
a suggest ion that was not taken up although a s enior Foreign 
Affairs officer became head of Division I .  The department 
also set up an Aid Liaison Sect ion within its Economic 
Divis ion , the head of which was to establish consultat ive 
procedures with the Agency . ) 
React ions within the Agency to these arrangement s for 
consult at ion differed . Those areas of the Agency concerned 
with proj ect administ rat ion accept ed them gracefully . As 
many of  these officers had been drawn from Foreign Affairs 
their view of the aid-foreign po licy nexus tended towards 
the views hel d in the Department o f  Fo re ign Af fairs , and in 
any . case they expected to have to argue their case on 
individual issues with Foreign Affairs desk officers , and 
in last resort , seek access to the minister . But those in 
the divis ion with control  of  policy , drawn chiefly from the 
upper levels of the now-defunct Department of External 
Territories , saw it differently . They had been used t o  
111 
policy-making without cont inual . reference to other department s 
and had had free access to their former minister , Mr Morrison . 
They construed the cabinet decis ion o f  September 19 7 3  as an 
intention o f  the government to develop a new policy line on 
aid , one in keeping with Labor ' s  welfare and equality 
orientat ion , and most importantly , one in which aid decisions 
were not b iased strongly by foreign policy or diplomat ic 
considerat ions . These men were experienced in development in 
Papua New Guinea (Alan Renouf , then Secretary of  the Department 
o f  Foreign Affairs , called them colonial hard hat s )  but they 
were attempt ing to gain a broader perspect ive on development 
issues from which to construct a new aid policy . Coming as 
they did to the debate on development in the early 19 70s , 
when it was at a peak o f  crit icism of  aid policies and 
effectiveness ,  they tended to be far more critical of  
Aus tralia ' s  exis t ing policies than those who had spent years 
operat ing within the constraints and frust rat ions of  inadequate 
ftmds , inadequate structures and inadequate polit ical will 
and bureaucrat ic power . 
Because a degree o f  consensus was needed within the new 
Agency on broad policy issues before tmdertaking consultat ion 
with the Department of  Foreign Affairs and reference to the 
minister , the conditions of intra-Agency bureaucratic and 
policy dif ferences promised a double line of con flict . 
When Mr Johnson , Director-General of  the Agency , took 
up duty in April 19 74 , the contending fact ions within the 
agency and the Department of Foreign Affairs looked to him 
to impos e  order on these conflicts . Mr Johnson had b een 
j udged out standingly success ful in the complexit ies of  pre­
self-government politics in Port Moresby , first as an 
enlightened Adminis trator and then as Australia ' s  first 
Commiss ioner . The b as is of this success was his s ense of 
equity , his calmness and his ability to bltmt con flict into 
what was vaguely called ' Melanesian compromise ' . It may have 
b een that the Labor Government expected Mr Johnson to give 
them much-needed expert ise on the thorny problems of  aid to 
Papua New Guinea , but such decisions would be made in the 
Canb erra arena, not in the fluidity of PNG polit ics . In 
retrospect , the qualit ies that were needed appeared rather 
to be the ability to impose a tmif ied Aid Agency view on the 
internal con flict s  so that these would not drag on in a 
deb ilitat ing way ; a strong hand in negot iat ions with Foreign 
Affairs ; a tough attitude to reform of aid administrat ion ;  
an d  the ab ility to develop the minister ' s  confidence in the 
Agency . 
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These organizat ional circumstances - int ra-Agency 
divisions , the relat ionship b etween ADAA and the Department 
of  Foreign Af fairs , together with the relat ive roles played 
by the minister and the Agency in pol icy making - formed the 
framework within which most policy issues of substance were 
decided . 
General aid policy 
Early in January 19 7 4 , the policy branch of Division II  
embarked on a broad review of policy . A new policy was clearly 
called for by the terms of the cab inet decision , and some of  
the enthus iasm for re form that generally emanated from the 
new Labor Government had spilled over into this area . More 
specifically , the Agency urgently needed a ministerial 
statement on policy to give it backing in the process of  
consultat ion with the Department of Foreign Af fairs . To this 
end ,  the head of Division II  employed two consultants from 
the Aus tralian Nat ional Univers ity - one an economist 
experienced in internat ional economic relat ions , and the 
other a graduat e in internat ional polit ics who had been 
adviser to the Joint Parliamentary Commit tee on Foreign Aid . 
In collaborat ion with these part-t ime consultants , the policy 
branch produced a broad philosophical underpinning for 
Aust ralian aid , and embarked on a policy review of  it s 
component s - volume , terms , geographical distribut ion , social 
dis tribut ion , obj ectives and so on . This review had three 
bureaucrat ic aims : to produce guidelines fo r those who 
administered policy in Divis ion I of the Agency ; to gain 
legit imat ion for the policy from the minister through it s 
incorporat ion in the Second Readin g Speech of the ADAA Bill 
and eventually in a det ailed policy statement ; and finally 
to estab lish an accepted government-backed policy base for 
the Agen cy in its conflict s with other departments . 
As the policy review pro ceeded , there was crit icism in 
Divis ion I of the Agency that they were not being adequately 
consulted and , as they had to implement policy , and indeed 
were experienced in this , they ought to as sume at least an 
equal role in formulat ion of the policy . The dispute on 
this issue , and indeed on many others , was never sat is factorily 
resolved , s ince in formal communicat ion between divisions was 
pat chy , and the formal co-ordinat ion through means of a 
senior officers ' meet ing usually led to part icipants standing 
pat on their previously as sumed positions . As the Director­
General was tmwilling in most cases openly to  impos e 
decis ions , decis ions remained tmmade . When news of the 
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policy review reached the Department of Foreign Affairs , 
there was an at tempt init ially to argue that policy review 
lay within their competence , and they would carry this out 
and consult the Agency , but eventually the Department of 
Foreign Affairs ' view settled on being consulted during the 
process of review and again before submiss ion to the minister . 
Divis ion II  of the Agency had another string to it s bow .  
The government had set up an interim Development Assistance 
Advisory Board pending passage of  ADAA ' s legis lat ion , and 
it s funct ions were to advise the minister and the Agency on 
aid policy and to involve the community more in Aus tralian 
aid . Division II  provided the secretariat for the board 
and produced papers for it s considerat ion , without being 
required to refer to Foreign Affairs ' views . The board was 
chaired by Sir John Crawford , who had advised the Prime 
Minister on aid matters , and included individuals with an 
interest in aid ,  as well as the Secretary of the Department 
of Foreign Affairs . The main thrust of  opinion in the board 
was towards a refo rm of aid policy and administ rat ion of 
programs and this const ituted an area of support for the 
embryo policies . The Agency put its b road policy statement 
to the board in February 19 74 and had it accept ed with minor 
changes . The way seemed clear for an approach to the 
minister . 
However ,  the firs t hurdle was to run the gamut of the 
interdepartmental commit tees on aid , con sis ting of senior 
representat ives of the Departments of Foreign Af fairs , the 
Prime Mini ster and Cabinet , Treasury , and Overseas Trade . 
Here the broad policy paper was severely crit icized . Rather 
than being viewed as the output of a new agency with strong 
government backing which was st ill in it s honeymoon period , 
the paper , as a result of the event s surrounding the 
format ion of the Agency , was seen as the product of a few 
former External Territories s taff and their equally naive 
academic advisers . The paper started from the assumpt ion 
that aid was about development , and unlike previous policy 
statements did not develop o r  provide a rat ionale for the 
aid- foreign policy connect ion . For this reason it attract ed 
crit icism from the Department of Foreign Affairs . Similarly , 
because it did not spell out the aid-commercial pol icy nexus , 
it was also crit icized by Trade and Treasury . As an attempt 
to get the development aspect s of aid down to bare bones , it s 
simple and straight forward presentat ion was also criticized . 
The A gency sent this paper to the minister in early August 
19 74 with an outline of the Interdepartmental Committee ( IDC)  
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comments and noted it s endorsement by the Advisory Board . 
The Department o f  Foreign Af fairs commented separately , 
enlarging on it s obj ect ion that insufficient account had 
b een taken of foreign policy obj ect ives and recommended 
that the whole matter be referred back to the !DC for 
redraft in g .  
Relat ions b etween the Agen cy and the Department o f  
Foreign affairs deteriorated seriously on this issue . The 
Agency made submi ss ions to the minister and sent copies to 
the Department of  Foreign Affairs rather than consult ing 
them. The Department of Foreign Affairs retaliated with 
t ime-honoured bureaucrat ic means to hinder the Agency .  The 
minister refused to decide the policy i ssue : he would not 
support the Aid Agency when no Foreign Affairs support could 
be found for it s view , and he would not refer the mat t er 
back to  the Aid IDC and end up with a protract ed struggle 
ending in a lowest common denominator compromise .  
At this s talemate stage , once again the Second Reading 
Speech mechan i sm provided the focus for decis ion-making and , 
in this cas e , part ial resolut ion o f  the aid policy conflict . 
The Foreign Min i ster asked his privat e o ffice to  int ervene 
to find a compromise to the s ituat ion . An agreement on the 
form of the Second Reading Speech for the reintroduct ion o f  
the Aid Agency legislat ion was negot iat ed - an agreement 
that for the Department of  Foreign Affairs necessarily 
included the minis ter ' s  instruct ions on consultat ion and for 
the Aid Agency neces sarily point ed to the new direct ion on 
aid policy . 
This first compromise on a maj or issue began a new 
pattern in relat ions between ADAA and the Department of  
Foreign Affairs . Each administrat ion saw that the minister 
would not automat ically come down on its side and that if 
it did not accept a compromise it ran the risk of  a decision 
even more un favourable to it s int erests . Each also appeared 
to recognize the dangers of a tri-cornered conflict should 
the minister ' s  offi ce act ively int ervene in disput es , 
part icularly given the fact of  easy access by the min ister ' s  
office to the minister . The minister ' s  office had been 
ins t ructed by the minister to observe to the letter his 
ins truct ions that ADAA should consult with Foreign Affairs 
and further , that disputes should not be allowed to  drag on 
interminably but be referred to him quickly for decis ion . 
From this t ime on , consultat ion improved between ADAA 
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and Foreign Affairs and residual differences came to the 
minister for decis ion . The minister ' s  office continued to 
advise him on the substance of such decisions , and on any 
domest ic polit ical considerat j-0ns , and decisions tended in 
mo st part to be taken on their merits .  In this way , intra­
ADAA conflict , and ADAA Foreign Affairs conflict declined 
and new kinds of informal working arrangements b egan to be 
forged . The price that the Agency appeared to  pay for its 
quieter life was the relegat ion to a more distant future of 
its vis ion o f  a maj or reorientat ion in aid pol icy . 
While the Second Reading Speech had b een settled , the 
problem of a more comprehens ive aid policy statement took 
somewhat longer to be resolved . The minister , although 
under pressure from non-government groups and the Aid Agency 
to make such a statement , declined to do so until mid-19 75 , 
feeling that s ince the issue had caused such conflict , a 
better chance of compromise would appear later rather than 
earlier . The speech was drafted on the minister ' s  instruct ions 
in his office , and found fairly ready agreement in both the 
Aid Agency and the department , which offered minor 
modifi cat ions . 
The speech , unlike aid policy statements by previous 
governments , did not refer in a pos itive and direct way to 
the relat ionship b etween aid and foreign policy . It argued 
for a new perspect ive on aid which would mean that ' aid is 
no longer the poor relat ion in our deal ings with other 
countries , nor primarily the cement of a success ful pol itical 
relat ionship ' (Willesee 1 9 7 5 ) . In speaking of the d istribut ion 
of  Australia ' s  aid , a downg rading of foreign policy aspect s 
was evident ; 
The main po int to be stressed is that aid is for 
people ' s  wel fare . The criteria for it s distrib­
ut ion should be princ ipally aid criteria : is it 
needed ? will ·it be spent on the purposes for 
which it is intended ? who will benefit from it ? 
It is our j udgement on these grounds that will 
inform the distribut ion of our aid - not it s use 
as a s t ick or a carrot to impose our beliefs on 
independent nat ions (Willesee 19 7 5 ) . 
The speech al so recognized the commercial interest in 
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aid1 but foreshadowed a mo re positive stance on untying of 
procurement than had hitherto preva iled . Overall the sp eech 
laid considerable stress on the maintenance of the exist ing 
pos it ive aspects of Australian aid ( for example its grant 
charact er) and looked to reform in aspect s of its qual ity , 
to increases in volume , and indicated that changes would be 
required to give th e social welfare and income dist ribut ion 
effects of aid a higher priority . 
This policy speech represented important changes in 
exist ing Aus tralian aid pol icy and it is perhaps surprising 
that the Department of Foreign Affairs had agreed fairly 
readily to it . This was in part because it carried the 
minister ' s  imprimatur b efore it was referred to department s .  
It may have also occurred in part because neither the 
department nor the Agency had any st rong con fidence that 
t hese new direct ions could be implement ed quickly , given the 
disputes that could be expected as each operat ional issue 
arose . 
While the speech broke no new ground in int ernat ional 
t erms , it did represent a cat ching-up of Australian thinking 
on these is sues . It also marked a new departure in that 
while the founders of the Agency had been only peripherally 
concerned with the relat ionship between aid and other foreign 
economic policies , the pol icy statement placed aid squarely 
as one component of the total range of economic pol icies 
towards developing countries , and argued for the development 
of a coherent and posit ive foreign economic policy for 
Australia on the North-South ques tion .  I t  acknowledged that 
the domestic ef fects of such a policy , although likely to 
be unpopular in the short run , were necessary adj ustment s in 
the long run , and both in Australia ' s  and developing countries ' 
interests . 
This argument found l it t le support in the economic 
departments of the bureaucracy , and only lukewarm support at 
this t ime in the Department of Foreign Af fairs . There was 
no cab inet backing for such a stance , and departments were 
l ikely to oppos e any int rus ion by ADAA on behalf of the 
1 ' In the spending of  our aid there are important 
advantages fo r Australian manufacturers , exporters and 
farmers . We cons ider these to be spin-offs  which we welcome , 
so long as they do not reduce the value and effectiveness 
of  our aid flows to developing countries ' (Willesee 19 75 : 9 ) . 
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interes ts of developing countries in their d is cuss ions . Yet 
this speech , by it s emphas is on a realis t ic view of what aid 
could achieve , and its broader perspect ive , did foreshadow 
changes that were to be forced on Aust ral ian policy-makers 
a few years later . 
The statement developed the broad and vague obj ect ives 
set out in the earlier cabinet decis ion in more detail . 
However ,  performance was yet to mat ch rhetoric . 
Volume of aid 
Various ministers in the Labor Government stated early 
in it s life that Australia was commit ted to the achievement 
of a level of Off icial Development Assistance (ODA) that 
would represent 0 . 7 per cent of Gross Nat ional Produce ( GNP) 
by 1980 . Significant increases in dollar terms occurred in 
the 19 73  and 1 9 74 Budget s which increas ed aid to $328 mill ion 
for 19 74-75 . The aid volume for 1 9 75-76 was $ 34 7  million , 
which was a decline in real terms (adj usted for 15 per cent 
inflat ion ) compared to 19 74-75 and represented the constraint s 
of prevailing economic circumstances . In t erms of GNP 
performance over the three years , the picture was a depress ing 
one ,  as there was no s ignificant progres s . 
Table 1 
Official Development Ass istance as % of GNP 
1 9 71 1972 19 7 3  1 9 74 19 75  1976 19 7 7  
Year ended 
31 December 0 . 5 3 0 . 59 0 . 44 0 . 55 0 . 60 0 . 42 0 . 45 
Year ended 
30 June 0 . 56 0 . 55 0 . 53 0 . 52 0 . 5 6  0 . 50 0 . 46 
Source : Aust ralian Development Assistance Bureau , 19 78 . 
The reasons for this were not diff icult to  ascertain . 
The usual method of setting aid volume was to take the 
previous year ' s  figure , add a percentage which represented 
some factor agreed with the Treasury ( for example the rate 
of growth of government expenditure as a whole) , and present 
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it to Budget Cab inet . The big dollar increases in aid made 
in f is cal 1 9 7 3  and 1 9 74 represented the apparent ease of  
economic circumstances , and the fact that the ODA/GNP rat io 
declined slightly , indicated the inflat ion component in GNP 
figures . However ,  the Treasury had not accepted the 0 . 7 
target and was always careful to reserve it s pos it ion on 
statements by minis ters ( even by the Treasurer) .  Aid 
bureaucrat s ,  looking to a long-term expans ion of aid volume , 
had sought to ensure this expansion by reinforc ing ministerial 
statements of the target at every opportunity . By a lack of  
collect ive pol it ical will and the  power of the Treasury in 
the circumstances of  1 9 7 5 , this st rategy came to grief in the 
19 75 Budget Cab in et . 
The Agency , supported by the Department of  Foreign 
Af fairs , went into the 19 75 budget process with a b id for a 
substantial increase over actual aid of $ 32 8  mill ion in 
19 74-75 . The bid was based on proj ected steps toward the 
GNP target , an allowance fo r inflat ion , and the need to  
increase Papua New Guinea ' s  component owing to that count ry ' s  
economic dif ficul t ies . The Agency encountered st rong 
oppos it ion to its bid in the Treasury which sought , wlth the 
backing of the Prime Minister and the Treasurer , to rest rain 
government expenditure to a level consistent with no growth 
in expenditure in real terms . When Budget Cab inet met , the 
issue was disputed ,  but the Treasurer and the Prime Minister 
preva iled against the Foreign Minis ter . This outcome had 
three serious and immediate effect s .  First , in demonst rat ing 
the vulnerability of annual aid volumes to prevailing economic 
condit ions ( though this should have come as no surprise) , 
it eroded the Agency ' s  growing conf idence in being able to 
plan its future programs . Secondly , b ilateral programs were 
seriously affected as the allocat ion for these fell in real 
terms . These funds had to be allocated to proj ect s already 
in the pipeline , thus put t ing back any chance for s ignificant 
chan ge in the existing type of programs . Finally , the 
component of aid to PNG was set at $210 mill ion , a reduct ion 
of $20  mill ion on the b id which had been agreed at earl ier 
negot iat ions between Aust ral ian and PNG officials . The PNG 
government was seriously disappo inted in this outcome . In 
spite o f  the government ' s assurances in 1 9 74 that PNG would 
be provided with $500 million over the three years 19 74-75 
to 1 9 7 6- 7 7 , disagreement had developed as to whether roughly 
$100 million in payments to retiring Australian expat riate 
public servants would be included in this sum.  The budget 
outcome of $210 million included some $50 million for this 
purpos e ,  leaving $ 160 million for development aid , a 
substantial decline in money and real terms compared with 
previous years . 
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In decisions both on the total volume of  aid and of the 
spec ific program for PNG , bureaucrat ic polit ics  played a 
part but were not the decisive factor . In the end it was a 
lack of  polit ical backing for the aid program at a t ime of  
economic downturn that l ed to a cut in the budget . 
Di stribution of  aid 
The compos it ion of  Australian aid underwent some changes 
over the years of the Agency ' s  life . The main one was a 
shift from b ilateral to mult ilateral aid and was a conscious 
effort to play a larger role in regional inst itut ions , to be 
involved in mult ilateral programs in areas such as populat ion 
and health where Australia had hitherto been uninterested , 
and to inc rease the percentage of  mult ilateral aid in line 
with the trend in other · DAC donors . 
This shift was achieved in spite of some strong opposit ion 
by the Department of Foreign Affairs , who feared that such a 
change would undermine their access to aid resources to be 
used in the support of d iplomacy . The Agency prevailed , 
however , for an increase in mult ilateral aid was in direct 
response to the Labor Government ' s  internat ionalist stance . 
The underlying geographical pat tern of  b ilateral aid 
distribut ion remained largely unchanged . Aid to Papua New 
Guinea maintained it s maj or share of Aust ral ian aid . The 
remainder of b ilateral aid was divided between South As ia 
and Southeas t As ia with small amounts going to Africa and the 
Pacific islands . In 19 7 3  Southeast As ia had received $42 
million (ADAA 19 75 ) . The l ion ' s  share of this , some $23  
million , went to Indones ia , while South Asia had received 
$13 million . By 19 75 the Southeast As ian share had increased 
slightly to $48  million , while aid to South As ia grew to $44 
million . This did not indicate a shift in Aust ralia ' s  aid 
priorit ies , for this increase in aid to South As ia had 
occurred in previous crises in the sub-continent . In this 
case it was almo st all food aid to Bangladesh and India 
during the food cris is , and represented a spec ial contribut ion 
over those years to a United Nat ions fund which was disbursed 
bilaterally . Apart from this , an increase from $1 mill ion 
to $ 8  million took place in aid to Africa , representing an 
increased Austral ian polit ical interest in Black Africa , and 
a small increase in aid to the Pacific also occurred . Within 
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Southeast As ia , the predominance of aid to Indonesia 
prevailed , despite it s gains from increased oil prices , and 
the Timor dispute . Aid to South Vietnam increas ed until the 
end of the war , when all aid stopped for the t ime being unt il 
arrangements could be made with the new administrat ion . 
The Agency itself was divided on the quest ion of the 
priorities in aid distribut ion , some arguing for the applic­
ation of a qualified needs principle ,  while others found 
pract ical and diplomat ic difficult ies in any shift in 
dist ribut ion . The Department of Foreign Affairs stood firm 
on the primacy of pol it ical cons iderat ions in aid distribut ion , 
and its voice was the most powerful in these discus sions . 
An upgrading of the developmental aspect s of Australian 
aid , and a concern with it s social and income distribut ion 
effect s was a maj or aim of the government ' s  aid pol icy . The 
const raints on achieving this in the short term were clearly 
recognized in the Agency . Aid to Papua New Guinea supported 
a development program that was bas ed on such obj ectives but 
in other countries the pipel ine effect of exist ing proj ect s ,  
and percept ions o f  recipients '  sensit ivity t o  Australian 
values on these asp ects ,  worked against changes on a broad 
front . Again the agency was divided on this issue , some 
giving priority to the d iplomat ic costs of  Austral ia taking 
an interest in who ben efited from its aid , others s eeing 
the necess ity for reform if aid was really to get to  the 
heart of development problems . On the whole , few changes 
occurred . If we examine the sectoral distribut ion of aid to 
countries other than Papua New Guinea in the years 19 72-73  
to 19 74-75 (and exclude food aid and other contribut ions not 
allocable by sector) , it is clear that Aus tral ian aid 
proj ect s continued to be overwhelmingly concentrated in the 
development of public ut ilit ies , with much les s substant ial 
amounts being devoted to agr iculture , and only small amount s 
to educat ion , health and welfare . 
The part of the agency concerned with the administrat ion 
of b ilateral aid had a st rong connnitment to tradit ional 
proj ect s  in infrastructure , t ied aid and an unwill ingness to  
assume any s.ignificant degree of on-shore cost s . The 
structure of  their operat ions and their standard op erat ing 
procedures were geared to this , and they preferred this degree 
of accountab ility and control . Those in the agency who 
looked for innovat ion and experimentat ion which would lead 
to a great involvement of Aust ralian aid in social welfare 
programs and to an impact on ' people ' s '  problems rather than 
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a government ' s  problems were not closely involved in the 
administrat ion of b ilateral programs and therefore their 
in fluence on these was limited . On the other hand , these 
cons iderat ions began to af fect thinking about long-term 
Aus tralian aid , and reform of exist ing administrative pract ices 
in proj ect aid , part icularly the count ry programming process ,  
allowed some scope for these considerat ions to b e  involved 
in future programs . 
In deciding what Aust ral ian aid should be spent on , the 
Agency it self had the strongest voice , although Fore ign 
Affairs expressed strong interest in proj ects with pol it ical 
impl icat ions , and the Treasury kept a watching brief over all 
expenditure . Thus the Agency itself bears the responsibility 
for the failure to effect a maj or shift in the direct ions 
that the government set down in its cab inet dec ision and in 
its aid policy statement . It does seem clear that a degree 
of separat ion of administ rat ion from foreign policy interes t s  
i s  necessary to allow the predominance of developmental 
interests in aid , but this opportunity was not grasped firmly 
by th e Agency . There were some s igns of a concern with this , 
part icularly in the count ry programming process , which might 
have led , in time , to a shift in the forms and impact of 
Austral ian aid , yet bureaucrat ic inert ia and a fondness for 
old ways , regardless of their appropriateness , delayed this 
process . 
Quality of aid 
The overall shape of  an aid program reflects the 
relat ionship b etween its part s .  In the case of Austral ian 
aid , the preference for grant aid appears to constrain the 
prospect s  for growth in volume , through the trade-off process 
that takes place in the bureaucracy . Again , an untying of 
Aust ralian aid could produce pressures for constraints on 
volume , and it is often the t ension between quant ity and 
qual ity that constrains advanc es on either front . Thus it 
is no t only diff icult economic circumstances that have an 
effect on the volume of aid and thus reduce the opportunit ies 
for change within programs , but the ongoing resolut ion of 
bureaucrat ic interes ts on all the important aspects of the 
aid program which leads to a bargaining s ituat ion where one 
gain may be matched by a future compromise , and where an 
agency ' s  power is weak compared to the other players ' .  
Moves to unt ie Aus tralian aid to count ries other than 
Papua New Guinea ran into entrenched oppos it ion from the 
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Department of Trade ( on the practical ground that aid should 
at least ass is t  export s )  and also from the Treasury , which 
while it acknowledged the economic bad sense of tying , has 
always at least had one eye on the balance of payments . Any 
advances by ADAA were immed iately halted by these departments 
and little support was to be expected from the Department of  
Foreign Affairs , which was usually amb ivalent on the issue . 
Conclus ion 
At the out set of this paper we set out five obj ect ives 
that it was hoped the Aid Agency might achieve . The first 
of these obj ectives - that developmental aspects  ( including 
the social and income distribut ion effects of aid) should 
receive a higher pr iority in a id than hitherto - became a 
source of  some dis illus ionment in the aid commun ity , as 
little evidence appeared that moves in this direct ion were 
taking place . 
To ascertain the extent to which this obj ect ive was 
fulf illed , we need to distinguish between the general 
developmental quality of the Australian aid as a whole , 
which remained largely unchanged , and changes in the range 
of d iscrete programs which did lead to some upgrading of the 
developmental impact of Aus tral ian aid . 
It is dif f icult to say that the aid program ,  viewed in 
its ent irety , gave higher priority to developmental aspects  
than was the case in the years to  1 9 72 . The volume of the 
aid program d id not grow so as to allow Australia to make a 
s ign if icant impact on the development problems of  any country 
except Papua New Guinea ; the d is tr ibut ion of the aid program 
among countries was not reoriented so as to give higher 
pr iority to the poorest developing countries , and indeed it 
retained it s former distribut ion pattern , one devised and 
maintained through the cont inuing influence of the Department 
of Foreign Af fairs for broad foreign pol icy reasons . There 
was a shift to mult ilateral aid ,  but it is arguable whether 
this was seriously seen as contribut ing to an upgrading of 
development aspects , since the main mo tive here was for 
Aus t ralia to play a mo r e  appropria t e  in t ernat ional role in 
such bodies . While the terms of Australian aid , as grants , 
remained good , several challenges to this policy from the 
Treasury having been resis ted , there was no success in 
untying procurement of  Australian aid ,  although again moves 
to t ie aid to Papua New Guinea were success fully res isted . 
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Thus , while the stated aid policy had come down on the 
side of the angels on all these maj or pol icy cho ices with 
developmental implications , the real ity was a con t inuat ion 
of the previous status quo in almo st all these aspects of  
the aid  program,  although the fact that no  s ignificant 
deteriorat ion occurred mus t  be cons idered a pos itive 
achievement in the c ircums tances that prevailed . 
While there was no s ignificant improvement in the 
developmental quality of Australia ' s  aid in the Agency period , 
what was the experience at the level of individual aid 
programs ? 
Viewed sectorally , there was little progress in aid to 
health , education and wel fare programs , and the sectoral 
distribution of aid remained firmly directed to public 
infrastructure proj ects . However ,  there were some indicat ions 
of a growing awareness within the Agency that the soc ial and 
income effects of aid should receive more attent ion , both for 
the interests of  developing countries and also b ecause of the 
climate of opinion within the government and aid community . 
This shift in awarenes s on these issues ( even if not yet 
translated very far into programs on the ground) was the most 
important s ign that the Agency had a role dis t inct from its 
predecessors . 
The argument over developmental v .  other ( chiefly 
pol it ical ) cons iderat ions in the use of  aid , takes many 
forms : for example , if Thailand request s  that a road be 
built through a low populat ion area with st rategic signif­
icance , but with little ob servable impact on the incomes of 
the local people , should Australia agree or should it propo se 
alternatives with greater developmental impact ? Again , if a 
high ranking developing country polit ician wanted a Colombo 
Plan scholarship for his son , who did no t ful fil the ent rance 
requirements , should he be rebuffed ? Such cases form the 
sub stance of the class ic conflict s in aid in any country , 
and it was apparent in these years that a stiffening of 
resolve to give higher priority to developmental aspect s 
occurred , though not without the cost of  constant conflict 
within the Agency and with the Department of Foreign Af fairs . 
The posit ive resolut ion of such conflict s requires not 
only a firm bureaucrat ic and polit ical hand , but an approach 
to the planning of aid which lessens the opportunity for 
diversion of aid resources from development goals . The 
development of  a count ry-progranuning approach was perhaps 
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the Agency ' s  most signif icant potent ial achievement in 
giving development aspects a higher priority . The process 
helped to prevent ad hocery which is the prime condit ion 
for political influence at home and abroad , and allowed the 
development of  a working philosophy as to how Aust ral ian 
aid could meet the development needs of each d ifferent 
country ' s  development plan . Conceived modes tly , this 
programming gave recipients some security in not ional level s 
of  aid and ongoing knowledge of Austral ia ' s inten t ions , and ,  
in Canberra , i t  provided the framework for coherent b ilateral 
aid admin istrat ion and forward planning - both aspects having 
been largely absent in the past . The giving of aid for 
pol it ical purposes s t ill oc curred , but the opportunities 
for this were whittled away through the country programming 
mechanism. Further ,  this mechanism does allow the applicat ion 
of consistent developmental criteria to part icular proj ect s . 
A growing sensitivity as to who benefits from the aid began 
to be observable , in the expans ion from tradit ional Australian 
roads and bridges proj ects to agr icultural development 
programs . 
The Agency worked hard at the second obj ect ive , an 
improvement in aid administrat ion , the introduct ion of  
pro fess ionalism into the aid program and the establishment 
of a career structure , but had not progressed far . The 
estab l ishment of the Aid Agency meant in it ially a new s et 
of administrat ive problems in addit ion to those exist ing in 
the previous dispersed administrat ions . The Agency was 
handicapped in this task first by internal confl ict over 
areas of respons ib il ity and then by shortages of competent 
and experienced staff . 
Later in the l ife of the Agency admin istrat ion of 
proj ect s improved somewhat ,  and some problems in post 
l iaison were ironed out . Yet the Agency was vulnerable to 
crit icism from other departments on this head and in some 
important areas of administ rat ion , such as expert s  and 
tra inees , l ittle progress was made .  Despite the varied 
origins of ADAA personnel , a degree of professionalism 
about development issues began to emerge and was bolstered 
by the recruitment of some competent out s iders . This meant 
that the aid-development considerat ion b ecame a profes s ional 
aim .  Developing a career structure , however ,  proved very 
d ifficult . The locat ion and status of overseas aid pos t s  
was disputed b y  both the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
the Public Service Board , a s ign that neither was convinced 
of the need for such a career structure . A cohes ive ethos 
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essential to the p'roper functioning of such a structure , was 
slow to develop . 
The dif ficulty in developing a career st ructure also 
inhibited the degree of innovat ion and experimentat ion that 
occurred , and to an extent the approach to research and 
evaluat ion ( the third obj ective above) . The integrat ion of 
funct ions allowed some scope for innovat ion , and count ry 
programming was the most  important example of this . On the 
other hand , there app eared to b e  little concept ion of the 
po ssibil it ies of new forms of aid and a tendency to cling to 
old ways even though these were less than effect ive in 
meeting development obj ect ives . 
The quest ion of Agency involvement in research into aid 
and development also illus trated thes e difficult ies . 
Research was seen as a good thing which no one in the Agency 
could oppo se per se , and the Agency spent some time looking 
into the various poss ib ilit ies for support ing research , but 
it put no money into it . Through it s funding of  the MADE 
Program at the Aust ralian Nat ional Univers ity ' s  Development 
Studies Centre it became involved with a res earch body at 
arm' s length , but an underlying distrust of the worth of 
research and fear of  the crit icisms of academics inhib ited a 
st ronger involvement . Evaluat ion of aid was taken far more 
seriously and a branch was set up with the purposes of  
apprais ing the  suit ab ility of proj ect s and monitoring their 
effect iveness . This innovation , long overdue in Australian 
aid , seems to have been quite important in increas ing 
profess ionalism in aid and in upgrading the quality of 
pro grams . 
The Agency had begun on the fourth obj ect ive noted , the 
development of an integrat ed aid policy , but had not yet 
gone very far . For the f irst t ime the question of  how aid 
to Papua New Guinea and aid to the rest of the world should 
be related ( in terms of  volume , and forms of aid) received 
serious cons iderat ion but the failure to develop a long­
term aid policy to Papua New Guinea did not allow an 
integrated aid pol icy to emerge . The Agency had managed to 
establish some input into the instruct ions to the Aust ralian 
members on the boards of the internat ional banks , but by and 
large these members continued to take a different and more 
conservat ive line to the rest of our aid representatives . 
Certainly if any hope had been entertained of integrat ing 
our overall economic pol icies towards developing countries , 
these were in no way realized , and our development polic ies , 
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as viewed from Manila or Suva , or even Port Mo resby , must 
have seemed confused and contradictory .  
The final obj ect ive in the es tablishment o f  the Agency 
had been the development of a lobby within the bureaucracy 
that had a s elf-interest in fight ing for a larger slice of 
the budget and more manpower for the aid program , and that 
was to some extent a spokesperson for the developing 
count ries in pol icy debat es within the bureaucracy . In so 
far as such a lobby was creat ed by the format ion of the 
Agency , clearly it was not a very effect ive one . The 
reasons for this are various . First , the staff remained 
divided among themselves , having been drawn from d if ferent 
departments and retaining old departmental loyalt ies . This 
was no where more apparent than in the second l ine of 
leadership of the Agency , where of  the three men involved , 
one retained t ies with his departmental home of  twenty years 
( the Treasury) and another was actually on temporary second­
ment from the Department of Foreign Affairs . Secondly , any 
weight the Agency could put behind the aid program was 
counterbalanced by the hos t ility that it s creat ion had 
caused in two powerful departments of  state  (Treasury and 
Foreign Af fairs ) .  Thirdly , the power of a body within the 
bureaucracy depends upon a number of factors , such as the 
l evers it controls in various bureaucrat ic processes , the 
informat ion , influence , or access that it has to t rade with 
other departments , and the importance of  the constituency 
with which it deals within the community . In all t hese 
respect s ,  ADAA was a lightweight . There was really very 
little t ime for the Agency to develop organizat ional cohes ion 
and a dis t inct ive philosophy , but such drive as it was able 
to generate had to be devoted to f ight ing off attacks on it s 
exist ing prerogat ives rather than on expansion and empire­
building . 
In sum, then , the j udgment that emerges on the balance 
sheet of the Agency ' s  successes and fa ilures in meet ing it s 
obj ect ives is , at the very b est , a mixed one .  On the maj or 
aspects  of the whole aid program, no significant advances 
were made , although it may be j udged that , given the exist ing 
pol itical , bureauc rat ic and economic circumstances , the fac t  
that no sign ificant deteriorat ion occurred is a pos it ive 
achievement in itself . There was some qualified success in 
reorienting programs to devel opmental obj ect ives , and in 
evaluat ion o f  aid . On the other s ide , it seems clear that 
while fo rmal integrat ion took place , a un ified aid agency 
view did not emerge quickly enough , and the hope of  the 
proponents of an agency that it would come to form a 
constituency within the bureauc racy capable of promot ing 
aid interests more effectively remained unfulfilled . 
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This is illust rated if the wider issue of the Agency ' s  
role in other foreign economic policy areas is examined . 
As ment ioned above , the founders of the Agency did not at 
f irst envisage a role for it in the format ion of other 
foreign economic policies . As the Agency progressed in it s 
thinking , it began to take the view that it was lit tle use 
giving aid with one hand , while the effect of other Australian 
policies was to damage recipient development prospects . In 
this vein , ADAA made a cogent and well-argued submission to 
the connnittee that was inquiring into the manufacturing 
indust ry , putt ing forward the view that restructuring of 
tariffs ought to take into account the needs of developing 
count ries . This  view apparently had l ittle effect on the 
out come of the commit tee ' s  del ib erat ions , but i-t was a sign 
of a broader view being proposed by the Agency . S imilarly , 
the Agency sought to have a voice on interdepartmental 
committees ( IDCs ) that dealt with issues affecting the 
development of Third World countries , l ike the IDC on 
Austral ian pol icies for the Law of the Sea . 
This was almost complet ely tmsuc cess ful . The Agency 
had no ministerial backing for intervention ; Foreign Af fairs 
resented an ADAA role , preoccupied as it was with putt ing 
its views to other departments . ADAA it self generally lacked 
the research capac ity and expert ise on the variety of issues 
that emerged and it was almost totally ignored in this pol icy­
making pro cess . About the same t ime , however , there was a 
growing feeling within the Department o f  Foreign Affairs 
it sel f  that Aust ral ia needed to develop a posit ive response 
to the claims of developing countries expressed in the New 
Internat ional Economic Order debate , and to avoid the 
pol it ical cos t s  attached to the trade pol icies of the economic 
departments . Thus Willesee ' s  speech in May 19 75 sought to 
encompass aid pol icy within this broader framework , although 
no not iceab le progress occurred on this in the life of the 
Labor Government . 
Thus the Agency had not progressed far in the achievement 
of it s aims , when the Labor Government was dismissed in 
November 19 75 . As part of  its policy of  economic stringency , 
the new Liberal Government effect ively abol ished the A id 
Agency in February 19 7 6 , and without demonst rat ing any savings 
in costs , reabsorbed it into the Department of Foreign Affairs . 
12 8 
In this study of  the concept ion , b irth , puberty and 
death of  ADAA , two related themes have emerged . The first 
is the constant debilitat ing ef fec t an the Agency of 
cont inuing bureaucrat ic pol it ics over its roLe in the aid 
pol icy process , a theme we have dwelt on at length . The 
second is the failure of polit ical will at crit ical moments . 
The Agency b egan with a fair degree of pol it ical support , 
though it was never especially high after the Prime Minister 
rel inquished his personal responsib ility for it . At the 
moment when it mos t  needed polit ical support , however , namely 
when the economic recess ion forced hard choices on ministers , 
that support failed altogether . This was because the most  
important condit ion for  a cont inuing high level of pol it ical 
support , namely a high degree of polit ical int erest and 
support within the community it self , does no t exist . Where 
an act ivity does no t have an act ive lobby within the community 
and when a cut in that act ivity does not neces sarily mean a 
lo ss in votes , then it is always especially vulnerab le to the 
ups and downs of the polit ical process , with a b ias towards 
the downwards side . Furthermore , the prospect s  for an 
improvement in polit ical support in the immediate future are 
not good . With the end of Australia ' s  direct colonial role 
in Papua New Guinea , we can no longer expect an automatic 
increase in aid to Papua New Guinea as development proceeds . 
The other pol it ical prop of  the aid program has also been 
removed .  This was the use of the communist menace in As ia 
as a j us t if icat ion for development assistance , which was said 
to promote polit ical stab ility in our north and thus fend off 
the threat to our security . However muddle-headed this 
rationale may have been and however cynical some of those who 
used it , it nevertheless was at t imes a power ful argument , 
both in cab inet and with the les s altruist ic s egment s of the 
populat ion . 
If the prospect for an increased volume of aid is indeed 
dismal , this makes the qual ity of aid and the interact ion 
between the aid program and Aust ral ia ' s  other internat ional 
economic pol icies of vital interest to the proponents of aid . 
In reaching dec is ions on such quest ions , administrat ive 
arrangement s can be of vital importance . This story of the 
Aid Agency and the reasons for its lack of success clearly 
have important impl icat ions for future administrat ive 
arrangements . It is not our intent ion at this stage to 
canvass poss ible alternat ives and their pol icy implicat ions , 
but rather ,  in this crit ique , to contribut e to the bas is for 
such a discuss ion . 
Chapter 6 
The administrat ion of  Australian aid 
J . C .  Ingram 
The organizat ion of the administrat ion of Australian 
government development assistance has b een subj ect to maj or 
changes over the las t few years , culminat ing in the dec ision 
to replace the s tatutory Australian Development As sistance 
Agency by a semi-autonomous Bureau within the Department of 
Foreign Affairs . Thes e changes have been controversial . 
However , as another studyl in this series has demonstrated , 
it is not evident that there is any one preferred arrangement 
for the administration of development assistance in donor 
countries . Indeed , there are almost  as many forms of 
organizat ion as there are donors . Convincing arguments can 
be advanced in favour of  a variety of adminis trat ive forms , 
with var ious levels of autonomy , ranging from a separate 
administrat ive body with full departmental s tatus , to a unit 
with little or no autonomy completely subsumed within a 
department concerned with foreign affairs . All o f  these 
forms , as well as other arrangements , are employed by one 
or another of the donor countries whose aid pol icies and 
p ractice are generally considered to be more enlightened 
than average . 
Against this background , a priori argument s  about the 
best and worst forms of organizat ion seem likely to be 
sterile . This applies with special force to debate about 
whether aid is best adminis tered within or without a foreign 
office . As Viviani remarked in her chapter : ' The problem is 
not how to divorce aid obj ectives from foreign policy and 
trade policy , but how to ensure that these polic ies take 
developmental cons iderat ions into account . Administrat ive 
isolat ion does not achieve this and can b e  totally counter­
product ive . ' 
1Nancy Viviani , ' Problems of aid administration and policy 
formulat ion among western countries ' .  
12 9 
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In this survey , therefore ,  it is not proposed to j oin 
the debate about organization and aid policy . As aid 
administrators we have to accept certain things as given 
whe ther they relate to government pol icy or the bureaucrat ic 
climate in which we are obliged to operate . Our task is to 
ensure that , within this framework , the Australian aid 
program is adminis tered as efficiently as po ssible and makes 
a maximum contribution to the economic and social advancement 
of the developing count ries . That is not an easy t ask . The 
art o f  government is never as s imple as its critics  seem to 
assume and the admin is trat ion of government aid is part icularly 
complex because it must take account o f  the constraints 
applicable in rec ipient countries as well as at home . My 
chapuer will out l ine some of  thes e constraints which affect 
the adminis tration of  b ilateral ' proj ect ' aid to countries 
other than Papua New Guinea . 
There will be no attempt to discuss in any depth the 
administrat ion of bilateral training and assis tance to 
educat ion facilit ies .  This is a complex subj ect which 
involves dist inct problems of administrat ion which , to do 
them j us t ice , would require elaborat ion in a separate paper . 
Bilateral proj ect aid administrat ion is in essence 
concerned with evolving the means by which the policies of 
both donor countries and recipients  are effect ively harmonized 
and t ranslated into viable programs which are efficiently 
executed . Before explaining how we try to do this , I shall 
set out briefly the bas ic characterist ic details of the total 
Aust ralian aid program in order to give some idea of  
how bilateral proj ect s  f it into the  total Aust ralian aid 
program. 
The sett in g  
Aust ralian aid , a s  i s  well known , i s  virtually all 
given on a grant bas is ,2 whether bilaterally or mult ilat erally . 
In the lat ter case , it is relent through the ' soft  windows ' 
o f  the lending agency , such as the World Bank ' s  Internat ional 
Development Associat ion or the As ian Development Bank ' s  As ian 
Development Fund . Over the years , there have b een propo sals 
to introduce a loan element into the general Aus t ralian aid 
program , but this has been res isted so far as disadvantageous 
2Except ions are some special loans to the Papua New Guinea 
government and one small loan to Fij i .  
to the recipient , and ,  in the longer term and wider 
perspect ive , to the donor as well . 
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The total level of  aid in current pr ices has increased 
rapidly over the past decade , as shown in Table 1 .  Although 
the real value of the sums shown has been eroded by inflat ion 
over the period , nevertheless some growth in real terms has 
been achieved . From a base of  1003 in 19 70-71 the total 
program grew to 110 in 197 7-7 8  after reaching 121 . 7 in 
1974-75 . 4 
Tab le 1 
Total Australian aid ( $  million)  
Bilateral aid 
of which 
Papua New Guinea 
Other cotlllt ries 
Mult ilateral 
Total 
19 70- 1972- 19 74- 1975- 19 7 6- 19 7 7-
71 73 75 76  7 7  78  
168 . 3  204 . 3  2 78 . 5  303 . 4  318 . 6  339 . 3  
125 . 0  144 . 3 168 . 8  2 11 . 9  2 2 6 . 4  219 . 4  
4 3 . 3  60 . 0  109 . 7 91 . 5  92 . 2  119 . 8 
12 . 3  14 . 5  49 . 6  4 3 . 4  5 9 . 7  79 . 2  
1 80 . 6  2 18 . 8  32 8 . 1  346 . 9 37 8 . 3  418 . 5  
Source : Australian Government , Australia 's Official 
Development Assistance to Developing Countries ,  
various issues to 1 9 7 7 -7 8 . 
Aid to Papua New Guinea and mult ilateral aid 
The predominance of Papua New Guinea (PNG) in the 
b ilateral aid program is especially s ignificant . In 19 70- 71 
it accounted for 6 9  per cent o f  Australia ' s  aid , although 
its share declined to 61 per cent in 19 75-76  and 52 per cent 
3The Aust ralian CPI is used as a basis for the calculat ion 
of  the real growth of the Aust ral ian Aid Program. 
4 rn the or iginal vers ion of this paper , 19 75-76 disbursement 
f igures were used as the mos t  recent complete s tat ist ics 
then available . Later figures and calculat ions based on 
them have b een inserted by the editors .  
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in 19 7 7-78 . In 1974 , Australia began to extend its aid to 
PNG on a three-year basis , so that their government could 
plan its use more effectively . 5 In 1 9 7 6 , this period was 
extended to five years . 
Aid to mult ilat eral agencies has grown strikingly in 
percentage terms . While the actual amount was only $ 79 
mill ion in 19 7 7-78 , nonetheless it is in real terms more 
than t riple the level of contribut ions at the beginn ing of 
the decade . 
It is worth dwelling for a moment on the quest ion of  
the role of  PNG and the mult ilaterals in the aid  pro gram. 
There is cons iderable legit imacy in the view that , in 
comparing the apport ionment o f  Aust ralian aid resources 
between mult ilateral and bilateral forms , it is more realist ic 
to set as ide our aid to PNG . If  this is done the mult ilateral 
share of the remainder is currently nearly 40 per cent , 
which is high by Development Ass istance Connnittee ( DAC) 
standards . While there are sound reasons why Australian aid 
to PNG should be at it s present level , those who crit icize 
our performance in the mult ilateral area might reflect on 
the improbab il ity that , were 40 per cent of  our total aid to 
be made available on a mult ilateral bas is , any signif icant 
port ion would make its way to PNG.  All donors with specific 
bilateral respons ibilities have had to face this sort of 
dilennna - Australia is no except ion . 
Although there are important issues involved with aid 
to both PNG and mult ilateral organizat ions which assume 
large port ions of the t ime of senior staff of ADAB , the 
compos it ion of the program provides a clear indicat ion as to 
where the main burden of Australian aid administrat ion lies . 
As far as donors are concerned , the mult ilateral organ iz­
at ions themselves assume primary responsib ility for evolving 
the means by which their programs are effect ively implement ed . 
Thus the administ rat ive burden for which cont ribut ing 
count ries are l iable is minimal . The same is t rue of 
Aust ralia ' s  budget support for Papua New Guinea , where 
spending decisions and implementat ion are the res ponsib il ity 
of the PNG government . Thus even though Papua New Guinea is 
the pre-eminent beneficiary of Australia ' s  bilateral aid , 
the adminis t rat ive tasks associat ed with that program are 
5The agreement is for min imum aid , with provis ion for 
negot iat ion on ' top up ' sums . 
also minimal . 6 Hereafter all references to bilateral aid 
will exclude PNG . 
Bilateral aid to count ries other than PNG 
133 
The bulk of the Bureau ' s s taf f is thus involved in the 
adminis t rat ion of bilat eral aid to other count ries . It is 
in this area that the challenge of ef ficient aid adminis­
t rat ion has to be met . It is also in this area that 
Australia ' s  aid administrat ion - and indeed Aust ral ia ' s 
credibility as an effect ive donor - is most exposed and has , 
on occas ion , been most sorely crit ic ized . 
In essence the aid program seeks to supplement the 
resources of the developing world , and through the effect ive 
t rans fer of technology and resources , to assist developing 
countries to create a cl imate conducive to sustained economic 
growth . Expressed in another way , an effect ive aid program 
seeks to eliminate itself from the internat ional economic 
scene . Irrespect ive of how slim the likelihood of this may 
seem at present , this ult imate obj ect ive should not be 
forgotten in the administrat ion of an aid pro gram. 
The out standing characteris t ic of  any b ilateral aid 
program is it s fundamental compl exity . This derives primarily 
from the numerous constraints that are bas ic to both s ides of 
the b ilateral relat ionship which is , by its very nature , a 
government-to-government one . Consequently , the primary 
challenge encountered by an aid administ rat ion is that of  
reconciling the constraints aris ing from the in terests  of 
the two part ies to the aid cont ract . The more obvious 
realit ies which affect the courses of  act ion open to both 
the donor and the recipient will be briefly discussed . 
The cons t raints 
Irrespect ive o f  domes t ic budgetary and other cons ider­
at ions , it is a reality that , because of its small size , 
Aust ralia ' s capacity to respond to the needs of the developing 
countries and to influence s ignif icantly the course of  their 
development is limit ed . Accordingly , the Bureau must seek 
6 It should be noted , however ,  that Papua New Guinea is also 
a principal beneficiary of the t raining program which , 
overall , is highly labour int ens ive in its adminis t rat ion . 
134 
to allocate scarce resources among a number o f  compet ing 
demands so as best to achieve the government ' s  aid policy 
obj ect ives . 
Regional concentrat ion 
Aust ral ia ,  as a developed and affluent country adj acent 
to some of the l eas t developed regions of the world , has a 
part icular responsib ility to concentrate its resources on 
the developing count ries in it s immediat e neighbourhood . 
The concentrat ion of resources on Papua New Guinea , the 
South Pacific and Southeast Asia (which is so clearly 
reflected in the stat is t ics on aid dist ribut ion given in 
Tab le 2 )  result s ,  not from the vicis situdes of  foreign 
pol icy , but rather from the reality of Aust ral ia ' s ob ligat ions 
to it s near neighbours . Again , if the relat ively small 
Aust ralian b ilateral program is to have any developmental 
impact it should concentrat e on a few developing count ries . 
It is natural that these countries should be our neighbours . 
Further , the aid administrator has to take account of 
the s ituat ion within individual developing countries , the 
realit ies of which exert a st rong in fluence on the composit ion 
of Australia ' s  bilateral aid programs . The great divers ity 
of individual cases makes it difficult to it emize all the 
constraint s that o riginate in recipient count ries . There 
s imply is no common denominator which can apply to all of 
them. Their resource bases vary widely ; their stages of 
development differ markedly ; their individual development 
needs are more often than not unique ; their ab ility to 
articulate their development obj ect ives and programs in 
forms to which aid programs can readily respond varies 
cons iderab ly .  
The common factor ,  however , is that almost all o f  the 
develop ing count ries with which Aust ralia has an aid 
relat ionship have , in one way or another , sought to enunciate 
their development policies and priorit ies . Oft en these 
statements of  development intent ions are not given adequate 
substance in investment programs and consequently in aid 
reques ts . At t imes , development p rograms int ro duced by 
developing count ries app ear to concentrate  on those sectors 
or t ypes of  act ivit ies which donors may as sess as being 
inconsis tent with , or even opposed to , the philosophies and 
obj ectives underlying their aid program. 
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It is an impo rtant funct ion of  aid administ rat ion to 
examine these apparently comp et ing obj ect ives and determine , 
where it can b e  found , the intersect ion of our goals with 
those of each of our bilateral partners . 
The set t ing of priorit ies 
The essential government-t o-government nature of our 
bilateral aid program imposes upon the Bureau a bas ic 
requirement for it to be sensit ive to the expressed needs 
of recipient count ries , within the constraint s imposed by 
the government ' s  stated aid policy obj ectives . Success ive 
Australian government s have acknowledged unequivocally that 
it is the prerogat ive of the developing countries themselves 
to determine their own development priorit ies . It follows 
from this that the s cope for Aust ral ia , or for any bilateral 
donor for that matter , to determine directly the thrust of 
development programs - other than by limiting the range of 
aid opt ions for which it is willing to provide support - is 
virtually non-existent . Our bilateral aid is necessarily 
limited to assisting those act ivit ies to which the recipient 
is firmly committed and for which the need for assistance is 
apparent . It is of  course open to Austral ia to refus e to 
undertake proj ects  sought by recipients if we assess that 
the proj ects contribute insuf ficiently t o , even negate ,  our 
broad development policy goals . 
One aid obj ect ive which is much discussed internat ionally 
is to raise the living s tandards of the poorest elements in 
the populat ions of  the developing count ries . Most LDCs hope 
to deal with this problem through the ' trickle down ' effeC't s 
of economic growth policies . It  is arguable that such 
policies have so far proved inadequat e .  In this connect ion , 
Aust ralia must t ake account of  developing countries ' 
absorpt ive capacity ' ,  which limit s their ability to t ackle 
the problems of the poor . 
It is probably true that an aid program which is severely 
compartmentalized and t ied to domestic sect ional interest s ,  
by presenting essent ially indigest ible lumps of  aid to the 
recipient , tends to inhibit its absorpt ion and at the same 
t ime fails to lead to any improvement in , or even worsens , 
the economic lot of the poorest classes . However , this 
scarcely applies to Aust ral ia .  This  is partly because of 
the small s cale on which almost  all our programs operate , 
which allows for great flexib ility of content . 
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The training element 
The main reason , however , why the general crit icism 
that foreign aid fails to ' t rickle down ' scarcely applies to 
the Australian bilateral program is b ecause o f  its strong 
t raining element . This is t rue even o f  those infrast ructure 
proj ect s which have been specifically crit icized . The ext ent 
of the technical assistance and t raining component of  
proj ects is not generally realiz ed . In the parlance of  
internat ional aid , this component is  commonly called 
' technical co-op erat ion ' .  Thus , while it is common enough 
knowledge that Australia has had a series of ' highway 
proj ects ' in Thailand , it is less common for peopl e to 
realize that the roads were built by the Thais . Aust ralia ' s  
contribut ion was in the fo rm o f  technical services , equipment , 
some suppo rting materials and considerable on-the-j ob 
technical and manual train ing.  The same mixture of  input s 
has been provided on numerous oc cas ion s for a wide divers ity 
of development as sistance purposes over the history of  the 
program. It has been a very success ful mix for what must 
always be a small program in most of the countries we assist . 
While the delivery mechanisms will gradually change and the 
sectors touched will vary and b ecome more integrated , the 
essential pat tern will undoubtedly remain . Some appreciat ion 
of the overall management problem involved may b e  gained 
from the fact that , in 1975-7 6 , there were 32 7 separat e 
proj ects involving , for long or short periods , 710 technical 
personnel op erating in the field . 
In the training pro gram it has been found that the most  
effective results can b e  achieved by  integrat ing the  various 
typ es of assistance offered to each developing count ry , both 
within the training and educat ion sector itsel f ,  and between 
that and other sectors . The aim is to  develop progress ively 
an individual ' package ' of aid to meet the needs of each 
count ry ,  after consulting each part icular government , and in 
relat ion to Australia ' s  capabilit ies . An allocat ion o f  
' t raining months ' will be part of the package , the recipient s 
being able to expend these on short- , long- or medium-term 
courses according to need and cho ice . 
Organ izat ion and planning 
In dealing with the constraints bearing upon the aid 
program, the Bureau employs a numb er of techniques in planning 
and administering the b ilat eral program. These techniques 
apply to all the forms of aid included in the bilat eral 
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program, to  a greater o r  lesser degree . 
The basic aid adminis t rative tool is what is known as a 
Program Planning Miss ion . These mi ssions are despat ched 
annually , and somet imes more frequently , to the maj or 
recipients of Aust ralia ' s  development assistance . ( Currently , 
we aim to cover all recipients , even if the smaller countries 
only receive a mi ssion every two years . )  The composition of 
the miss ions includes not only administrators from the Bureau , 
but also specialis t s  in the various disciplines which will 
be maj or constituent s  in that country ' s  program. Since 
almost all recipient count ries seek to set their development 
in the context of a development plan , the missions at tempt , 
in as sophist icat ed a way as po ssible , to mat ch Australian 
capabilit ies with the priorit ies as expressed in these plans . 
In recent years a systematized approach to the analys is 
of new requests has been evolved to take account of a wider 
range of considerat ions than purely economic and technical 
feasibility . Aspects now emphas ized include : 
( a) consistency of the proposal with the recipient 
government ' s  stated development obj ect ives ; 
(b ) the relat ionship of  the proposal to exist ing 
programs and proj ect s , irrespect ive of sources 
of  funding ; 
( c )  an assessment of  the absorpt ive capacity of the 
recipient , in terms of manpower , t echnical 
expert ize , inst itut ional facilit ies and financial 
resources needed t o  meet recurrent cos t s ; 
(d)  the likely direct and indirect economic and soc ial 
bene fits that the proposal may generate and the 
iden t ificat ion , if po ssible , of  the persons or 
groups which will be part icularly advantaged or 
disadvantaged by the proj ect . 
This init ial phase of the processing cycle is carried 
out by the appropriate agencies in the rec ipient count ry 
itself in collaborat ion with Australian personnel ass igned 
to that count ry . Such documentat ion enables the Bureau ' s  
staff t o  become aware o f  any maj or deficiencies or st rengths 
in the proposal , and to determine whether more intens ive 
analys is , for example the coIImliss ioning of  a feas ib ility 
study , should be undertaken or whether the proposal should 
be proceeded with at all . 
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Monitoring program execut ion 
An integral element of  the continuing effort to improve 
the quality of the aid program is the input made by 
qual ified and appropriately-experienced appraisals and 
evaluat ion personnel in the planning of new proj ect s . Their 
task is to recommend in some detail courses of  act ion in the 
design of new proj ec ts , which will help to ensure mos t  
effective use of  resources for both the recipient and the 
Aust ral ian taxpayer , and the success ful implementat ion of 
the proj ect . They have the added responsibility of building 
into the proj ect design benchmarks which will permit crit ical 
evaluat ion o f  it as implementat ion proceeds . 
Innovat ions are being progress ively introduced in the 
operat ions ( t hat is implement at ion ) areas of the Bureau . 
These are des igned to improve greatly the actual process of 
proj ect execut ion and monitoring.  A part icularly s ign ificant 
development is the greater us e o f  agents in the management 
of the broader-based and more complex multi-discipl inary 
proj ects that are being carried out on an increas ing scale . 
The technique followed in allocat ing food aid resources 
is similar in bas ic concept to those fo r proj ect aid . 
Decis ions are reached only after a thorough analys is of a 
country ' s  food needs , its balance o f  payments  and budgetary 
posit ion and the consequences , if any , of the provision of 
food aid on their domest ic product ion of s t aple foodstuf fs . 
The food aid program seeks to avoid creat ing dependence , a 
disincentive effect on domes t ic indust ry or det riment to 
no rmal commercial t rade . Since food supplies in most 
co\lllt ries are so vulnerable to the vagaries of  weather , the 
pat tern o f  food aid programming is less con s istent year t o  
year than other element s of the b ilat eral program. 
Program orientat ion and composition 
The interface of two quite dist inct ive set s  o f  
con st raints - namely those to which the donor mus t accommodate 
and those folllld in the developing countries thems elves - has 
an impo rtant consequence which is readily apparent f rom an 
analys is of  the bilateral aid stat ist ics . These const raints 
encourage a degree of continuity : both in terms of the 
recipients of aid and its composit ion. 
The stat ist ics nevertheless do reveal some new t rends , 
namely the ris ing curves for the South Pacific and , to a 
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lesser extent , Africa . The fluctuat ions in the volume of  
aid to South Asia for most  of the decade result from the 
dominance o f  food aid in the country programs and reflect 
that region ' s  acute vulnerab ility to weather . 
The realit ies of  Aust ralia ' s  geographical situat ion and 
the volume of  available resources has led to the distribut ion 
o f  total bilat eral aid ( excluding PNG) shown in Table 2 .  
The broad pat tern revealed may appear rather stat ic . 
A short coming of this anal ysis , however ,  · is that it deals 
only in gross magnitudes , and fails to reveal the essent ial 
dynamism which underlies the Aus t ralian aid program and its 
sensit ivity to changing development needs and donor pol icy 
obj ect ives . The ab ility o f  the Bureau to react quickly to 
such changes must  of course be l imited . The s cope for 
Australia , and indeed for other donors , to induce dramat ic 
and rapid changes in the proj ect composit ion of bilat eral 
aid programs is restricted by the const raint s which have 
already b een des cribed .  Nevertheless , the fact remains that 
there does exist s cope for the progressive reorientat ion of 
aid programs to reflect key sectors more adequately , and to 
ass ist in tackling more· effect ively fundamental development 
problems . 
Critics of  bilat eral aid programs have b een quick to 
crit icize the cont inuity o f  direct ion and compos it ion that 
characterize the aid program, often without analys ing with 
sufficient care changes in the program that broad descript ions 
do not reveal . Argument s  have been presented that this 
apparently static quality is evidence of an aid adminis­
t rat ion ' s  failure to acknowledge the recent evolut ion of  the 
theories and philosophies of development . Moreover , crit ics 
claim that this essent ial cont inuity reflect s an unwill ingness 
to use aid programs as effect ive vehicles for improving 
development prospect s at the ' grass roots ' and for induc ing 
a mo re equitable redistribut ion of resources and benefit s to 
the more disadvantaged groups . This argument has b een carried 
a stage further , with the content ion that mult ilateral agencies 
are a more ef fect ive vehicle for inducing change . 
Aid to the rural sector 
This type of  thinking fails to take account of  the 
changes that are gradually bein g  induced in the compos it ion 
and focus of Aust ralia ' s  program. To demonstrate this point , 
it is worth examining recent t rends in Aust ral ia ' s  aid 
...... 
� 
Table 2 0 
Geographical dis tribut ion of  bilat eral aid ( excludes PNG , per cent)  
1969-70 19 70-71 1 9 72 - 7 3  19 74-75 19 75-76 19 76- 7 7  19 7 7-78 
Southeast As ia 45 . 0  66 . 3 70 . 7  44 . 0  53 . 7  4 8 . 0  48 . 5  
of which 
Indonesia 15 . 3  36 . 0  38 . 7  2 0 . 8  2 6 . 9  24 . 4  2 3 . 6  
Other ASEAN 18 . 9  16 . 5  15 . 3  12 . 8  18 . 3  18 . 2  19 . 2  
South As ia 49 . 3  25 . 9  21 . 7 40 . 2  30 . 9  2 8 . 9 22 . 8  
of  which 
Bangladesh 9 . 5  14 . 1  10 . 6  9 . 9  9 . 8  
India 2 3 . 9  10 . 5  2 . 2  9 . 8  9 . 5  7 . 9 2 . 0  
Pakistan 11 . 8  6 . 0  2 . 8 4 . 2  5 . 2  4 . 6  2 . 7 
South Pacific 1 . 3  3 . 1  3 . 5 6 . 5  9 . 7  13 . 6 15 . 1  
o f  which 
Fij i 0 . 7 2 . 0  2 . 2  3 . 1  3 . 7 4 . 7 5 . 2  
Western Samoa ins ig .  0 . 3 0 . 4  1 . 8  2 . 1  4 . 3  3 . 2  
Africa 2 . 2 2 . 5 2 . 2 7 . 4  4 . 5  7 . 8  10 . 3  
Rest of  world 2 . 2 2 . 2 1 .  9 1 .  9 1 . 2  1 .  7 3 . 2  
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source : Aus t ral ian Development Assistance Bureau , 1 9 7 8 . 
Table 3 
Secto ral comEosit ion of bilateral aid Ero gram 
( excludes PNG , $ mill ion ) 
19 70-71 19 72-73 19 7 3-74 19 74-75 19 75-76  1 9 7 6- 7 7  19 7 7- 7 8  
Development of 
public ut ilit ies 9 . 6  18 . 8  15 . 0  22 . 8  2 4 . 9  2 5 . 8  30 . 1  
Agriculture 2 . 3  2 . 5  3 . 4 8 . 4 12 . 4  14 . 0  20 . 7 
Indust ry ,  mining 
and const ruct ion 0 . 4  1 . 4  0 . 9  4 . 3 2 . 2  3 . 4 6 . 6 
Educat ion 7 . 2  9 . 2  13 . 9  11 . 4  12 . 9  14 . 6  16 . 6  
Health 0 . 7 1 . 2  0 . 4  0 . 4  1 . 2  2 . 3  3 . 1 
Social infrastruct ure 
and wel fare 1 . 0  1 . 1  1 .  5 0 . 6 0 . 9 1 .  9 4 . 5 
Mult isector 1 .  3 1 . 4  0 . 6 3 . 9 1 . 9 1 . 1 5 . 8 
Ot her ( including 
food aid)  20 . 8  24 . 4  30 . 0  5 7 . 9  35 . 1  29 . 1  32 . 4  
Total 4 3 . 3  60 . 0  65 . 7  109 . 7  91 . 5  92 . 2  119 . 8 
Source : Australian Development Assistance Bureau , Functional Classification of Australian 
Deve lopment Assistance to Deve loping Countries ,  various issues to 19 7 7 / 7 8 .  I-' � 
I-' 
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involvement in the rural sector in developing countries . 
Table 3 shows that the funding of agricultural act ivit ies 
rose from as little as $2 . 3  million , or 5 per cent of t ot al 
(non-PNG) bilateral aid expenditure in 197 0-71 , to $2 0 . 7 
mill ion in 19 7 7 -78 , or 1 7 . 3  per cent total expenditure . 
This represents a fourf9ld in crease in real terms . Although 
it can b e  argued that the proport ion remains fairly low in 
relat ion to total expendit ure , the t rend is nonetheless 
significant .  
Aust ralia ' s  contribut ion to the agricultural sector 
covers a mult itude o f  act ivit ies . Particular emphas is has , 
however ,  b een given to the various aspects o f  the l ivestock 
industry , ran ging from the establishment of  b as ic research 
facilit ies in animal husbandry in Indonesia , the development 
o f  animal industries in India , Malays ia and Korea , the 
cont rol of animal diseases throughout the region , to  the 
improvement of pastures . It may be observed that such 
act ivit ies may not b e  o f  immediate benefit to the ' poor 
maj ority ' in rural areas . It should b e  real ized , however , 
that the l ivestock indust ry has b een tradit ionally a small­
holder operat ion in most recipient count ries . Although many 
developing countries are in the process o f  estab lishing 
larger scale and more capital intens ive indust ries , the 
essent ial quality of indigenous livestock indust ries is 
unlikely to change in the foreseeable future . Aust ral ia ' s  
t echni cal and capital ass istance in this area thus enab les 
a sect ion of the rural community to broaden it s bas e  of  
economic opportunity , increase its income-earning capacity 
and eventually its standard of economic well-bein g .  
As sist ance to the food crop sector has been mainly 
indirect . Australia has cont ributed through mult ilateral 
inst itut ions such as the Internat ional Rice Research 
Ins t itut e , and other inst itut ions under the umbrella of the 
Consultat ive Group on Internat ional Agricultural Research , 
to the development of technology associated with staple food 
grains . It has done relat ively little to assist  this bas ic 
area directly through the bilateral aid program ,  although 
proj ect s , part icularly in the field of food s t o rage and 
handl ing , are being developed . This applies especially in 
the Indian sub-cont inent . But this apparent deficiency in 
the pro gram is rather more the result o f  const raints  aris ing 
from within the recipient countries themselves than of  any 
pos it ive decision on the part o f  the aid administrat ion not 
to b ecome involved in this area . 
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Real or imagined short comings on the part of  the aid 
pro gram in the bas ic food crops area are in any case off set 
by the contribut ions that have b een made in several 
countries in the introduct ion and development of alternat ive 
cash crops . The main part of this work has been in land 
development schemes in northern Thailand . Research work 
dominated the init ial phases of such proj ects , but now the 
emphasis is on application of the research findings and the 
development of more effect ive ext ens ion act ivit ies . The real 
incomes of the rural communit ies influenced by thes e proj ects 
have already b een increased , and a degree of economic 
independence is being achieved . S imilar progress can be 
expected from s imilar proj ects  in a number of other countries . 
The spread effects of infras t ructure development 
This analysis has so far concent rated on Australia ' s  
direct involvement in the development o f  agricultural 
resources . This does not reveal the total picture , for 
indirect contribut ions to increased product ivity in this 
sector must also be taken into account . These can derive 
rather obviously from proj ect s designed to achieve the more 
effective use of water resources , and rather less obviously 
from the development of public ut ilit ies such as roads , 
railways and othe r  communicat ions facilit ies . 
In recent years Auatralia ' s  aid has t ended to concentrat e 
on the development of public ut ilit ies , and part icularly on 
such capit al intens ive fac ilit ies as maj or highways , tele­
conmn.m icat ions , railway rehab ilitat ion programs and port 
development . This has b een the subj ect of some adverse 
comment . The stat is t ics in Tab le 3 reveal that the proport ion 
of  resources devoted to this sector rose from 22 per cent in 
19 70-71 to 2 8  per cent in 19 76- 7 7  and remained high at 2 5  per 
cent in 19 7 7-78 . It can be argued that this cont inuing 
concent rat ion could be to the det riment of  the most disad­
vantaged groups and the most crit ical areas of  development . 
But this feature of  the aid program reflects more than 
anywhere else the real constraint impo sed on an adminis­
t ration by the bas ic requirement t o  be sensit ive to stated 
development priorit ies and needs of  recipient count ries . A 
large number o f  developing count ries have , in the post­
colonial period , b een obliged to devote the bulk of their 
resources to the establishment , rehab ilitat ion and expans ion 
o f  the basic pub lic ut ilit ies . Unles s  these facilit ies are 
at least adequate , a government ' s  prospects of achieving any 
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growth and development is small , thus reducing its scope for 
t ackling in the future the more sensit ive problems associated 
with employment creat ion , income redistribut ion and improved 
social welfare conditions . 
The emphas is on public ut ilit ies is not as stat ic as 
statistics an d single line descript ions o f  individual 
proj ects might indicate .  While there is only limited scope 
for dramat ic changes in what might be called the ' core 
element ' o f  proj ect s des cribed generally as the ' development 
of  public ut ilities ' ,  oppo rtunit ies do exist for a reorient­
at ion in their scope . Such innovat ions o f  course need to be 
effected in co-operat ion with the recipient governments and 
agencies . The experience of recent years has assured 
Aus tralia ' s  aid adminis t rators that the developing countries 
are indeed very recept ive to Aust ralia ' s  wish to adopt 
gradually a much more broadly-based and integrated approach 
to individual proj ects . Governments  have collaborated closely 
in the planning of new proj ects to ensure that the road - if 
that is the primary need - forms a part of a wholly-int egrated 
area proj ect rather than an exclusive obj ect ive . Since the 
focus of Aust ralia ' s  act ivit ies in road work has swung away 
from t runk roads to farm-to-market and feeder-type road 
proj ect s , a significant emphasis in these programs inevitably 
in on agricultural and other resource development , the mo re 
efficient use of water resources , market ing and ext ens ion 
facilit ies , and health programs . Examples of this approach 
include proj ects in Thailand , the Philippines and Indones ia . 
More are currently being planned . The t rend for programs t o  
concent rate on priority areas des ignated b y  recipient 
governments - rather than on apparently disconnected packages 
of individual proj ect s - will b ecome increasingly a more 
dis t inct ive feat ure of Austral ia ' s  bilateral aid programs , 
with of course recipient government ' s  approval . 
Problems in aid for basic human needs 
Although there have b een some significant changes in the 
bilateral aid program,  other areas to which development 
theorists attach prominence may appear either to be wholly 
igno red by Aust ral ia o r  to b e  inadequately accounted for in 
program planning . Th ere is , for example , an apparent lack 
of  direct involvement in ' grass roots ' or  commun ity development 
(especially in rural areas ) , and in programs reflect ing bas ic 
needs . 
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This is understandable , for developed countries , much 
less the developing count ries , have yet to evolve the pol icies 
and programs which will tackle these fundamental problems 
effectively . Yet it is a reality that , whils t most  governments 
acknowledge the need to devote more resources to community 
development and bas ic needs of  the ir poorest classes , these 
generally have a much lower priority in development st rategies 
of  recipient countries than other needs . Domestic polit ical 
considerat ions , the limitations of both financial and manpower 
resources and the neces sity to cope with a wide range of  
competing demands are some o f  the factors that influence 
recipients . Recipient governments cons ider that they are 
bet ter able to understand their bas ic problems and to identify 
solut ions than even the most  well-intent ioned aid donor . 
Whilst  the scope for aid donors to become directly 
involved in soc ial developmen t act ivit ies is in pract ice 
limited , oppo rtunit ies do exis t for aid administrat ions to 
design programs which will give some attention to these 
crit ical areas . For example , it is universally acknowledged 
that the availab ility o f  potable water is essential to 
improving health standards , and that its provis ion in 
associat ion with effective waste disposal services can 
eliminate maj or sources of  debilitating infec t ion . Australia 
has been much involved in the provision of water supplies , 
although the concentrat ion has tended in the past to be on 
urban supp lies . More attent ion is now being given to the 
needs of rural communit ies . It is planned to expand aid to 
rural water supplies , in part by ensuring that provision for 
them is made in the integrated programs described above . 
Constant revision of programs 
An examinat ion of the dynamism of the Australian aid 
program would be incomplete without a brief considerat ion of 
the changes that occur , admittedly rather slowly , within 
individual coun try programs . These variat ions reflect the 
sensit ivity of the aid administrator to changing circumstances 
in the developing countries . For example , the program in 
Indonesia , which was dominated by balance of  payments and 
budgetary suppo rt types of aid at the beginning of this 
decade , now consists largely of proj ect s and techn ical 
assistance , supplemented by a modest amount of food aid and 
training and educat ion as sistance . A similar change in the 
program in Bangladesh has already b egun . As that government 
becomes progressively more able to meet an increasing 
proport ion of  its food requirement s ,  it is  concentrat ing more 
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of it s resources on development proj ect s . Bangladesh is 
looking to Australia for assistance , part icularly in the 
agricultural sector and in area development , a field in which 
Australia has earned a reputat ion in developing countries , 
extending from the Pacific through As ia and to Africa . 
Just as changes are occurring in the compos it ion of  the 
Australian b ilateral aid program , so too are changes to 
improve its overall quality being progressively int roduced . 
The mos t  significant in it iat ive in this regard in recent 
times has been the government ' s  decision to triple the volume 
of  aid earmarked for the South Pacific and to provide for 
a three-year rolling program for the region . Equally important 
is the Aust ralian Government ' s  willingness to int roduce new 
forms fo r the del ivery of aid in the Pacific . These include 
support for the new nat ional development banks , the f inanc ing 
of local costs on a significant scale , support for host  
country partners in j oint venture proj ec ts  with Austral ian 
firms , and increas ing support for the work o f  non-governmental 
agencies involved in development ass istance work . All of 
th ese forms are designed to ensure that Australia is as 
responsive as is pract icable to the unique problems of the 
island nat ions . 
Other qualitative improvements  which the Bureau is now 
charged with administering include those announced by the 
Prime Minister in 19 77 at the Connnonwealth Heads o f  Government 
Meet ing in London . Inasmuch as these init iat ives relate to 
two integral elements  of  the bilateral aid pro gram, they have 
very important implicat ions for its future development . 
In relat ion to capital proj ect s  and technical as s istance , 
the government has decided to extend the pract ice of untying 
beyond Papua New Guinea and the South Pacific , as well as to  
increase the number of  countries eligible for the financing 
o f  an increased proport ion of local co st s . Such innovat ions 
should help to diminish some of  the real constraints within 
which the bilateral aid pro gram currently has to op erate . 
Maj or food aid init iat ives provide for an increase in 
the total volume o f  foo d grains from 2 2 5 , 000 t onnes per 
annum to 400 , 000 tonnes . In addit ion , an annual amount will 
in future be allocated to the Interim Reserve for Emergencies , 
pending the establishment of an internat ional system of 
nat ional food grain reserves . 
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The future 
Judith Tendler ( 19 7 5 )  has drawn our attention to the fact 
that aid administration is , or  should b e ,  a learning process . 
That is indeed its fascinat ion . It i s  simply not easy to 
know how best to help developing countries . We are very much 
engaged in the bus iness of trial and error . Government 
administrat ion is a difficult art at the b es t  of  t imes . It 
is ·even more difficult when it invo lves two governments . We 
are very conscious of  our shortcomings and o f  the need to 
make further b ig improvements in our administ rat ion dealing 
with individual technical experts ,  f irms and authorit ies who 
are the means through which Aust ralian know-how is being 
transferred to developing cotmtries . 
The aid program has always had a significant relat ionship 
with various part s of the Aust ralian research community . 
This is an area needing close  attent ion as our program 
diversif ies and Australian interes t s  widen . Steps have 
already b een taken to improve this relationship . It is certain 
that this will continue to be an important element of the 
Bureau ' s  future network of contact with the Aust ralian 
community . 
Although the government-to-government approach impl icit 
in bilateral aid limit s the scope for promoting innovat ions , 
it will be increas ingly important for ADAB to learn how aid 
might be adapted to ensure that it meets the needs of the 
maj or target groups , so contributing more effectively to the 
process of socio-economic development . As d iscussed , 
Australia has become more clo sely involved in area act ivit ies 
and mult i-disc iplinary ass istance programs . These are more 
commonly directed by provincial rather than nat ional author­
it ies . Further planning may reveal scope for the entry of 
our technical co-op eration at even more localized levels .  
The limit s will largely b e  set by the sophisticat ion o f  the 
nat ional government machinery through which we mus t  cont inue 
to operate . 
To help solve the dilennna of  matching our point of  access 
with limited administ rat ive resources ,  the Bureau has b een 
exploring the scope for becoming an effective partner in 
programs identified with and fac ilitated by internat ional 
bodies such as WHO , UNESCO and UNICEF . Village tube-well 
programs , community health programs and educat ion development 
all lend themselves to this approach . 
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Addendum , 19 7 8  
Ment ion has been made of  chan ges intended to improve 
the qual ity of the aid program and its administrat ion . The 
Bureau was reo rganized in December 19 7 7  primar ily to facil itate 
the operat ional effect iveness of proj ect aid , and a review 
of the administrat ion of the training program was completed 
which will lead to substant ial changes in its administrat ion . 
Further policy init iat ives have als o  been launched 
during the past twelve months . Th ese have in cluded a new 
framework o f  increased forward commitments of aid to the 
ASEAN countries and to j o int  Aus tral ian-ASEAN programs . 
This pledge also contained several measures to  improve 
the qual ity of Aust ralian aid . These included the untying 
of procurement in the region , so that suppl iers o f  locally 
produced goods in all ASEAN countries could t ender alongs ide 
Austral ian manufacturers to supply equipment and materials 
for proj ect s in any ASEAN country . Aust ralia may now also 
ass ist  with funding local costs  associated with aid proj ect s 
and will act ively pursue t he greater use o f  co-financing 
proj ect s  undert aken by mult ilateral donor agencies . 
The terms of Aust ral ian aid , already very liberal by 
world standards being all grant f inance , are being regularly 
revi ewed and furt her improved . Cab inet has approved the 
procurement of goods for aid proj ect s in the recipient 
country concerned , where these goods have a substant ial 
local content , as well as the meet ing of a s ignificant part 
of local cost s in the l eas t developed rec ipient s of 
Australian aid . 
Aust ralia has agreed that as a supplement to the 
exis t ing food aid program , which is scheduled to increase 
to 400 , 000 tonnes annually by 19 79-80 , non-grain food aid 
will be supplied on a regular bas is for specific nut rit ional 
impact proj ect s in developing count ries (school chil dren 
feeding programs , nurs ing and pregnant women diet supplement s ,  
in fant feeding , et c . ) .  These measures aim to raise the 
nut rit ional level of the most  vulnerable groups in rec ipient 
countries . It  is expected that this program will grow 
s ignificantly in future years . 
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Aust ral ia has also undertaken to provide half its pledge 
to the Conference fo r Internat ional Economic Co-op erat ion 
( CIEC) Special Act ion Program as mult ilateral aid , in the 
form of unt ied cash payments  to the Internat ional Development 
Assoc iat ion ( IDA) of  the World Bank Group , and the other half 
as grants to eligible regional Commonwealth countries t o  
cover the importat ion o f  developmental goods and services 
fr9m Aust ralia . We have also j o ined with other Commonwealth 
regional countries in estab lishing a Consultat ive Group on 
Energy . It is expected that the group will focus its init ial 
effort s on the applicat ion of alternat ive energy technology 
to the n eeds of  small rural communit ies . 
Careful cons iderat ion has b een given to the conclusion 
of the DAC High-Level Meet ing in October last year , concerning 
development co-op erat ion for economic growth and meet ing 
bas ic human needs . Aust ralia recognizes that programs for 
meet ing bas ic human needs must b e  country specific and dynamic 
and that they are not a sub s t itut e  for , but an essent ial 
component of , more economic growth . 
A high level Consultat ive Committee on Research for 
Development was set up to as s ist  the Austral ian Government 
to identify and make specific recommendat ions concerning 
research and research-relat ed proj ect s , inst itut ions and 
programs which benefit developing countries and which may be 
assisted under the aid program. 
Chapter 7 
Aid , natural resources and development 
R. Garnaut 
Many of the developing collllt ries pos sess within their 
boundaries natural resources which can be t ransformed 
prof itably into internat ionally t raded commodit ies . Such 
transfo rmation is not in itsel f  development in any meaningful 
sense of th e term.  But the exploitat ion of natural resources 
can yield rents which , if claimed effect ively by hos t  
governments , can provide the financial resources that are 
necessary for wider development . 
Indust ries based on natural resources , especially 
minerals and energy resources , are commonly highly capital 
intensive , and utilize highly sophisticated product ive and 
organizat ional techni ques . Developing countries cannot 
themselves eas ily supply the capital , management and 
technology that is necessary to achieve the t rans format ion 
of  natural resources into t radeable commodit ies . These 
necessary factors of  product ion are usually obt ained from 
overseas . 
Despite the recent fashion for fostering rural develop­
ment , foreign governments and the int ernat ional agencies 
tend to provide concessional funding for large resource 
developments more readily than for other act ivit ies . For 
example , the government of a developing country could fund 
several t imes over a large power facility t hat was in part 
des igned to serve a new oil field or nickel mine , but would 
have very great difficulty in marshalling overseas support 
for a program of  small-scale village electrificat ion that 
made similar demands on financial resources . 
In an important sense , the absence o f  the domest ic 
capital and organizat ional capacity to handle such proj ects 
is a safeguard against some of  the dis tort ion to domest ic 
income distribut ion that accompanies o ther capital-int ensive 
economic act ivity in developing countries . The state is the 
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princ ipal immediate domestic beneficiary from the proj ect , 
and the state can be wise or foolish , efficient or ineffective , 
honest or co rrupt in its disbursement of  benefits . 
At the same time as the ava ilabil ity of capital for 
resource development s  from foreign official sources provides 
opportunit ies for st rong revenue growth , it raises complex 
quest ions o f  economic policy-making and administrat ion . It 
raises quest ions of  effect ive nat ional sovereignty over 
development priorit ies , and of  it s ant ithes is , neo-colonialism. 
This st udy had it s origins in an obiter dietum in an 
earlier art icle on taxing natural resource proj ect s .  In that 
article it was suggested that the availab ility of foreign 
official support for such expenditure raised the poss ib il ity 
that a government might increase the revenues it obtains by 
providing some infrastructure for or part icipat ion in the 
ownership of resource development s that were operated 
principally by private  foreign investors (Garnaut and 
Clunies Ros s 19 75 : 2 72 -8 7 ) . 
This chapter dis cusses the circumstances in which a host  
government might increase it s revenues by  making expenditures 
associated with resource developments .  The study ' s  maj or 
focus is on problems that are raised by the involvement of  
foreign governments in the financing of such expenditure . 
It analyses distort ions in the pattern of development that 
can result  from such involvement . It concludes that the 
compat ib ility of nat ional sovereignty with the interest of 
donor countries in large-scale capital-intens ive resource 
investment s depends very much on the inst itut ional apparatus 
through which aid is received in a rec ip ient count ry . These 
mechanisms are usually inadequate ,  leaving the developing 
country ' s  government with a dilemma : less revenue growth 
and reduced development opportunit ies on that account ; or 
a development pattern potentially very different from that 
which it would have chosen had o f fic ial foreign aid not b een 
t ied to specific uses . 
Private foreign investment and t he rent of mines 
Let us keep in mind the case of private foreign 
investment in the minerals and energy sector . The problems 
to which this st udy is addressed are most  wide-ranging and 
take their mos t extreme form in this case . However , the 
prob lems arise as well where investment is undertaken by a 
nat ional corporat ion which goes overseas to borrow capital 
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and hire expert ise , or where it is directed towards agricul­
tural , fores t , fish or other natural resources . 
The pr ivate .  foreign factors o f  product ion that are 
required for maj or resource proj ects in developing countries 
each have a supply price . The rent that is generated in the 
pro cess of exploit ing a natural resource is the income that 
is earned after deduct ion of the supply price of all domest ic 
and foreign factors that are used within the product ion 
pro cess ,  including the factors which are supplied within the 
direct investment package . The lower the supply price of  
direct privat e investment , the larger the amount of rent . 
It is poss ible for the state to impos e  financial 
condit ions on access to natural resources which claim the 
rent for public revenues , without det erring any investment 
that would have occurred in the abs ence of condit ions . This 
follows from the definit ion of  rent . In the real world , 
where there is a high degree o f  uncertainty about the 
possible out comes of an investment , it is not pos sible to 
appropriate the whole of the rent from all resource proj ect s  
without risking the deterrence o f  some investment s that are 
capable of making some contribut ion to the revenue . The 
amount of rent that can be t aken by the state from profit able 
proj ect s without deterring more marginal proj ects depends 
very much on the system of  fiscal levies that is applied to 
resource inves tments . The effect s of  various f iscal policy 
sys tems are dis cussed in a lat er sect ion of this analysis . 
The supply price of  direct investment is expressed in 
terms of  the amount of profit after tax that is available 
for remit tance to the own ers of  the investment . It is colIUilon 
for investors to require a proj ect to meet a variety o f  
expl icit and implicit criteria on expected profitab il ity 
before they are prepared to colIUilit resources to it . For 
large resource investments , the mo st important s ingle 
criterion is that the investment must  be expected to generate  
pos it ive net  present  value at the discount rate which the 
investor j udges it appropriate to apply to total expected 
cash flows associated with the proj ect . 
The rent generated by a proj ect is higher the lower the 
supply price of private foreign investmen t .  Thus it is 
higher the lower the di scount rate appl ied by foreign investors 
to future cash flows from the proj ect . It is also higher 
the lower the amount of capital which the investor must place 
at risk . Both the dis count rate applied by investors and 
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the amount of  private cap it al at risk can be af fected by the 
provision of funds to the proj ect by foreign governments .  
Where the af ter-tax out come o f  an investment is less 
certain ( that is , where the variance of  po ssible outcomes is 
greater) , it is usual for the investor to apply a higher 
discount rate to future cash flows from the proj ect . A 
higher expected return is required when there is greater risk . 
This aversion to risk is likely to be especially important 
in the case of  investments where the absolute size of possib le 
lo ss is very large , and therefore a threat t o  the financial 
standing of the parent company it self . 
The dis count rate that inves tors apply to ant icipated 
cash flows associated with an investment is also a funct ion 
o f  the opportunity cost to them of  any funds that might be 
connnit ted to the proj ect . In a purely connnercial situat ion 
in which the investor raises capital in open market s ,  funds 
to all possible investments have s imilar opportunity cost . 
However , if funds are available for some inves tment s but not 
for others , or if cheaper funds are available for some 
investment s ,  the investor may apply a lower discount rate to 
proj ects fo r which the concess ional finance is available . 
Thus the amount of rent from a natural resource may be 
increased by the provis ion of concessional funds for its  
exploit at ion by foreign government s .  
There are other determinants o f  the supply price o f  
investment , an d  s o  of  the rent as sociated with the exploitat ion 
of a resource . One is the investor ' s  assessment o f  sovereign 
risk,  or the risk that the hos t government will change the 
rules that determine the amount of prof it that accrues to 
private investors . The s tructure of  the fis cal policy system 
also affect s the discount rate applied by investors , through 
its effects on the variance of after-tax out comes : the 
variance of  after-tax pro f its will be lower (and with it the 
dis count rate applied by inve stors)  the more fiscal charges 
are con cent rated on prof it s which represen t  a high discount ed 
cash flow return on investment . 
The general rule is that the amount o f  rent in a proj ect 
that is available as revenue to the government is great er 
the less the amount o f  private capital at risk in it s 
development and the less the risk of  unsuccessful out comes . 
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Fis cal policy systems and the amount of  rent 
Governments  coll ect revenue from the rents generated by 
private investments  in resource proj ect s through a great 
variety of mechanisms : licence fees ; t axes on personal 
incomes of employees and on imports and other charges on 
input s into product ion ; royalt ies related to the volume o f  
ore mined ,  i t s  met al content o r  i t s  value ; export t axes ; 
profits taxes of  various kinds ; withholding taxes on dividends 
and interest payment s ;  and dividends from government equity 
purchased on concess ional t erms . The form and the rates o f  
these various charges together determine ( i )  the amount of  
rent available from resource investment s ,  ( ii)  the dist ribut ion 
o f  the rent b etween the private  investor and the government , 
and ( iii) the t iming of the government ' s  revenue receipt s .  
The value of an expected revenue flow t o  a government 
depends on the t iming o f  the revenue receipt s .  The government 
will apply its own implicit or explicit discount rate t o  
future revenue receipt s .  Provided that the country has some 
credit standing in internat ional capital market s (and most 
developing countries are in this pos it ion ) , it is likely that 
the government ' s  dis count rate will be lower than that of the 
private foreign investor . 
There are two dis t in ct approaches to the set t ing of  rent 
charges on resource investment s .  One approach is to establish 
a general system of  fiscal policy includin g  t axat ion rat es 
within which all investors operate . It is possible that a 
general sys t em that collect ed some revenue from int ra-marginal 
proj ect s  would deter some investments , no matt er how careful ly 
it was des igned . S imilarly , a general system would not be 
abl e  to extract all of the rent from every proj ect , although 
a well-des igned fiscal sys tem could ext ract a high proport ion 
of rents from profitable proj ects without los ing large 
potent ial rents through deterrence of o ther investments . A 
more severe fis cal system would claim for the revenue a higher 
proport ion of  rents from barely marginal proj ect s , but might 
reduce the total amount of rent that is generated from 
resource investments . A balance must be st ruck between these 
two factors in the implement at ion o f  a general sys t em of 
fiscal levies . 
The alternat ive approach is to  tailor the sys tem of  
fis cal charges to  each proj ect , through negot iat ions with the 
investor . If the government knew exactly how investors 
viewed fut ure expenditures and income from each proj ect , 
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together with their at t itudes to risk and the discount rates 
that they appl ied to cash flows ant icipated in future , it 
would be able to claim all of the rent from profitable 
proj ect s without deterring any marginal investment . 
The advantages of  the former approach are that it provides 
a more certain environment for exploration , and that is 
protect s  the government from being exploited in negot iat ions 
through it s own relat ive ignoran ce about parameters relevant 
to investment decis ions . In pract ice , mo st government s 
choose to use a hybrid approach , in which the system of  
fiscal charges is nego t iated within more or less clearly 
defined l imit s .  
Whatever the approach adopted , the t otal amount of rent 
is affected by the nature of t he levies by which the government 
obtains its revenue . Any charge applied in the early years 
of a proj ect ' s  life must be balan ced by the relinquishment 
o f  claims t o  a greater amount of  revenue in lat er years . 
The int eract ion of tm.certainty about the out come of  investments 
with investors ' aversion to risk means that more revenue can 
be collected through levies on pro fit s , and especially on 
profits which represent a high realiz ed return on investment , 
than through charges on product ion or sales , or on profit s 
which do not represent a high return on investment . ! 
For the purposes of this study� let us say that the 
government has sett led on a set of fiscal levies , and that 
the system yields more revenue from a proj ect when it s 
realized pro fit s are greater . The import ant conclusions 
are even stronger if the rate of  fiscal charges out of  
pro fit s rises with the  rate of  return on expenditure . 
In examining the effect of variat ions in the supply 
price o f  investment on government revenue , let us look first 
at the case where the government negotiat es the fiscal system 
separately for each new proj ect . If some external factor 
leads to a reduction in investors ' discount rates , the 
government can claim for the revenue the whole of the increase 
in rent from proj ect s which were previously barely marginal , 
provided only t hat it is fully aware of  the change in the 
supply price of investment . The government can al so claim 
1 These issues are discussed , and an opt imal system of resource 
t axat ion suggested in Garnaut and Clunies Ross 19 75 : 2 72-87 
and Garnaut 19 79 ( fo rthcoming) . 
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revenue from previously sub-marginal proj ect s  that are viab le 
with the n ew  lower discount rat e .  
Where the government has estab lished a system o f  fis cal 
levies that are applied in the same way t o  all investors , a 
reduct ion in the supply price of  investment causes more 
investment s to t ake place , and increases the revenue that 
the government receives from investment s that had b een under­
t aken at the old supply price of investment . The addit ional 
investments  might include some that would have b een under­
t aken at the old supply price of investment if no fiscal 
charges had been levied . 
If  the system of fis cal policy is to provide an adequate 
flow of  revenues , it must be sensit ive to the supply price 
of investment . The requirement is met within a general 
sys tem of taxat ion in which the rate of t ax out of income 
rises with the rate o f  return on investment .  
Government equity and the amount of rent 
Beyond some scale of investment , corporat ions t ead t o  
apply a higher discount rate t o  future cash flows in the 
evaluat ion of a larger proj ect , even where the variance o f  
expected out comes i s  ident ical to that associated with a 
more modest investment . This occurs because corporat ions 
are caut ious about accept ing the risk o f  very large losses . 
In this circumstance , both the government and the investor 
have an int erest in establishing a consort ium to share the 
risk . It is essent ially fo r this reason - to reduce the 
maximum size of the poss ib le loss borne by each foreign 
investor - that maj or resource investment s in developing 
count rie s are now increasingly undert aken by consort ia . 
Privat e investors place espec ially high value on the 
government of the host country . as a consort ium member . In 
addit ion to the usual benefit s of  a consort ium , it is 
commonly thought that government membership reduces sovereign 
risk . 
For its part , the government through part icipat ion in 
the cons ort ium can share in any untaxed rent s that are 
allowed by the system of fiscal levies , earn the high return 
required by the privat e investor , and increase the total 
amount of rent through reduct ion of  the supply price of 
private foreign investment . The government can claim all or 
part of  the addit ional rent through the negot iat ion of 
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concess ional terms for it s equity , or through the impos it ion 
o f  a more severe system of  fis cal levies than would otherwise 
have b een applied .  
The government ' s  equity must b e  funded , an d  this 
expenditure is at risk in much the same way as funds supplied 
by private  investors . 
Public provision o f  infrast ructure and the amollllt of rent 
Infrast ructure o f  various kinds usually represent s a 
high proport ion o f  the capital expenditure associated with 
the exploitat ion of nat ural resources in developing count ries . 
When this infrast ructure is provided by the private  operators 
as part o f  the proj ect , the proj ect must be expected to 
gen erate sufficient profits aft er t ax to recoup the whole of  
the investment with interest equal t o  the investor ' s  high 
dis count rat e . 
There are circumstances in which the power , roads , port , 
town facilit ies , telecommunicat ions and other infrastructure 
required by a resource development provide benefit s to the 
general community beyond the requirements of the proj ect . 
These external benefit s can j ust ify some public contribut ion 
to ensure that private  investors proceed with an investment 
that is j udged to be marginal . This should not be forgotten , 
although it is not analysed further here . 
The supply price of investment is  reduced by government 
provision o f  infrast ructure . The high dis count rate o f  
private investors i s  applied to a smaller quant ity of  capital . 
In addit ion , the probability of absolute loss or very low 
return is reduced , so that investors ' discount  rates are 
reduced . The amount of rent is increased through each of 
these processes . 
When in frast ructure is provided with public funds , the 
government may choos e  to charge for it s use at a rat e which 
recoups it s costs , p erhaps with some profit , or it may choose 
to rely entirely on it s share of the increased rent to recoup 
its outlays . If no fee is charged for the infrast ructure , 
it is po ssible for the government t o  suffer an ab solute  lo ss 
through the development of the resource , or a net lo ss through 
the provis ion of  infrast ructure . If a user charge is set at 
a rat e designed to recoup the government ' s  outlays on 
infrast ructure with interest equal to it s own discount rate , 
there is lit t le chance o f  net loss . In the lat ter case , the 
amount of rent will be raised above the level associated 
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with the investor ' s prov1s 1on o f  infrast ruc t ure , provided 
only that the government ' s  discount rate is less than that 
of the privat e investor . However , the amount of addit ional 
rent will be less when a user charge is levied .  Where no 
charge is levied,  the amount of increased government revenue 
from the addit ional rent may be less than o r  great er than 
the amount o f  revenue that would have b een raised through 
economic user charges , depending on the pro f itab il ity o f  the 
proj ect and the st ructure of the fiscal system. 
The provision of infrastructure without the cost being 
recouped from user charges reduces the possib ility that a 
marginal proj ect will be deterred by fiscal levies . It may 
also make sub-marginal proj ect s at tract ive t o  private  
invest o rs , and cause the government to incur an absolute loss 
in relat ion to a proj ect . This latter possib il ity dis t ing­
uishes government expenditure on infrast ructure from government 
purchase o f  equity in a resource proj ect . 
When a government ' s  financial relat ionship t o  a resource 
proj ect is simply that of a taxing authority , it runs no 
risk o f  absolute loss . Where it purchases equity at a 
commercial price , it runs the same risk o f  ab solute loss as 
the private investor and ,  as the taxing authority , st ands t o  
gain proport ionately more than the privat e  investor from a 
success ful out come . However , a government is wise t o  be 
very much more wary about the provi sion o f  infras t ructure 
without economic user charges . In the latter case , the 
government must make it s own assessment of the l ikelihood 
that returns from th e proj ect will be too small to cover its 
outlays , in an environment in which the private investor 
has a positive incen t ive to obs cure from the government some 
asp ect s of the financ ial realit ies o f  the proj ect . 
Of course , the amount of  the absolute lo ss that might 
be incurred by the government , and the amount o f  addit ional 
revenue that must b e  raised in consequence o f  the provision 
of infrast ructure for this expenditure to be worthwhile , are 
less the lower the opportunity cost to the government of  
funds used for  this purpose . 
Foreign official as sistance and the amount of rent 
There are many mechanisms through which foreign 
governments and internat ional agencies make funds available 
on concess ional terms to resource investment s in developing 
countries . The general effect of  the provis ion o f  funds 
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through these mechanisms is to  reduce the supply price of 
investment directly , or to reduce the opportunity cost to 
host governments of funds allocat ed to resource developments . 
One common mechanism is for funds to be made available 
to the hos t government for the financing of commitments that 
it enters in relat ion to resource investments . Infrastructure 
is somet imes made available directly as proj ect aid . Some 
governments in industrial count ries make concessional funds 
available to their nat ional invest ors for mineral explorat ion 
and development . Loan funds are made available to the 
operators of a proj ect for the purchase of equipment or for 
other purposes . Ass istance in any of these forms may be 
t ied to purchases of goods and services from the donor or 
lender , or unt ied.  In addit ion , the  private internat ional 
capital markets provide finance more readily to government s 
fo r resource development than for their general development 
pro grams . 
The mot ives of foreign governments and lending agencies 
are varied . The out standing examples of b ias t owards 
resource investments  in concess ional finance are provided 
by th e governments  of Germany and Japan , which are anxious 
to increase world suppl ies of resource-based commodit ies . 
Some government s and agencies are att racted s imply by the 
prospect of  making a large loan to advance a proj ect that is 
likely to be well managed and very likely to yield a high 
economic return . Some see the provision of funds s imply as 
promot ion o f  exports of machinery and materials . Others are 
keen to improve the compet it ive pos it ion of their nat ional 
companies , or are vulnerable t o  pressure from thos e companies . 
The effect ive grant element in such funding , and so the 
real effect on the supply price of investment or on the 
opportunity cost  of finance to the home government , depends 
on the extent to which it is t ied to purchases in the donor 
country ,  and on the extent to which the home country is a 
compet it ive suppl ier o f  goods and services required by a 
resource proj ect . 
Conflict s  between the dif ferent mot ives of a donor 
count ry occas ionally affect the terms upon which finance is  
made available . The conflict in Japan between the resource­
t rade expansion and the export promotion mot ives provides 
one interes ting example . Japanes e authorit ies appear to have 
decided to let their interest  in the expans ion of overseas 
petroleum product ion override their interest in the promot ion 
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of indust rial export s . The only maj or cases of  Japan making 
concessional funds available to foreign governments on a 
complet ely un t ied bas is involve loans for pet roleum explor­
ation and development in Indones ia and Burma . 
The effect of  the concess ional funding on the rent 
generat ed by resource developments  depends on the particular 
mechanism through which it is made available . The provi sion 
of finance directly to nat ional investors o f  the donor 
country reduces the supply price of investment from this 
source . It reduces the supply price of investment to the 
proj ect if the particular recipients are compet it ive investors 
in the absence of assistance . However , if the assistance 
is required merely to make the recipients compet it ive with 
nat ionals of other count ries , there may be no reduc t ion in 
the supply price of  investment to the proj ect and no increase 
in rent . 
The provision of concessional funds t o  the operators 
of a proj ect independently of  the ir nat ional ity (as is 
usually the case with equipment loans ) lowers the supply 
price of investment and increases the total amount of rent , 
so long as the concess ional element in the financing exceeds 
any exces s co st of tying . 
The direct provis ion of infrast ructure lowers the supply 
price of investment and increases the amount of rent . The 
provision of concess ional funds to the host governmen t 
reduces the opportunity cost o f  pur chas ing equity or 
installing in fras t ructure , and so provides potent ial for 
in creases in the amount of rent . However ,  as is clear from 
the earlier discus sion , where conces sional f inan ce promotes 
a sub-marginal proj ect , it may not contribute to the 
generat ion of rent , and may be dissipat ed without signif icant 
bene fit to the recipient country . 
Problems with fo re ign ass istance to resource investments 
The ava ilability of concessional finance for resource 
developments raises some diff icult problems of economic 
policy administ rat ion for developing count ries . The maj or 
dilemmas are associated with difficult ies in determining the 
t rue opportunity cost  of public expenditure on resource 
proj ect s that are financed with foreign assistance . 
It is well known that aid is used most effic iently in 
terms of the priorit ies of the recipient countries if it is 
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unt ied and made available in support of the total development 
program of the recipient country .  Aid is us.ed inefficiently 
to the ext ent that it promotes act ivit ies that would not have 
survived a lis t ing of  the recipient ' s  priorit ies within a 
single budget constraint . It is  used inefficiently even 
when it is allocated to genuinely high priority programs if 
tying causes it to be used to purchase relat ively high cost 
goods and services . Aid for resource developments poses all 
of ' the usual problems of t ied aid and proj ect aid , although 
often in an ext reme form b ecause of the s cale of the proj ect s . 
Although aid for specific purposes and t ied aid are 
likely to be less efficient than \lllt ied aid in support of a 
recipient ' s  general development program, it will often appear 
to be better than nothing . It is likely to be bet ter than 
nothing , pos s ibly much bet ter , when it s availability reduces 
the supply prices of investment and increases government 
revenues from the rent of min es .  However ,  there are circum­
stances in which it can b e  worse than nothin g ,  and it is 
always difficult for a recipient government to j udge whether 
the alternat ive really is nothing rather than some less 
res trict ive form of aid . 
There are three circumstances in which the accept ance of 
aid to resource proj ects might b ring negat ive net b enefit s to 
a recipient count ry . The first is where the availab ility of 
concess ional funds from a part icular source leads t o  the ineff­
icient use of a valuable resource . This will only occur where 
there is an inefficient administ rat ive system within the 
recip ient co\llltry ,  but unfortunately there are many examples 
of  inef ficient administ rat ive systems in the developing world.  
One clear example of  this problem oc curred in the last days of 
colonial administ rat ion in Papua New Guinea , when a palm oil 
conces sion was granted to a Japanese company with no experience 
in the indust ry .  The development was to be financed by t ied 
concess ional finance , although there was no evidence that the 
home count ry was an efficient manufacturer of the relevant plant 
and machinery in Japan . The availability of  large quantit ies of 
very cheap finance allowed the private investor to  make a high 
level of  equity available to the government without payment 
being required , but it turned out t o  be equity in an asset of 
very low value . 
Th e second circumstance is where the recipient govern­
ment ' s  financial commitment s  to a proj ect exceed the con­
ces sional element in the fo reign funding , and where the 
taxat ion on the rent s generated by the investment is less 
than this short fall . This s ituat ion could arise where public 
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provis ion of infrast ructure caused a sub-marginal proj ect to 
be undertaken by private investors . 
The third circumstance is where the resource proj ect , 
with effect ive concessional financing , itself b rings 
positive n et benefit s ,  but where the accept ance of  aid that 
is specific to res ource investment s  reduces the amount of  
aid  from the  same source that is available for other , higher 
priority purposes . In this cas e ,  the t rue opportunity cost 
would exceed the cost  of  the concess ional finan ce . Alter­
nat ively , even if there was no prospect of raising the 
quality of aid from the relevant donor ,  there might be some 
danger that the acceptance of  restrict ive condit ions of aid 
from one donor would weaken the commitment of other donors 
to provide aid in less rest rict ive forms . 
It is always difficult for an aid recipient to ident ify 
the latter circumstance in pract ice , and high orders of 
polit ical j udgment are required in the admin is t rat ion of 
pol icy in this areas . Nevertheless , it is a crucially 
import ant area . A recipient of large quant it ies of  foreign 
aid would be left with very little cont rol over the 
direct ions of it s nat ional development effort if the terms 
upon which aid was provided by all donors deteriorat ed t o  
the lowest common denominator amongst exist ing forms of  aid . 
Admin is t rative systems for the receipt of  aid 
A country has the maximum po ssible cont rol over the 
compos it ion of  its own development program if aid is 
allo cat ed without restriction to goods and services required 
by the programs that are most  product ive according to it s 
own prio rit ies . It may have very little cont rol over it s 
own program if  a large part of the re· sources available to it 
are t ied t o  specific act ivit ies and to purchases from 
part icular sources . It may nevertheless choose to accept 
aid on rest rict ive condit ions when it brings net benefit s ,  
even though it would allocate the resources involved in the 
aid t rans fer to very different purposes were it free t o  
do so . 
A few relat ively s imple innovat ions in the systems 
within which aid is administered in rec ipient count ries 
could remove the ma j o r distort ions that are associat ed with 
proj ect aid and t ied aid , without requiring radical changes 
in the formal conditions that are usually applied to 
government to government ass istance in the financing of  
resource investments . However , maj or changes may be 
required in some current pract ices . 
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There is no s imple expedient for managing problems 
associated with the provis ion by donor countries of finance 
to their own nat ional investors . In pract ice , a recipient 
government can do no more than ins ist that such t ransact ions 
are not aid in any sense - that they are s imply a domest ic 
transaction b etween the foreign company and it s own govern­
ment . The recipient government can then accept proposal s  
on their compet it ive merits from all foreign investors that 
are interested in a proj ect , without representat ion from 
foreign governments . There are poten t ial threat s to 
effect ive nat ional management in these types of arrangement , 
and a host government is wise to ins is t  on full declarat ion 
of such t ransact ions between a foreign investor and his 
home government . 
Government-to-government t ransact ions would be very 
much mo re manageable under certain rest raint s :  first , if 
they took the form of  a connnitment to  provide a specified 
level o f  aid over a period o f  years , and ,  second , if the 
funds represented by this connnitment were made available to 
support a sp ecified range of act ivities , includin g  maj or 
resource inves tments where government expenditure on these 
activit ies survived a l is t in g  of the recipient ' s  priorit ies . 
The aid would be portable across the list ed activities . 
The third restraint is if the commitment could be drawn 
down select ively against purchases from sources to  which 
the donor expected its aid to b e  t ied . 2 
The system would work most effect ively if it was 
supported by all maj or donors . The recipient government 
would add the commitments of  aid to it s estimates of  
resources available to support pub lic expenditure , and 
adj ustments would be made to int ended future levels of  
general borrowing and total public expenditure . The 
recipient government would allocate this total level of 
2The system suggest ed here is a variant adapted for a single 
recipient country of  a mult ilat eral reciprocal aid untying 
arrangement discussed by Koj ima , Okita and Drysdale 19 71 : 
32 7-30 . The terms portable aid connnitment and select ive 
drawdown o f  aid have b een developed in Papua New Guinea 
in the pro cess of recent work to strengthen administrat ive 
structures for the receipt of foreign aid . 
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expenditure amongst programs through it s normal budget ing 
and planning procedures . Decis ions to allocate expenditure 
to the purchase of equity or to the provis ion of in frast ructure 
for resource investment s would be made on the merits of these 
expenditures relat ive to others , with t he contribut ion of 
these expenditures to future revenue growth being weighed 
against th e economic and other returns from alternat ive 
programs . 
The development program having b een defined without 
reference to the purpo ses for which aid is allocated , a range 
of act ivit ies could be selected from the t ot al program for 
suppo rt by foreign donors . For the system to work e fficiently ,  
it is necessary for total expendit ure on act ivit ies which a 
part icular donor is prepared to support to be very much larger 
than the amount of the donor ' s  aid commitment . 
Goods and services required by each aid-supported 
act ivity would be purchased compet it ively , through the normal 
supply procedures of the recipient government . When a source 
of goods and services to which some aid was t ied was revealed 
to be the most efficient supplier , the aid commitment of the 
co rresponding donor would be run down . 
The sys tem would clear all aid commitments so long as 
each donor country was a compet it ive source of an amount of 
goods and services required by act ivit ies which it was 
prepared to support that exceeded the amount of its aid 
commitment . I f  aid commitments cleared aut omatically , there 
would be no distort ion in prio rit ies associated with the 
proj ect orientat ion of aid , and no exces s cost  of tying 
For the dono r ,  aid might appear to be proj ect-oriented . and 
t ied , but this would carry no distort ion s in expenditure and 
no excess cos t s  for th e recipient . 
Th e system might fail to clear all aid commitment s if 
the priorit i es of the recipient allowed few act ivit ies of 
types a donor was p repared to support , or if a donor was 
tmcompet it ive as a supplier of goods and services required 
within the act ivit ies that it was prepared to support . 
It has already been suggested that the f inancial returns 
to a government on funds allocat ed to resource investments  
can b e  very high , so long as  the proj ect s operate within an 
efficient system of rent taxes . It  is likely that genuinely 
pro fitable expenditures of this type would find their way 
into a recipient ' s  development program on their own merit s ,  
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unless the recipient placed very low value on revenue growth . 
The largest donors which restrict the use o f  their aid 
narrowly to  resource investments are maj or industrial 
count ries which are compet it ive suppliers of the machinery 
and material s required in large indust rial and mining invest­
ments . These real it ies would ass ist in the clearing of aid 
commitments through the suggested processes . 
Nevertheless , it is po ssible that a donor would be 
prepared to make more funds available in support of expend­
iture on resource investments than could be util ized 
efficiently within act ivit ies that survive a conscient ious 
list ing of the recipient ' s  priorit ies . One advantage of the 
suggested administrat ive sys tem is that it makes variat ions 
from allocat ion according to  the recipient ' s  priorit ies , 
and the excess cost of  aid tying ,  clear for all to see . The 
recipient is ·in a much b etter pos it ion to j udge whether 
expenditures on low priority , aid-supported act ivit ies are 
worth the various costs associated with them ,  including the 
cost of risking corro·sion of the terms of less restrict ive 
aid from other donors . 
Each recipient needs to form it s own j udgments on the 
worth of accepting aid for low priority purposes , or for 
purchases from less efficient sources . Its j udgment is 
affected by the importance it attaches to short-term economic 
growth , on it s prospect s for improving the terms upon which 
aid is made available through resistance to low quality aid , 
and on it s j udgment of  the l ikelihood that acceptance of low 
quality aid within one bilateral relat ionship could undermine 
attempt s  to reduce restrict ions on aid in others . 
Difficult choices on aid 
The availability of foreign aid for expenditure related 
to resource investments has the potent ial to raise substan­
t ially the nat ional revenues of recipient count ries . It can 
st rengthen a nat ional economy and expand it s opt ions in many 
areas of development . 
It also has the potent ial for undermining budget ing and 
planning sys tems within a developing count ry . The attract ion 
of ' something for nothing ' is compelling , and only government s 
with well-organ ized and well-conceived structures for 
receiving aid are in a pos it ion to en force crit ical j udgment s 
on the value o f  specific aid proposals . 
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There is always a heavy neo-colon ial weight leaning 
against attempt s  to enforce nat ional priorit i es in respect 
of foreign aid receipt s .  Foreign companies are act ive in 
ident ifying aid expenditures that are l ikely t o  be of  
b ene fit to them , selling proposals t o  contacts in the home 
government , and engineerin g  requests  for aid from o ff icials 
in the recipient country .  In the worst cases , o fficials 
are bribed to make the right request s .  In others , o ff ic ials 
(and relat ively j unior o fficials out s ide the central agencies 
will often do ) are provided with opportunit ies to restore 
programs within their own bureaucrat ic control that have 
failed to survive lis t ings of government priorit ies . A 
conscient ious government of  a developing country must lean 
back against the weight  of well-mean ing foreign ambassadors , 
who have plenty of t ime to think about the style of  develop­
ment that th�y cons ider best for their host count ry ,  plenty 
of opportunities t o  sell their views to one or o ther min ister 
or o fficial ,  and to report ' request s '  back to the home 
government . It has to lean back against the enthusias t ic 
aid o fficial of the donor country , who has little under­
standing of or pat ience with the t edious processes of macro­
economic management , priorit ies set t ing and budget control 
within which a conscient ious government goes about the admin­
ist ration of  public expenditure . 
If  the administrat ive structures are well-conceived and 
effective , there is little danger that aid will be s quandered , 
or involve the recipient in net losses . The potential 
bene fits of estab lishing such st ructures are so large that 
it would seem worthwhile for recipient s  to insist on b ilateral 
aid arrangements that were con s istent with them ,  even at the 
cos t  of some loss of aid which j udged in isolation has posit ive 
value . Many o f  the int erest s  of  donor countries can also 
be met more easily within rat ional administ rative s t ructures . 
One obj ective of some donor count ries may conflict 
directly with importan t  int erest s  of recipients . Some 
donors may be interested primarily in advancing proj ect s 
that would n ever get off the ground without ass istance . 
However ,  individual recipients  have a very st rong interest 
in channelling concessional funds into barely marginal 
proj ect s ,  where the reduced supply price of investment is 
reflect ed fully in increased rent . The forced development 
o f  previously sub-marginal proj ect s does not generate ren ts , 
and , through it s effect on world market s  for resource-based 
commodit ies � can reduce rents accruing to all est ablished 
producers . 
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But the reduct ion in world prices and resource rents 
is not the sole obj ect ive even of the most hard-nosed donors . 
There would seem to be enough common ground across the 
interests of  donors and recipient s for the co-operat ive 
explorat ion of  improved administrat ive arrangement s for 
receiving aid to be worthwhile . 
The present reality is that many developing countries 
lack the administrative means to measure the true cost of 
accept ing aid on restrict ive terms for resource investments 
against the ben efits of increased revenues . As a result , 
the internat ional aid effort is less effect ive than it could 
be in st rengthening developing economies . 
Chapt er 8 
Problems of aid for_rural development 
Ralph H. Ret zlaf f 
Thirty years have elapsed s ince the out set of  decolon­
iz at ion at the end of World War I I .  During this period the 
dominant view held by the governments of most less developed 
count ries (LDCs ) of  the development process in the rural 
sector has undergone repeated change .  At first , relatively 
little at tent ion was given to rural development problems 
by either the newly-independent government s or the donor 
agencies which sought to ass ist them. Large-scale capital 
int ensive proj ects with part icular emphas is on industrial­
iz at ion were on most planning agendas . The combinat ion of a 
' t rickle-down ' effect plus a labour sector trans fer responsive 
to proj ected industrial demand , represented the accepted 
view of how rural development would be brought about . Hydro­
electric dams and steel plants were to  b e  the engines of 
progress and modernizat ion . The role ass igned to the rural 
sector was to provide labour and capital for transfer to the 
small but growing indust rial sector . 
By the mid-1950s community development progr�s aimed 
at ameliorat ing the general conditions of rural life had 
b een init iated by a number of governments . In many instances 
these programs contained elements of activit ies which began 
during the later phases of the colonial period (Mosher 
1976 : 1-8 ; Mayer et al . 19 58) . In some countries these effo rt s  
have had a l imit ed impact , a t  b est , upon the rural s ector , 
in others they were failures (Rut tan 197 5 : 9-16) . In the 
ensuing decades LDC governments and donors have experimented 
with a succession o f  st rat egies , programs and proj ect s ,  none 
of which has as yet b rought about the desired comprehensive 
transformation of  the rural sector . I 
1A reflect ion of  the shifting strategies of  many LDCs can be 
seen in the changes in the policies of  the World Bank ' s 
rural development ass istance programs (Yudelman 1 9 7 6 : 36 7-81) . 
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Among the most important of these changes was the 
decis_ion t aken by some LDCs in the early 1960s to focus 
explicit at tent ion upon modernizing agriculture as a necessary 
condit ion o f  rural development . Both a concern for poss ible 
food short ages as well as the problems involved in trans­
forming tradit ional sub s i stence agriculture (Wharton 1969 ; 
Schultz  1964)  brought about maj or changes in rural development 
act ivity , to  which a number of  donor agencies readily 
responded . At t imes they p layed an important role in helping 
to shape new st rat egies . Nowhere was donor involvement more 
apparent than in the t echnological b reakthroughs which 
resulted in the new high-yielding variet ies of wheat and 
rice . Other advances in biological , chemical and mechanical 
technology also contribut ed to the more efficient use of the 
factors of product ion within each country ' s  agricultural 
system (Hayami and Rutt an  19 71) . 
However ,  one implicat ion of the emphasis upon a market­
oriented factor product ivity st rategy was the downgrading in 
import ance of  the need t o  develop a capacity to alter 
st ruct ural-institut ional constraints which acted as impediment s 
to rural development . A second implicat ion was that at tent ion 
was focused upon agricultural as the dominant rural act ivity ,  
an d  away from the remaining non-farm act ivit ies in the rural 
sector . Apart from the largely emergency , relief-oriented , 
rural works programs , little syst emat ic considerat ion was 
given to generat ing adequate off-farm rural emp loyment 
opportunit ies t o  mat ch the continuously expanding rural labour 
force . The rapid gains in overall agricultural product ion 
and the product ivity increases stennning from such things as 
the modern seed and fert ilizer technologies in the lat e 1960s 
contribut ed to the hope that agricultural development could 
carry with it the success ful development of the ent ire rural 
sect or . 
Those  expectat ions were short lived . By the early 1970s 
a chorus of dissenting voices b egan to b e  raised . Increas ing 
short falls in the growth of new employment opportunitie s , 
part icularly in the rural sector, came under att ack (Myrdal 
19 68 ; Faber and Seers . 197 2 ;  and 110 1970-74) , as well as the 
inattention to the dist ribut ional implicat ions of exist ing 
development st rategies . 2 Frankel ( 19 71) and others argued 
2An init ial stat ement , which caused considerab le discussion , 
came from Mahbub ul Haq , 19 72 : 19-2 2 . For a recent , more 
systemat ic exposit ion of his views see Haq 19 7 6 .  
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that the modern technologies int roduced were responsible for 
the inequalit ies in the dist ribut ion of gains . This crit icism 
was , however ,  rooted in an erroneous assumpt ion .  In t ime it 
was recognized that it was the inequal it ies ari s ing from 
exist ing st ructural-inst itut ional condit ions in rural society 
that were responsible fo r the tmequal dist ribut ion of  
product ivity gains accruing from a biological-chemical 
technolo gy essent ially neutral to s cale . This increased 
att ent ion to pers istent st ructural inequalit ies was further 
height ened as our awareness sharpened of the abs ence of  
change in the condit ion o f  the rural poo r .  An increasing 
number of both LDCs and donors began t o  s t ress the need t o  
develop poverty-oriented rural development st rategies which 
concent rated on the least advantaged , who had been largely 
bypassed during the previous decades . 
As the concern for widespread poverty and the failure 
of  exist ing development efforts  to deal with the pers ist ing 
maldist ribut ion of  income , wealth , status and power grew , 
problems on the agricultural product ion side of  rural . 
development re-emerged . 
The present state of  rural development in most LDCs in 
As ia can be summarized broadly : 
( a) Despite the int ro duct ion o f  new foodgrain 
t e chnologies and substant ial increases in pro­
duct ion in many cotmt ries , per capita cereal 
product ion has declined during the past decade in 
Asia . 
(b ) This decline is at rributab le t o  ( i )  populat ion 
increase , ( ii)  the const raints t o  adopt ion o f  new 
technologies in a number of  regions , part icularly 
with respect to small farmers , t enant s and share­
croppers , ( iii) the lack of  suitable s it e  specific 
technologies for some regions , and ( iv) a slowdown 
in annual product ivity gains . 
( c) Labour force absorpt ion within the rural sector 
both in agriculture as well as in of f-farm 
employment has failed to keep pace with increases 
in the rural workforce , result ing in increases in 
tmemployment and tmderemployment . When proj ect ions 
of the limited absorpt ive capacity of the urban 
indust rial sector and o f  total proj ected growth in 
the lab our force within the next decade are 
considered along with rural sector employment dat a ,  
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the t ask in the next decade assumes the dimens ions 
of a crisis . 
Maj or prob lems 
Estimates of  the present s it uat ion indicate three chief 
problem areas which must be addres sed if we are to make 
further gains in rural development . I will not discuss 
limit ing the rate o f  populat ion growth among them. I would 
suggest though that the widely held neo-Malthusian perspect ive 
does not accurat ely reflect the full range of  pressures on 
available resources . These arise from two sources in both 
LDCs and DCs : the rate o f  increase in populat ion and the 
rising level of affluence which exert s substantial influence 
on the actual distribut ion of available resources . 
Inadequate food product ion . There is a cont inuing need 
to ident ify and relax significant constraints on food 
product ion . This t ask is increas ingly complex s ince it 
involves determining agro-climat ic zones on an int ra-country 
basis , ident ifying the principal constraints within each 
zone and developing product ion technologies and cropping 
systems to increase output . This process is a maj or 
responsibility for the nat ional research ins t itutes in the 
agricult ural s ciences . Within the t ot al CGIAR3 system it 
may involve a redefinit ion , in s ome cases , of their collab­
orat ive role with the internat ional commodity inst itutes 
both to identify research priorities in the agricult ural 
sciences and to share responsib ilit ies in the conduct o f  
such research . 
What is even less well understood , and to some st ill 
controversial , is the extent t o  which ,  and the reasons why , 
despite being neut ral t o  scale , new technologies where 
available have yet to be uniformly adopted in many regions , 
part icularly by smallholders , tenant s and sharecroppers . 
The product ivity increases of  the non-adopters remain quite 
low . The problems here lie within the domain of  the social 
s ciences where the effect ive research capacity within many 
count ries is much weaker an d  where counterparts at either 
a regional or global level to the internat ional commodity 
institut es are largely absent . 
3The Consultat ive Group for Internat ional Agricultural 
Research , set up by the UNDP , the World Bank and the 
F� . 
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Inequity .  On moral an d  economic grounds , as well as 
for polit ical reasons clearly understood by LDC leaders , the 
gains achieved through rural development must reach the poor 
in the bottom in come deciles . A maj or component of such an 
equity-oriented nat ional rural development policy is employment 
generat ion . The picture as we have not ed is increasingly 
bleak .  Indust rial growth has not generated the hoped for 
increases in j obs in the urban sector .  Employment oppor­
tunit ies in the rural sector , both in agriculture as well as 
in o f f-farm act ivit ies , have also  failed t o  keep pace with 
the total expans ion of the labour force . There is ample 
evidence that in many count ries rural unemployment and under­
employment and consequent ly poverty is in creasing.  It s 
incidence varies between LDCs but it remains a dominant 
cons iderat ion for almo st all count ries within South and 
Southeast Asia . 
But equity considerat ions do not end with employment . 
The issue is much broader . How does one alter exist ing 
programs , and what n ew  programs must  be introduced in order 
to assure that rural development brings about a reduct ion in 
the range of  inequality and improved the condit ions of  life 
of  the rural poor?  The search for pract ical st rat egies to 
reduce inequalit ies must be high on all agendas . 4 
Like Janus , the ancient Roman deity , we must bestow 
our at tent ion in two opposite  direct ions . The exist ing 
rural systems must become more efficient producers of food 
and employment while s imultaneously the extent of poverty 
and inequality within them must be reduced . One link 
between these two lies in our third maj or problem area.  
The lack of  capacity for inst itut ional change . To some 
' the principal limit s to sustained economic growth and 
accelerat ed development are polit ical , social and inst it­
ut ional in character rather than phys ical ' (Umali 19 7 7 ) . To 
ot hers ins t itut ional const raints are import ant , although not 
overriding (World Bank 19 7 5 ) . Both radical analyst s  (Haque , 
Meht a,  Rahman and Wignoraj a 19 75)  and conservat ive int er­
nat ional lending ins t itut ions (As ian Development Bank 19 76  
and 1 9 7 8 )  concur that there are significant inst it ut ional 
const raints to rural development . What they differ on 
markedly is how pervasive these constraints are , and how 
they are to be changed . 
4 cl ine ( 19 75 : 359-9 6)  has surveyed the literature . See also 
the papers delivered at the Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundat ion , 
Food Cris is Workshop , 7-9 February 197 7 .  
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T o  achieve effect ive ins t itut ional change rural develop­
ment pro grams must focus upon the st ructural features of both 
product ion and distribut ion systems in the rural sector . 
How the product ion pro cess is organized , that is access to 
lartd , irrigat ion , fert iliz er , seeds , pesticides , credit , and 
the knowledge of how to ut ilize them effect ively , det ermines 
how product ivity gains from agriculture are distributed in 
the society . 5 Equally important are the extent to which 
part ic ipat ion in relevant decision-making is broadly based , 
and the rural poor in part icular are ab le to  enforce account­
ability upon those who are the gat e-keepers in the resource 
distribut ion process . Increasing access , part icipat ion and 
the ab ility to enforce accountability on behalf of  the rural 
poor are the strucgural components of rural development­
related ins t it ut ional change .  Technological contribut ions 
of the s cient ific dis ciplines to this problem cont inue to be 
necessary , but they are far from sufficient . To achieve 
this we require the resources of a vigorous problem-oriented 
applied social science effort in det ermining reasonable , 
accept ab le st rategies of  int ervent ion to  alter the status quo . 
Both academics and aid agencies , in their desire to ass ist 
the development process ,  have at t imes contributed to ob fus­
cating the \lllderlying problems of rural development . All too 
frequently LDC leaders have b een persuaded to  b elieve that if 
they can find and adopt the right strategy , innovat ion , or 
approach , then all o f  the difficult problems will somehow be 
resolved or rendered insignificant . The radical shifts in 
attent ion which have characterized much of  the past development 
literature have b een lit t le more than a search for panaceas . 
But there are no panaceas . Anderson ' s  comment is much to the 
point . 
Government s have a tendency to look for the easy 
way out and the s imple solut ion . In this they 
are generally fooled . There are no miracle 
variet ies to solve problems . There is much hard 
work and planning necessary aft er superior 
variet ies are produced if these are to be translated 
to product ion . Research and extension must be 
st imulat ed . The whole infrast ructure must be 
5 see the papers del ivered at the Workshop on Access , Develop­
ment and Dist ribut ive Just ice , Singapore , 31 July to 2 
August 1 9 7 6 , sponsored by the Inst itute of Southeast Asian 
Studies and the Internat ional Legal Center , New York. See 
also  Deve iopment and Change , 19 75 . 
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revamped .  
prob lems . 
Hard work is the price for solving 
There is no other way (Anderson n . d .  : 60 ) . 
The problem of rural development which confronts both 
the LDCs , and the donor agencies which seek to assist them, 
is how to enab le the LDCs to become increas ingly s elf-reliant , 
keeping in mind their comparat ive factor endowment advantages , 
in producing the goods and services which their populat ions 
require and in dist ribut ing them more fairly and evenly to 
their ent ire populat ions . 
These issues are similar to those which confront developed 
nations . Trying to improve the condit ions of l ife of  a 
minority conmnmity in an urban ghet to in the USA or the UK 
is analogous to trying t o  reach the urban and rural poor in 
LDCs . There are significant differences t o  be sure , both in 
resources available and the magnitude and int ract ab ility of 
the problem. In both developed and developing countries 
planned intervent ion to alt er the status quo is a polit ical 
matter , a source of divis iveness and t ension , which calls int o  
play t h e  b asic skills of  orderly con flict management on the 
part of nat ional , regional and local leaders . These matters 
are not easily resolved . Thus , when we speak of  rural 
development , we are in fact direct ing att ent ion to the 
inst itut ions which determine the nature of  rural social , 
economic and polit ical power . It  is necessary that we s ee 
this as relevant as we proceed to design programs o f  rural 
development . 
Rural development programs alt er rural inst itut ions and 
the processes which control their funct ionin g .  For what 
purposes and in which specific direct ion thes e  changes are 
made must be made apparent if donor agencies are to ass ist 
recipient count ries in success ful rural development ventures .  
To obs cure goals or avoid difficult quest ions is at b est  to 
risk being l es s  effect ive than one might be and at worst to 
fail complet ely . 
The nexus of concerns for increasin g  agricultural 
product ion , making the dist ribut ion of gains more egalitarian , 
and alt e ring t h e  ins t itut ional f ramework thro ugh which these 
effort s  are to b e  carried out , are now s een by most LDC 
government s  and donor agencies alike to imply that the 
principal t ask of rural development i s  to aid the rural poo r .  
The important quest ion i s  why the effort s  of the past several 
decades have failed to bring about a s ign ificant reduct ion in 
the numbers of  those living in ext reme poverty within the 
rural areas . 
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Const raints t o  rural development 
Rural development planning , t o  be effect ive , must 
concentrate upon the identificat ion of the principal con­
straints which impede p ro gress , and the determinat ion of 
act ions n eces sary to relax such const raints . The requis ite 
act ion may involve the development of new knowledge , the 
alt erat ion o f  exist in g  policy , direct intervent ion in the 
rural syst em,  or shift s in polit ical goals and leadership 
styles . What is important in each ins tance is that there 
be a clear understanding of : ( i )  the effect of each constraint 
and the extent to which it can be relaxed ; and ( ii)  the 
relat ionship o f  the program or p roj ect under considerat ion 
to such constraints . An ass istance program which is not 
capab le of  relaxing the binding const raints in its area o f  
act ivity i s  twice in erro r .  First , i t  will waste resources 
and fail to achieve results .  Second , it will raise hopes 
and expect at ions only to let them down again , cont ribut ing 
t o  cynicism and despair . 
The categories of  const raint s ident ified here are 
t e chnological , market-oriented , inst itutional , and polit ical . 
One maj or l imit at ion o f  past rural development act ivit ies is 
that these const raints were addressed separately , negl ect ing 
the fact that they are interrelated , and in many cases 
mutually reinforcing . 
Technological 
Developing count ries could greatly increase their 
potential for both food product ion and employment by devot ing 
more resources to research on adapt ing new variet ies and 
developing new pro duct ion t echniques . As Arndt and Rut t an  
( 19 7 7 : 3) have not ed : ' The capacity to develop t echnology 
consistent with physical and cultural endowment s  is the single 
most impo rtant variable account ing for differences in agri­
cult ural product ivity among nations ' .  A maj or challenge lies 
in developing LDC capab il it ies for adapt ive agricultural 
research in order to enable their nat ional ins t itut es to play 
the necessary role in generating and applying new product ion 
technology , under the spe cif ic ecological and socio-economic 
conditions in which it will be used (Boyce and Evenson 1 9 7 5 ) . 
Many LDCs lack the capacity t o  conduct s uch research on 
commodit ies of maj or impo rtan ce to their economies . This 
constraint is b est appreciat ed and least cont roversial , so 
that s ome limit ed p rogress has b een made . 
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Market-oriented 
(a) Price policy . Among the most  frequently cit ed 
const raints to rural development are disincent ives to expanded 
food product ion . These include governmental pricing policies , 
such as ( i )  domest ic pro curement at prices cons iderably below 
prevailing market prices , ( ii)  government-subsidized ret ail 
sale to the urban consumer , ( iii) forced lagging of producer 
prices behind general inflat ion rates , ( iv) the import of  
maj or commodit ies and subsidized sale t o  the urban consumer ,  
an d  (v) excessive cost ( inadequat e sub s idy) o f  input s such 
as fert ilizer and pes t ic ides . These policies aim to provide 
cheap food primarily for the urban consumer and to capture 
revenue other than through direct taxat ion methods .  They 
also act either directly or indirectly to depress prices 
received by rural producers , and consequently to reduce the ir 
incent ive to increase product ion . 6 They reflect the polit ical 
leaders ' dilemma in det ermining who gains and who loses , a 
point we will return to lat er . 
(b ) Taxat ion pol ic ies . In many LDCs t axat ion policies 
are inconsistent and at t imes counter-product ive . They have 
emerged for a variety of reasons , at t imes owing t o  urgent 
revenue needs , at other t imes owing to the demands of important 
pres sure groups . High levels of  indirect commodity t axat ion 
and low rat es of income and land taxes mean that the rural 
poor o ften pay a larger share o f  their income in t axes than 
the rural rich (World Bank 19 75 : 30) . Most LDCs have yet to 
6 . ) USAID , Draft Summary • • •  ( 19 75 prepared by S . H . But terfield , 
cit ed hereaft er as USAID ; and US General Accounting Office , 
Report . • •  by the Compt roller General • . .  ( 19 75) , c it ed 
hereafter as US Compt roller-General . I have drawn very 
heavily upon both of these papers for several part s of the 
dis cussion in the const raints sect ion and at t imes have 
reproduced sect ion s in the te-.xt of this chapter with only 
slight modificat ion s .  Nevertheless the overall st ructure 
and the part icular argument s of the const raints sect ion 
remain my responsibility . It has not b een poss ible to 
determine the extent to which the USAID paper has actually 
been adopted by USAID as a guide for operat ing policy . 
The Compt roller-General ' s  Report contains an interes ting 
rebut tal sect ion prepared by several of the maj or 
department s involved in aid programs . These are referred 
to below . 
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develop and implement fiscal policies relat ive to the rural 
sector which : ( i )  enable the government to capture a 
reasonable share o f  product ivity gains , on a progress ive 
basis , part icularly where those gains are at tributable to 
government programs such as irrigat ion and other infrast ructure 
investments ; and ( ii) administ er and enforce these measures 
in a stable fashion , avoiding fluctuat ion between harsh 
pr�curement programs in t imes of s carcity , and sharp drops in 
price supports in abundant t imes (US Comptroller-General 
1 9 7 5 : 13 ) . 
( c )  Monet ary and t rade pol icies . In some developing 
count ries governments have made food relat ively cheap , 
dis criminat ing against foreign exchange - earning food and 
agricultural export s .  The sale of  foodgrains received through 
commodity assistance programs has provided a short-rtm revenue 
gain , while perpetuat ing a long-term dependency on external 
assistance . In some countries t hese counterpart revenues 
have accounted for a s izeable proport ion of the total annual 
resources availab le .  
Overvalued exchange rates also act as a form o f  agric­
ultural export taxat ion . When a country maintains a s ingle 
exchange rate that overvalues domestic currency , the exporter 
is ' t axed ' ,  in that he receives less local currency than if 
the rate were more realist ic , while importers are ' sub sidized ' 
by b eing able t o  purchase foreign goods b elow their real 
value (US Compt roller-General 1975 : 15 ) . 
The principal thrust o f  these three market-oriented 
const raints is that they decrease profit and hence the 
incent ive to the producer to increase his product ion . Taken 
together they comb ine to frust rat e  a ' get the prices right 
st rategy ' .  This line of crit icism is relat ively insensit ive 
to equity considerat ions . 7 It relies upon an indirect 
' t rickle-down ' effect to assist the rural poverty groups who 
lack effect ive access to (or control over) the factors of 
product ion which would enable them to benefit from more 
favourable fact or pricin g .  Nevertheless these are important 
policy constraints to all those in the rural sector at or 
above the level of  the viab le smallholder . 
7Apart from providing expert ass ist ance in the field o f  pub lic 
finance ,  which is frequently of  limited value in the face of 
st rong internal polit ical considerat ions , a contribut ion of 
donor count ries may lie in more enlightened connnodity 
ass istance programs (Lipton 1 9 7 7 ) . 
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The nat ure of  commodity assistance programs and the 
impact which the dif ferent manner of such programs have upon 
price policy , for example , requires careful cons ideration 
lest the long-run impact o f  such aid be counter-product ive 
t o  recipient LDC and donor goals . 8 
Inst itut ional 
A longer-term perspect ive stresses government intervent ion 
to alter the inst itut ional constraints in the rural sys t em 
which inhib it opportun it i es for access t o  and part icipat ion 
in the product ion process , the more equitab le sharing of  
gains , and the improvement of  the condit ions and quality of 
life of those living in the rural area . Even the most  
opt imist ic analysts  acknowl edge that the most  difficult task 
in rural development is to involve an increas ing proport ion 
of the landless , unemployed , poverty groups in product ive 
work and t o  ensure that they b ene fit reasonab ly from their 
efforts . Greatly overs impl ifying , by reducing market 
const rain t s  we seek to make the existing sys tems operate more 
ef ficiently , wh ereas by reducing inst itut ional constraints 
we seek to change the nature o f  the system it sel f  and make 
it operat e more equitably .  The second i s  far more dif ficult 
to achieve than the firs t . For those who would like t o  see 
a more complete discuss ion of these difficult ies , I commend 
an insight ful , if depressing , essay by Martin Rein ( 19 76 : 
1 71-209 ) who has b een an important contributor to the develop­
ment of poverty-oriented policies for urb an  development in 
the USA aad the UK .  
(a)  Inadequate extension , credit and input delivery . 
Research on new technology is of  little value if  ext ension 
services fail to disseminate the result s to the farmers . 
8rnsufficient at tent ion has b een paid to the role which 
developed count ries could play in helping to overcome 
agricultural pricing policy problems in developing count ries . 
Foreign aid donors could play a valuable role by helping 
to finance a phased adj ustment in urban food prices over 
several years , both to avoid sharp short-term income effect s 
from higher prices , and to cover the period b etween the 
undert aking o f  farm level price increases and investment­
inst itut ional development programs to lower product ion cos t s  
and the actual achievement of  increased an d  cheaper food­
grain suppl ies (Brown 19 76 : 30-1) . 
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Extension services in many count ries are generally inadequat e ,  
part icularly for the small farmer . There are frequently too 
few extension workers , they are generally poorly trained and 
paid , and lack support facilit ies . 
Credit requirements for the new ,  more product ive t ech­
nologies and the inadequate delivery systems for seeds , 
fe�t iliz ers , pest icides , irrigat ion , implements and machinery 
are const raint s to increased agricultural product ion . Without 
access to credit , small farmers in part icular have little 
opportunity to purchase the costly input s necessary to 
increase product ion significantly . Even though credit can 
remove a financial constraint to increas ing the product ivity 
of small farmers , the efficient use of credit depends on such 
other factors as the t imely availabil ity of input s and an 
ef fect ive post-harvest processin g  an d  market ing system. 
What is lacking is an integrated agricultural system 
which is part icularly responsive to the needs of the small 
farmers who are least capable of funct ioning in an independent , 
sel f-reliant fashion . 9 
(b ) Land reform.  The inst itut ional change most  
frequently suggested in LDCs is  land reform. In many 
developing count ries , the exist ing land tenure system leaves 
the cult ivator with only a small fract ion of the benefit s  
st emming from increased investment or labour . Land reforms 
deal ing with both ownership and tenancy have b een carried out 
in a number of As ian countries . Success (Japan and Taiwan) , 
mixed result s or varying degrees of failure (most of South 
As ia and more recently the Philippines ) have b een widely 10 
studied and documented . The overall record is not encouraging . 
9For a most  useful d iscussion of  the attempt s  to develop such 
inst itut ions in Indonesia , Malays ia , Thailand and the 
Philippin es see Palmer 19 7 6 .  
lOThe standard literature on land reform is reasonably well 
known and will not be cit ed here . What is of  int erest are 
the newer reconsiderat ions of data and experience concerning 
various experiment s with ' group farming ' .  The result s of a 
a seminar on group farming j ointly sponsored by the ADC 
Research and Training Network and the Land Tenure Centre , 
University of Wisconsin , will shortly be publish ed by the 
University of Wisconsin Press , edited by Peter Dorner . A 
second seminar focusing on group farming experiences in 
Asia , organized by the ADC Regional Research and Training 
Program is scheduled for August 19 77 . 
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The most formidable obstacle to land reform is the 
resistance of land owners who naturally oppose land reform 
legislat ion . They can and do delay the execut ion of land 
reform laws once they are pas sed . To the extent that 
exist ing regimes within the region derive a significant 
proport ion of their pol it ical support from the land-owning 
classes , any effect ive alterat ion of the currently operat ing 
sys tems of land ownership , tenancy , and share. cropping 
arrangements by itself w ill be difficult and unl ikely .  In a 
sense the failure of  land reform in some countries raises 
bas ic quest ions about the ab ility to deal with inst itut ional 
change in a piecemeal fashion . 
( c) The rural social system .  The problem of changing 
inst itut ional constraints  to fo ster rural development is , 
however , much broader than ext ens ion , credit and input 
delivery , and land reform. In many cases the pervas ive 
const raint s lie in the rural so cial system.  The failure of 
specif ic inst itut ions to op erate effect ively , and respond in 
part icular t o  the needs of the rural poor , can oft en be 
t raced to both the inst itut ions and the soc iety in which they 
operate .  A 19 7 6  ESCAP/FAO/ ILO meet ing on strengthening 
rural inst itut ions serving small farmers put the matter as 
follows : 
Even though [ rural ins t itut ions ] were intended t o  
serve a wider target group , including small farmers , 
tenant farmers and the landles s , it was evident 
that in general , the rural poor did not part icipate  
in the operat ions o f  those inst itut ions , did not 
have access to the services and benefit s which they 
delivered , and were unable to hold those inst itut ions 
ac countab le for their failure to serve them . . .  
That meet ing went on to urge serious considerat ion to 
the following strategies for developing rural inst itut ion s 
appropriate to the needs of the rural poor : 
(a)  The creat ion or promot ion of  appropriate 
inst itut ions [ and ] organizat ions with the 
specific aim of t reat ing preferent ially the 
special needs of the rural poor in ext ens ion , 
credit , market ing , input del ivery , opportunit ies 
for product ive employment , etc ; 
(b ) Enhancement of the capability of the rural 
poor to organiz e themselves for the more 
ef fect ive representat ion of their interest s , 
to promote their economic viability and to 
ensure the accountability of  the inst itutions 
designed to serve them ;  
( c )  The positive intervention of Government to 
assist the rural poor in identifying and 
articulating their needs more effectively , in 
gaining access to  the agencies designed to 
serve them ,  in redressing their legitimate 
grievances and achieving their legit imate 
right s to part icipat ion in rural development ; 
(d)  Educat ion of  nat ional and local elite and the 
privileged sectors of  rural society towards 
a system of values , norms and behaviour which 
recognizes the imperat ive of strategies of  
rural development based on equity , growth and 
social j ust ice ; 
( e )  Orientat ion of the system of incentives and 
rewards of government personnel to ensure 
that they serve the rural poor ef fectively , 
and to enhance their commitment to that goal 
(ESCAP 19 76 ) . 
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To identify these inst itutional constraints which deal 
with the distribut ional aspects of rural development leads 
to quest ions regarding national level polit ical capacity and 
goals . 
Polit ical 
Polit ical constraints assume primary importance as we 
cons ider the dist ribut ional implicat ions of rural development 
policy . In the past , as analysts have focused s imply upon 
technology policy , or market-oriented economic policy , in 
which the main obj ect ive is increased agricultural product ion , 
they neglected to give adequate at tention to polit ical 
constraints . Attempts to alter institut ions which impede 
development innnediately bring one into direct contact with 
issues of national polit ical goals and capacity . Just as 
there are technological constraints to agricultural product ion 
so also are there polit ical constraints upon nat ional level 
decis ion-making and action . They are far more problemat ic 
and difficult to relax . 
(a) Risk averse polit ical behaviour . Rural development 
is a high risk venture . It involves high stakes , demands 
182 
cons iderab le investment , and requires recurring expenditures . 
Once the rural areas b ecome the focus of at tent ion , it  is 
pol it ically dangerous for the central government to reduce 
it s level of support for their cont inued development . Mo st 
LDC leaders are averse to the risks and uncertaint ies involved , 
part icularly where it means followin g development st rategies 
other than those which have proven success ful in indust rialized 
nat ion s .  They cont inue to allocate maximum resources to the 
modern sector , on the as sumpt ion that such investments  will 
generate the addit ional resources needed to develop the 
t radit ional sector at a later date . Frequently it is not 
really a ' trickle-down ' approach , but rather a calculated 
risk based on estimates of the level of tolerance of the 
rural poor (USAID 19 75 : 1-6 ) . 
(b)  The importance of  short-term gains . Polit ical 
leaders feel the need for quick results . But rural development 
frequently involves long-term investments in phys ical and 
social in frastructure . The changes sought are slow in coming 
about . The dilemma is that the absence o f  short-run gains 
which lead to increases in support in the rural sect or , 
part icularly among the rural poor , fails to compensate leaders 
for the predict able loss of support in the urban sector . 
Consequently LDC leaders are reluctant to init iate a maj or 
shift in resources away from the urban-industrial sector . 
( c) Uncertainties in the rural balance o f  power . Rural 
development involves a devolut ion of decision-making and is 
likely to alter the power of t radit ional leadership at all 
levels .  These shift s could affect the polit ical life o f  the 
count ry in a lasting way . Once within the polit ical arena , 
the rural poor will resist efforts  to dislodge them. 
Thereafter no polit ical party or interes t can afford not to 
reckon with them . In the long run the part icipat ion of the 
rural poor in nat ional polit ical life will st rengthen the 
polit ical system.  But in the  short run there are  considerable 
uncert aint ies for nat ional leaders . Thus it is not s imply 
a matter of a shift from a pro-urban bias to a pro-rural b ias 
as Lipton (19 7 7 )  suggest s . For the LDC leader it raises the 
quest ion o f  whether an increasing emphas is on the rural 
sector should for the sake of polit ical expediency be focused 
upon the rural well-to-do , or alternat ively upon the rural 
poor . 
(d)  Bureaucrat ic ineffect iveness and non-accountability . 
Once polit ical leaders have connnitted themselves and the ir 
count ries to rural development , they are confronted with 
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pro grams which arouse expectat ion s ,  but frequently do not 
produce results . Their ab ility to improve program performance 
is frequently limited by a conservat ive bureaucracy resistant 
to change , and tmresponsive to the rural poor in particular 
who lack the means to hold these bureaucracies accotmtable 
for ineffect ive behaviour . Much has been said about the 
failure to implement rural development . One o f  the most 
cogent statements is by Chamb ers in an import ant study of 
experience in Eas t Africa . In answering the quest ions ' What 
impedes implementat ion ? ' and ' How could implementat ion be 
improved ? ' , Chambers notes a series of  problems which appear 
especially prevalent and damaging at the lower levels of 
rural management . In their more pathological forms these 
are authoritarian management , wasteful meet ings , excessive 
report s ,  departmentalism, top-down target ry , inadequate 
resources ,  and ineffective work programming ( Chambers 19 74 : 
37-8) . 
The problems confronted by LDC leaders in seeking to 
avoid risks involved in rural development , in coping with 
ext remely complex and potent ially rapid shifts in polit ical 
power , and in facing up t o  the s ignificant challenge of the 
reform of  rural development adminis t ration , all raise quest ions 
about the capacity of LDC leaders t o  bring these changes 
about . In recogniz ing these polit ical constraint s the 
problem before donor agencies is how , if at all , they should 
or indeed can seek to contribut e const ruct ively to minimiz ing 
the negat ive effects of  these const raints upon rural 
development . 
It must be remembered , first , that while incen t ives 
through market forces are necessary , they are not sufficient 
to increase output . Where there is no new technology to be 
adopted , or where inst itut ional const raint s are b inding , 
incent ives alone can do lit tle to increase product ion (US 
Compt roller-General 19 75 : 110-1) . Incent ives play a role in 
encouraging farmers to take advan tage of profit able product ion 
opporttmit ies . But they cannot , in themselves , creat e the 
product ion potent ial . 
Second , policy�making must always be respons ive to 
various obj ect ives . The simple dictum ' more incent ives are 
always preferable ' is not enough . Food prices are a good 
example . Higher food prices provide more incentives to 
producers . But what about the poor?  Higher food prices 
;hurt poor people , - · a trade-off that cannot be ignored 
polit ically by policy-makers in LDCs . What is needed are 
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adequate product ion incent ives which , in turn , benefit 
consumers through larger supplies and reasonable pt.ices of 
basic foods . 
Third , the const raints to development discuss ed above 
are emb edded in a matrix of compet ing polit ical forces within 
every societ y .  Altering such things as prices , taxes , 
tariffs or exchange rates alters the balance between those 
who gain and those who lose , and consequent ly modifies the 
dist ribut ion of power within the society among the compet ing 
groups . Any government which seeks to alter its policy on 
these mat ters mus t carefully assess the t rade-of fs involved . 
Donors cannot ignore such policy considerat ion when seeking 
to proffer solut ions in the form of  programs and proj ect s .  
Finally , i f  they are t o  survive , LDC governments have 
to be concerned with both product ion and equity . This implies 
a rej ect ion of earlier ' t rickle-down ' strategies . The view 
that the key to the development process is the t rans fer of 
capital from large t radit ional agricultural sectors to small 
but growing indust rial sectors has given way to agricultural 
and rural development policies which stress the need for a 
dual strategy reflect ing both growth and equity . The j oint 
st ress on growth and equity also is neces sary in view of  the 
ext reme d ifficulty in t rying to impl ement redistribut ive 
policies in the ab sence of product ivity gains . 
Do we know how? 
There is an assumpt ion which runs through much of  the 
rural development literature that has remained largely 
unchallenged , with few except ions such as that o f  Paddock and 
Paddock ( 19 7 3) . It is , s imply put , that we do know how to 
bring about the types o f  social , economic and polit ical 
changes associated with rural development . After several 
decades of experience , much of it ill-digest ed , how certain 
is our knowl edge ? How confident  should we be about our 
ab ility to design and implement programs and proj ect s which 
will remove the exist ing constraints to rural development and 
improve the condit ions of l ife in rural areas , part icularly 
for those l iving in abj ect poverty ? 
The agricultural sciences can specify the opt imum amount 
o f  water , fertilizer and pest icides required for a given 
variety of seed , in a part icular soil type and environment , 
and attach reasonab ly precise probability figures to a likely 
range of yields . But as we move away from the subj ect matter 
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of the agricultural sciences , and int o  the social sciences , 
part icularly those other than economics , our knowledge 
becomes far less certain . 
In how many cases are we able to specify intervent ions 
aimed at altering a set of inst itut ional and behavioural 
condit ions , within a specific geographic and cultural 
location , and make a realist ic assessment of the set of 
out comes relat ed to a part icular policy choice ? There are 
wide gaps in our tmderstanding . These gaps affect the degree 
of cert ainty with which proposed act ions can be specified . 
Ad hoe intuit ive criteria continue to dominate  most areas of 
social development policy . They involve the expenditure of 
large sums , influence the fate of  millions , and entail high 
risks generating dis content . 
We lack effect ive methodologies for evaluat ing ongoing 
rural development programs . Evaluat ion systems are only now 
being developed and of  ten lack the capacity to assess the 
types of so cial benefit s most  directly related to the 
problems of poverty (Fox n . d . ) .  In her excellent introduct ion 
to evaluat ion research , Carol Weiss captures the interplay 
between design , implementat ion , and evaluat ion problems in 
poverty-oriented programs within the USA. She stresses the 
urgent need for knowledge where planned social intervent ion 
is involved .  
Social intervent ion i s  plagued with a series of 
important (but not necessarily insurmotmtab le) 
short comings . One is the state  o f  social science 
knowledge . Programs based on intuit ive wisdom 
and ext rapolat ions from past  experiences are not 
good enough . Important theoret ical and research 
contribut ions are due . Even with the present 
state  of knowledge , programs do not put int o  
pract ice all that i s  known . Most  programs are 
born with roots in exist ing agencies , t radit ional 
profes s ions , established procedural arrangements . 
Rather than innovat ive programming ,  there is 
t inkering with the mixture as before . Moreover , 
programs are o ften poorly managed . There has 
b een insufficient at tent ion in many fields t o  
developing the kinds o f  administrat ive skills that 
lead to opt imal use of t ime and t alent . The 
st ructure of programs , too , has often b een 
deficient . Fragmentary proj ect s are created to 
deal with broad-spectrum problems . Each program 
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t ackles one facet of  a complex , int errelated 
issue , not only uncoordinated with complementary 
effort s but o ften compet ing and j ockeying for 
power and prestige 
Much remains to be done to improve social 
pro grannning .  Many moderate , piecemeal , cheap 
solut ions have b een tried , and evaluat ion research 
has found them want in g .  If we take evaluat ion 
results  seriously , we will have to embark on more 
fundamental social experimentation .  Social 
inst itut ions will have to take greater risks in 
the search fo r effect ive pro grams (Weiss 19 72 : 12 8) . 
The absence of effect ive connnun icat ion and exchange of 
knowledge between those conduct ing poverty-oriented research 
and act ion programs in developed count ries such as the USA 
and the UK and their counterparts in LDCs con cerned with 
rural development is unfortunate , since the problems of the 
poor in both set t ings bear marked similarit ies . 
The role o f  donors 
Dis cuss ions of  the intent ions of donors are relat ively 
rare . This is un fortunate .  A clarity of purpose should 
exist and inform the act ions and expectat ions of both donors 
and recipient s alike . Where public awareness of these 
intent ions is absent or where attempts  are made to prof fer 
the inconsequent ial in place of the significant , self­
delus ion and disillusionment rapidly ensue . The donors ' 
role in rural development frequently is supported by at 
least three set s of j ustificat ions . 
The first and most  frequently s t ressed reason is human­
itarian . It is widely used to evoke broad-b ased pub lic 
support within donor count ries , by presenting aid as a 
dis interested nat ional act of compassion to those in dire 
need . Such mot ives are to be connnended .  But within 
recipient countries , cont inued stress on humanitarian 
purposes by donors gives rise to what might b e  t ermed the 
' anti-begging bowl respon se ' .  In effect LDCs feel obliged 
to square nat ional dignity with seemin g perpetual dependence 
upon external ass istance . It is a delicate mat ter , with 
substantial counter-product ive potent ial , part icularly when 
applied to rural development assistance . 
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The second reason given for ass istance is economic . An 
economically st rengthened recip ient cotmtry can potent ially 
be a vigorous and act ive t rading partner with the donor 
country across a range of commodit ies : indeed most  people 
would agree that if aid can be said to have a logical 
evolut ionary form, it should be in the growth of t rade 
relat ionships . But the snail ' s  pace at which the UNCTAD 
discuss ions have progressed , and the acrimonious debate in 
the inappropriately named North-South Dialogues have led many 
crit ics of aid to give greater weight to other more specific 
economic reasons for aid . These include ( i) developing 
sources for the purchase of raw materials required by donor 
country indus t ries ; ( ii)  develop ing markets for the sale of 
dono r country manufactured goods ; and ( iii) creat ing 
condit ions for the disposal of agr icultural surpluses created 
within donor cotmtries . A comparable set o f  risks attend 
the interpretat ion of intent here as well . 
The third set o f  reasons lie in the realm of inter­
nat ional relat ions and diplomacy . Economic development is 
widely believed to con tribute to nat ional stab ility in LDCs 
and ass istance is therefo re seen as the cont ribut ion to a 
stable internat ional order . Closely related is the potent ial 
of aid to contribute to friendly regimes , wherein goodwill 
accrues to the donor . Past evidence suggests that little 
weight should be given to this by donors . Other uses of 
ass istance in the area o f  int ernat ional relat ions and diplomacy 
( or the withholding of assistance such as in the case of the 
Allende regime in Ch ile)  are well known , and need no further 
elaborat ion . 
In whatever comb inat ion of humanitarian , economic and 
diplomatic reasons aid may be given by the donor ,  aid has an 
impact upon the internal polit ical system of the recipient 
cotmt ry (Haq 19 7 6 : 76 ) . Humanitarian , economic and diplomat ic 
mot ives merge . The sophist ry whereby aid which is in support 
o f  (or which otherwise does not disrup t )  the status quo in 
a count ry is seen as ' non-polit ical ' ,  while aid which seeks 
t o  support alterations of  t he status quo is seen as ' polit ical 
intervent ion ' ,  is at b est  self-deluding and intellectually 
misleadin g .  No donor , not even the World Bank , has unlimited 
resources .  A finite quantity o f  assistance reaches and 
ben ef it s a limited number of people and thus plays a part 
in shaping the syst ems of product ion and dist ribut ion within 
a count ry - a directly polit ical act . This very important 
point mus t  be clearly recognized , and a part icular assistance 
program assessed in this light . Their clear realizat ion of 
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these considerat ions lie beyind many of  the otherwise 
inexplicable decis ions and act ions of  recipient countries . 
Thus a crit ical set of  choices for a donor committed to the 
support of a poverty oriented strategy of rural development , 
involve identifying programs and proj ects mutually accept ab le 
to both recipient and donor . 
But who will b e  the b eneficiaries from a change in the 
st atus quo ? The donor needs to assess this quest ion explicitly 
and to be ever mindful of the fact that the ult imat e purpos e  
of  development i s  an improvement in the human condit ion , in 
the lives o f  people . Both a new sys tem of  bas ic rural 
educat ion and a hydro-electric dam have an impact upon people , 
though the nature of that impact will vary cons iderab ly .  
The resources used in one proj ect must also be assessed in 
terms of  foregone opportunit ies in other areas . Therefore 
a clarity of purpose is essent ial for the donor .  
The emergence o f  poverty-oriented strategies o f  rural 
development make reco gnit ion of its polit ical potent ial 
imperative , and the role of giving as sistance more complex . 
Poverty,  both urban and rural , has both absolute as well as 
relat ive d imensions . To bring the condit ions of living of 
a subset of the rural populat ion up to some minimum acceptable 
threshold of income , nutrit ion , health or whatever also 
implies an alterat ion in their relat ionship to the remainder 
of society - a change in the system of so cial s t rat if icat ion 
and power . The challenges to the donor in part icipat in g  in 
this process are substant ial , and clearly will vary markedly 
across count ries and regimes . 
The past history of rural development programs suggest s  
pit falls for the donor .  In dis cuss ions with a caut ious , 
conservat ive LDC leadership ' technical experts '  have b een 
known to ' oversell ' possible programs , o ften assisted in 
this task by interested internal minist ries or department s .  
The danger here lies in the promot ion o f  a panacea , a cure­
all which if adopted will supposedly make all other hard 
choices tmnecessary . As one rural development analyst has 
noted : ' The most serious crit icism • • .  of  the modern [ seed ] 
variet ies is that for at least a generat ion most Goveillments 
felt the green revolut ion would solve all their rural 
development problems and it consequently dis couraged • . •  
[the in it iat ion of  other]  programs t o  help the poorest 
villagers ' ( Coll ier 197 7 ) . The history of rural development 
pro grams is replete with these s :ingle factor solut ions which 
held out a promise of avoiding difficult and unpleasant 
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choices . At present it is now fashionab le t o  ' sell ' all 
manner o f  programs on the bas is o f  their ability to alter 
income distribut ion and aid ' the poorest of  the poor ' .  Our 
knowledge of what to do in a given situat ion is at best  
imperfect . More often than not , as  noted earlier , we do  not 
know how t o  help the poor . 
A second problem arises from the pract ice of  ' pushing 
money ' .  Most  forms of development ass istance are complicated 
and laborious , but rural development is part icularly so . It 
requires long-term adapt ive agricultural research , the 
creat ion of new inst itut ions , and the alterat ion of  individual 
and group values and behaviour - all of which are t ime-consuming 
and subj ect to alternat ing periods of act ion and inact ion . 
But LDC minist ries and donor count ry aid agencies operate on 
fixed annual budget cycles , where the failure t o  use 
appropriat ions can result in their sub sequent reduct ion . 
The con sequences o f  ' pushing money ' for poverty-oriented 
rural development programs can b e  most  unfortunate . 
Standard AID or LDC pressures t o  move money 
smoothly and within predetermined and relat ively 
short t ime periods can be expected to result in 
proj ect goal displacement toward more easily 
achieved result s ,  generally moving from the non­
part icipat ing rural poor up the income scale to 
those who have a high absorpt ive capacity already 
and who often can proceed effectively without 
many element s of the AID-supported program 
(U SAID 1965 : 2 1) . 
A third problem which limits the effect iveness of aid 
agencies in cont ribut ing to poverty-oriented rural development 
arises from practices which they themselves have adopt ed of 
using narrow economic growth criteria for proj ect select ion , 
design and evaluat ion ( Dorner 1975 : 6 3-4 ) . Aid given on the 
basis of these criteria usually works count er to the needs 
of the mass of the people at the bot tom of the present 
income distribut ion pyramid . Such pract ices should be 
abandoned . In calculations determining p roj ect select ion 
the benefit s accruing t o  the poor should be weighted more 
heavily , and ' social bene fit s '  should be more ef fect ively 
assessed . 
What is t o  be done ? 
Given the problems which confront aid donors , and the 
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p it falls which beset ass ist ance to poverty-oriented rural 
development programs in part icular , what role should nat ional 
aid programs seek to play in the next decade or longer ? 
The provis ion of bilateral as sistance programs (one of  
the ' classic ' roles direct ly played by  nat ional donors in the 
past ) is likely to be less feasible in the coming decade . 
Large-scale capital as sistance will increas ingly be provided 
through the World Bank , the regional development banks such 
as the ADB , and perhaps the capital as sistance prog�ams of 
the OPEC nat ions . Individual nations will cont inue t o  gain 
a seat at the deci sion-making table through their part icipat ion 
in var ious country consort ia , and in mult ilateral agencies 
such as the CGIAR. 
Providing operat ing p ersonnel , the second classic  role 
of donors , is likely to decline within the several LDCs in 
As ia in the coming decade , as the supply o f  t rained pro­
fess ionals available within these countries increases . In 
addit ion , the emphas is upon ' indigenous solut ions ' and 
' appropriate technology ' will contribute  to a decrease in 
demand for those whos e  experience is derived exclusively 
from developed country s ituat ions . 
There are , however , several roles which b ilateral 
donors will be increasingly called upon to play . These 
involve both new act ivit ies as well as adaptat ions in earlier 
patterns of  support . The first of  thes e  is support for the 
development of local professional competence within LDCs to 
address the complex problems of rural development . LDCs 
are placing increas ing st ress upon s elf-reliance in government 
agencies , research ins t itutes and t raining inst itut ions 
( including but not limited to tert iary level inst itut ions ) .  
There will be more quest ioning of  the appropriateness to the 
LDC ' s  problems of  dono r agencies ' home count ry t raining 
pro grams . As a con sequence , sustained efforts at building 
inst itut ions wit hin the LDCs will be required . Count ries 
such as India and the Philippines are at one end of  the 
inst it ut ional development spect rum, while Nepal and Indonesia 
are at the other end .  In a number of  cases , however ,  such 
an effort will have to ext end ove r s everal decades , so that 
the need for innovat ive t raining programs within the inst it­
ut ions of DCs will not yet be reduced . Aid agency support 
for such programs is likely to be required for quite some 
t ime . 
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The search for new knowledge is the second area of rural 
development assistance within which bilateral aid programs 
can ext end suppo rt . Donor support for experimental programs 
aimed at improving the capacity to carry out poverty-oriented 
rural development programs is especially needed . The 
difficul t ies encountered by rural development programs in 
the past decades have underscored the inappropriateness of 
mo�els drawn from the experience of  the developed western 
nations . As the expert ise within LDCs increases , a useful 
mode of ass istance will b e  the j oint e ffort of LDC and DC 
specialis t s  in ' co-operat ive problem solving ' in the design 
of  programs and proj ect s . This is already taking place , 
and in a number of  cases with good effect . But it is far 
too l imited in extent . The ins t itut ional locat ion (whether 
in a DC or LDC) will vary depending upon the nature of 
problems addressed , and whether proximity to an ' act ion 
set t ing ' is necessary . The obj ect ives are both the generat ion 
of  new knowledge and the reinforcement of LDC professional 
capacity . 
In o rder to discharge effect ively these t raining and 
knowledge building roles , the donor count ry must have access 
to  a body of  expertise within its own country , willing and 
able to  devote long-term career pat terns to such goals . In 
some countries , such as the USA, that pool of available 
expert ise is rapidly declining owing to other unrelated 
changes , but a considerable resource cont inues to be 
availab le . In other countries , a task for their donor 
agencies will be to devise the means to enlarge such a pool 
of expert ise and improve the inst itut ional relat ionships 
required to sustain it (Hardaker 19 7 7 ) . 
Conclusion 
The role of b ilateral ass istance for rural development 
suggested here s tresses the importance o f  recogniz ing it s 
fundamentally polit ical nature . It emphas ises the integrated 
nature of rural development act ivity and the need to recognize 
the linkages between technological , market-oriented , 
inst itut ional and political constraints . It stresses the 
importance of their j oint cons iderat ion in both research and 
program development , if the goals of growth and equity are 
to be tackled effect ively . Further it places primary emphas is 
upon assisting LDCs to become more self-reliant , through 
enabling them to develop the necessary profess ional competence , 
inst itut ions and knowledge so that they can direct their own 
programs of planned social , economic and polit ical change 
successfully . 
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There is one f inal caution to b e  ut tered . As Haq has 
pointed out , while few LDC leaders can af ford not to pay at 
least some lip s ervice to pro grams which make a direct 
at tack upon poverty , st ill the rest ructuring of polit ical 
and economic power which is necessary for such a program has 
hardly b egmi in most  developing comitries . He goes on t o  
remind donors that they risk disappointment : 
Th e most ardent support ers o f  poverty alleviat ion 
programs at present are generally the aid-giving 
agencies , but , with the b est  will in the world , 
their role in fashioning and implement ing new 
development st rategies can only be marginal and 
not very decis ive ( 19 76 : 10) . 
Chapter 9 
Forms of aid : aid to the rural secto r  
R . T .  Shand 
Rural aid programs , these days , are expect ed to blend 
in closely as components of nat ional rural development 
programs o f  less developed count ries , and attent ion of  donors 
and recipient s is concentrated on the appropriate select ion 
of these components , and on the problems of effect ive 
implement at ion . Despite the accumulated experience of aid 
over the past quarter century and more , achievements have b een 
b een s carcely sat is factory . In this survey it is  argued that 
there are , amongst others , two maj or reasons for the short­
comings o f  aid performance : first , that obj ect ives of 
rural development are seldom spelled out in a form definite 
enough to provide a basis for detailed policy fo rmulat ion , 
and second , that it is only rarely that the strategy opt ions 
for rural development available to the policy-maker to 
achieve these obj ect ives are clearly set out and evaluat ed . 
The problems of  identifying obj ectives and determining 
priorit ies is admittedly dif ficult . Obj ect ives vary from 
count ry to count ry and may change over t ime , but it can be 
argued that closer specificat ion than now occurs is possible 
and necessary . It might also be argued that the range of 
condition s within rural sectors o f  the Third World is so 
great as to deny the possib ility of  a s imple classificat ion 
of  strategy options for the development process and the 
feasib ility of comparing these alternatives . The reverse is 
contended here : that in fact there are only a limited numb er 
of comb inat ions of broad st rategy opt ion s  available for the 
development of rural sectors , that these are amenable to a 
useful degree of quant itat ive evaluat ion to ass ist the process 
of  choice , and that these strategies and evaluat ion procedures 
are bas ic to an understanding of possib il it ies · for aid to the 
rural sector . 
This study attempt s to ident ify and explore these 
st rategies and their implicat ions for aid programs . It will 
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seek to ident ify their key characteristics and component s ,  
relate them t o  the var ious obj ect ives of development policy , 
cons ider their suitability for aid programs and proj ect s and 
examine their contribut ion in recent y ears in Aust ralia ' s  
proj ect aid expenditures . 
Obj ect ives and rural development 
For mo st of  the period since World War I I , rural policy­
makers have b een almo st exclus ively concerned with growth o r  
growth-related obj ect ives . Spurred by high populat ion growth 
rates and the desire for higher l iving standards , there was 
a s t rong drive for maximiz ing the rate of growth of sector al 
output and income , often with only superficial cons iderat ion 
o f  the spread of b ene fit s within the sector . Given the 
shortage of foreign exchange prevalent in this period , alter­
native policies were also evaluat ed and j udged in t erms of 
their l ikely impact on the balance of  payment s  through export 
expansion o r  impo rt sub st itut ion . The planners ' approach 
to the rural sector t ended to be sectoral and aggregate . 
From the viewpo int of  aid , this preoccupat ion with growth 
impl ied a s imple process for evaluation of alternat ives . 
Di scussion thus centred not on what was to be achieved b ut 
rather how b es t  to achieve it and on the l imit s to and 
const raints on effect ive rural aid programs . Disput e was 
concentrated on quest ions such as the relat ive merits o f  
mult ilateral and b ilateral mechanisms , commodity versus 
financial ass istance , the appropriate mix o f  f inance ,  
t echnology and t raining , and whether program o r  proj ect aid 
was preferable . 
Retz laff observes in another contrib ut ion to this 
monograph · (p . 168) that experimentat ion with a ·variety of 
strat egies , programs and proj ect s  has not produced ' the 
des ired comprehens ive t rans format ion of the rural sector ' .  
Two connnent s  are worth making on this failure . First , 
development planners in a great many l es s  developed countries , 
part icularly in the early years after World War II , did not 
give a high priority to the rural sector . Second , ·even when 
and wh ere they did ,  it was of t en nominal only . .Thus , under 
development pol icies that promoted the rural sector as a 
source of  capital and cheap labour , of  low cost  raw materials 
for indust ry and final p roduct s for the urban consumer , ! 
1Michael Lipton ( 19 7 7 )  argues forcefully that resource allo-
cation in less developed countries is urpan b iased , reflect ing 
the power , art iculateness and organizat ion o f  urban int erest s .  
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condit ions were s imply not conducive to high returns from 
rural aid expenditures . In recent years two important shifts 
in policy emphas is have t aken place among planners . First , 
greater emphasis has b een given to the role of the rural 
sector in overall development plannin g .  This was born part ly 
of  disappointment with the indust rial , urban-based , lead 
sector approach , partly of recognit ion of the necess ity t o  
at�end to the most  pressing problems o f  rural poverty and 
unemployment , and partly of opt imism that the sector is in 
fact capable o f  achieving a fast growth rat e ,  which if 
b roadly based and sustained can st imulate faster growth rates 
for the economy as a whole . This  has creat ed a more favourable 
climate of policy for the rural sector and thus for aid 
programs as well . 
Second , the obj ectives of rural policy have broadened . 
To the original sectoral growth rate/balance of  payments  
orient ation have been added goals of greater dist ribut ive 
j ust ice in rural incomes and o f  rural employment generat ion . 
There is also a greater awar eness that past pol icies have 
bestowed benefit s  o f  growth unevenly within the rural sector 
and have frequently widened the var ious regional , occupat ional 
or farm s ize group gaps in l iving standards . Whilst this 
broader interpretat ion of obj ect ives of rural development is 
welcome , it makes the task of  achievement more complex . 
Difficult ies are apparent  in determining acceptable def init ions 
of the new aims and in establishing priorit ies among them .  
Definit ion has been part icularly elus ive f o r  the obj ect ive o f  
an equitable dis t ribut ion of  rural incomes . I s  greater 
equality to be achieved by redistribut ive measures , for 
example , by land reform ,  or only through pol icies that 
determine the dist ribution of year-to-year increments  to 
rural income , or are both sets of measures to be used ? 
Again , given that obj ect ives other than high sectoral growth 
rates . are to be satis f ied , and that t rade-of f s  are required , 
what l evel of sacrifice in the rate of  growth is acceptable 
on these grounds and where will the sacrifices b e  made ? It 
is only when such quest ions are resolved that realist ic polic ies 
can be explic itly formulated both for the nat ional ef fort and 
for the aid contribut ion . 
It i s  clear though , that given this reorientat ion of 
obj ect ives , there is a need to reassess the potent ial of 
available strategies to det ermine their potent ialities in 
relat ion to these obj ect ives . 
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Strategies of rural development 
The range of types of rural development st rategies 
available to a less developed country are det ermined , on one 
hand , by the local populat ion/resource relat ionship , and on 
the other by direct or indirect market linkages with the 
materially and technologically advanced soc iet ies of the 
developed economies .  
Trade exchanges between Wes tern Europe on one hand and 
Asia , Americas , Africa and the Pacific on the other , were 
init ially rest ricted to a few high value goods { spices , 
palm o il , etc .  among agricultural product s ) , but expanded as 
the pace of industrial izat ion quickened in the course of  the 
colonial period . Agricultural product ion for such exchange 
in the colonies became more organiz ed to meet European demand . 
This was init ially achieved in two ways : ( i) through fuller 
employment of resources then available to indigenous 
conununities ; and ( ii)  through land settlement . 
It was also during the colonial period that , in Western 
Europe , a third key process conunenced - that of the applicat ion 
of sc ientific method to agricultural production through 
experimental research . These three processes , available as 
opt ions in various combinat ions , provide the basic strategies 
fo r rural development in the Third World t oday . Precisely 
which are available as opt ions to part icular countries depends 
upon their natural resource endowments  and upon the historical 
t iming and nature of their linkages with the more advanced 
economies . 
Various aspects or these linkages will be discussed 
below , but the one that requires special general ment ion is 
the consequence of contact upon the size and growth rate of  
populat ion in Third World countries . Demographic ·factors , 
more than any other in recent years , have condit ioned 
att itudes towards choice of  development strategies . Given 
the magn itude of the problem o f  populat ion pressure current 
and in prospect in South As ia , China and in Java , this is 
unders tandable , but it  has served to divert att ention from 
the fact that the range o f  strategy opt ions for most 
developing count ries is st il l  wide and is determined not only 
by demographic considerat ions . 
St rat egy I :  enlargement of the exchange economy 
European explorers , t raders and colon izers found the 
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out side world in widely varying condit ions of  material well­
being and sophist icat ion . At one ext �eme were the highly 
spec ialized occupat ional structures of South and East As ian 
communit i es producing a wide range of goods and services for 
sbbsistence and for t rade within long established exchange 
networks . At the other were the sub s istence-oriented 
economies of Africa , Southeast As ia and the Pacific in which 
product ion for exchange was of negl igible or relat ively minor 
signif icance . The important characterist ic of the latter 
commun i ties was the availab ility of unexploited resources ,  
both o f  land and labour . Given an adequate st imulus or 
incent ive , these reserves could be tapped . Individual 
producers raised total product ion either with addit ional 
output of one or more commodit ies produced trad it ionally 
(e . g . palm o il in West  Africa) or introduced for the purpose 
(e . g . commercial rubber in Southeast As ia) . 
The cruc ial components  of this st rategy were ( i )  the 
select ion of producer tmit s  with a capacity to respond to new 
economic incentives with production of a marketable surplus , 
( ii)  select ion of commodit ies and product ion technologies 
suited to the area concerned and with an export demand , and 
( iii)  establishment of  effect ive market linkage through 
creation of infrast ructure and provis ion of appropriate 
t ransport , processing and market ing services , both for those 
commodit ies exported and those imported as in cent ive goods . 2 
In colonial t imes , this was never recognized formally 
as a development strategy . The init iat ive for encouraging 
such addit ional product ion was somet imes taken up for private 
gain by traders , somet imes for revenue purposes by colonial 
governments or for higher mot ives by some missionaries . It 
was apparently not until comparat ively recently that govern­
ments assumed prime responsib ility for planning rural 
development with substant ial f inanc ial backing , so that it 
could be said to have emerged as a dis t inct strategy . 
The extent to which colon ial governments depended on 
this strategy varied greatly . For tropical Afr ica , Lord 
2The scope for product ion expans ion of this type has b een 
studied extens ively at the theoret ical and empirical levels 
in recent years in the Research School of Pac ific Studies 
of the Austral ian Nat ional Univers ity (by Fisk , Shand and 
others )  in relat ion to the Southeast As ian and Pacific 
regions ; by G . K .  Helleiner et a l . in relat ion to Africa , and 
generally by H.  Myint ( 19 65 ) in his ' vent for surplus ' model . 
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Hailey ( 19 4 5 )  reviewed three alternat ive approaches used for 
resource development : 3 ( i) in some areas  progress seemed 
mo st likely to be achieved through large-scale land alienat ion 
to expatriate Europeans , for example in Kenya , Nyasaland and 
Northern Rhodesia ; ( ii)  in cases where there was a large 
indigenous population (and /or the climate was unfavourable ) , 
output of  local produce was best stimulated by effic ient 
market ing by European entrepreneurs granted monopolies for 
the purpose . This was the pat tern , for example , in French 
and Belgian equatorial territories , and mo st German colonies 
in Afr ica ; ( iii) in s t ill o ther colonies economic consider­
ations , and a policy of recogniz ing indigenous land rights ,  
led to the encouragement o f  peasant  product ion . It  was , 
however ,  exceptional for primary emphasis to be placed on 
indigenous development ,  as it did occur in Burma , Ivory 
Coast , Ghana and other Brit ish Wes t  African colonies . 
Even where expansion of  peasant production was the 
dominant s trategy ,  it was rarely applied in a manner that 
would maximize the rate of advance of smallholders , nor meet 
all their development needs . Where polic ies encouraged 
mixed strategies of encouraging both p easant and European 
development of  resources , efforts of ten tended to be 
concentrated in and around European enclaves of  land 
settlement , mining , etc . Resources for public investment 
were typically l imited , particularly b efore World War I I , 
and efforts to encourage peasant product ion tended to be 
concentrated where resource endowments  were rich and the 
development potential p romised a substant ial marketable 
surplus . Further , public investment tended to flow to those 
areas which had a longer colonial history in which surpluses 
had already b een built up . Remoteness , small populat ions , 
problems of  access , low init ial resource product ivity , 
discouraged the colonial effort . For example , the small 
isolated island populat ions o f  the Western Pacific made 
Britain a reluctant and relat ively late colonial power in 
that area ( Scarr 196 7 ) . Exploitat ion of resources and 
encouragement of  local development initiat ives were poorly 
o rgan ized and financed . and b elated compared with areas in 
South and Southeast As ia which were more favourably located 
and endowed . 
The historical process o f  market linkage was mos t  uneven 
and select ive . Thus although it can be said t o  have 
3Espec ially sec t ions on ' The S tate and the Land ' .  See also 
P im ( 1940 : 11-2 ) . 
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commenced more than four centuries ago , it was s t ill pos s ible 
in the 19 30s for explorers to penetrate a hitherto isolated 
area in the highlands of  New Guinea with a populat ion not far 
short of  one million . New contact s are rare now and are with 
small communit ies . More relevant currently are the weaknesses 
of  these past contacts ,  in terms of the limited nature of the 
infrastructure created . Whilst there are few communities now 
still totally isolated from the global market economy , for 
large numbers the l inkage cos t s  are high and the economic 
incent ives for participat ion in it are correspondingly low. 
With independence , nat ional governments  had to face the 
task of extending market l inkages to areas and communit ies 
largely or wholly ignored in the colonial phase and of  
improving weak market linkages in order to raise the level 
o f  in come incentives to disadvantaged areas or groups . This 
strategy s t ill competes strongly for resources in most parts 
of the Third World , particularly in Africa . Even in India , 
a country relat ively well served with t ransport and market ing 
in frastructure , there are st ill some hill areas and remote 
tribal communities wit h  high cost market l inkages . Many parts 
of  the Outer Islands of  Indones ia lack infrastructure of port 
facilit ies and rural main and feeder road systems . In Papua 
New Guinea , this s t rategy absorbed the maj ority of public 
investment funds allocated to the rural sector from the end 
of  World War II until Independence .  Expenditures since 
Independence show a prolongation of  this strategy and indeed 
some expans ion . 
The pot ential contribut ion o f  this s trategy of  enlarging 
the exchange economy to nat ional obj ectives of  rural 
development relates to its impact on rural income growth and 
dis trib.ut ion through expansion of  output and employment . In 
terms of  output and income expansion , the impact depends upon 
the strength of the economic incent ive provided through new 
and improved market linkages , the resources available to 
individual producers and the numb ers o f  producers affected . 
The benefit / cost  rat ios for this s trategy have b een high at 
t imes with impres sive expansion of output . This seems to b e  
the case in the Papua New Guin ea highlands . But equally there 
are many areas in which the ben efit / cost  rat io can be 
expected to be low for any of a number o f  reasons , for 
example where market linkages are with small isolated 
commun it ies , where an expanding populat ion is already press ing 
heavily on a limited resource base , and where the infrastructure 
cos t s  of providing market access are high . This would be the 
case in many development programs for hill areas in Third 
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World countries . The distributional effects of  this strategy 
are typically favourable in that they promote development in 
backward regions , notably among hill farmers and in tribal 
areas . Its impact on employment ,  however ,  is restricted . It 
leads principally to the greater ut ilizat ion of  exist ing on­
f arm labour resources , though some opportunit ies are created 
with the development of local t ransport and market ing 
facilities and t rading oppo rtunit ies . 
Given the limited progress in infrastructure development 
made during the colonial perio d ,  and the typically restricted 
public revenues available after independence in most  less 
developed count ries , it is not surpris ing that this st rategy 
has b een of maj or importance in internat ional p rograms of  aid 
to the rural sector . It has b een prominent mult ilaterally 
through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP ) , 
Internat ional Development As sociat ion ( IDA) and Internat ional 
Bank for Recons truct ion and Development ( IBRD) loans for 
early-stage development .  It  has also b een a feature of 
b ilateral loan programs . Analysis of  recent Aust ralian aid 
shows that of total accumulated expendit ures on proj ect s  that 
were on-going in 19 7 7-78 , it  absorbed $A64 million or 54 per 
cent  (Table 1 ) . Of this , Southeast  Asia received 90 per cent  
and the Pacific Islands 9 per  cent . Indonesia alone was 
allo cated about 40 per cent and another 2 6 per cent  went to 
the Philippines .  Important items were $14 mill ion on road 
development (West Kalimantan Province) and $ 1 3  million on 
railway upgrading in Indones ia , and,  in the Philippines ,  an 
integrated program of  road and agricultural resource 
development ( $ 1 3  million ) . 
St rategy II : extending the land front ier 
Historically , land settlement was the second source o f  
growth o f  agricultural output during the colonial period . 
This st rategy is made pos sible by the geographically uneven 
distribut ion of  population and the opportunit ies thus created 
for explo itation of unut ilized land . The dist inction between 
St rategies I and II is that , in the former , the populat ion is 
already located , while in the lat ter it has to move . The 
shift in populat ion covers many forms , ranging from voluntary 
unas sisted migration of communit ies or individuals to formal , 
government-organized settlement schemes . 
In colonial t imes , the frontier was typically extended 
by expatriate private enterprise ,  using imported capital , 
technology , management and even labour , and was organized as 
Tab le 1 
Total Aus tralian aid expenditure on on-goin g  proj ect s 
under Strategy I to 19 7 7-78 
Country 
Bangladesh 
Burma 
Cook Islands 
Fij i 
Gilbert Islands 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
New Hebrides 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
Solomon Islands 
Thailand 
Tonga 
Tuvalu 
W .  Samoa 
Total 
Amount ( $A ' OOO) 
30 
2 , 405 
2 89 
60 
313 
2 5 , 46 3  
4 , 615 
9 7  
596  
16 , 302 
1 , 092 
8 , 12 7  
2 7  
100 
4 , 766  
64 , 2 82 
Source : Aust ralian Development As sistBJice Bureau 
(ADAB ) , 197 8 .  
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large-s cale estate unit s . The role o f  the pub lic sector was 
rest ricted to the provis ion o f  t ransport and market ing 
infrast ructure such as port facilit ies , roads and railways . 
In many places even this involvement was limited and these 
enclaves of  foreign enterprise were virtually self-sufficient . 
Resettlement o f  smallholders was not generally a feature 
of agricultural policy in colonial t imes . There were instances 
of voluntary and large-scale migrat ion and resettlement in 
some count ries , for example in Burma (Richter 1969 : 144-6) , 
but this was comparat ively rare . Formal , government-sponsored 
settlement schemes were as unconunon , largely b ecause colonial 
administ rations did not have the finance for the heavy 
inves tments required . 4 After independence , the extension of 
cult ivat ion under the old estate  sys tem was unacceptable to 
4The Gezira scheme in the Anglo-Egypt ian Sud� was . a notable 
example . 
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many ex-colonies and in some the existing estates were 
expropriated or at least discouraged from expanding . 
New nat ional government s  had , however , l ittle o r  no 
experience in organiz ing settlement schemes based on small­
holders . Consequently this land set tlement st rategy has been 
in a state of flux during the past two decades , as var ious 
alternat ives have been t ried out . Voluntary or part ially 
ass isted migrat ion schemes were at tract ive to government for 
their relat ively low cost  in terms of public investment but 
many have generated neither a sub stant ial flow of would-be 
set tlers , nor a significant and sustained expansion o f  
product ion in the settlement areas . At t imes thes e  have b een 
promoted with the purpos e  o f  relieving populat ion pressures 
elsewhere . This can be success ful where small numbers are 
involved but not where pres sures are on a large scale , as 
for example in Java . Additionally , expected and actual 
incomes in settlement areas n eed to be substant ially higher 
than those in home areas to count erbalance the private social 
and economic costs  of migrat ion . 
For some perennial crops such as tea or o il palm there 
are substantial economies of scale , particularly in proces s ing 
under exist ing technologies . The challenge has b een to 
evolve product ion organizat ion on a large scale with small­
holder schemes that will retain these economies . 5 
There are some examples of  schemes with large-scale 
processing unit s drawing their supplies solely from smallholder 
unit s . Some have been success ful , such as the Kenya Tea 
Development (KTDA) settlements  and the Malaysian Felda 
Schemes . Others have b een t roubled by problems of ensuring 
con t inuity of supplies for processing from smallholders . 
The ' nucleus estate ' concept is an intermediary type designed 
to t ackle this problem . In such s chemes large-scale 
pro cessing unit s  are supplied both b y  an estate , usually 
5Malaysia appears to have shown the most init iative of  any 
country in experiments with public sector land development 
schemes . This commenced in 1955 with recommendat ions for a 
Federal Land Development Authority , and by 19 70 there were 
1 , 090 schemes on peninsular Malaysia . These ranged from 
Felda Schemes , planned by a specialized nat ional agency , in 
which all development co st s  are fully financed by government , 
to Unsubsidized Schemes in which proj ect s are financed almost 
ent irely by part icipants .  For an important analysis of  these 
types see Lim Sow Ching , 197 6 . 
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expat riate-managed at least init ially , that assures continuity 
of supply of a large proport ion of total factory input , and 
by smallholders organized either on a settlement scheme , on 
a village or on a mixed basis . Depending on government policy 
and the severity o f  capital shortage , part or all of  factory 
and estate operations may b e  f inanced locally or externally . 
Formal settlement schemes are frequently crit icized for 
requiring heavy expenditure on administrat ion , extension and 
soc ial services , and thus for being expens ive in terms of 
capital investment per settler , and providing benefits only 
to a fortunate few .  Whilst this cannot be denied , it is 
necessary to cons ider this strategy in the wider context of 
obj ect ives s ince they can achieve a fast rate o f  growth of  
output and of  exports . It  may well be that the overall 
development program needs such a component , especially if 
other development programs that are being carried out have 
low yields in terms o f  addit ional output . 
Formal land settlement s chemes have quite commonly been 
ass isted by aid agencies , in spite of  misgivings about the 
capital costs  per settler . Mult ilateral agencies such as IDA 
have financed many smallholder components of such schemes , 
one example being palm o il in Papua New Guinea . Internat ional 
ass istance is also provided on a b ilateral basis . For some 
crops with a high requirement of technical skills ,  especially 
in management and proces s ing , expert ise is t rans ferred from 
ex-colonial powers with previous involvement in the crops . 
This ranges from short-term consultancy work to long-term 
involvement and partnership in the settlement s chemes them­
selves . The Commonwealth Development Corporat ion ( CDC) 
engages in such partnership , particularly in nucleus estat e  
development . CDC makes a capital contribut ion towards a 
nucleus estat e  and for a factory unit , around which a small­
holder s ettlement scheme is developed . The overall s cheme 
receives the benefits o f  CDC ' s technical and managerial 
skills , though the extent to which this arrangement can be 
class ified as aid varies with the type of agreement s igned 
with the hos t  government . 
Land sett lement schemes were never a feature of Papua 
New Guinea ' s programs for rural development . A few rather 
tmsuccess ful schemes were implemented after World War II , 
mainly for ex-servicemen . The Hoskins Oil Palm Scheme on 
West New Britain is a succes s ful in stance of a fully financed 
settlement of smallholders . Aust ralia has allocated lit tle 
aid for reset tlement schemes . In 19 7 6- 7 7  it provided 
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ass istance 
(Tab le 2 ) : 
Sri Lanka . 
should not 
s chemes . 
worth only $3 . 3  million to on-going proj ects 
a rice scheme in Fij i and others in Kenya and 
There seems no obvious reason why Aust ralia 
b ecome more heavily involved in land development 
Table 2 
Total Austral ian aid expenditure on on-going proj ect s 
under St rategy II to 19 7 7-78  
Country Amount ( $A ' OOO ) 
Fij i 1 , 054 
Kenya 1 , 344 
Sri Lanka 86 7 
Total 3 , 2 65 
Source : ADAB , 1 9 7 8 . 
St rategy III : increas ing resource product ivity 
The pro cess of expanding the exchange economy with 
marketed surpluses from product ion addit ional to customary 
subs istence levels of  output has b een responsible for 
con siderable growth o f  total output and o f  per capita output 
and income , and many count ries st ill have further prospects  
of  this type . However ,  within a given product ion technology , 
this st rategy has a rest rict ed potent ial , set by the limit s 
to which product ion unit s  will devote t ime as labour to 
economic act ivit ies at  the expense of other act ivit ies such 
as household t asks and leisure . 
At this l imit , increases in total output will then 
follow from increases in populat ion , provided that the 
addit ional populat ion can exploit new land . As long as the 
area under cult ivat ion increases in this fashion labour 
remains the s carce resource . With low densit ies of populat ion 
and rates of  populat ion , there is often a reasonable chance 
that total output may rise in parallel with populat ion . 
With higher densit i es and rates of growth this opportunity 
diminishes and the shift in populat ion has to be to more 
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distant locat ions . Such adj ustments have o f  course seldom 
occurred either because the move was not made suf ficiently 
attract ive or b ecause no land was in fact available . Either 
way higher population densit ies have led to the famil iar 
declining average and marginal labour product ivit ies . In 
the former cases the problem of populat ion pres sure is 
local ized , as it is , for example , in Indonesia , and there 
are s t ill at least two development strategies available : to 
facilitate migration and to raise resource product ivity . 
Once land be comes the s carce factor , increases in per 
capita output can only come from rais ing resource product ivity .  
In these circumstances this can arise from technological 
innovat ions that raise output per unit of labour ( largely 
through mechanizat ion) or per unit of land (by higher yielding 
crop variet ies or animal breeds ) . In Bangladesh , for example , 
the only strategy opt ion6 available is to raise resource 
product ivity by intens ifying land use and rais ing yields , 
through irrigat ion and high yielding crop variet ies , et c .  
The strongest argument s  fo r this third st rategy arise 
from the universally accepted obj ect ive of  higher living 
standards for larger populat ions and the fact that other 
strategies have only a limit ed capacity to contribute to  
this . Another source of st imulus is  derived from the market -
the prospect of  st ronger compet it ion and lower prices for a 
commodity . The best illustrat ion in recent times is that of  
Malays ia which after World War I I  ant icipated st rong 
competit ion for rubber from synthet ics with lower costs of 
product ion . Research was init iated that led to the development 
of new high yielding var iet ies that were used to replace most 
estate and much smallholder rubber by the mid-19 60s . This 
greatly reduced the cost of rubber product ion and enabled 
producers to absorb lower prices . It also increased output 
and so helped to avoid a maj o r  decline in export earn ings 
from this , Malays ia ' s  most important export industry (Fisk 
1969 : 194-6 ) . 
Intensif ication of food crop product ion has tradit ionally 
been based upon the development of irrigat ion systems , to 
raise the number of crops p er year or to reduce yield 
fluctuat ions due to climate . It is not surprising therefore 
that initial effort s to raise land produc t ivity in labour 
surplus economies were made for irrigat ion areas that were 
thought to have the largest potent ial for product ivity 
6Land reform is discussed below . 
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increases . In food grains , research produced high yielding 
variet ies requiring more water and a greater degree of  
control than was n ecessary for  t radit ional variet ies . They 
were highly respons ive to chemical fert il izers but generally 
needed more protection aga inst pes t s  and diseases . The 
advances embodied in the new technologies that are evolving 
for crops and livestock indust ries in less developed 
countries represent a maj or new scient ific involvement in 
research , large-s cale part icipat ion of the public s ector at 
all levels to facilitate part icipat ion by farmers , and closer 
industrial l inkages with the rural sector . 
The public sector , in part icular , is required to : 
(a)  take a leading role in fostering nat ional research 
programs for development of new technologies , which 
in turn necessitat es heavy expenditures on 
educat ion to generate the appropriate profess ional 
manpower at all levels ; 
(b ) finance large-scale development of  irrigat ion with 
construct ion of facilit ies ranging from large dams 
and canal systems to small-scale river l ift schemes 
and tubewell s ; 
( c )  organize efficient del ivery systems for input s by 
creating or adapt ing inst itut ional arrangements 
fo r t imely and adequate suppl ies for the farmers .  
These range from informat ion ( the ext ens ion system) 
to material input s ( seed , fert ilizers and plant 
prot ect ion materials and equipment ) and finance 
( short- to long-term credit ) ; and 
( d) develop an ef fective planning and admin is t rat ive 
sy stem for implement ing development programs that 
incorporate these new technologies . 
Implementat ion of the other st rategies required many 
of the same input s from the public sector : public investment 
in infrastructure , research and extens ion systems and 
inst itut ional arrangements for provision of credit . Demands 
on the public sector arising from this product ivity-oriented 
strategy are , howeve r ,  intensified and expanded in all areas . 
Sustained achievement of  ris ing product ivity requires a 
stream of innovat ions over t ime from a research syst em 
sensit ive to probl.ems at field level . The ext ension sys tem 
mus t b e  capable o f  quickly and e f fect ively t ransmit t ing a 
two-way flow of in format ion between researchers and farmers . 
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New inst itut ions have to be created and old  ones adapted to  
these new demands . The introduct ion of high-yielding 
variet ies of  wheat and paddy led to the virtual creat ion of 
a seed replacement indust ry .  It generat ed heavy demands for 
input s of industrial origin that needed sub stantial adaptat ion 
on the part of  inst itut ional suppl iers . New credit needs 
could not be met from exist ing ins t itut ional sources . 
It is not surprising therefore that , in the face o f  
these sudden and comprehens ive new demands , there was less 
than adequate response , so that new oppo rtunit ies arose for 
aid programs to assist the adj ustment process . It is not 
possible here to list th ese exhaustively , but a few comments 
are offered on a key component , agr icultural research . It 
was quickly recognized that few count ries had inherited 
nat ional organ izat ions for agricultural research with the 
profess ional manpower or oth er resources to  mount the programs 
of research required . Both internat ional and domest ic 
research inst itut ions have b een evolved to meet the problem.  
An expanding program of  internat ional research has b een 
estab lished on key agricultural conunodit ies over the past two 
decades or more , in order to  develop more product ive tech­
nologies . Originally s tarted for wheat by the Rockefeller 
Foundat ion in Mexico , it is now a network of research 
inst itut es that covers most of the crops of s ignificance in 
global con sumpt ion pat t erns . This approach has had it s 
successes and i ts problems . The problems centre largely on 
the difficult ies of int ernat ional trans fer of  t echnology . 
While for high yield variet ies (HYVs ) of  wheat from Mexico 
there has been rapid and widespread adopt ion elsewhere , 
succes s in trans ferring HYVs of paddy from IRRI in the 
Philippines has been quite l imited . Experience with paddy 
has , however ,  provided valuab le guidance fo r future varietal 
research . This clearly has to  b e  nat ionally based and has 
to take account of local condit ions (agro-climat ic , pest and 
disease , et c . ) . This has only served to strengthen support 
for the alternat ive approach to the research problem - that 
of building up domestic research capacit ies through t raining 
programs and inst itut ional ass istance , to enab le less developed 
countries to meet these greater demands . 
Critics of this productivity-rais ing strategy point to 
the fact that it has favoured areas , and groups within these 
areas , who are already well endowed with resources , and that 
it has therefore widened income disparit ies between regions 
and farm s ize groups . In so far as the new technology has 
been adopted , these criticisms have some j ustificat ion 
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(PEO/ANU 197 6 ) , but it  should be remembered that this is  
st ill an early s tage in the evolut ion o f  these technologies . 
Considerable effo rt is now being applied to ext end the sphere 
of influence of the new technology to a wider range of  
product ion condit ions , for example to rainfed and flood 
prone areas . It must also be remembered that some groups , 
particularly small and marginal farmers , have been unable to 
enj oy the benefit s o f  the n ew  technology b ecause the 
inst itutional setting for such things as credit on reasonable 
terms has yet to  be adapted to meet their needs , rather than 
because of any limitat ions inherent to the technology . It 
is to be hoped that a broadening of the research effort and 
appropriate inst itutional change will extend the influence 
of this st rategy . 
Australia already contributes directly to  this mult i­
nat ional research effort and to the int ernat ional agencies 
which support the development of research systems , such as 
the IBRD. Cons iderable aid is also being given on a bilateral 
basis tmder the heading of this strategy . In 1 9 7 7- 7 8  for 
example $52 . 5 million was spent on such on-going items . 7 
Analysis by type of assistance ( Table 3 )  showed that the 
maj ority was allocated to ass ist the development of an imal 
industries and about one-fifth was allocated for crop 
industries . A breakdown by dest inat ion (Table 4 ) indicates 
that 66 per cent was absorbed by those mo st dependent upon 
technological progres s : Indonesia , India , Bangladesh and 
Pakistan . Other Southeast Asian count ries (Malaysia and 
Thailand) received most of the remainder . Given Aust ral ia ' s  
exp erience in rural research , and the growing demand for 
technologically based development in rural indust ries , this 
would be a logical area of  growth for Aust ral ian bilateral 
assistance both in terms of · technical expert ise and for local 
development . 
St rategy IV : inst itut ional change ? 
Inst itut ions can b e  con sidered as establ ished customs , 
pract ices and laws , or as organizat ion s for promot ion of  a 
public obj ect ive . Both are relevant here . On the one hand 
differences in established inst itut ions between communit ies 
provide an important explanat ion of observed variat ions in 
responses to strategies of rural development . On the other , 
they are important instruments for effect ive implementat ion 
7This does not include expenditures on new commitment s  that 
may have b een made during 19 76- 7 7 . 
of  public pol icy . 
Table 3 
Expenditure on on-going b ilateral aid for raising 
rural resource produc t ivity , by industries , to 1 9 7 7-78  
Indust ry Amount ( $ ' 000) 
An imal 
Crop 
Forestry 
Fisheries 
Unspecified 
Source : ADAB 197 8 .  
31 , 088 
8 , 3 71 
7 78 
2 4 7  
12 , 035 
Table 4 
Per cent 
59  
16 
1 
1 
2 3  
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Expenditures on on-going b ilat eral aid for raising 
rural resource product ivity , by dest inat ion , to 19 7 7- 78 
Country Amount ( $ ' 000)  Per cent 
Bangladesh 2 , 4 80 5 
Bhutan 74 neg . 
Burma 1 , 892  4 
Fij i 1 , 2 43 2 
Indonesia 2 4 , 65 3  4 7  
India 6 , 744 13 
Korea 39 7 1 
Laos 2 , 552 5 
Malays ia 5 , 816 11 
Nepal 714 1 
Pakistan 5 73 1 
Solomon Islands 389 1 
Sri Lanka 2 60 neg . 
Thailand 2 , 505 5 
Tonga 5 68 1 
Vietnam 1 , 56 9  3 
Total 52 , 4 79 100 
Source : ADAB 1978 . 
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The quest ion of whether inst itut ional change should b e  
considered a s  a distin ct development strategy revolves largely 
around the obj ectives of pol icy . To the extent that , say , 
distribut ive j ust ice is concerned there is often a strong 
case for considering it separately , espec ially where severe 
inequalit ies in land ownership exist . Inequal ity may also 
have to be con sidered in relat ion to it s effect s on output 
growth , as for example in ins tances where land owned by large 
landholders lies idle . But often the argtllllent for inst it­
ut ional change is not clear-cut one way or the other . This 
seems to be the case with land reform in India . On balance 
I find it more useful to regard inst itut ional change , whether 
as re form or innovat ion , as an integral part of each of the 
three strategy opt ions outl ined above . Aid for inst itut ional 
change is s imilarly considered as a component of each of the 
three strategies . This is not meant to dimin ish in any way 
the importance of inst itut ional change , but rather to place 
it in a more dynamic context of economic development . 
Choice of strategy 
Up to this point , each strategy has been separately 
cons idered , but most count ries are faced with the opportunity 
of using some o r  all of them and thus of  dec iding upon the 
relat ive emphasis to be placed on each . For example 
Indonesia faces the quest ion of  the relat ive weight to be 
placed on alternat ives under Strategy III for Java , as 
against alternat ives for the Outer Islands under the first 
two strategies . In Papua New Guinea there are regional 
alternat ives of further development of market l inkages in 
the highlands , land settlement opportunities on some o f  the 
smaller islands and of rais ing yields and product ion in longer 
establi shed cash crop areas with sizeable populat ion 
concentrat ions . 
These strategies have been discussed as though they are 
discret e ,  as they are in many in stances . It should be kept 
in mind , however , that they can be int errelated and comb ined . 
Thus technical advances that raise resource product ivity in 
labour surplus areas , such as higher yielding paddy variet ies , 
may also favourably alter economic prospects  in settlement 
and even in remote areas . Again , the infrast ructure created 
for smallholder sett l ement schemes may also b en ef it the 
exist ing populat ion of the settlement area and s t imulate 
them to produce a marketable surplus . 
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The pros and cons of each st rategy were broadly set out 
in this paper in relat ion to the obj ectives of output growth , 
fairer distribut ion of  income and employment creat ion . The 
class ificat ion of strategies does allow some scope for 
comparat ive as sessment of these in quantitat ive terms , for 
example in benefit / cost analys is . Even though forecasting 
may be only in terms of  rough orders of magnitudes , it 
should enable better order ing of alternat ive opt ions and 
encourage better in formed decision-makin g .  It should al so 
allow donor countries to gain a better apprec iat ion of the 
likely nature and extent of the impact of aid programs and 
proj ect s . 
Chapt er 10 
Forms of aid : po�ulation control 
* 
Gavin W .  Jones 
During the 2 5-year period 1950-75 a populat ion 
indust ry was born , grew to significant 
proport ions , and was labelled variously as 
essent ial to mankind ' s  future , as showing 
promise , and as being a failure (Mauldin 19 7 5 : 32 ) . 
' The populat ion field ' can b e  defined to  cover a very 
broad area , since the growth and movement of  populat ion are 
bas ic factors in development and are influenced rather 
directly by a number of government agencies in most countries , 
including those responsible for health , educat ion , manpower , 
city and regional planning and hardly less directly by those 
respon sible for rural development , transportation and 
economic planning . Populat ion policy has , indeed , even been 
defined so broadly as to cover all government policies which 
intentionally or \lllintentionally influence populat ion 
variables . It would be hard to think of a policy which did 
not qualify . In the present context it is b etter to confine 
the di scussion to policies des igned to influence populat ion 
growth and distribut ion . So far , relat ively lit t le inter­
nat ional aid has gone into  direct interventions in populat ion 
distribut ion (although World Bank support for Indones ia ' s  
t ransmigrat ion proj ect is one example) . Nor has the 
sub stant ial investment in health and disease control s in ce 
World War II  been aimed at influencing populat ion growth ; 
rather , the rapid populat ion growth which resulted was an 
* 
A confess ion is in order . I have served t ime in the ' popu-
lat ion establishment ' ,  working fo r nine years for the 
Populat ion Co\lllcil in a number of cotmtries and more recently 
as Aust ralian representative on two World Bank populat ion 
evaluation miss ions . This may accotmt for otherwise 
inexplicable prej udices in this survey . 
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unintended consequence of  the success in meet ing the goals 
of eradicat ing or controlling diseases and improving health . 
Aid for population control : the past two decades 
When we talk of aid in the population field we are 
talking primarily about aid for fertility control , which has 
normally been in the form of support for family planning 
programs . Such programs do not have a lon g  history .  The 
first was India ' s  in 1952 , but few countries followed suit 
before the 1960s , and it was not until the late 1960s that 
the maj or countries of Southeast Asia ( Indones ia ,  19 68 ; 
the Philippin es , 19 70 ; and Thailand,  19 70)  init iated official 
family planning programs . By 19 75 , thirty-four developing 
countries had adopted an anti-natalist policy , and within 
their borders lived 7 7  per cent o f  the population of  the 
developing world .  An addit ional twenty-nine count ries , with 
15 per cent of the population , support family planning purely 
on health and welfare grounds . Only 8 per cent of the people 
in developing count ries live under governments which do not 
support family planning at all . l Most of these are in Africa 
and Lat in America . In As ia , there is almost universal 
governmental support for family planning programs , not only 
in the non-communist countries but also  in China and Vietnam. 
Despite a lot of talk about maternal and child welfare 
and the freedom of couples to plan the size of their families , 
the key mot ivat ion for western ( and ,  more recently , Unit ed 
Nat ions and World Bank) aid in the field of populat ion has 
been a concern with rising rates of  populat ion growth in the 
develop ing countries and a s ense o f  foreboding at the implic­
at ions of  proj ect ions , current in the 1960s , that the 
population of the developing world would double in thirty to 
thirty-five y ears , compared with a paltry 35  per cent growth 
during the same period in the populations of western nat ions . 2 
The forebodings stemmed from var ious sources : pure alt ruism 
directed at avert ing the dis aster which many felt would befall 
the developing countries if  such growth were allowed to o ccur ; 
enlightened self-interest , which foresaw that in an 
1 For more details , see Nortman 19 7 6 .  
2It has since b ecome clear that populat ion growth in western 
nat ions is likely to be considerab ly less than this , and 
that population growth in developing countries may be less 
massive than was previously believed . 
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interdependent world any such disaster would also b e  visited 
on the western count ries in the fo rm o f  spin-offs of  various 
kinds ; the environmentalists ' concern with ecological issues 
and res ource limitat ions ; and of course the mut ed but never­
theless real concern in many quart ers that the polit ical 
implications of populat ion growth in the ' have-not ' ( and 
coincident ally , non-white) nat ions to a point where they 
could boast almost 80 per cent of the world ' s  populat ion by ' 
the end of the twent ieth century would not b e  favourable to 
the ' have ' (and coincident ally , mostly whit e)  nat ions . 
It is not possible to  j udge the relat ive st rength of  
these assorted mot ivat ions in influencing the growth o f  aid 
in the field of populat ion control . This aid has grown 
enormously f rom a modest b eginning in the 1950s . In the past 
f ift een or so  years , internat ional ass istance for populat ion 
act ivit ies increased more than a hundredfold - from $US2 
million in 1960 to over $US2 80 million in 1 9 7 7 .  
There has b een a marked shift in the relat ive importance 
of different aid donors s in ce the early 1960s . Indeed , as 
recent ly as 1962 , a privat e ,  American non-profit agency , the 
Populat ion Council ( it s elf funded largely by Ford , Rockefeller 
and the S caife-Mellon family of Pit t sburgh) was st ill 
cont ribut ing 50 per cent of  the very modest sum of about 
$4 . 8  million allocated as internat ional aid in the f ield of 
populat ion in that year . The Swedish Internat ional Development 
Authority , which gave its first grant for family planning 
act ivit ies in 195 8 ,  was the only government ass istance agency 
involved ,  followed by the Unit ed Kingdom and Norway in 1964 . 
Private agencies carried the field unt il the mid-1960s , when 
the ' heavies ' began to make their appearance - first , the 
United States Agency for Int ernat ional Development (USAID) 
in 1965 , then the Unit ed Nat ions system in 196 7  and the World 
Bank in 1969 ( see Table 1 ) . Sin ce then , the most notable 
trend has been an increase in funds supplied by government s 
other than the USA, a substant ial part of  whi ch is channelled 
through the United Nat ions system and the Internat ional 
Planned Parenthood Federat ion . 
After its late start , United Stat es aid for populat ion 
cont rol built up dramat ically ,  and pas sed a tot al of  a 
billion dollars in the years s ince 1965 or about 60 per cent 
of  all internat ional population ass istance over that period . 
In the 1969-7 1 period , the t ime of  sharpest increase ,  the 
pressure on USAID to spend the available funds was intense , 
the feeling being that funds left unspent would provide a 
Year 
1965-69  
(yearly 
average) 
1 9 70 
19 71 
1972  
1 9 7 3  
19 74 
1975 
1976 
Foundat ions 
( Pop . Coun cil ,  
Ford , 
Rockefeller)  
23  
35  
23  
2 5  
2 3  
2 5  
2 2  
20  
Table 1 
Sources o f  funds f o r  EOEulat ion cont rol , 1965-76 
(millions of US dollars ) 
Internat ional 
Planned 
Parenthood USA ID World UNFPA Sweden Bank Federat ion 
( IPPF) 
2 . 5 18 . 1  o . o  2 . 0  2 . 6  
10 74 . 6  o . o  4 . 0  6 . 5  
15 95 . 9  0 . 0  6 . 0  9 . 2  
2 6  12 3 . 3 0 . 1  12 . 5  12 . 7 
30 12 5 . 6  0 . 5  2 6 . 6  1 3 . 7 
35 112 . 4  2 . 6  46 . 1  1 8 . 3 
42 . 6  110 . 0  10 . 3 6 8 . 7 29 . 4  
45 . 2  135 . 2  n . a . 8 7 . 0  32 . 0  
(est . )  
Other count ries 
Norway (UK, Canada , Total a 
Germany , et c . ) 
0 . 0  0 . 3 4 6  
1 . 0 8 . 7 136 
3 . 9  15 . 1  162 
5 . 5  2 3 . 0  215 
12 . 5  2 9 . 7 235  
12 . 7 30 . 4  2 34 
1 3 . 6 38 . 5  2 5 6  
2 3 . 1 2 8 . 2b 2 84b 
a Total is for maj or sources of funds , i . e . it excludes the World Bank and UNFPA because their populat ion funds are 
entirely supplied by  memb er countries whose total funds for populat ion are listed elsewhere in the t able . However ,  
some foundat ions and the IPPF receive part o f  their funds directly from governments and t o  the ext ent that this is 
so , the ' Total ' column is an overestimat e .  
b Incomplete - n o  data for some countries . 
Source : Geor ge Washington University Medical Center 19 7 7a ;  miscellaneous other sources . 
Figures are for actual disbursements rather than conunitments . The difference is somet imes great . For examp le , 
in 1974 the World Bank conunitted $82 . 6 million b ut only dish.ursed $2 . 6 million . 
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poor basis for  seeking continuing large or larger appropri­
at ions in later years when the level o f  support in Congress 
for family planning programs might not be as strong .  In 
those years , there was really an inflat ion of  family planning 
support - ' too much money chasing too few viable family 
planning programs ' .  The result was some excesses . Not that 
the total level of financial support for family planning 
programs was ever as great as is commonly imagined . It 
constituted only 2 to 3 per cent o f  total int ernat ional 
development ass istance in the 1970s and only 4 per cent o f  
total U S  official aid disbursements . But the rate of  
in crease in US  ass is t an ce for  family planning programs was 
very sharp and coincided with an ab solut e  decline in overall 
aid levels . The earnes tness with which leads on ways to  
dispose of  family planning money were pursued by  USAID 
personnel was somet imes in sharp contrast to the cool 
recept ion given proposals from host country planners for 
development ass istance in f ields such as malaria eradicat ion . 
The conclusion not uncommonly drawn was that the US was 
att empt ing to buy development ' on the cheap ' through family 
planning programs , a conclusion that gained further credence 
from President Johnson ' s  rather unfortunate use of Stephen 
Enke ' s  claim that ' $ 1 invested in family planning is worth 
$20 spent on development programs ' .  The suspicions generat ed 
by American act ions contributed to the backlash against family 
planning observed at the World Population Conference in 
Bucharest in 197 4 . 
The entry of  the United Nat ions into the field was 
equally dramat ic . After a two decades-long rearguard act ion 
by an unholy alliance of Catholics and Connnunists to prevent 
the UN sy stem from support ing family planning programs , 3 the 
breakthrough came in 1966 , when the General Assembly pas sed 
a resolut ion calling on the UN and it s specializ ed agencies 
to provide technical assistance in the field of populat ion , 
including fert ility control . In 196 7 ,  a Trust Fund was set 
up to  f inance such act ivit ies , and the United Nat ions Fund 
for Population Act ivit ies (UNFPA) was est ablished in 1969 . 
When it became clear that the financial resources available 
3 See Symonds and Carder 19 7 3 .  The Catholics were opposed 
to any resolutions or act ions by internat ional agencies 
which might encourage the pract ice of  what were regarded as 
illicit methods of birth control . The Connnunists had no 
obj ect ion in principle to family planning , but argued that 
populat ion cont rol was being put forward as a cheap but 
inef fect ive alt ernat ive to  economic ass istance . 
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to other arms o f  the UN through the Ftmd ( and later the UNFPA) , 
were to be very cons iderable,  the alacrity with which the 
sp ecial ized agencies - FAO , !LO , UNESCO and so forth -
dis covered previously undetected links b etween the ir own work 
and the task of disseminat ing family planning throughout the 
developing world was not able , as was the s ize of the budgets 
required for their programs . 
The case of the World Health Organiz at ion (WHO) is 
interes t ing.  As the United Nat ions specialized agency with 
the most obvious role to play in assisting member nat ions in 
the f ield of populat ion , WHO kept out of the family planning 
field l.ll1t il 1966 as a result o f  pressure from Catholic and 
Socialist member stat es and the feeling that populat ion 
control programs would divert funds from health services . 4 
Between 1966 and 19 70 , WHO evolved a populat ion as sistance 
poli cy , integrat ed with health services , but s t ill in a very 
small way . As Finkle and Crane have shown ( 19 76 : 3 73) , the 
rapid expansion in WHO ' s  family planning role in the 1970-74 
period was prompted not by a philosophical conversion on the 
part of it s Secretariat so much as by ' t erritorial cons ider­
at ions ' ( to protect its special relat ionships with health 
minist ries in developing count ries from encroachment by the 
World Bank) and by the prospect of us ing UNFPA money for 
health purposes . 
By 197 7 ,  internat ional aid in the field of  populat ion 
cont rol had reached some $US2 80 million a year . This is only 
a rough est imate , and in some respect s understat es and in 
others overstates the total sums going into populat ion cont rol . 
In the past , training o f  young s cholars in the fields of 
demography and public health has had large but difficult-to­
measure spin-o f fs in subsequently building an informed public 
on the issues of populat ion in their home count ries . Thus , 
Colombo Plan aid in the form of  s cholarships awarded by the 
Australian Government for the study of demography at the 
4WHO Director-General Candau, in a speech in 1966 , attacked 
the populat ion control movement for its ' reversal o f  
priorit ies ' an d  fo r ' divert ing funds from public health in 
order to est ablish family planning programs ' ( Finkle and 
Crane 19 7 6 : 373) . The weakness of this argument was clear , 
in the face of  evidence that excess ive childb earing has 
serious health consequences for mothers and children . In 
the mid-1960s , Chile ' s  and Colomb ia ' s  mat ernity hospit als 
were t reat ing two to five cases of ' bot ched ' abort ions for 
every ten bab ies they delivered . 
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Australian National Univers ity, f o r  example , can in this 
sense be considered aid for populat ion control . So can some 
of the aid going to health ministries in countries where 
there is no off icial support for family planning but where 
the health ministry actually conduct s family planning 
pro grams under another name . On the other s ide of  the coin , 
however , many planning minist ries , sensing that populat ion 
money is more readily available than other money , are adept 
at giving a ' family plann ing ' slant to programs whose real 
thrust lies elsewhere . Moreover ,  the $280 million estimate 
includes funds with only an ind irect relevance to populat ion 
control , such as advisory ass istance and other support for 
the conduct of populat ion censuses . 
Not only has the magnitude of aid changed dramat ically , 
but so too have it s direct ions . In the early days , when few 
governments in developing count ries had mounted official 
family planning programs , the ef fort was mainly in the f ield 
of training and research in the demog raphic and b io-medical 
fields - an effort in which the United Nat ions Populat ion 
Divi sion was also involved .  Pressure was growing in certain 
circles - notably among med ical people , economist s , and some 
academics and civil servant s  - in many countries to establish 
off icial family planning programs . Agencies such as the 
Populat ion Council at tempted to encourage o fficial acceptance 
in various countries by seeking out ' friends of family 
planning ' in high places . In Thailand , for example , the 
support was enli sted of an influent ial general who headed 
the Nat ional Research Council , who could to some ext ent 
counter another influent ial voice , that of the deputy secretary 
of the Ministry of the Interior who was prone to argue 
eloquently but irrelevant ly the stagnationist theories of the 
19 30s (when he was studying ab road) as sound grounds for doing 
nothing in the field of family planning . 
But the tide was running st rongly in favour o f  family 
planning and by 1970 not only Thailand but also the Catholic 
Philippines , mixed-race Malaysia and many other countries of 
widely differing background had official policies to reduce 
populat ion growth rates by means of a family planning program .  
The off icial sponsorship o f  family plann ing throughout much 
of the developing world , and the greatly increased inter­
nat ional funds available to support it , led to marked changes 
in the kinds of aid given . Technical ass istance to family 
planning programs in the form of resident advisers and 
evaluat ion mi ss ions became important from the mid-19 60s 
onwards , as did the supply of  cont racept ives . Pills are a 
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big element in the cost  of  most  pro grams , and here USAID 
stepped in on a large scale : in 197 4 , it supplied 20 million 
cycles of pills and 300 , 000 gross o f  condoms to Indones ia 
alone , at a cost  o f  some $4  million . Concern was occas ionally 
felt among donor agencies that some family planning programs 
were overly reliant on foreign fundin g , 5 and there was some­
times a half-hearted attempt to impose the criterion that 
the count ry should progress ively t ake over a larger share of  
it s total family planning budget . However , i t  was somet imes 
recognized t hat countries were oft en put t ing more into their 
own programs than was apparent at f irst sight b ecause , .  
especially in countries where family planning programs were 
int egrated into health s ervices , many expenditures which 
might have been imputed to family planning were subsumed 
under the general costs  of the health ministry .  
In actual fact , few populat ion programs have been over­
endowed with foreign funds , although in some cases they have 
certainly been over-endowed relat ive t o  general public health 
programs . Rather , both health and family planning have been 
seriously under-endowed with local funds . As already noted , 
even after the rapid build-up in funding , programs receive 
only some 2 to 3 per cent o f  the total funds available for 
development ass istance , or  t o  put it another way , some 0 . 1 
t o  0 . 2  per cent of annual world spending on defence . The 
level o f  fundin g  for population control is not too high , but 
it has expanded too fast in some directions in some periods 
for fully cost-effect ive us e to be made of it . There is a 
great deal of was t e ,  overlap and repet it ion , ineffect ive 
conferences and t raining programs are mounted , and in planning 
agencies and univers ities throughout the Third World it is a 
recognized fact that for somebody with a t aste for inter­
nat ional travel , populat ion is the field to b e  in . Examination 
of research proposal s  submitted t o  funding agencies would 
suggest that the sine qua non of any advance in knowledge in 
the field of  populat ion is two air condit ioners and one land 
rover . 
The investment of funds by the donor agencies in 
act ivit ies aimed at ' swinging the balance ' of  public opinion , 
or rather of  opinion in c ircles where it count s , in favour 
5 In recent years , family planning pro grams in a numb er o f  
maj or countries (Bangladesh , Colomb ia ,  Egypt , Pakistan and , 
unt il the last couple o f  y ears , Thailand and Indonesia) 
have s t ill been receiving more than hal f their funds from 
foreign sources (Nortman 19 76 : Table 10) . 
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of  policies to cont rol populat ion growth can be , an d  has been , 
crit icized as meddling in the internal affairs o f  other 
count ries . And it is also true that some o f  the argument s 
used in this context , even those b ased on complex-looking 
demographic-economic models , relied more on the weight of 
their users ' convict ions than on hard scientific evidence 
fo r the delet erious effect s of rapid populat ion growth . 6 Yet 
it does remain t rue that in many developing countries there 
were serious lags in introducing for public o r  official debate 
issues of rapid populat ion growth which deserved a serious 
airing and some serious policy decisions . This neglect was 
partly due to a dearth of t rained demographers or public 
health profes sionals in many of  these countries ; and to the 
ext raordinary neglect by European and American economists of 
the complex interrelat ionships between populat ion and economic 
growth , and hence a s imilar neglect of these relat ionships 
in th e t raining o f fered in the west to economists  from 
developing countries . Only in the late 1960s did a concern 
with these issues begin to b lossom again amongst economist s . 
Even so , French economi cs , very in �luent ial throughout 
Francophone Africa and other areas , appears st ill to be  
heavily influenced in th ese  matt ers by  the trauma o f  the 
French lo ss of the population race against Germany . 
The dearth o f  people in many Third World count ries with 
a thorough and relevant training in fields of demography and 
demographic-economic interrelat ionships meant that the hoary 
arguments equat ing population size with mil itary might and 
larger market s ,  and the Catholic argument s against contra­
cept ion in areas such as Lat in America,  could be left 
unchallenged to dominate the f ield . I would argue that the 
educat ional and research role of foreign aid in the field 
of populat ion through the 1960s was of great importance in 
in fluencing the adopt ion o f  policies to control populat ion 
growth in country after country . And as more count ries 
changed their policies , the weight of internat ional legit imacy 
shi fted in favour o f  countries with such policies . Quite 
influent ial around 196 7 was the World Leaders ' Declarat ion 
on Populat ion , the brainchild o f  John D .  Rockefeller III , 
which was signed by thirty nat ional leaders from countries 
as diverse as Colombia , India , Iran , Tunisia,  the Philippines , 
Aust ralia and the United St ates and presented to the United 
6The Tempo model , produced under contract for USAID , was one 
such model in which the deleterious economic effects of  rapid 
populat ion growth were in fact built into the model because 
of  it s neo-clas sical framework and the form of the product ion 
funct ion used . 
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Nations on Human Rights Day . 7 The support then given for 
populat ion programs by the United Nat ions systems and the 
World Bank was a further import ant step in this direct ion . 
But if , in Asia at least , all appeared to be sweetness 
and light in the late 1960s , in parts of  Latin America and 
Africa dismay was felt at the growing pressures to adopt 
family planning programs , and by the t ime of the World 
Populat ion Conference in Bucharest in 19 74 a strong backlash 
which had been building up for some years reached it s peak -
a backlash against the by then convent ional wisdom that rapid 
populat ion growth is a serious obstacle to economic growth 
in developing cotmtries , needing to b e  tackled by vigorous 
effort s  in the field of family plannin g .  The debate has 
been sunnnarized elsewhere ( Finkle and Crane 19 7 5 ; Mauldin 
et  aZ . 19 74 and Jones 19 7 7b ) . It is too complex to be 
covered in detail here . While there were valid point s of  
intellectual dispute , concerning the ext ent to which rapid 
populat ion growth is a problem and the relat ive emphas is to  
be given to overall social-economic development and to family 
planning in tackling this p rob lem,  the Bucharest debate can 
be properly understood only if viewed in its context as part 
of the Third World broads ide against the stance of the west 
in matters of  trade and development and the at tempt to 
institut e  a New Internat ional Economic Order . This is why , 
for example , the stance o f  India at Bucharest bore so litt le 
relat ionship to  what India was actually doing at home in the 
field of family planning ( and , short ly thereaft er , compulsory 
st eriliz at ion) . Bucharest did serve to re-emphasize the 
importance of a concerted development strategy rather than 
tmdue reliance on family planning in tackling development 
issues ; but the extent to which the main mot ives of the attack 
on the family planners at Bucharest lay elsewhere is illus­
t rated by the continued list of countries newly annotmcing 
populat ion policies incorporat ing family planning programs 
since that t ime , notab le amongst these being Mexico and 
Braz il .  
But this is all background . I believe that we have now 
reached a reasonab ly balanced situat ion in which a fairly 
high proport ion of  developing cotmtries ( including all of 
the ten largest developing countries)  see the need for 
official ef fort s in the field of family planning.  Sufficient 
7 It was first present ed on Human Right s Day , 1966 , with 12 
signat ories . By Human Right s Day , 196 7 , the number of  
si gnatories had risen to 30 . 
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internat ional funding support i s  available.  The debates 
that raged over populat ion issues around the t ime of Bucharest 
have ' cleared the air ' and perhaps made it eas ier for 
countries to  adopt an independent stance in populat ion 
policy , without feeling llllduly pressured in any one direct ion 
by other collll tries , especially pot ent ial donor count ries . 
Birth rates are turning down in a great many developing 
count ries (Mauldin 19 76)  and the shrill c ries of  the prophets 
o f  doom who saw mankind rushing like lennnings t o  a disast er 
generated by it s unbridled procreat ive proclivit ies are 
somewhat mut ed .  The quest ion at issue ,  then , is the approp­
riat e  role for internat ional aid for populat ion control in 
this new context . 
The determinant s of fertility 
Before att empt ing to answer this question we must f irst 
attempt to  llllderstand the role which any government programs 
can play in th e field o f  populat ion control , for foreign aid 
from offic ial sources is rest rict ed to helping such programs . 
And in seeking an answer to this prior quest ion , it is 
necessary to know what it is that determines fert ility levels , 
and which among the diverse influences at work might be 
amenable to  alt erat ion by means o f  government programs . 
The det erminants of  fert ility are many and complex , and 
debate rages around their relat ive importance (Jones 19 7 7a) . 
Clearly enough , the birth of  a child requires sexual int er­
course b etween a man and a woman , a period of pregnancy and , 
finally , a successful delivery . Anythin g  which influences 
the length of the period during which a woman is exposed to 
the ' risk ' of  intercourse or it s frequency within that 
period , anything which in fluences the chan ces that intercourse 
will result in p regnan cy , and anything which influences the 
chanc es of  the pregnancy ' s  being brought to term,  will have 
a bearing on the fert ility of that woman and ,  more broadly , 
of the community as a whole . To say this immediately brings 
to mind a list of  factors influencing fert ility : the health 
of people , which is likely to affect their fecundity or 
capacity to  repr.oduce ; convent ions about age at marriage 
which ,  in a society which taboos pre-marital intercourse ,  
will affect the length o f  period during which a woman is 
regularly having inter cours e ;  the ext ent to which abort ion 
and/or contracept ion are sanct ioned as means of  b reaking the 
links between intercourse ,  pregnancy and childbirth ; and one 
step further back , the desire for children among couples and 
the society in general , which is likely to  influence the more 
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proximat e determinant s of fert ility . Points o f  possible govern­
mental intervent ion readily come to mind : influence on the age 
at marriage through minimum marriage laws , expanded educat ion 
and so forth ; increas ing the availability and acceptability of  
contracept ion and/or abort ion as  means of birth control , 
perhaps through an o fficially-mounted family planning program ; 
and in fluen ce on the desire fo r children by changing the 
social and economic set t ing within which the des ire for 
children is determined . Possible policies here are legion : 
commonly cit ed are attempts to lower infant mortality rates ; 
expanded educat ion especially for girls ; increased employment 
opportunit ies out s ide the home for women ; urb an izat ion ; 
indust rializat ion ; hous ing policies ; and improved social 
security . Finally , the government could provide direct 
incent ives or disincent ives for having fewer children . Such 
measures have been pioneered in S ingapore ( Chen and Fawcett 
forthcoming) , though in most count ries they would necessarily 
have to be oriented to a more rural sett ing. 8 Finally , the 
government could take more Draconian steps such as the 
compulsory steriliz at ion campaign which recently contributed 
to the downfall o f  the Indira Gandhi government in India . 
There is a great deal of  d isagreement in the academic 
lit erature about the relat ive importance of various influences 
on fert ility . The ' demographic transit ion ' theory is a 
shakier theoret ical prop than was once thought . This theory 
long dominated the field and underlay the popular Bucharest 
argument s  that ' development is the best cont racept ive ' and 
that , further , family planning programs could achieve little 
in the ab sence of thoroughgoing social and economic develop­
ment (Teitelbaum 19 75 ) . In fact , fert ility declines have 
been init iat ed in a wide variety o f  social and economic 
set t ings , 9 and there is no readily-ident ifiable ' threshold 
level ' of social and economic development at which b irth 
rat es will automat ically start to fall . And j ust as well , 
because countries such as Indones ia , India and Ban gladesh 
are st ill a long way from the levels once cons idered necessary . 
8For a summary of p ilot programs already undertaken in such 
set t ings , and a proposed s cheme , oriented to Malaysia , see 
Ridker and Muscat 19 7 3 . For a broader t reatment of  possible 
policy interventions , see Ridker 19 7 6 . 
9Both in the European historical experience and in developing 
country set t ings in recent years , a number of  cases can be 
cited in which birth rates started to decline before the 
spread of a number of import ant aspect s of development which 
are of ten considered to be prerequis it es o f  a decline in 
fert ility . 
224  
Coale ( 19 7 3 ) has classified the prerequis ites for 
fert ility decline into three cat egories : (i) fert ility must 
be within th e calculus of cons cious choice of  parent s ;  ( ii) 
reduced fertility must be advant ageous to parent s ;  ( iii) 
effective techniques of  fert ility reduct ion must be available . 
On the first two of  these , Caldwell ( 19 7 7 )  has argued that 
demographic t ransit ion theorists have erred in underest imat ing 
the degree of rat ionality with which illit erat e peasant couples 
in developing count ries face quest ions of  family size and the 
degree to which parent s ( or , more part icularly , fathers )  may 
benefit economically and otherwise from having many children . 
He argues ( 1 9 7 6 )  that westernization is a potent force for 
change , especially fo r change in the net flows of wealth 
between parents and children , which have an important bearing 
on fert ility levels . Clearly , no amount o f  availab ility 
(physical or psychologi cal ) of cont racept ives will induce 
declines in b irth rat es if parent s perceive it to be in their 
best interest s to have mo re children . However , it can be 
argued that in any society there is a cert ain proport ion of 
parents who , for one reason or another , wish to avoid having 
mo re children , and that some proport ion of these will avoid 
births they would otherwise have had if cont racept ives are 
made readily and cheaply available through the good off ices 
of  a family planning program. Even in Bangladesh , where the 
social and economic set t ing provides rather barren ground for 
dramat ic success in family planning,  field proj ect s indicate 
that as many as 15  per cent of reproduct ive-age couples are 
potent ial regular users of cont racept ion . The proport ion is 
much higher in countries where economic and social changes 
are taking place on a large scale . I will return to this 
point shortly in evaluat ing the success of family planning 
programs to dat e .  
Opt ions for policy intervent ions 
Nothing is mo re certain than that success ful economic 
development will be as sociated with reduct ion in birth rates . 
Apart from a few 'nouveau riche ' oil-producing count ries , it 
is impos s ible to find a count ry in the higher per capita 
income bracket s ( say ,  above $US1500 per annum) which does not 
have low levels o f  fert ilit y .  Th ere is l it t le disagre ement 
with the proposit ion that fertility is mo re likely to  come 
down in countries where gains are being made in educat ion , 
greater equal ity of income distribut ion , liberat ion of women , 
improvement of  health and nut rit ion , rais ing real incomes 
and ,  perhaps most import ant of all ,  involving the poor in 
development programs and spreading an ideology of development 
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which is  oriented to  the dignity and welfare of  people rather 
than to increased product ion of goods and services per se . 
But how to bring about such an ideal state of  affairs remains 
as much a puzzle as it ever was . 
For the count ries with the greatest problems ( India , 
Bangladesh , Indones ia) it is not an opt ion simply to wait for 
development to t ake care of  the populat ion problem. The 
populat ion problem is it sel f one of the barriers (perhaps a 
maj or barrier) to success ful economic development . And this 
is t rue to a lesser degree in other developing count ries . 
Hence the call for emphasis to be placed on those development 
programs which will influence fert ility in the des ired 
direct ion , as well as on family planning programs . But there 
are some real problems in att empt ing to use development 
programs to influence fert ility . Development is , aft er all , 
the goal , not the means to a goal . The developmental policies 
which are generally seen as having a long-term effect in 
depressing fert ility (widening educat ional opportunit ies ; 
bringing more women into the workforce , especially the modern 
sector ;  indust rializat ion ; improvement of social security 
and welf are policies ) are the kind of policies which no self­
respect ing developing country has b een without for the past 
two decades . Government s ,  then , have been ' doing the right 
thin g ' , but in many cases this has not brought about either 
development or lower fertility . Bearing in mind our limited 
understanding of the ext ent to which development programs 
of various kinds can influence fert ility , 10 it is rather far­
fet ched to as sume that arguments based on the fert il ity 
effect s of part icular development polic ies would ever be 
st rong enough appreciably to modify the mix of development 
measures that planners would otherwise propose ( Demeny 19 75 : 
158) . Moreover , such arguments would be no basis for t rans­
ferring funds away from family planning programs into other 
development pro grams . The chance , for example , that trans­
ferring the family planning budget into educat ional expans ion 
(which would finance between 1 and 5 per cent more educat ion 
in the typical Southeast As ian country) would result in as 
large a decline in fert ility as would us ing the funds for 
family planning is remote indeed . The fact is that expenditure 
on family planning is not part icularly large in money terms 
and is likely in most cases to have a more direct impact on 
fert ility than any alternat ive use of  the funds . 
10 For an excellent summary of  the state o f  our knowledge ( or 
lack of it ) about the determinants of fert ility , see Gassen 
1976 : 788-80 3 ;  also Ridker 19 76 . 
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Nevertheless , there is enormous variat ion in the qual ity 
of family planning programs (Rosenfield 1 9 7 4 )  and in their 
apparent effect iveness , while their cost s ,  though relat ively 
low , are tending to increase .  Some evaluat ion o f  the record 
to dat e  is therefore in order . 
Probably few programs in the field of  int ernat ional aid 
have been so readily written off  as ' fa ilures ' without any 
at tempt to define first in realist ic terms what would 
constitute ' success ' .  And yet surely , by any standard , a 
family planning program in a low-income rural set t ing which 
succeeded in recruit ing more than 2 5  per cent of ' eligible ' 
women (married women aged 15-4 4 )  as cont inuing use rs of  
cont racept ion within six years of the  start of  the o f ficial 
pro gram must be counted a success .  Such a result has been 
achieved both in Thailand and in East Java and Bali by the 
Indones ian p rogram, and probably in a number of other places 
as well . Many examples of failure can also be cited . 
A number of careful effort s to evaluate the impact of 
family planning pro grams have been carried out in recent 
years . 11 The ac cumulat ing evidence suggest s  strongly that 
the downgrading of family planning programs at Bucharest was 
misplaced . Freedman and Berelson ( 19 7 6 )  in an imaginative 
analys is in which they s tudied family planning acceptance 
rates , prevalence of cont racept ive us e ,  crude birth rates and 
changes in crude birth rat es in the light of the social 
set t ing and the intens ity of family planning program effort s 
in forty-six developing count ries , folllld that for all four 
dependent variab les , ' program effort ' has an independent , 
significant effect of it s own . Indeed ,  in all cases the 
net effect of ' program ef fort ' was slightly larger than the 
net effect of ' social setting ' .  However ,  the int eract ive or 
j oint effects of ' program effort ' and ' social setting ' were 
mo re dominant , explaining 40 to 60 per cent of the total 
variance in the dependent variables . ' So cial setting ' not 
only af fect s people ' s  interest in fertility cont rol but also 
affect s the collective capacity to implement such a program. 
A more recent study by Mauldin and Berelson ( 19 7 7 )  
confirms and s t rengthen s  these findin gs .  Again i t  shows that 
in mult iple regress ion analys is of  factors influencing 
fert il ity de clines , family planning program effort is more 
11In particular , see Freedman and Berelson 1976 ; Lapham and 
Mauldin 1972 ; and Mauldin and Berelson 19 7 7 . 
highly associated with crude b irth rate declines than are 
the various ' demand ' factors , either s ingly or in 
combinat ion . 12 
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I t  i s  now possible t o  compile a list of  cotmt ries and 
regions in which significant declines in fertility have taken 
place which would not have been readily predictable on the 
bas is of demographic trans it ion theory . Such regions include 
Bali and East Java in Indonesia , parts of rural Thailand and 
the Philippin es , and states such as Haryana in India . 13 The 
list could no doubt be widened . Developmental factors can 
be cited in some o f  these areas which may have facilitated 
the fertility decline , but none of  them would have featured 
on anyone ' s  list , compiled t en years ago , of areas where 
family planning programs were likely to succeed . In all of  
them, a dynamic family planning program appears to have had 
an import ant ro le in the fert ility decline which has taken 
place . We do not fully tmderstand why programs should have 
succeeded there and failed elsewhere . But whatever the 
reason , the record does lend support to the argument that 
family planning pro grams should b e  strengthened in all 
cotmtries in order to meet the exist ing demand for contra­
cept ive services , however l imited that may appear to  b e .  
Social change tends to beget more social change , an d  the 
growing use and availability of contracept ives in a society 
will foster their wider and more rapid acceptance once family 
12There is also a moderately strong relat ionship between 
socio-economic condit ions and pro gram effort it self 
(Mauldin and Berelson 197 7 : 181) . But the independent 
ef fect o f  program effort is quite clear . 
1 3For an analys is of  the Indian reco rd , see Visaria and Jain 
1976 . Other Indian states including Kerala and Maharasht ra 
have also done very well in family planning , but their good 
performance was more pred ictab le on grotmds of social and 
economic development . Other analyses o f  the Indian record , 
based on mult ivariate analysis of  data for states , conclude 
that both st rong family planning input s and a high level 
of development are associated with high family planning 
performance (Amonker 19 75 ; and World Bank ( IBRD) 19 74 : 150-8) . 
Perhaps j ust as interesting as the internal variat ion 
within India is the fact that some Indian states have 
performed much better than regions in other count ries 
where social and economic condition s  appear equally or 
more favourab le . 
2 2 8  
size norms begin to turn down . 14 
The most intractable cultural regions appear to be sub­
Saharan Africa and the Moslem world (Mauldin and Berelson 
19 7 7 : Table 5 ) , where social and family structure place a 
pos it ive weight ing on large numb ers of  children . Here 
Kingsley Davis ' s  ( 19 6 7 )  argument that ' reliance on family 
planning allows people to feel that "something is b eing done 
about the populat ion problem" without the need for painful 
social changes ' may have most relevance . Even so , family 
planning has an appropriat e role to play here as well , 
provided that primacy is given to the reordering o f  the 
familial , social and economic structure which appears to be 
a precondit ion for the at tainment of low levels of fert ility 
in these areas . 
Both in recent years and in the demographic t rans ition 
in the west , then , significant fert il ity declines and large­
scale adopt ion of birth cont rol have occurred under widely 
differing developmental conditions , though the greatest 
successes tend to be in count ries or regions where the social 
and economic set t ing is favourable . No rigid limit s can be 
set on the possible impact of  a family planning program , 
even in a country where many of the supposed precondit ions 
to fert ility decline have not b een met . Therefore there 
seems to be every reason to proceed as far as poss ib le with 
development of a dynamic family planning program as part of  
a total development st rategy , befo re succumb ing to  the 
temptat ion to introduce more coercive measures . In count ries 
with good prospect s for social and economic development , with 
reasonably good administ rat ive infrastructures , such sust ained 
ef forts in family planning might be enough to accelerate the 
downward t rend in fert ility and facilitat e the at tainment of  
zero populat ion growth within thirty to fifty years in a 
context o f  rising levels of  living . This may well be  t rue 
of countries such as the Republic o f  Korea ,  Taiwan , Malays ia , 
Fij i ,  perhaps Thailand and the Philippines . The problem 
arises in tho se count ries with poor prospect s for sustained 
social and economic development (part ly b ecause of their 
populat ion prob lem) , a weak administ rative st ructure , and a 
social sys t em wi th a built -in mo t ivat ion for large families . 
14As Not est ein has aptly put it : ' It is t rue that values 
mediate behaviour ; but it is also  true that behaviour 
mediat es values , as any observer of fashions in dress must 
agree ' (Notestein 1 9 7 5 : 541) . 
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The best  effort s  to achieve fert ility reduct ion through a 
supply-oriented family planning program will not work in 
thi s set t ing,  or in any event will not have a large enough 
impact . 15 In such set t ings , aside from the somewhat ut opian 
goal of accelerat ing development so that it will ' automat ically ' 
t ake care o f  the fert ility problem, there is a need for 
policies influencing the demand for children , either through 
giving ext ra weight to those development prog�ams which can 
be expected to have a specially large impact on this demand , 
or through introducing direct incent ive or disincent ive 
programs . Whether more Draconian measures exemplified by 
India ' s  program of compulsory sterilization are ever j ust ified 
is an important ethical issue , and the posit ion taken will 
depend on a j udgment as to the welfare implicat ions of present 
populat ion trends , the likelihood of influencing these trends 
in other ways and the extent to which individuals bear the 
full social co sts of their childbearing.  At the very least , 
pruden ce and common sense would suggest that these ' harder ' 
programs not be tried until voluntary family planning and 
the milder ' beyond family planning ' measures have been given 
a fair test and have proved inadequate .  
In the whole area o f  ' beyond family planning ' ,  there is 
a good deal of experimentat ion going on through s lanting 
so cial and economic development proj ects to give the maximum 
demographic impact ( for example , expans ion of factories 
employing female labour in rural areas , expans ion of female 
enrolment in the school system, concentrating economic and 
social development pro grams in certain areas to test their 
impact on fert ility , improvement in income distribut ion , 
programs aimed at lowering infant mortality and improving 
nut rition) . The evidence is not yet in and the demographic 
impact of such proj ect s  will be very di fficult to measure . 
There is also some ·experimentat ion with incentive programs -
rewards and penalt ies to make fert il ity control more appealing 
to the couple , and to bring the privat e costs and benefits 
of childbear ing mo re in line with the social costs and 
ben efit s .  But p ilot proj ect s alon g t h es e  lines are relat ively 
few and their success is not yet easy to evaluate .  There is 
increasing agreement that becaus e people ' s  fert ility is 
influenced by and , in turn , vitally affect s the welfare of 
the communit ies they live in , community-oriented populat ion 
and development st rategies which will mob ilize community 
15For a classic , but now somewhat dat ed ,  expos it ion of this 
line of argument , see Kingsley Davis 19 6 7 ;  see also 
Ridker 1969 . 
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pressures for appropriate behaviour by individuals are needed 
(McNicoll 197 5 ) . 
The role of  foreign aid 
Finally , what has been ,  and what should b e ,  the role of 
foreign aid in ef fort s to lower b irth rates ? So far , its 
role has been quite broad . For example , in the 1969-75 period , 
UNFPA 
allocated 39 per cent of  its program funds to family 
planning delivery sys tems , program management and 
evaluation , and clinical studies of fert ility 
control methods ;  2 8 per cent to bas ic dat a 
collect ion , populat ion research and training ; 14 per 
cent to communicat ion , school and other populat ion 
educat ion programs ; and the remainder to populat ion 
policy fo rmulat ion and implementat ion , program 
development and mult isector act ivit ies ( George 
Washington Univers ity Medical Center 1 9 7 7b : J-2 7 7 ) . 
USAID has b een allo cating it s funds ( 1965 -7 7 period) to s ix 
maj or areas : development of  adequate family planning 
services ( 49 per cent ) ; informat ion programs ( 12 per cent ) ;  
manpower and inst itut ional capacity and ut ilizat ion (16 per 
cent ) ;  demographic data (9 per cent ) ;  development of adequate 
populat ion policies (5  per cent ) ;  development of  adequat e 
means of fert ility control ( 9  per cent ) .  In strengthening 
family planning field programs , AID ' s  biggest contribut ions 
have been the supply of cont racept ives and surgical equipment 
to family planning pro grams in over one hundred count ries ; 
development and testing of new or improved cont racept ive 
distribut ion methods , including the community-based systems 
now in use in Indonesia ; support for training o f  personnel 
and inst itut ion building ; and providing technical consult­
at ion for family planning programs . 
Largely owing to  the strong personal convict ions of  the 
Director of the Office of Populat ion of USAID , their 
philosophy has always b een supply-oriented , discount ing the 
po ssibil ity of deficient demand . 16 This supply-oriented 
st rategy , though backed up with rather ques tionable arguments 
and documentation , ·has b een more effect ive than it s crit ics 
16The philosophy has been outlined in many places . See , for 
example , Ravenholt 1976 . 
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expected or , perhaps , wished . The most serious weakness of  
the AID program has been the Congressionally-imposed require­
ment that it tender each year for supplies of oral contra­
cept ives , result ing in arb it rary and sudden changes in pill 
brands which have dist ressed users and caused serious setbacks 
to family 71anning pro grams in a number o f  count ries , including 
Thailand. ! 
The World Bank ' s  populat ion proj ects have a far higher 
const ruct ion component than those of other donor agencies , 
perhaps partly b ecause the Bank feels more at home with 
construct ion , even in the field of social development , perhaps 
part ly b ecause this is the sort o f  use to which recipient 
countries prefer to put loan money . Const ruct ion reaches 60 
or 70 per cent o f  the total package in many Bank proj ects , 
usually provided for rural health centres , training cent res 
for nurses and paramedics , and so forth . The Bank follows 
very strict accounting procedures , and disbursement of funds 
in Bank proj ects has , to dat e ,  been very s low . It can be 
argued that the Bank should have paid more attention to the 
need to increase demand for family planning services and 
should have given more encouragement to research in this area. 
The Bank is also well placed to build populat ion control into 
mult isectoral rural and urban development proj ects , rather 
than to concentrate on populat ion proj ects in isolation , but 
has not moved in this direction as yet . 
Now that very large funds are available from other donors 
for support of family planning programs , the foundat ions 
(Fo rd , Rockefeller and the Population Council )  and the 
Canadian Internat ional Development Research Centre put more 
of their funds into research , and increasingly into research 
with a populat ion policy emphasis . This is helping to redress 
the balance of  funding for research , b ecause it is arguable 
that USAID ' s  ftmding for non-cont racept ive research has been 
excessively concentrated on generat ion of  b asic demographic 
data and too little on address ing the fundamental issues of 
the relat ion between populat ion and so cial structure . The 
foundat ions have also b een import ant contributors to basic 
biomedical research into improved contracept ive technology . 
The foundat ions are keeping in the forefront of  the policy 
debate : for example , the Populat ion Council has created a 
Center for Policy Research and Ford and Rockefeller have a 
grants program to support policy-related research proj ect s .  
17For evidence on the problems caused in Thailand , see 
Keeny 19 7 3 : 12 4-5 . 
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Alto gether , probab ly about $18 million a year is going into 
social scien ce research in population , and in view of  the 
very bas ic unanswered ques t ions about det erminant s of 
fertility alone , this sum cannot be con sidered excessive . 
This in brief , then , is what the aid donors are doing.  
Is  it  what they shou ld be doing? Foreign aid should rarely , 
if ever , be crucial to the success of populat ion control 
programs , though there is evidence that it lzas been crucial 
in the early stages of some programs . But in most cases , if  
the polit ical will , the administ rat ive capacity and the 
funding to run a success ful family planning program cannot 
be generated lo cally , no amount of foreign expert ise and 
funding is likely to redress the balance adequately . There 
is an observable t endency for too much of the success to date 
in family planning programs to be appropriated to themselves 
by donor agencies . A case in point is the Indonesian pro gram. 
It is quite incorrect to att ribut e the early success of the 
Indonesian pro gram in East Java and Bali to the World Bank 
loan in support of the program. Not a cent of Bank money had 
yet b een disbursed at the t ime when the pro gram was already 
achieving notable gains . The dynamism, the organiz at ional 
st ructure was almost entirely Indonesian , though support from 
other donor agencies , notably USAID , in areas such as the 
supply of pills and development of report ing sys tems , was 
undoubtedly valuable . 
There are many ways in which fo reign aid can play a 
useful supplementary role in populat ion cont rol programs . 
In principle , such aid should go mainly into removing bot t le­
necks , into providing connnodit ies requiring s carce foreign 
exchange , into training and the disseminat ion of useful 
knowledge generated internat ionally (a$ well as to  helping to  
generate that knowledge in the first place , for  example in 
the development of new contracept ive technology ) , and perhaps 
in ' topping up ' local budgets to enable the program to expand 
faster than would be po ssible if it had to rely on the budget 
the national government was willing to make availab l e .  Local 
budget s often skimp badly in the research area , and foreign 
aid here can be part icularly useful , not only in support ing 
ent irely new research effort s ,  but also in replicat ing 
research findings well established in studies elsewhere , 
necessary if such research is to in fluence policy in the 
country concerned because of the prevalence of the ' not 
inven ted here ' syndrome . Another area where foreign aid can 
be valuable is in support ing pilot proj ects which local 
budget ary agencies may be loath to fund because their worth 
is not yet proven . 
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Technical ass istance remains a key area of  foreign aid 
in the populat ion f ield . Many countries embarking on 
populat ion programs do not have trained communicat ions expert s ,  
demographers or persons trained in evaluat ing the stat ist ics 
generated by the program . Consultants , provided they are 
sensit ive to cultural att itudes and const raints , can play a 
useful role in the period when nat ionals are being trained 
in these fields . Whether they can play an equally useful 
role in the field of management , an area in which many family 
planning programs are notoriously weak, is more doubt ful . 
Finally , foreign aid donors , despit e  all the pious claims 
of ' responding only to count ry request s ' , do exert an 
influence on governments in var ious sub tle and not-so-subtle 
ways . Rather than condemning this , it is perhaps more 
con struct ive to recognize that it is so and to aim to make 
the pressures pos it ive ones . The very availab il ity of aid 
for populat ion control from such a wide variety of donor 
agencies , including the UN sys tem and the World Bank , gives 
a sense of urgency and le git imacy which may influence 
governments to embark on family planning programs . To invoke 
the stringent account ing procedures required by the World 
Bank may be to st rengthen the hand of those who are trying 
to clo se off  those loopholes in lo cal accounting and tendering 
procedures which facil itate corrupt ion and nepot ism. Aid 
donors may be able to strengthen the hand o f  those att empting 
to develop community health services and expunge the elit ism 
and urban bias so prevalent in developing country health 
st ructures . 
The pos s ib il ity of counter-product ive pres sures is j ust 
as real , however ,  and everyone will have their own definit ion 
of  what such pressures are . It is well to recogniz e that 
some of the aid-giving agencies , for reas ons of inst itut ional 
aggrandis ement , need to give money for populat ion act ivit ies 
j ust as much as the recipient countries need to receive it . 
The observer could be excused at t imes for l ikening the 
compet it ion b etween aid donors to that of the mult inat ionals 
clamouring for a lucrat ive new telecommunicat ions cont ract . 
Busy family planning program administrators are beseiged by 
a constant stream of  foreign vis itors , with individually 
mostly legit imate concerns but collect ively offering 
compet ing,  overlapping and redundant proj ect s . ( Bangladesh 
was recently s coring some twenty per month . )  The has sled 
administrator could be excused for wishing them all to hell 
so that he can get on with the j ob of controlling populat ion 
growth . 
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There are lessons here for Australia ' s  involvement in 
the field of  aid for populat ion control . As Arndt has not ed 
in this monograph , a proj ect by a small donor country can 
cost the recipient almost as much in terms of  the t ime and 
energy of high-level administrators in the recipient govern­
ment as a much larger proj ect under World Bank or other 
auspices .  Moreover , Aust ralia cannot lay claim to part icular 
expert ise in designing or monitoring populat ion proj ect s . 
Therefo re the pract ice wh ereby Aust ral ia ' s aid for the 
Bangladesh populat ion proj ect (Australia ' s  first foray into 
this field) has b een built in as an integral part of a much 
larger World Bank proj ect is one that should continue t o  be 
followed in other proj ects , provided that Australia ' s voice 
is heard in the des ign and evaluat ion of the proj ect and her 
concerns do not diverge too widely from those o f  the other 
donor agencies involved in the proj ect . There is no place 
for ' prima donnas ' in effective aid proj ect s . 
Chapter 11 
Forms of aid : food and health t rans fer 
A. Bridger 
In this chapter it will be argued that the urgent health 
problems of developing countries relate to poverty , to 
in fect ion , to malnutrit ion and undernutrit ion , to lack of 
accessible potab le water and to mult iple environmental 
hazards . Such bas ic threat s to health are unlikely to be 
conquered by convent ioned health service techniques , however 
sensit ively and int ensively they are applied .  
The quest ion i s  how to make more j udicious use of all 
resources , in view of the insufficiency of funds and 
inadequate numb ers of  qualified or trained personnel to 
maintain services , let alone improve them. A system must be 
devised to cope no t only with current problems but , at the 
same t ime ,  at least make sure that the ground is being 
prepared for a bet ter future . Obviously the posit ion will 
vary greatly from one count ry to another . In a country which 
has to s t ruggle constantly against famine and other threat s 
to the very existence of  its inhab itant s , the order of 
priority in the government ' s  allocat ion of  funds will be 
very different to that which exists in a country suffering 
from the grave and undesirable consequences of affluence . 
But there are certain basic rules which are equally val id 
everywhere s ince good health and welfare is a fundamental 
desire of  human beings . Good physical and also mental health 
is the desire of all . Inseparable from this is adequate 
nutrit ion to enable cont inued enj oyment and preservat ion of 
that health . 
To achieve perfect results  under present condit ions 
would mean quality only for a very few . We should be far 
more concerned with quantity for all and be prepared to 
compromise at least for the t ime bein g  by seeking to avoid 
the worst . To achieve this there must at least be an inter­
nat ional exchange of experience , permitt ing errors to be 
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confessed . This is the more necessary b ecause many of  the 
errors that have been made in individual count ries arose 
when well intended act ions created negat ive result s .  
Evaluat ion would enable many o f  the proj ect s or proposals 
promoted by well-intentioned but naive fools or ideologist s 
in the fiel d  o f  public health to b e  stopped , at least at a 
nat ional level . 
In medicine it sel f , as taught in our univers it ies , the 
emphas is is placed on the teaching of prec ise data and 
sophist icated techniques and the more the pat ient is viewed , 
not as a human bein g ,  but a conglomerate of organs or a 
scientific problem,  the more remote applied medicine becomes . 
The formula fo r prevent ing the development o f  such a trend 
in medicine is to devise n ew curricula , new methods , and even 
new structures of  medical t raining which emphas ize a rat ional 
social us e of health resources and which gear regional heal th 
systems to the needs and spe cial characteris t ics of their 
populat ions . 
The rat ional use of medical resources depends not only 
on the structure of the public health sys t em, but j ust as 
much upon the degree to wh ich the individual consumer of  
health services - the actual member of such a public health 
system - can be mot ivated to make use of what is available 
to him or her . The most effect ive public health system is 
one which best serves the health interes t s  of  both the 
individual s and the community and does this by interes t ing 
individual users in their own health by keeping them informed , 
act ively involved , and cons cious of their share of  respons­
ib il ity for its care . The result is that they part icipate 
in the operat ion of  the system and enj oy the fruit of  their 
own effort s . A pub lic health sys tem ,  geared to the pat tern 
of  human behaviour , designed neither for the highly 
intell igent nor the illiterate , will generate a feeling o f  
con fidence an d  well-being . I t  should at tend to the body and 
it s in firmit ies , to mat ters of  hygiene and disease as well 
as to meet ing the needs of  the psyche and alleviat ing 
anxiety . 
Malnut rit ion 
The UN World Health Organizat ion (WHO) est imates that 
90 million children under the age of five suffer from malnu­
trit ion in the world today . Of these , 10 million suffer from 
severe malnut rit ion , that is from a shortage of  calories and 
protein .  This can prove fatal . But mo re often malnutrit ion 
opens the door to other dis eases ,  respiratory in fect ions , 
pneumonia , bronchit is , middle ear in fect ions , croup , 
tonsillit is an d the common cold . Then comes diarrhoea , 
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either the result of  gas tric infect ion or the react ion of a 
poorly nut rit ioned in testine to yet another gastric insult . 
Mortality rates fo r children are about 100 times higher in 
developing countries than in developed ones , the great est 
killer being the diarrhoea-pneumonia complex . In many 
developing countries children do not receive a minimum 
accept able standard of nut rit ional , social and health care . 
Malnutrit ion has not b een conquered , in fact in many countries 
with increasing populat ions , it is becoming more prevalent . 
Paradoxically the emphas is often given to in fant and 
child care in the less developed count ries has b een a barrier 
to long-term improvement in health . Illogically , they are 
nurtured through one crit ical period only to enter a more 
prolonged crit ical period of early childhood .  Thus 50 per 
cent of children in many parts of the world who reach the 
age of one year will still die by the age of five owing to 
the superimposed effect s of  infect ion on malnut rit ion . Unt il 
there are necessary changes in social structure , educat ion , 
food product ion and distribut ion and in health care this 
s ituat ion is likely to continue . Some ' modern ' correct ives 
are harmful and should be changed . For example , only recently 
publicity has been given to the po ssible adverse e ffect s of  
the del ivery of  condensed milk for infant feeding to developing 
count ries - indeed we here in Austral ia were recently made 
aware of the lurking pit fall s o f  this fo rm of  feeding in our 
own society despite our sophist icated health system. The 
mass of the populat ion living in dire circumstances in 
developing countries cannot afford to  buy enough milk and 
cannot keep it clean . They dilute it excessively and , far 
more important , t inned milk is given in preference to breast 
feeding . This pract ice is part icularly prevalent in urban 
areas and amon g working mothers . Cons equently there is a 
vast increase in gas troenterit is in weaning months . 
Deficiencies in prot ein and other nutrients can lead to 
ret arded brain development with irrevers ible neurological 
changes in the new-born and even in the foetus . Protein 
malnut rit ion which occurs later , that is after the first few 
months of life , can result in decreased mental development 
and apathy . This , however ,  does not seem to result in 
permanent damage . Recovery may b e  complete , provided that 
protein intake becomes adequate .  An exacerbat ing factor is 
that protein deficiency normally result s in an apathet ic 
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emot ionless child . This  apathy then affects mother-child 
interact ion and so indirectly impairs child development as 
well . 
Malnutrit ion of  course is not confined to the youn g .  
I t s  extensive ramif icat ions right through life are of  the 
utmost importance not only to the health of the people but 
the health and wealth of  the nat ion . The effects of  malnu­
trit ion on pregnancy and lactat ion are well known , for 
example , ( i) spontaneous ab ort ion with its resultant ef fect 
upon the mother producing either deb il ity or serious 
in fect ion ; ( ii)  a higher incidence of toxaemia of pregnancy ;  
( iii) s till b irths . All add to a depress ing l ife s ituat ion . 
There is increased inc idence o f  contagious disease b ecause 
of a poorly developed auto-immune system. Anaemia e ither 
from poo r food intake or paras it ic in festat ion leads to 
lethargy and resultant poor product ivity .  Ab senteeism from 
school and work further aggravates the whole socio-economic 
problem and leads only to a further wastage of resources . 
The image in the indus trialized world of the character­
istics of malnutrit ion in developing count ries is often 
grossly distorted and based on pictures of helpless individuals 
in refugee war camps or war-torn countries . This is seldom not 
the general case . The appearances of malnutrit ion are far 
more subtle . Retarded growth and development is difficult to 
as sess unless the child ' s  age is known . Moreover , in adults 
the apathy of prot ein deficiency or the deb ility of  anaemia 
may be covered by a greater dependence on alcohol or drugs . 
There must be proper evaluat ion of the nut ritional 
status of populat ion s ,  with knowledge of  their food prefer­
ences and social and cultural customs . Addit ional informat ion 
is also needed concerning the availab ility , production , 
distribut ion and pro cessing of  food . With such informat ion 
it becomes pos s ible to des ign pol1t ically feas ib le programs 
which may provide the desired health effect s .  If  possible 
such programs should be field tested in pilot studies b efore 
being est ablished on a large scale and then continually 
re-evaluated as they are implement ed . 
In low income countries emphasis mus t be given to 
protein supply in two main cat egories : 
( a) to provide protein rich foods for the needs of 
infants who cannot be breast fed and during the 
weaning period ; 
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(b ) to raise general protein intake and to improve its 
distribut ion to ensure that all can obtain their 
phys iological minimum required intake . 
Food p riori;.ies in the Third Wo rld 
Agricultural policies in less developed countries t end 
to concentrate on increas ing cash c rops and developing food 
processing indust ries , often with an eye to potent ially 
lucrat ive urban and export markets . This has resulted in 
very little at tent ion being paid to the real needs of  the 
rural people , part icularly women . It becomes increas ingly 
difficult to maintain sel f -suf ficiency in staple food crops 
such as maize ,  cassava and sorghum . Until recently , very 
little research had been done on these t raditional crops and 
this , comb ined with the emphasis on cash crops , has resulted 
too o ften in a shortage o f  staple foods . To compensate for 
this governments must import gra ins such as wheat and rice 
for sale in the rural areas as well as in the towns , so 
adding to  overseas expenditures . 
It is important to  det ermine priorit ies at the grassroots 
level in any att empt to modernize food ut ilizat ion systems . 
Although init ially a costly pro cess , government assistance 
is essent ial to raise s tandards of processed food in rural 
market s .  Control of hygiene in the pro cessing and preparat ion 
of food is also important to protect the health of consumers . 
It is necessary to  study the day-to-day rout ine in rural 
households , part icularly the pro cessing and cooking of food , 
in order to develop and evaluate food utiliz at ion systems 
and to ensure co rrect moderniz at ion . Much informat ion is 
often gleaned from mothers at baby clinics , at schools where 
snacks or lunches are provided , in group consultat ion with 
famil ies and through demonstrat ions and discuss ions with 
women ' s  associat ions , Many new ideas and techniques for 
food technology will come from rural women themselves and 
much can be ga ined by exchanges of informat ion between 
communit ies and even countries . 
Populat ion cont rol 
There is no doubt that the very b est contracept ive is 
good nut rit ion . When asked about family planning by 
Schreiner (19 76)  Cicely Williams commented : 
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If we look after the quality of the populat ion the 
populat ion will look after it self [ experience has 
taught her that it is no good distribut ing contra­
cept ive devices to a populat ion where young children 
cont inue to die in droves from diseases or malnu­
trit ion ] , but once parents real ise that they can 
raise two or three healthy children they then begin 
to think about limit ing family s iz e .  In the poorest 
communities safety is st ill seen to be in numbers 
of children . Voluntary birth cont rol will only come 
with understanding . ( Interpolat ion in original . )  
The role o f  nut rit ional scientists in research 
Nut rit ional scientists should be much more closely 
involved in the planning of  agronomic refo rm. In looking 
at many maj or nut rit ional programs supported by governments 
and internat ional agencies , it becomes clear that nutrit ional 
s cient ist s have had little involvement in their concept ion , 
development , administ rat ion or evaluat ion . This is a 
mistake . The qual ity as well as quantity of  foods available 
for the poorer classes in less developed count ries chould b e  
a priority element in planning for higher agricultural 
product ivity .  The nut rit ional content of crops promoted 
should be scient ifically assessed under the varying circum­
stances in which they grow . Storage and process ing procedures 
should be evaluated both for unneces sary waste and for their 
effect on the quality of foodstuffs . Alternat ive sources of 
prot ein such as aquaculture should be exploited to their 
utmos t ,  especially at village level . 
Nut r it ional scient ist s can contribute great ly to improving 
the food s ituat ion . An example worth rememb erin g  is that of  
Britain in World War II  where nut rit ional principles were 
applied rigidly to an island of some 50 million people which 
for some t ime had imported 50 per cent of it s food . The 
success achieved was in the recognit ion that in many aspect s 
the health of  it s people was better at the end of the emergency 
than at the beginning , which was direct ly due to close and 
succes s ful collaborat ion b etween food scientists and planners . 
Health trans fer 
Health has a maj or role to play , not only in being a 
goo d in its own r ight , but as a maj or component o f  economic 
prosperity and social development . Improving people ' s  health 
widens their horizons , makes them more able to control their 
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own destiny , lifts their product ive capacity and makes them 
more responsive to programs designed to improve the economic 
condit ions of the community . 
The health of a populat ion is influenced by many factors : 
climat ic , geographic , cultural , administ rat ive and economic . 
In developing countries the health problems concern mainly 
the younger age group , in contrast to western societ ies , 
where they lie chiefly with the older age group . Malnut rit ion , 
rapid populat ion growth , poo r maternal and child welfare , 
poor environmental sanitat ion , paras it ic infes tation , lack 
of access to primary health care , unsafe potable water are 
but some of the many press ing problems . 
Medical t raining 
The des ign and implementat ion of a health program for any 
any country must take into account the requirement s of the 
socio-economic condit ions existing in the country . A 
balance between curat ive and prevent ive medicin e  is essent ial , 
and high priority should be given to creat ing environmental 
situat ions which are more conducive t o  b etter health . 
Despite the well-known and do cumented fact that western 
medicine with its accent on highly trained doctors who o f  fer 
personal curat ive treatment carried out at ever increas ing 
public cost in ivory tower hospitals , is j us t  not applicable 
to Third World countries , many of these count ries s t ill base 
their systems of  medical treatment on our e�ample . Thus 
nat ional pride may direct aid funds into  construct ion and 
support o f  a large hospital complex even if  only to benefit 
polit icians and bureaucrats ,  and will deny funds for pub lic 
health pro grams des igned for the masses . The reasons for 
this pro-urban and upper class bias are many and complex , 
and change will only come slowly with educat ion , with it s 
understanding of social j ustice and quality o f  life . 
Modern educat ion is not widely available in developing 
countries , s ince the maj ority of the populat ion live in 
rural areas , and have little contact with the · mas s media and 
sophist icated educat ional facilities . There is , however , in 
some countries an increas ing trend to follow the Chinese 
example and establish a pyramidal health t ier with it s 
foundat ion in a village health worker or ' barefoot doctor ' .  
The emphas is then changes to a low-cost , integrated health 
delivery system based on low-key technology . In other words , 
the st ress is on quantity rather than quality . 
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Disease t ransmi ss ion 
The pattern of disease throughout all developing 
count ries has a bas ic similarity and can be classified as 
follows : 
( diarrhoeal 
i Faecally related ( int ernal parasit ic 
a) Communicable ii Air-borne 
iii Vecto r-borne 
b)  Non-commllll icable 
(hepat it is 
( t uberculosis 
{pneumonia 
( upper respiratory 
infect ion 
(malaria 
( t rypanosomias is 
( s chistosomiasis 
(onchocerias is 
malnutrit ion 
( i) Faecally related disease can only be controlled by 
proper at tent ion to water and sanitat ion . Individual 
curat ive measures have only a short-term effect if the 
environmental s ituat ion producing the disease continues . 
( ii)  Air-b orne . The most common diseases are tuber­
culo s is , pneumonia , diphtheria , bronchit is , whooping cough , 
meningit is , influenza , measles , smallpox and chicken pox . 
Poor qual ity housing and environment al condit ions are 
princ ipal factors in the spread of these diseas es . 
( iii)  Vector-borne diseases can only be eradicat ed by 
removal of  the vector . This will include public health and 
sanitat ion measures to remove suit able breedin g  grounds for 
these insect s . Constant vigilance is required as otherwise 
a resurgence of  the vector and dis ease will occur . Unfor� 
tunately this has b een the case with malaria with the dual 
problem o f  vector resistance to insect icides and parasit ic 
adapt at ion to chemotherapeut ic agent s .  
More recent work by the World Health Organiz at ion has 
been towards the development of suitable vaccines against the 
paras ite it sel f . Protect ion against the disease is ensured 
by st imulat ing the individual ' s  auto-immune system by 
vaccinat ion . 
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As in our own country , where possible , inno culat ion 
against any of these three classes of disease is the surest 
way of protect ion . Large-s cale innoculat ion programs are 
always the most  direct way of obtaining mas s  immunity .  A 
fine example i s the almost complet e world-wide eradicat ion 
of smallpox by mass populat ion innoculat ion . 
Immuniz at ion against smallpox , typhoid , cholera , yellow 
fever , plague , measles , tuberculosis , poliomyelit is , 
diphtheria and tetanus are essent ial , part icularly in reducing 
infant mort ality . 
Health planning in developin g  countries 
Health planning is a management tool with which 
polit icians and civil servants who administer health services 
can be helped t o  obt ain and organize resources for priority 
purpo ses . Problems concerning the public ' s  health , or 
problems in other sectors of  nat ional life which are related 
to health , should be def ined and given an agreed priority by 
representat ives of  the pub lic working j ointly with managers 
and t echnical expert s in health services . Responsible 
representat ives of  profess ional groups such as doctors , 
nurses , sanitarians , technicians and service s t af f  should be 
consulted during the planning of the services they will have 
t o  implement . 
Frequently the greatest hindrances to the implementat ion 
of success ful health programs appear to be weak mot ivat ion , 
inert ia in management and problems in planning . Health 
planning i s  not solely the budget ing of resources . A 
document which merely specifies how many hospital beds , 
health centres , doctors , nurses , and health workers are to 
be provided and the level of expenditure on drugs and 
equipment planned , is no real health plan at all . The plan 
must indicate the purposes for which facilit ies are to be 
provided ,  why t hese purposes have been chosen , how their 
achievement will be measured and how the specific resources 
will be organiz ed to achieve these purposes . It should 
est imate the feasib ility of the program and the ant icipated 
const raint s to b e  overcome . Of espec ial interest to 
potent ial aid donors is the quest ion of  what special 
development effo rt s  will be needed . to overcome these 
const raint s and the form and sources of support that those 
sp ecial effort s will need . 
The social and economic cost s  and benefit s of attaining 
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specified nat ional health obj ect ives should be compared with 
those expected if the s ame resources were to be used for 
other desired purposes . Non-medical planners , economis t s  
and polit icians must be co-op erat ively involved to include a 
wide range of  values and obj ect ives . Offsetting fact ors to  
improved health such as  an in crease of populat ion must be  
cons idered . It  may b e  more impo rtant to safeguard the 
health of immediat ely economically important groups of the 
population , e . g . workers in maj or agr icultural , industrial 
or ext ract ive proj ects , rathe r than to care for new-born 
and small children who are economic ally dependent . Investment 
at a cruc ial st age of t ime may be o f  great importance to the 
fut ure development of a country . 
The j ustif icat ion for health planning is that it at tempt s  
to ident ify tmequivocally these priorit ies , then t o  distribute 
the available t rained manpower and funds to relevant well­
des igned programs which will meet them . The benefit / cost 
rat ios of simple techniques in preventive medicine and 
environmental sanitat ion are not understood by many polit icians 
in developing countries , and the advant ages that these 
measures can bring are not appreciated by the people .  The 
tradit ional b eliefs and att itudes about the causes and 
there fore the prevent ion of diseases may cont inue to differ 
widely from those which are held by the planners of health 
services . Therefo re very effect ive programs such as rout ine 
childhood immuniz at ion , chlorinat ion o f  water supplies , health 
educat ion to improve dangerous weaning customs or hab it s  of  
excret ion may be thought irrelevant by the public . 
When the health demands of  the pub lic can be expres sed , 
they may be strident . They are usually overwhelmingly for 
curat ive services , whereas the most urgent health needs , 
from the health managers ' and economist s ' point of view , are 
for prevent ive and promot ive health pro grams . The ult imate 
remedy of  course for these short-sighted demands is to  be 
found in another secto r - educat ion . The divers ion of 
resources to educat ion may in fact be far more b eneficial t o  
the general health of a community than the same amount o f  
money being spent on the highly expensive , therapeut ic 
technologies of  up-to-date hospitals . 
Negat ive effect s of aid 
Unfortunately improvement will almo st always bring with 
it new problems and these may prove to be more difficult than 
the old ones . Aid carries with it a negat ive as well as 
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pos it ive repercussion s .  These may lie coupled with the 
overall ecological implicat ions of any proj ect . For example , 
man-made lakes may increase the incidence of vector breeding 
and so increase the incidence of diseases such as bilharia , 
malaria and onchocerciasis ( river blindness ) . Irrigat ion 
proj ect s may contaminate land producing increased hookworm 
infestat ion with subsequent anaemia and deb ility . Provis ion 
of powdered milk may produce enterit is in children due to 
poor steril izat ion of utens ils .  Indiscriminate use of DDT 
in malaria eradicat ion can kill spiders , beetles , cent ipedes 
and the like , which are natural predators of human paras ites 
such as lice and bed bugs . Supply of village water may 
promote the spread of water-borne diseases and increase 
mosquito breeding if drainage is inadequat e and sanitat ion 
measures are not observed . 
The po ssible negat ive effect of aid must be considered 
in all proj ect s but part icularly in tho se of water conser­
vat ion , mining and land settlement . Adequate assessment of 
water-borne diseases must be made in irrigat ion and aqua­
culture proj ect s . 
Land s ettlement proj.ects can bring more people into 
areas of disease to  which they have very little natural 
resis tance . Part of the proj ect assessment should be a 
health component in which the following factors are examined : 
( i) the prevalence of disease in the area ; ( ii) the po ss i-
bility of eliminat ing the disease and its cost ; ( iii) the 
provis ion of adequat e staff for the health post ; and ( iv) 
the acces sibility of the populat ion to curat ive cent res 
(health centres , hospitals , et c . ) .  
Conclusions 
The ext ent and nature of problems obviously vary from 
country to  country ,  but when deciding priorit ies , the cent ral 
obj ect ive - the rural and urban poor - must be kept firmly 
in mind .  Emphasis has therefore been recommended to : 
Eradicat ion of  malnutrit ion , part icularly in children . 
Preventat ive and d isease eradicat ion measures . 
Training of  medical and paramedical auxiliaries . 
Cont inuing health and nutrit ional educat ion at all 
levels and part icularly in associat ion with a 
development proj ect . 
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Local product ion of vacc ines , drugs and ant ibiot ics 
which can be used by the medical auxiliary at village 
level . 
Public health and commun ity medicine at village level ; 
in part icular water supply , sewerage and sanitat ion 
facil it i es . 
Greater research into the health and nutrit ional needs 
of developing countries . 
The emphas is o f  change must be a shift from expens ive 
and intermit tent curat ive t reatment of illnes s  in individuals 
to the promot ion of mass health on a cont inuous bas is at a 
community level . Ideally there must be a change in the 
ecological , cultural and nut rit ional s ituat ion which permit s 
disease to thrive . 
A complete change from curat ive to preventat ive medicine 
is not envisaged but rather a balance b etween curat ive methods 
and those des igned to control and prevent disease .  At tempt s 
at a more rapid shift in health educat ion or environmental 
health will encounter resistance . Change will come only 
s lowly . It must follow a sustained systemat ic approach aimed 
at altering living hab it s  and att itudes as well as encouraging 
household and community act ion to improve water supply and 
sanitat ion pract ices . 
Chapter 12 
Charity b egins at home - on development , 
trade and structural adj us tment 
Wolf gang Kasper 
This study starts from the premise that aid to developing 
countries , that is the internat ional transfer of gifts , falls 
far short of  the requirement s of  those 70 per cent of  the 
world populat ion who live in less developed countries and 
generate a quarter of world product ion (Tinbergen et a l . 19 7 6 :  
Tab le 1 ) . Worldwide social policy b y  donations will always 
be strictly confined by the narrow limits o f  int ernat ional 
solidarity . It is even doubt ful whether the cit izens of the 
rich count ries are really prepared to put up as much as the 
1 per cent of gross domest ic product that has long b een 
st ipulated for aid . 
The bulk of resources that can b e  marshalled for economic 
development to meet the economic aspirat ions of  the cit izens 
of  the poor count ries has therefore either to be given as 
credit s or has to come from the developing countries them­
selves . In developing their own resources and in implementing 
more advanced t echnologies , less developed countries (LDCs )  
have a choice between an inward-looking strategy , and looking 
outward and co-operat ing with the rich countries . It will be 
argued in this st udy that the latter s trategy of fers by far 
the best lon g-term opportunit ies for fast and sustained 
economic growth , both in the less developed and the more 
developed countries (MDCs ) .  But this st rategy makes cons id­
erable demands on the will of dif ferent societ ies to co-operate 
and on the readines s of rich societ ies to adj ust their pro­
ductive structures so as to make room in world market s  for 
the products of the n ew industrial countries . If , despite 
these obstacles , world development is allowed to go the way 
of  t rade co-operat ion , t rade will contribute far more to 
development than aid ever can . 
The main purpose of this chapter is to explore the precon­
dit ions of increasing t rade b etween rich and poor , which rich 
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countries , like Australia , will have to create so a s  t o  
f acilitate co-operat ion an d  avert trade confrontation . 
The effects of art ificially stimulat ing import subst itut ion 
It has frequently been argued that the obstacles to 
spont aneous economic development in LDCs are so high that 
they can only be overcome by the suppress ion of internat ional 
compet it ion ( infant-industry argument) . Certain types of 
privat e product ion costs - such as the cost of developing 
skills , of overcomin g market frict ion s ,  or of  developing 
energy and wat er supply and transpo rt facilit ies - are indeed 
much higher in LDCs than in MDCs , so that the st imulus of 
tariff or quota prot ection may be needed to init iat e industrial 
development . 
However , internat ional experience has shown that pro­
tection opens a road to development that is dangerous and may 
in the longer run end in a blind alley : 
(a)  The impact o f  a new tariff on the pro fit ability of 
producing a certain commodity differs greatly from 
the longer-run effect o f  an established tariff : 
if  it is the long-term relative pro fitability per 
unit of  product ion ( in the LDC locat ion relat ive 
to  the MDC lo cat ion)  that mat ters for  the viability 
of  a new industrial development , then both the 
short-run and the long-run cost effect s of the 
tariff have to be taken into account . To elaborat e ,  
let us write : 
where 
Un it profit = price - unit cost ; 
L K M 1f = p 
- 0 · w - 0 r - 0 q ;  
1f prof it per unit of output 
p sales price 
O/L labour product ivity 
w = wage rate 
O/K capit al product ivity 
r = capital interest rat e ( including 
p remium 
M/O materials per unit of  output 
q = price of  inputs 
risk 
The ef fect of a new tariff is to raise p while unit 
cos t s  remain constant , so that pro fitability goes 
up ( relative to a given world level )  and the chances 
249 
fo r att ract ing the protected industry increase .  
However ,  the longer-run increase in productivity 
will be hampered because ( i) entrepreneurs are not 
forced to become efficient by internat ional price 
compet it ion for their products , ( ii) the limited 
size of many LDC market s  precludes product ivity 
growth out of economies of larger s cale of pro­
duct ion , ( iii) protect ionism tends to increase the 
prices of other product s ,  including input prices q ,  
and ( iv) indust rial workers in protected groups 
manage to  raise their wages (Little , Scitovsky and 
S cott 19 70) . 
(b ) Protect ionism increases the size of  the bureaucracy 
(a  cost to a developing nation )  and induces 
corruption and administ rat ive inefficiency . The 
most ef fect ive contro l  of business and multi nat ional 
corporat ions , the control by compet itors , is replaced 
by bureaucratic intervention , a control litt le 
suit ed to ensure the social benefits of industrial 
development . 
( c )  If the new entrepreneurial class of  a developing 
country becomes accustomed to expect to obtain 
their profits from ' lobbying Delhi ' rather than 
compet ing with other entrepreneurs , the developing 
country is likely to develop a class of  ' Keynesian 
ent repreneurs ' that admini ster demand handed out to 
them by government , rather than ' Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurs ' who pioneer new opportunit ies and 
develop their own markets .  Thi s  creates a s erious 
long-run liab ility in countries in which there is 
no tradit ion of compet it ive commerce and in which 
genuine enterprise is the most scarce of product ion 
factors . 
( d) The protect ion o f  industry means that consumers , and 
especially the rural secto r ,  are exploited by 
higher product p rices . This increases socio­
pol it ical tens ions (and will raise the risk premium 
in capital cost ) . The long-run polit ical effects 
of the tariff are compounded by the co st s o f  rapid 
urbanizat ion ,  as tarif f-protected factories tend to 
be located in large ports or big cit ies . There , 
the growth of services does not keep pace with 
industrializ at ion or populat ion growth and creates 
unexpected long-run social cos t s . 
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(e)  Development of  domest ic resources in LDCs is to a 
con siderable ext ent conf ined by limited informat ion 
about pot ent ial costs and profit s . In LDCs , 
informat ion cannot be derived by ext rapolat ion from 
past experience , so that it is doubly important that 
world-wide scarcit ies and world-market prices prevail 
to st eer allo cat ion in the init ial phases of develop­
ment to prevent misallocat ion of s carce resources 
( such as skills and capit al ) . Tariffs  o ft en produce 
the wrong market s ignals ( especially tarif fs obtained 
by polit ical pressure or bribery ) , s o  that coun tries 
end up with product ion structures that may appear 
more developed , but are entirely out of l ine with 
their long-run needs . 
For thes e  reasons , tarif f prot ect ion in many LDCs , 
especially the smaller ones , has led to an init ial spurt o f  
growth that i s  typically followed b y  industrial stagnat ion 
(Lit tle , S citovsky and Scott 1970 ; Krueger 19 7 8 ;  Donges 1 9 74 ) . 
On ce this st age is reached , it is essent ial to  convert 
the import-subst itution st rat egy to an outward-looking export­
growth st rategy (Pomfret 1975 ) . In other words , ' infant 
protect ion ' must be followed by ' t eenage compet it ion ' ,  
otherwise the new industries become senescent and a social 
liability . This swit ch in development st rategy has b een very 
success ful in many well-document ed cases , such as Spain , 
Korea , Braz il and Taiwan ( see , for example , Donges ( 19 76) ; 
Don ges and Riedel ( 19 76 ) ; Balassa ( 19 7 7 ) . But the swit ch is 
not easy for a developing country to  make because the t ariff 
has by then creat ed it s own powerful int erest groups ( indust­
rialist s , bureaucrat s and polit icians who administer it , urban 
trade tmions ) .  Moreover , internat ional compet it ion can eas ily 
be branded as a reversal to colonial t imes and can b e  shown 
to be a vexing internat ional const raint on nat ional s overeignty . 
Th e case for a swit ch to export orientat ion can be 
crit ically weakened if the r ich cotmtries threaten t rade 
protection against new and increas ing LDCs ' export s .  World­
market access is of course a precondit ion for the success o f  
the swit ch .  In the decade 1965-75 , when man y  success s t ories 
of  indust ry-strat egy swit ches were writ ten , market access was 
on the whole not a l imit . But new att itudes in the rich 
countries that developed during the recess ion of  the mid-19 70s 
may well force LDCs into inward-looking prot ect ion , into 
industrial and social stagnat ion and ult imat ely into  cost ly 
confrontat ion with th e old-established indust rial nat ions . 
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The cost s  and benefits o f  co-op erat ion 
Many developing count ries embarked on import-substitut ing 
st rategies for economic growth during the late 1950s and 1960s ; 
and mo st are now reaching the limits of their frequently very 
small domestic market s .  At the s ame t ime , urbanizat ion , 
rising aspirat ions and a frequently very rapid growth of  the 
labour force and of youth unemployment make continued indust rial 
growth the most desirab le option to enhance material living 
standards . Access to overseas markets ,  the markets of the 
developed countries as well as those o f  neighbouring developing 
count ries , is therefore becoming a crucial precondit ion for 
further growth and polit ical stability in LDCs . 
It is important to realiz e ,  however , that a part of  the 
benefit s of a closer int ernat ional divis ion of labour between 
rich and poor countries also accrues to the developed countries . 
Just as the United States pro f it ed in the postwar period from 
the trans fer of their advanced product ion and management 
technology to Europe and Japan , so are the OECD count ries bound 
to benefit from a t rans fer o f  their technology and a cat ch-up 
by LDCs of their own living standards and purchas ing power 
(Abramovit z 197 7 ;  Kasper 1978a) . Moreover , demographic trends 
in our post-indust rial societ ies point to long-rlnl labour 
s carcit ies , despite present tmemployment . Thus long-run 
strategies that aim at MDC labour-saving through the indirect 
means of import ing labour-intensive product s from LDCs will 
remove future labour bottlenecks to growth in MDCs . The 
adj ustment of product ion st ructures in LDCs and MDCs to 
different trade st rategies involves long t ime lags (as all 
supply policies do) , so that it would be both wasteful and 
sub -opt imal to stem labour-saving imports now , induce LDCs to 
acquire more skill- and capital-intensive lines of product ion 
and hope for readj ustment s lat e r . l 
Of course , adj ustment to  the arrival on the world s cene 
of new indust rial count ries also creates cos t s  to the 
developed countries , most of them of a short-term transit ional 
nature , whereas the benefits are predominant ly long-t erm. 
This is why polit icians and interest groups , who have a short 
t ime horiz on, tend to oppose these adj ustments .  Apart from a 
general desire to perpetuate old ways and t echniques and 
apart from the fact that internat ional and interracial 
1This ' z ig-z ag ' l ine was advocated by the recent Australian 
White Paper on Manufacturing Industry (Australian Government 
1 9 7 7 ) . 
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solidarity pose st rict limit s on the readiness o f  producer 
groupings in rich countries to make adj ustments that appear 
to be in the short -rllll interest only of producers in LDCs , 
there are some identifiable cost obstacles to  adj ustment 
(Kasper 19 7 8b ) : 
( a) Cert ain part s o f  the capital stock may have to  be 
scrapped before it has reached the end of it s 
technically useful life and before this has b een 
expected . 
(b ) Even more impo rt antly , many types of human capital 
may have to be depreciat ed . Specific worker skill s ,  
managerial expert ise and established market 
knowledge may all of a sudden become useles s . 
( c )  In th e case of  some plant s that close down in the 
course of adj ustment , workers may have to move to 
new locat ions . This creates social as well as very 
high private cost s .  Regions which depend heavily 
on shrinking act ivit ies may be pushed into  a 
vicious circle of cont ract ion , and many pub lic 
in frast ructure investments in these areas may also 
become useless . 
However ,  it is  important in the interest of  a rat ional 
debate to obtain a realistic perspect ive of the extent of  
adj us tment co sts . Experience in count ries that liberaliz ed 
in the past and adj usted to a closer integrat ion with world 
market s  ( for example , Europe in the 1950s and 1960s under 
OECD/EEC auspices ; Spain in the 1960s ; many LDCs over the 
last decade ) clearly shows that indust ries , once established , 
are not completely wiped out by overseas competit ion .  
Exist ent asset s , skills and in frast ructures which are 
combined in thes e indust ries normally const itut e  powerful 
enough precondit ions for the survival of most industries and 
plant s .  All that happens is that factors of  product ion are 
redeployed to produce a new ,  prob ab ly more spec ializ ed 
product range . Many means of product ion , that app eared 
\lllcompet it ive on the bas is of prot ected ,  high-price inputs 
and small product ion rllll s ,  prove to b e  compet it ive under 
worl d-market condit ions , as the gains from special izat ion 
raise product ivity . This aspect has gained in importance 
over the last generat ion as product ion runs have increased 
llllder the dual influence of technolo gical change and a 
widening of market s due to lower transport cost s (Fig . 1 ) . 2 
2The re are of co urse except ions where technological change 
Unit  costs of 
production 
I 
C2 I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Production technology of the 1 940s 
Scale of outpu t 
F ig. 1 Market Size and I ncreasing Optimum Sca l e  of Production : a schematic example 
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It must also be realized that a large share of industrial 
worke rs is not directly engaged in product ion , but in des ign , 
packaging and dist ribut ion . If exist ing firms specialize and 
become importers of part of  their previous product range 
(and exporters of some product s ) , the ' overhead part ' of the 
workforce will hardly be affected . Moreover , integrat ion 
with the new indust ries in LDCs offers many opporttm it ies for 
b ilateral , inter-f irm co-op erat ion as the new indus trialists 
in LDCs often lack the des ign and marketing expert ise that 
would enable them to gain large shares in sophist icated MDC 
market s .  
2 ( cont inued) 
has decreased opt imal product ion s cales , e . g .  where synthetics 
have replaced met als in products .  However ,  the net effect 
is to larger rnns . 
Technological change and lower transport costs  have shi fted 
product ion funct ions to larger opt imum scales of product ion . 
A small country with an actual domest ic demand of Atl1 for a 
specific product might have incurred only a small cost disad­
vantage ( C1) a generat ion ago , whereas the cost disadvantage 
c2 becomes very large when int ernat ional best-pract ice tech­
nology for that specific p roduct shift s to product ion tech­
nology 2 - even if the domestic market grows to Atl2 .  
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Much internat ional spe cialization b etween LDCs and MDCs 
has so far occurred even below the level of s ingle final 
product s .  Th e capital-intensive early process ing stages 
( e . g .  semiconductor and t ransistor production or wool carding 
and cot ton spinn ing) remain locat ed in developed-country 
locat ions ; the labour-intens ive mass product ion stages of 
producing intermediate industrial product s move to newly 
developed indust rial locat ions (e . g . assembly o f  TV circuits 
or text ile weaving) ; the skill-intens ive f inal st ages o f  
product ion may again remain lo cated in high-income countries 
(e . g . chass is manufacture and design ,  or cloth treatment , 
dyeing, et c . ) .  The end result is that workers b oth in LDC and 
MDC plant s earn higher incomes on the b as is of higher product­
ivity and enj oy safer j obs . 
Actual adj ustment costs will depend to a cons iderable 
degree on macroeconomic employment levels . Where there is high 
employment , expanding act ivit ies which benefit from t ariff 
cut s and cheap LDCs imports ,  and will ' b ribe ' workers away from 
shrinking act ivit ies and b ear the cost s  of retraining , whereas 
in condit ions of overall unemployment shrinking indus tries 
feed workers into a pool of llllemployed and the t axpayer is 
expected to b ear · ret raining cost s . 3 Higher employment , 
however , will be promoted by t ariff cuts in the longer run 
as the new prof it opportunit ies o ffered by specializat ion and 
a bet t er internat ional divis ion of  labour tend to lead to 
in creased investment demand . Flagging consumer demand is 
also stimulated by the cheaper availab il ity o f  novel overseas 
models ,  which again may spontaneously cont ribute to higher 
domestic demand . 
A design for accelerated adj ustment 
Some basic principles . Adj us tment o f  product ion 
struct ures is of  course time-consuming .  I t  i s  therefore 
essent ial to make indust rial adj ustments to  the arrival of  
new indus trial nations as  foreseeab le and gradual as  possib le .  
Tariff cut s which are decreed as a surprise only create 
costly frict ions and are seen to generate unemployment , as 
3rn the , case , of  Aust ralia. is seems likely that the chance for 
adj ust ing to East and South As ian imports under high� 
employment condit ions has been missed in the early 19 70s . 
By now , many j obs are permanently under close compet it ive 
pressure from overseas so that the st ructural crisis can 
probably only be solved against a background of unemployment . 
This is a cost o f  the failure to adj ust in t ime to the clearly 
vis ible industrial revolut ion in the West Pacific region . 
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the ill-conceived Australian 2 5  per cent tariff cut o f  19 7 3  
demonst rated . Preannounced and gradual tarif f  reduct ions can , 
however , be success ful , as European experiences in the 1950s 
and 1960s illustrat e .  
For private producers in the developed countries to 
engage in adj ustments and invest in reaping specializat ion 
opportunit ies it is also necessary that tariff cut s are not 
only preannounced but expected to be maintained , so that 
producers can plan firmly on the basis of  a new set of  
relat ive costs  and prices . Investo r confidence in new price 
structures is very quickly dest royed if governments yield to 
understandable p ress ares to take backward steps in their 
program of cutt ing tariffs or quotas . Governments may be 
well advised to protect themselves against a dangerous 
' credibility gap ' by laying down the tariff cutt ing s chedule 
in legislat ion , by securing internat ional credit lines 
against the contingency of a temporary balance-of-payment s  
cris is ( import s  may rise immediately after tariff cut s , 
whereas export suppliers t ake t ime to  implement cost 
reduct ions ) and by giving exchange-rate guarantees so that 
capit al inflows finance the rest ructuring of the domest ic 
product ion apparatus and cover the likely t rade deficit . 4 
The obj ect ive of  producing firm expectations of new 
price structures will only be achieved if  all tariffs are 
cut across-the-board on a s ingle formula , whereas indust ry­
by-industry t ariff reviews lead to con fusing leads and lags 
in price/ cost changes , so that profitability in individual 
industries may approach the free-trade state on a zig-zag 
course (Lloyd 197 7) . Industries respond to changed expect­
at ions in relat ive prices and pro f itab ilit ies only if  factor 
market s are flexib le .  It is therefore essent ial for a 
st rategy o f  structural adj ustment in developed countries to 
increased LDC imports , so that labour and capit al market s in 
the former are freed from bureaucrat ic re gulat ion and so that 
40ne obvious method of checking capital inflows and promoting 
speculat ive capit al flight in connect ion with moves to 
liberaliz e t rade is of course to propagate devaluat ion 
equivalents to tariff cut s , which are derived from models 
with short time horizons and which exclude capit al flows 
( Indust ries Ass istance Commission 1 9 74 ;  Gregory 19 7 6 ) . If 
the not ion of  a devaluat ion equivalent o f  a tariff cut is 
widely held , it b oth creates the likelihood o f  a balance­
of-payment s  cris is and frustrates the cheap and flexible 
financing of  st ructural adj ustment . 
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factor mob ility is promoted (for example , b y  allowing fast 
capit al depreciat ion of  asset s  in shrinking act ivit ies , by 
st imulat ing ret raining and regional labour mobility) . The 
efficiency of the market in rest ructuring is enhanced if 
domest ic factor market s  are opened up to int ernat ional 
comp et it ion s imultaneously with the opening-up of product 
market s ,  so  that supply short ages in domestic capit al , 
management , labour and technology can b e  supplemented from 
overseas . 
Prospect ive adj ustments in Australia . Despite the fact 
that many indust rial act ivit ies will remain viable after 
tariff cut s ,  it would be useful in the interest of stable 
expectat ions to identify indust ries , in which one would 
expe ct a relative shrinkage after tariff  reduct ions , and 
indust ries that would b en efit from increased internat ional 
specializ at ion as a consequence of adj ustment to mo re t rade 
with LDCs . I shall dis cuss below how such a proj ect ion may be 
be approached on the basis of Aust ralian data . 
Relative to the neighbouring countries of  East and South 
Asia ,  whose dynamic industrial growth (Table 1) has suddenly 
removed the industrial isolat ion of the past , Aust ralia is 
rich in land , cert ain natural resources such as metal o res 
or coal , physical capital and skills . In addit ion , Australia , 
being a rich , developing country , disposes of  much rugged 
' outback technology ' that may be better suited to the 
condit ion s and servicing standards available in LDCs than the 
mo re refined technology of the indust rial countries of  the 
nort hern hemisphere . Finally , Aus tralia has a tradit ion of 
polit ical stab ility that would at tract int ernat ionally mobile 
expertise and capit al whi ch may be hes itant to locat e it self 
directly in As ia , again making Australia a good locat ion for 
skill- and cap ital-intensive act ivit ies (Kasper 19 7 8b ) . 
Figure 2 shows estimates of industry-specific factor 
intensit ies (physical and skill capital ) . It also gives some 
informat ion about raw-mat erial dependence of  specific 
indust ries . 5 Indust ries lo cated close to the origin are 
5The est imates repo rted here are based on indust rial values-
added (1972-73)  and are derived by a method first used by Lary 
( 19 68), which has become widely imitat ed . It is interesting 
to not e that the Aust ralian indust ry ranking of  facto r  
intensit ies corresponds clo sely with industry rankings else­
where , despite the fact that t ariffs have distorted product 
prices . For details and alternat ive est imat es the reader is 
referred to Kasper ( 19 7 Sb )  and Kasper and McMahon ( 19 7 6 ) . 
Table 1 
Growth and trade in developing countries 
Population 
millions 
1 9 7 3  
Growth of Growth of Populat ion Per capita . manufact . growth income per capita 
East Asia 
South Asia 
Latin America 
Africa 
East Asian 
LDCsa 
Hong Kong 
Korea ( S )  
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Indonesia 
PNG 
China,  PRd 
South Asian 
LDcsa 
Bangladesh 
Burma 
India 
Pakistan 
4 . 2  
32 . 9  
11 . 8  
40 . 2  
2 . 2  
15 . 4  
39 . 4  
125 . 2  
2 . 7  
815 . 8  
7 6 . 7 
2 9 . 6  
5 75 . 0  
6 8 . 9 
a Selected countries only 
b 1965-71 only 
c 1967-73 only 
d 1 9 7 1  
income product ion % p . a . 1 9 7 3  1960-73 1960 - 7 3  1950-73 $US 
2 . 2  
2 . 5  
2 . 8  
2 . 3  
3 . 5  
2 . 4  
2 . 9  
3 . 0 
3 . 3 
3 . 2  
3 . 0  
2 . 1  
2 . 7  
1 . 8  
2 . 8  
2 . 0  
2 . 1  
3 . 2  
1 4 30 
4 00 
5 7 0  
2 80 
1 8 30 
660 
2 7 0 
1 30 
410 
160d 
80 
80 
12 0 
12 0 
% p . a . 
4 . 3  
1 . 4  
2 . 8  
2 . 5 
3 . 9 
6 . 9  
3 . 2  
2 . 5  
7 . 8  
6 . 9  
4 . 2  
2 . 6  
5 . 2  
2 . 6  
-0 . 7 
1 . 4  
1 . 4  
2 . 8  
% p . a .  
10 . 7  
5 . 9  
7 . 1  
6 . 8  
12 . 7  
19 . 1  
1 1 .  5 
6 . 2  
15 . 7  
18 . 2  
9 . 7 
6 . 0  
n . a . 
5 . 8  
5 . 5  
3 . 9 
5 . 7 
8 . 2 
Sources : IBRD , Wor ld Tab les 1 9 76 ;  
UN ,  Statistical Year Book , various editions . 
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Growth of 
exports , 
goods & 
services 
1960-7 3  
% p . a .  
9 . 0  
2 . 8  
5 . 7 
6 . 4  
9 . 5b 
18 . 1  
5 . 2  
7 . 1  
24 . 0c 
24 . 0  
8 . 6 
11 . 4  
31 . 0c 
3 . 0 
2 . 1  
-4 . 4  
3 . 8 
7 . 1  
2 5 8  
Physical 
Capital 
$A log ...., 
.... 
1 6000 ......, 
-
1 4000 -
-
1 2000 --
-
1 0000 -
-
-
-
8000 -
-
__; 
6000 -
-
5000 -
4000 -
3000 
-
2000 -
1 500 -
Effective rate of tarriff protection 1 973-74: 
(Source: IAC, 1 976) 
o - 1 0  to 20% 
D 20 to 36% (manuf. average) 
• 37 to 49% 
• 50 to 79% 
• above 80% Industry Average 
o D  
0 
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Basic N F metals 
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• Printing 
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Pree. instr. sports go�oc:ls 0 � 6 .A 
E lec. household appl . ___.------� 
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F ig. 2 F actor I ntensities in Austra l i an I ndustry 
Source : Kasper 1 978b : 1 1 5. 
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I -r 
7000 $A log 
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labour-int ensive . It is no coincidence that these are the 
industries in which prob lems of st ructural adj ustment to 
As ian impo rt s  have already become mo st acute , whereas 
indust ries to the northeas t of the figure are naturally 
favoured by Aust ralia ' s  endowment with capit al and skills , 
as one would expect . 6 Physical and human capit al have b een 
separated , because indust ries t end to vary in their relat ive 
use of  these two factors and because physical capit al is 
internat ionally more mob ile . Skill-intensive indust ries are 
after all probably the b est long-term guarantors of high 
incomes and safe j obs for Australians . It can be expected 
that skill-capital- and raw-material-int ensive industries 
would carry the dynamic expans ion of indust ry and employment 
that would result from a more rat ional allocat ion of  
Austral ia ' s  industrial resources after t rade liberal izat ion . 
It is a lucky coincidence that high capital int ensit ies 
frequently are mat ched by Aust ralia ' s  resource endowment 
(and technology) and that capital-intensive industries on the 
whole o ffer the b iggest economies of scale . 
The two most t ime-consuming and socially costly aspects 
of st ructural adj ustment are labour-skill and regional 
structures . In the Aust ralian case , it has b een found that 
the skill and labour implicat ions of a l iberal izat ion of the 
Aust ralian market would not po se large problems (Blandy 1 9 7 8 ) . 
Indeed ,  it is likely that indust rial adj ustment would increas e  
j ob availability and give new economic chances to the mob ile 
and young who are presently disadvantages (Australian Bullet in 
of Labour 197 7 ) . The problem of  regional adj ustment is 
manageable in Aust ralia , as the bulk of  industry is r�gionally 
concentrated (Vipond 1 9 7 8 ) , so that relatively shrinking and 
relat ively expanding act ivit ies are often locat ed in the same 
neighbourhood . Thus an expanding metal-proc essing firm in the 
the Bot any Bay area may buy and re-use many of the product ion 
facilit ies (such as buildings or t rucks ) of  a shrinking 
garment-making firm next door . Many of the ' overhead ' workers 
may be ret ained in such a swit chover .  
6For example , a much neglected art icle by Bensusan-Butt (1954)  
would have allowed a predict ion of Australia ' s st ructural 
adj ustment prob lem long befo re it occurred . It is also 
worth not ing that labour-intensive indust ries are the most 
heavily protected (Kasper 19 7 8b : ll4- 7 ) . Tariffs have con­
tribut ed to giving Aust ralia an indust rial structure that 
makes it difficult to promote growth through the inter­
nat ional divis ion of labour . 
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In residual , hard-core problem areas of s tructural 
adj ustment there may be a rol e  for government sub s idies . 
However ,  government intervent ion has an inbuilt t endency to 
be dis continuous , and entrepreneurs have learnt that it is 
dangerous to build their pro fit expectat ions on microeconomic 
interventions . Therefore , government int ervention must be 
used sparingly and ruled by overall and widely accept ed 
principles that make them steady , uniform and co-ordinated 
in the interest of  promoting the nat ion ' s  growth potent ial . 
Bureaucrat ic act ivism, under which Aust ralian entrepreneurs 
have suffered more than any of the ir count erpart s in other 
OECD cotmt ries (except New Zealand ,  is harmful vis-a-vis 
slow-changing supply structures . There would be little 
confidence in a policy of promoting structural change predom­
inantly through government intervent ion , so that such a 
policy would not l ead to the necessary private new investment 
react ion s .  After all , it is known that the politicians and 
the bureaucracy side with estab lished and well-organized 
domest ic supplier interes t s  and not with the uno rganized 
interest s  of  those who would ga:in most from st ructural change : 
the consumers ,  the yotmg and the producers in developing 
count ries . 
Conclus ion 
Organized interest groups resist structural adj ustment s  
and frequently t ry to  make the pub lic and the polit icians 
believe that accelerat ed adj ustment would lead t o  a nat ional 
catast rophe . Although it is doubt ful whether protect ion can 
do more than merely postpone adj ustments , it creates s erious 
long-term cos t s . It contributes to a confrontat ion in world 
market s b etween old and new industrial countries that bears 
in itself the seed of future armed conflict . The aid purpos e  
i s  frust rated if i t  i s  not increas ingly supplemented b y  t rade . 
Without this , internat ional aid is seen by recipients 
increasingly as a means to ' buy them o ff ' . 
Aust ralia has recently introduced addit ional protect ionist 
inward-looking measures aga inst LDC industrial product s . 
The most important of  these are list ed in the appendix . Such 
measures have al ready converted i t s  image in the region of a 
sel f-reliant , non-colonial , pioneering , rich society into  an 
image o f  a pet ty , s el fish and ruthless ' ugly Aust ralia ' .  
Since it is located closer than most other OECD cotmt ries to  
developing industrial cotmt ries , Australia will have a key 
role in deciding whether the rich and the poor will live in 
con frontat ion or co-operat ion . If the developing countries 
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move from ' deference to defiance ' (Tinbergen 1 9 7 6 )  vis-a-vis 
the privileged r ich countries , income growth in both will 
suffer and the rich may discover belatedly that short-s ighted 
protect ionism was not in the ir own long-term interest .  
2 62 
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Appendix 
Selected Australian trade policies towards 
developing count ries 
15 Nov . Labor government init iates rest rict ions on t ext ile 
impo rt s .  
2 Dec . Korea is forced to consent to ' voluntary ' rest ric­
t ions on knitwear exports to Aust ralia . 
3 Dec . New import quot as impo sed on synthet ic yarns and 
fabrics . 
3 Dec .  To contain expanding flat-glass import s from the 
Philippines , Aus tralia withdraws developing­
country preferences for flat glass . 
19 7 5  
14 Jan . Import quotas imposed on a wide range of  garments . 
14 Jan . 10 per cent addit ional duty on car tyres . 
6 March Further import rest rict ions on garments . 
6 March Taiwan excluded from developing-country preferences 
for furniture 
9 March Import quot as on rolled steel imposed ret roact ively 
to 1 Jan . 19 75 . 
11 March Import quot as on refrigerators , washing machines , 
and clothes driers . 
2 7  Nov . Liberal-NCP caretaker government imposes new s teel 
tariff quotas . 
19 7 6  
17  Feb . 
9 June 
Glob al quo t as on t ext ile impo rt s to replace 
select ive barriers to import s from East and South 
As ia . 
New steel import quot as , imports in excess of  
quotas : 2 5 -40 per cent tariff . 
9 June 
19 7 7  
Quota restrict ion s applied to wider range o f  
text ile import s .  
263  
10 May Government White Paper on Manufacturing Industry 
as sert s  need for long-term st ructural change and 
short-term prot ectionist intervent ion . 
17  May Government refuses Midford Product s Pty Ltd 
permission to import children ' s  clothing from 
Malays ia , aft er previous ly encouraging Aust ralian 
garment manufacturers to move operat ions to As ia . 
2 7  June Australia increases protect ion for orange j uice 
and batteries . 
2 9  June ASEAN economic ministers express distrust of  
Aust ralia ' s  prot ect ionism and threaten ret aliatory 
trade measure . 
30 June Imposition of quotas on children ' s  tracksuit s t o  
stave o f f  compet it ive As ian import s .  
2 8  July Changes in Copyright Act announced that protect 
Aus tralian record industry from import compet it ion . 
2 August IAC draft recommends a phased reduct ion of  pro­
tect ion for the text iles , clothing and footwear 
industries , which cos t  consumers $ 800 million in 
19 75-7 6 . 
3 August Australian Prime Minister informs ASEAN heads of  
state that Aust ralia will not make t rade concessions . 
ASEAN reaffirms ' serious concern ' over Australian 
indus t ry protect ion . 
1 7  August Government announ ces that protect ion will be used 
to maintain employment in the text ile , garment and 
shoe industries , and reduces quotas for garments 
by 20  per cent . 
2 6  August Government orders indefinite deferral of general 
trade-policy review by the IAC . 
19 Oct . Government tight ens rules that ensure that Connnon­
wealth department s buy from Australian manufacturers , 
irrespective of  higher cost s .  
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